Monday, November 24, 2025

The Ironclad Assault on Charleston Part II (April 7, 1863)

 

With Du Pont's attack force of 9 ironclad warships steaming towards the harbor, both sides were ready for the possibility of their success. Confederate war ships were waiting further back in the harbor. The most formidable were the Chicora and Palmetto State, both ironclads. For their part the Union had wooden ships waiting to join once the ironclads had done their part. Neither of these groups would act unless the ironclads made it past Fort Sumter.[1]

Storm in the Harbor

The Confederates knew the ironclads were coming, and they worked on ensuring that their batteries and works were ready for battle. At 2 PM the enemy fleet began to advance up the channel, and the South Carolinians waited expectantly for them to get into range. General Roswell S. Ripley, commanding the defense, had personally gone to Fort Sumter as it was sure to be the epicenter of the battle.[2] Frank Vizetelly, a British journalist, waited like the Confederate defenders, and reported on the appearance of the oncoming ironclads:

There they came, their turrets whirling in a waltz of death. Cautiously they worked their way up the ship channel, and, as I watched their approach through my glass, I could hear the thumping of my heart against my ribs…Every house is pouring out its inmates, eager to witness the engagement: ladies, in almost gala costume, are hastening to the battery promenade, from whence an unobstructed view of the harbor and forts, and of the enemy’s fleet, can be obtained. There is no terror expressed in any of these countenances – all are calm and collected; they are going to witness the bravery of their defenders.[3]

Frank Vizetelly was a traveling British journalist. At the start of the American Civil War he attended the Union Army, but then went South to report from the Confederate side. He grew so like the Confederates so much that he began to label the conflict the more secession-friendly "War Between the States." (https://emergingcivilwar.com/2012/04/04/drawing-the-war-part-3-frank-vizetelly/)

In Fort Sumter, as the defenders assembled for action and the flags were raised, the band struck up “Dixie,” though there’s no record that the Union seamen could hear it. However, they must have heard the 13-gun salute, either a humorous attempt to treat the battle like a gala occasion or a chivalric salute to the enemy.[4]

Almost immediately the attack plan went awry when at 12:50 the Weehawken got entangled in the grapnels of its torpedo raft, an object fixed to its bow and intended to detonate a mine safely away from the fleet. This caused a delay. It was so long Captain Drayton of the Passaic signaled Du Pont for permission to take his ironclad ahead, but then the Weehawken got free and they were able to continue in the planned order.[5]

Confederate batteries opened up at 2:50. Captain Rodgers of the Weehawken noted that it began when they passed by a buoy, 1,500 yards from Fort Sumter. This indicated that the Confederates had been using the buoys for target practice, and this explained the accurate fire which would hammer the ironclads throughout the battle.[6]

The Confederates at Fort Sumter concentrated their fire on the first few ships. If they cause enough damage, the entire line of Union ships would get stalled. The tide pushed against the Federal ships. To avoid bumping into each other, they had to keep turning, cutting into their rate of fire. At the same time the numerous obstructions that Beauregard had placed in the harbor also did their work, limiting maneuverability.[7] Watching from ashore, Vizetelly was awed by the heavy fire’s effect on the water. “The bay, lately so calm and peaceful, is now like a seething cauldron”.[8]

Du Pont lamented that “owing to the narrow channel and rapid current,” the New Ironsides “became partly unmanageable.” The flagship had to anchor twice to prevent going aground, and at one point collided with the Catskill and Nantucket. Thanks to the New Ironsides’ problems, the vessels behind it got confused, following the flagship until nearly 3:30 when Du Pont signaled them to go on ahead to the front four ironclads.[9] Men on those ships also noted the confusing maneuvers and technical difficulties. One man aboard the Nahant recalled, “The clumsy vessels were here pretty nearly unmanageable,” while Captain Worden of the Montauk described the disorganized movements “a serious embarrassment.”[10]

One torpedo went off near the Weehawken, causing it to jump a little.[11] An almost worst detonation befell another ship during the fight. Rebel engineer Langdon Cheves was in charge of one of the electrically-charged torpedoes, and had one of the most tantalizing and frustrating moments of the battle when the New Ironsides went over his weapon. “…For ten minutes he could not have placed the Ironsides more directly over it if he had been allowed to, but the confounded thing, as is usual, would not go off when it was wanted. The insulation of the wire, I suppose, defective.”[12] Perhaps frustration was felt by the gunners on Fort Johnson. Further into the harbor from Forts Sumter and Moultrie, they couldn’t reach the fleet with their projectiles, though they tried a couple times with a mortar.[13]

Charlestonians watch the battle in this image from the Illustrated London News.

Captain John Johnson, an engineer, was one of the key officers In Fort Sumter’s defense. “The water all around the fighting ships was seen on nearer view to be constantly cut, ploughed, and splashed with every form of disturbance, from the light dip of the ricochet shot to the plunge of the point-blank missile, from the pattering of broken pieces of solid shot falling back from the impenetrable turrets to the sudden spout of foam and jet of spray sent up by a chance mortar-shell exploding just beneath the surface of the water.”[14]

Though the sea was in upheaval, there was little wind. Smoke from the lower level of guns rose, the calm, light-breezed weather failing to dispel. At a few points the straw in the fort also caught fire, though these were quickly put out. Thus, to avoid wasting ammunition, the gunners had to wait for clearings to emerge in the smoke before aiming and shooting.[15]

Most of the reports from the ships’ officers noted how difficult it was for them to see each other. This was partly due to the limited viewports on the ironclads, and more due to the heavy smoke caused by the intensive firing. The water did not help the view, as at this point the Confederate guns “literally rained around them, splashing the water up to thirty feet in the air, striking and booming from their decks and turret.”[16]


Regardless of the smoke and water geysers obstructing the view, the Confederate guns around the harbor began to have an effect on the supposedly invincible monitors. The Weehawken continued to struggle with its torpedo raft, which was no longer moving in line with it. Throughout the battle Captain Rodgers and his crew were afraid that the highly disturbed waters would throw the raft onto the top of their vessel, as if the hammering from the harbor’s defenses was not bad enough.[17]

The Patapsco only got a few shots off when one of its guns “was rendered useless from carrying away the forward cap square bolts.” It was also having its own turret problems. It couldn’t muster enough steam to turn it in a timely manner. With one gun already out of action, the Patapsco could not mount any decent rate of fire.[18]

Heavy shells struck the turret of the Passaic, “which bulged in its plated and beams, and, forcing together the rails on which the XI-inch carriage worked, rendered it wholly useless for the remainder of the action.” Then the turret couldn’t even turn. The sailors only got it partially working again when the pilot house was bent over and exposed. Drayton feared “that the next shot would take off the top itself entirely.” This particular monitor received 35 shells in as many minutes.[19]

The Nahant under Commander Downes had it especially hard in the pilot house. Three pieces of heavy shot slammed into it, one of them ripping out 78 pounds of iron. The iron was thrown “with such violence to the other side of the house, striking, bending, and disarranging steering gear in its course.” The other two bent the pilot house from inside, sending boltheads flying. One fractured the skull of the helmsman, Edward Cobb, effectively guaranteeing his death. The pilot I. Sofield rushed over to take the wheel, but was rendered senseless by two more bolts, leaving Downes to command the pilot house single-handedly. Overall the Nahant’s crew suffered 7 casualties from the flying bolts.[20]

Commander Alexander C. Rhind

The Keokuk, which steamed far ahead of the others, also got it rough. A few minutes after 4:00 PM, it came into range and used its frontal guns. For 30 minutes it fell under concentrated fire from Moultrie, Sumter, Bee, and Cumming’s Point, taking 90 hits in 30 minutes. “In short, the vessel was completely riddled.”[21]

Robert Smalls, in the pilot house, had perhaps his most intense experience as a Union seaman. The fragment of an enemy shell fell into the pilot-house. He brushed this of, but then a long stream of shells, like “a cart-load of bricks”, came from Fort Sumter and slammed into the side. Most of the shells pierced the armor around the water line. There were no deaths from Confederate fire, but nine men were rounded, with a dislodged bolt piercing Captain Rhind’s ankle. Smalls himself had a scare when his vision started to suffer, but it turned out to be a temporary effect of all the powder thrown in his face.[22] At 4:10 the Keokuk was the first ship to withdraw from the fight, as it was showing possible signs of sinking. [23]

The New Ironsides had been staying further back, but as the damaged ironclads began to withdraw, it became the primary target. Right away the flagship steamed out of range. Throughout the battle it only got off a futile broadsides at Fort Moultrie. In return it received 90 hits, which seaman Oscar W. Farenholt described as “the ringing of many bells.”[24] On board, Du Pont, seeing the uneven ratio of shots between sides, the difficulty of the ironclads to maneuver and coordinate, and how far they had to go to achieve their objective, ordered a retreat from the harbor.

Both Beauregard and Du Pont had been vindicated. If Beauregard had not toughened up Charleston, the ironclads would not have suffered such a tremendous crossfire and would have likely been able to drive all the way up to the city itself. Du Pont's vindication, however, would be much more bitter.

Possibly the Chicora and Palmetto State. This pair of Confederate
ironclads did not have a need to join the battle.


[1] Chatelain, Neil P. “Deconstructing Common Misconceptions of the April 1863 Fort Sumter Ironclad Assault,” https://emergingcivilwar.com/2023/04/07/deconstructing-common-misconceptions-of-the-april-1863-fort-sumter-ironclad-assault/.

[2] ORN XIV, 79; Bostick, Charleston Under Siege, 58.

[3] Editors of Time-Life Books, Voices of the Civil War: Charleston, (Time-Life Books. 1997), 50.

[4] Charles Inglesby, “Historical Sketch of the First Regiment of South Carolina Artillery (Regulars), 1896.” Grenville County Library, 8.

[5] ORN XIV, 9, 11.

[6] ORN XIV, 6, 11, 13, 86.

[7] ORN XIV, 6, 79; Burton, The Siege of Charleston, 137.

[8] Time-Life, Voices: Charleston, 57.

[9] ORN XIV, 3, 17.

[10] Musicant, Divided Waters, 388-389.

[11] Burton, The Siege of Charleston, 137.

[12] ORN XIV, 111.

[13] Burton, The Siege of Charleston, 139-140.

[14] Time-Life, Voices: Charleston, 54.

[15] Burton, The Siege of Charleston, 139.

[16] Bostick, ORN XIV, 26; Charleston Under Siege, 63.

[17] ORN XIV, 12.

[18] ORN XIV, 15.

[19] ORN XIV, 10; Burton, The Siege of Charleston, 138.

[20] ORN XIV, 21-23; Bostick, Charleston Under Siege, 63.

[21] ORN XIV, 23, 86.

[22] Lineberry, Be Free or Die, 142-143.

[23] ORN XIV, 23.

[24] ORN XIV, 28, 96; Bostick, Charleston Under Siege, 64; Time-Life, Voices: Charleston, 56.

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