The Battle of Apache Canyon
Each army was now based out of a ranch on at an end of Glorieta Pass, the Texans at Johnson’s Ranch and the Federals at Pigeon’s Ranch. Glorieta Pass ran on a northward slant from both east and west, creating a semi-triangular pathway. The Federals’ base of Pigeon’s Ranch was inside the pass itself, creating a narrow, defensible area. The ranch held may buildings and corrals, much of the former made of protective adobe. On the other end, the Texans tried to go to sleep on the night of the 25th, but this proved difficult thanks to the cold ground. The men were finally able to get some shuteye in the middle of the 26th, when the sun warmed up the ground. While it was still fairly dark, a Union scouting party encountered four reconnoitering Santa Fe Brigands. The Brigands asked if they were being relieved. The commander of the Federals replied “Yes, we came to relieve you of your arms.” The first encounter of Glorieta Pass was a bloodless surrender.[1]
On the 26th Chivington and his Coloradan volunteers, as well as elements of the 3rd U.S. Cavalry, turned the northward bend and headed south into Apache Canyon. At this moment he had over 400 men. Pyron himself led nearly 450 Texans out of camp. Two evenly matched forces were set for a blind collision. Pyron was aware of his blindness, not having heard from his four Brigand scouts since the previous evening. He sent 30 men ahead to investigate along with two artillery pieces (an odd supplement for a scouting force, but as it turned out a smart move). Around 2 PM this tiny force bumped into Chivington’s column. The surprised Texans lost an officer to capture, but were able to unlimber their guns. The Rebels fired off their artillery and the Coloradans went up the two mountainsides on their left and right. This firing alerted and in some cases woke up the rest of Pyron’s men. They temporarily halted the Federal advance with their artillery.[2] Chivington kept most of his men on the slopes. In his official report he claimed that his plan was to lure the enemy in so that they would pass by the hidden men. Then the Federals could descend and surround them. In fact the Confederate were withdrawing, and the ensuing entrapment came about because part of Pyron’s force failed to join the retreat, exposing their flank. The Federals poured into their rear. They formed a line at the mouth of a side canyon, funneling the enemy into one front. Major John Shropshire came to the rescue, riding right through the Federals to rally the men. He urged, “Boys, follow me.” When informed the men did not have enough ammunition to affect a breakout, he countered, “Then take your knives and follow me.” The following escape was largely successful, though not without some losses. Two soldiers tried to hide in a hole, but as the second crawled into it a Federal spotted his legs and pulled. The soldier was dragged out. Coming along with him was the other Texan, who was desperately clinging to his comrade.[3]
Pyron
sent a messenger to warn Scurry of the enemy presence and took up another
defensive position. Around 3 PM the Federals appeared again. Chivington
repeated his earlier tactics, trying to use the slopes to flank the Texans. Again
Pyron managed a fighting withdrawal. Seeing that the Confederates might escape
again, Chivington urged a charge to take the enemy artillery. Captain Samuel
Cook, another Coloradan officer, led a charge of Company F, the only mounted
Coloradans. The horsemen braved intense fire and leapt over a small gully
(traversed at one point by a wooden bridge). Exaggerated accounts and boasts
turned this small gully into a formidable gorge. Captain Cook was shot off his
horse. Finally the various charges and flanking maneuvers broke the scattered
but hardy Confederate line. Many Texans were cut off and forced to surrender.
Chivington wished to continue the chase, but the sun was declining and he did
not know how many more Texans were waiting at the other end of Glorieta Pass.
He thus withdrew, content to have routed the enemy and bagged 71 prisoners.[4]
 |
| Colorado cavalrymen charge down Apache Canyon. |
Glorieta Pass: Battle in the Canyon
Colonel Slough, knowing now that the enemy was in striking distance, marched a 1,300 man force out on morning of the 28th to the “deep, narrow, and thickly-wooded” canyon. He sent Chivington with 430 (some sources say 488) mounted and wagon-riding men to a road running parallel with the canyon. Their objective was to get ahead and flank the enemy while Slough led the main frontal assault. Lieutenant-Colonel Samuel Tappan was placed at the head of a strategic reserve of 250 men.[5] On the Confederate side Sibley had wanted Scurry to stay put, but his orders were vague and on the 27th Scurry sent his men forward to Pyron’s base at Johnson’s Ranch. Many of the hills on the way proved too rocky or steep for the horses, so the men had to roll the guns forward themselves. Once there, Scurry took overall command and set out. He left a very small force to protect the wagon train. He thought the heights to the south of it impassable. This would prove to be a grievous mistake.[6]
This
is the order of battle. Both Slough and Scurry found themselves in commands of pieces
of units rather than entire regiments. Slough’s units had not been arranged in
brigades, so he had to organize them into provisional battalions.[7]
Union
Forces (1,019)
Commander:
Colonel John P. Slough
Field
Battalion: Lieutenant-Colonel Samuel F. Tappan
1st Colorado Volunteers:
(5 companies under Tappan)
Heavy Battery: Captain John F.
Ritter
Light Battery: Lieutenant Ira W.
Claflin
Cavalry:
Colonel John P. Slough
3rd US Cavalry
detachment: Captain George W. Howland
3rd US Cavalry
detachment: Captain Charles J. Walker
1st Colorado Volunteers,
Company F: Lieutenant George Nelson
Flanking
Column: Major John M. Chivington
First Battalion: Captain William H.
Lewis
5th
US Infantry
Company
A: Lieutenant Barr
Company
G: Lieutenant Norvell
1st
Colorado Volunteers, Company B: Captain Samuel M. Logan
Independent
Company of Colorado Volunteers: Captain James H. Ford
New
Mexico Volunteers: Lieutenant Colonel Manuel Chaves
Second Battalion: Captain Edward W.
Wynkoop
1st
Colorado Volunteers: (3 companies under Wynkoop)
Confederate
Forces (1,285)
Commander:
Lieutenant-Colonel William R. Scurry
2nd Texas Mounted Rifles detachment: Major Charles
L. Pyron
4th Texas Mounted Rifles: Major Henry W. Raguet
5th Texas Mounted Rifles: Major John S. Shropshire
7th Texas Mounted Rifles: Major Powhatan Jordan
Attached Units
Arizona
Rangers: Lieutenant William Simmons
San Elizario
Spy Company: Lieutenant J. R. Parsons
Santa Fe Brigands:
Captain John G. Phillips
Artillery: Lieutenant James Bradford
 |
| William Scurry found himself in command of a battle while Green and Sibley stayed behind in Albuquerque. |
Albert Peticolas, from Pyron’s regiment, described the physical features of the battlefield:
The road here down Apache Canyon runs through a densely wooded pine country where you cannot see a man 20 steps unless he is moving. The hills slope up from the valley gradually, rising more abruptly as they near the mountains. Heavy masses of rock, too, crown most of these hills, and the timber is low and dense. On the left, the hills rise more abruptly than on the right and the rocks are larger. About a mile down the canyon is Pigeon’s Ranch, around which was the enemy’s encampment.[8]
Around
11 in the morning, the Confederates and Federals bumped into each other in the
canyon. “Get out of our way you damned sons of bitches!” growled a Federal. One
Texan responded, “You’ll take dinner in hell!”[9] The
Confederates formed a line across the canyon ground, with a fence to the left
and wooded slopes to the right.[10]
Scurry decided to take advantage of the canyon’s terrain and set up an ambush:
We were fighting
down a canyon, gullies running across it, and heavy timber thick on each side
of the road. Our cannon was brought up and Scurry pointed to the gunners and
told them where to shoot. We could not see anything in the world to shoot at,
but Scurry must have seen them. We were instructed to run like we were scared
to death when the cannon fired as soon as the enemy returned the fire. Hardly
had our cannon fired before they tore loose and we broke and there they came to
take our cannon, nobody but Scurry and the cannoneers to defend it. They came
in about twenty steps of the cannon, when a lot of men that Scurry had
concealed and lying down rose up and began peppering them and they began
getting away from there as fast as their legs could take them.[11]
Glorieta Pass: Battle at Windmill Hill
Slough realized that, as he was currently outnumbered, the Confederates could use the slopes of the canyon, as well as a high path on one of them, to get around his flanks and trap his force. Tappan, his highly competent subordinate, recommended that they fall back to the more defensible terrain at and around Pigeon’s Ranch. Slough ordered the retreat, but would have to make a temporary stand somewhere between the canyon and Pigeon’s Ranch. This would buy some time for him to figure out he configuration of his next line of defense.[12] The Federals withdrew to a position centered on Windmill Hill. A notable terrain feature was the thick cedar trees which provided considerable cover. Overall Slough had a numerical advantage in men, and an even greater advantage in number and quality of cannon. However, about a third of his men were put in guard and reserve positions or were off under Chivington, so the Confederates actually outnumbered him at Pigeon’s Ranch. To ensure both length and depth of his line he had three quarters of his cavalry dismount and strengthen the center. Slough’s troop positioning was quick, but somewhat sloppy in comparison to Mexican War veteran Scurry’s troop alignments.[13] The Confederates were almost upon the enemy’s supply and artillery train. Challenging them was Tappan’s reserve force from the 1st Colorado. This consisted of only 70 men, but they had a position on a hill. Thanks to the hill’s highly rocky and “irregular” terrain, the men had ample cover and were able to hold off their foes for a long time. The supply train got to safety.[14]
The Texans advanced up the wooded Windmill Hill. One soldier remembered “a perfect hail of grape-shot came tearing the trees and brushing the brow of the hill and making a tremendous noise, but fortunately without hurting anybody.” The trees as well as a fence provided good cover for the advancing Confederates. And soon they were already getting to the Federals’ second position.[15] One humorous incident around this point involved Jesse Haire, a drummer boy. When the battle came a bullet slashed through his drum. He joined the battle line, though he had impartial training in regards to actual fighting. Haire found himself separated from his comrades and in a duel with a sole Texan, each firing from behind a tree. He ran out of ammunition and surrendered, only to learn that cartridge boxes had two layers. All along he still had half his ammunition left.[16]
Scurry
rallied the 4th Texas for an assault on Claflin’s battery. Colorado
infantry fixed bayonets and came to the assistance of the guns. A fierce hand-to-hand fight followed. Texan
Captain Buckholts killed two men with his bowie knife, while one private with a
double-barreled shotgun was able to knock out several foes in the packed melee.
The Union infantry retreated, but Claflin’s battery remained in action.[17] Scurry
reinforced the right flank under Pyron. He ordered the major to use these extra
men to flank the Federals from the south. The Federals caught onto the tactic.
Slough ordered a withdrawal, which was wonderfully executed. The soldiers on
his left paused to fire a firm volley whenever they were about to be flanked.
This staved off Pyron’s regiment long enough for the Federals to withdraw to
Pigeon’s Ranch. The victorious but entangled Confederate units reorganized
themselves on and around Windmill Hill. The Federals used this valuable time to
form their third line of defense. The battlefield fell quiet.[18]
Glorieta Pass: Battle at Pigeon’s Ranch Part I
In
the new Federal line the 3rd U.S. Cavalry anchored the right flank
on Sharpshooter’s Ridge. Two companies of the 1st Colorado and
Ritter’s battery took up a position directly in front of Pigeon’s Ranch and the
field hospital there. These men enjoyed the protection of an adobe wall.
Claflin’s battery and the rest of the Coloradans held the now-named Artillery
Hill on the left. Company I of the 1st Colorado was separated to the
north, fortifying a rock formation. The Confederate units shifted as they
disentangled from each other, with Pyron now on the left with Raguet. The 4th
and parts of the 5th Texas Mounted Volunteers made up the center,
directly commanded by Scurry. A gully separated them from Shropshire, with the 7th
and rest of the 5th Texas Mounted Volunteers to the south. Tappan
correctly identified Artillery Hill as the focal point of the next Confederate
assault.[19]
Though Artillery Hill was a prime target, Scurry advanced his men all along the
line. On the left flank Pyron went after Company I of the 1st
Colorado. As he led his men, his horse was decapitated by a shell. He took his
pistols from his saddle and continued on.[20]
The Texan artillery could not make out the Federal guns, which were covered by
trees, buildings, and battlefield smoke. Scurry was able to guess their
positions and directed the big guns to fire at them. He was accurate in his
guesses, as US battery commander John Ritter felt compelled to shift his line
of fire towards the Texan battery instead of the oncoming infantry. The
combination of Ritter’s counterbattery fire and sharpshooting from the U.S.
Cavalry had a tremendous effect on the Texan artillerists, killing one and
wounding many others as well as blowing up a caisson. The artillery withdrew
towards Windmill Hill. Emboldened, the Federals launched a counterattack on the
Rebel center. The Texans quickly repelled this unwise attack. The Texans
falsely remembered the withdrawal of the artillery as a clever ruse to draw in
the Federals for a failed attack. This was a much more appealing story than a
break in morale among their artillerists.[21]
 |
| This painting shows Scurry personally leading his men. He was indeed a front-line officer and suffered several small wounds at Glorieta Pass. |
Chivington vs. the Supply Train
While the battle raged around Pigeon’s Ranch, Chivington’s men struggled to find their way into the Confederates’ flank. With the help of Manuel Chaves, the descendant of a conquistador, Chivington finally accomplished his mission of reconnoitering Johnson’s Ranch. It was 1:30 PM, and most of the Texans were at the big fight. Chivington arrived to see that only 200 men stood between over 400 Federals and their essential supply train. Chivington waited a bit, confused as to why he could hear no fighting. He was unaware that Slough’s planned assault had been derailed by the Texans’ own offensive plans. Not willing to pass up an opportunity, Chivington ordered an assault.[22] 30 men under Captain Wynkoop tried to stealthily slide down the rocky terrain. They dislodged a few stones on the way and alerted the wagon guard. A Colorado officer shouted “Who are you down there?” One of the guards shouted back, “Texans, God damn you.” The officer said, “We want you!” The Rebel, only seeing the small group of Coloradans, dared, “Come get us, God damn you, if you can!” The Texans fired the first shots. They were then horrified to see hundreds of Chivington’s men, screaming out an Indian yell, rushing down the cliffs at them. Most of the Texans fled. Federal riflemen picked off the crew of the Rebels’ sole big gun. One Texan spiked it and set fire to the ammunition. Unable to run away in time, he was burned all over by his own arranged explosion. The rest of Chivington’s men surrounded and rushed the wagons. The defenders, losing a few killed and wounded, surrendered. The Federals set the loaded wagons ablaze. One, full of ammunition exploded and wounded one unlucky Federal private. The attackers also recovered five men who had been taken prisoner at the Apache Canyon fight two days prior.[23]
 |
| John Chivington was a star performer at the battles for Glorieta Pass. His triumphs would be overshadowed, however, by his leadership at the Sand Creek Massacre over two and a half years later. |
Chivington also performed or tried to perform several acts that foreshadowed his future famous crime at Sand Creek. One was his order to bayonet the horses and mules so they could not carry any of the Confederates out of the canyon. This at least had the justification of military necessity. There was also “the shooting and dangerously wounding of the Rev. L. H. Jones, chaplain of the Fourth Regiment, with a white flag in his hand,” though this incident had occurred under the confusion of the brief fight. Also according to a complaint from Scurry, Chivington had given orders that his prisoners were to be executed if Texans came between him and Slough on the return trip.[24] Regardless of moral issues, the attack on the wagon train was a smashing blow. Any success attained in the main fight would now be rendered pointless in the long run.
Glorieta Pass: Battle at Pigeon’s Ranch Part II
Scurry began to focus his assaults on the Union batteries. Shropshire was to use a tree line to cover a flanking maneuver against the Coloradan left. Raguet was to make his own flank assault on Sharpshooter’s Ridge. Scurry’s center would go for the enemy guns. One Union gun under a Private Kelly had been particularly effective with its shells. One struck a Texan gun right on the muzzle. Another hit a box of artillery ammunition. The resulting explosion took out the nearest gun.[25] The assault against the Federal right soon grew intense. The Texans got right into the Coloradans on the northern rock-strewn terrain. Pyron himself is said to have emptied a six-shooter at the Federals, scoring a hit with each shot. The Federals were pushed from their boulders. Believing that his right flank was imperiled, Slough brought up men from the center.[26] Those Federals in the center had remained positioned behind the adobe wall, but one of the men huddled there recalled “our gunners got careless and occasionally dropped grapeshot” right near them. With many of them moving north to save the right flank, their position was now more open to attack. Scurry saw this and ordered an assault on the adobe walls. In the face of frontal fire from Ritter and enfilading fire from Artillery Hill, this assault petered out. However the Texan artillery finally got their range on Ira Claflin’s battery of howitzers.[27] Rebel shells pressured Claflin’s battery to withdraw, but Captain John Ritter’s on the right, protected by an adobe wall and corral fences, held firm.
To the south, Shropshire had gotten into the Federal left. Shropshire forced the Coloradans back and was now in a position to attack Tappan on Artillery Hill. The southern end of the hill was steep and provided the Federals with a good firing field against any attack. The Texan officers had trouble urging their men to climb the hill in the face of such fire. They took “advantage of every bush and tree to shelter us.” Over half the men stopped, afraid to advance further. Shropshire finally rallied them up the hill. “We saw no foe till in twenty yards of them, and then they rose from behind their breast works or rocks and poured into us a deadly volley.” Their hopes were emboldened when Tappan withdrew. As it turned out Tappan was merely moving his men into a more favorable position and the Confederates ran into another obstacle. A Federal cavalryman, George Pierce, took aim at Shropshire with his Sharps carbine and hit him dead in the forehead. The sudden death of their commanding officer precipitated a rout among the Texans. Pierce and some of his comrades rushed down the hill and seized Shropshire’s body along with his surviving subordinate officers. The killer laid claim to Shropshire’s pair of ivory-handled revolvers and then scurried back to his lines as an angry Texan fired at him with a shotgun. Captain Crosson assumed command and rallied the Texans for one more assault, which was no more successful. Buckholts, who had felled several Federals with a bowie knife, was killed in this final assault on Artillery Hill.[28]
One Texas soldier, Albert Peticolas, suddenly found himself separated from his unit and amongst the Coloradans. Perhaps thanks to the lack of standardized uniforms in this battle, he was mistaken for another Federal. No less a figure than Captain Tappan, referring to Peticolas’ exposed position between the two lines, told him “You had better look out, Captain, or those fellows [Confederates] will shoot you.” Under the story that he was going close to the Rebels to get a better shot, he was able to slip back to his line.[29] Scurry took in some of Shropshire’s defeated men for his next attack on the center, with Raguet and Pyron attacking from the north. At this point, late in the afternoon, the Federals once again rearranged their lines. With less Texans threatening Artillery Hill, Slough had the men on its northern slopes wheel right so that they could sweep the fields in front of Pigeon’s Ranch. The Confederate assault came. One of the Coloradan defenders recalled, “The woods were full of them and the situation looked serious to us for a short time.” Emphasis on “a short time.” The fierce Rebel charge was halted in its tracks when all nine Federal guns unleashed a thunderous barrage. Before the Texans could regain their momentum, the guns fell silent and the Coloradans and cavalry regulars behind the adobe wall rose up and unleashed a swift stream of volleys. Still the Confederates determined to go on, even as men throughout their ranks fell dead and wounded.[30]
 |
| Texans assault the adobe wall at Pigeon's Ranch |
Raguet and Pyron’s initial charge fared no better. They likewise came up against stiff opposition. Raguet decided to lead from his horse. Being the only mounted man among the Texans, he was an easy target. Taking a Federal bullet, he fell from his horse dead. Pyron took overall command of this wing of the assault. While Scurry’s assault on the center met with failure, Pyron managed to get his men onto Sharpshooter’s Ridge. Coming into close quarters with the enemy, the Texans made full use of their shotguns and finally sent some of the Coloradans in retreat. Pyron now held Sharpshooter’s Ridge, with its commanding position over Pigeon’s Ranch. Discerning Pyron’s success by the decreased volume of Federal fire on his left, Scurry made one final assault. With his right flank turned, Slough ordered another retreat.[31]
The
Texans almost captured Claflin’s howitzers, but a fierce stand by Colorado
infantrymen gave the guns and their crews time to escape. Tappan’s men rushed
off of Artillery Hill before the Rebels could cut them off. Slough managed to
form yet another new line along rocky terrain. From here the Federals repulsed
further Confederate assaults. The Texans were by this point fought out and
Scurry, face bleeding from light wounds, ordered a halt to the fighting.[32]
Slough ordered a withdrawal under night towards Kozlowski’s Ranch.[33]
There, Chivington’s column finally returned and their news of the destruction
of the enemy’s wagon train lifted the spirits of the Federals. They recognized
that although they had been driven off the field, they had enabled Chivington
to sneak through the back door and impede the progress of the Sibley Brigade.[34]
Tactical Victory, Strategic Disaster
In Albuquerque Sibley learned of the battles at Glorieta Pass. In an action believed to have been induced by his drinking, he hastily declared that a great victory had been won and ordered a celebration before heading to Santa Fe. He soon learned the unfortunate truth. Though Scurry had scored a tactical victory, the loss of his wagons to Chivington was a massive logistical blow. Without those supplies, the Texans could proceed no further. Sibley wrote despairingly to his superiors back east. “I must have re-enforcements. The future operations of this army will be duly reported. Send my re-enforcements.”[35]
Losses in the two days of fighting are unclear. Neither commander was very thorough in collecting information on killed and wounded. At Apache Canyon the Confederates suffered 4 killed and 20 wounded with over 70 falling prisoner. The Union lost 5 killed and 14 wounded. The casualties in the main fight for Glorieta Pass were more even. The Confederates lost nearly 50 men killed and around 60 wounded, with a dozen or so men captured. The Federals suffered at least 48 killed, 70 wounded, and 21 captured. As at Valverde, both sides had an approximate casualty rate of 10 percent. Total losses in hard casualties of killed and wounded were almost equal. Factoring in the 70 or so captured Texans, the Confederates suffered more losses overall.[36]
Because
of its ramifications, historians have often referred to Glorieta Pass as the
“Gettysburg of the West.” While Sibley’s campaign always suffered from
logistical and supply issues, as well as a fair number of losses in men, he
still had a theoretical chance of achieving his goals. Now, unless the
Confederacy was miraculously able to produce and send help via more supplies
and fighting men (it was not), he would have to abandon his dreams of conquest.
Next: Sibley's dreams go up in smoke and sand. The Texans embark on a hellish retreat while the Californians arrive from the west.
Primary
Sources
Peticolas,
A.B. Rebels on the Rio Grande: The Civil
War Journals of A.B. Peticolas. Albuquerque: University of New Mexico
Press, 1984.
Thompson, Jerry (ed.). Civil War in the Southwest: Recollections of the Sibley Brigade. Texas A & M University Press, 2001.
United States. The War of the Rebellion: A Compilation of the Official Records of the Union and Confederate Armies Vol. IX. Washington D.C. 1894.
Secondary Sources
Alberts,
Don E. The Battle of Glorieta: Union
Victory in the West. Texas A & M University Press, 1998.
Frazier,
Donald S. Blood & Treasure:
Confederate Empire in the Southwest. Texas A & M University Press,
1995.
Josephy,
Alvin M. The Civil War in the American
West. New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1991.
Nelson,
Megan Kate. The Three-Cornered War: The
Union, the Confederacy, and Native Peoples in the Fight for the West. New
York: Scribner, 2020.
Pittman,
Walter E. New Mexico and the Civil War,
The History Press, 2011.
Thompson,
Jerry. Henry Hopkins Sibley: Confederate
General of the West. Natchitoches: Northwestern State University Press,
1987.
https://www.nps.gov/articles/the-battle-of-glorieta-pass-a-shattered-dream-teaching-with-historic-places.htm
[1] Alberts, 44-48.
[2] Alberts, 52; Thompson, 2001, 81.
[3] OR IX, 530-531; Alberts, 55-56;
Thompson, 2001, 81-83.
[4] OR IX, 530-531; Alberts, 58-59,
61-64.
[5] OR IX, 533, 536; Alberts 71-72.
[6] OR IX, 542; Thompson, 2001, 89,
Alberts, 79-80.
[7] Alberts, 176-178.
[8] Peticolas, 77-79.
[9] Nelson, 106.
[10] OR IX, 543.
[11] Thompson, 2001, 93.
[12] Frazier, 217.
[13] OR IX, 534-535; Alberts, 87;
Pittman, 36.
[14] OR IX, 536-537; Thompson, 2001,
97.
[15] Peticolas, 81; Alberts, 89.
[16] Pittman, 37.
[17] Alberts, 90.
[18] OR IX, 542-543; Alberts 91-92.
[19] Alberts, 95. 98-99.
[20] Thompson, 2001, 94-98-99
[21] Alberts, 100-102.
[22] OR IX, 538; Alberts, 130-131.
[23] OR IX, 538-539; Frazier, 226;
Alberts, 131, 133.
[24] OR IX, 542; Alberts, 134; Sand
Creek was the sight of an infamous massacre on November 29, 1864, Chivington
led an assault on peaceful Cheyenne and Arapaho Indians and oversaw the murder
of not just men, but women and children.
[25] OR IX, 540; Alberts, 103.
[26] Alberts, 105; Thompson, 2001,
96.
[27] Alberts, 105-106.
[28] Alberts, 107-110; Peticolas, 82.
[29] Peticolas, 82-83; Alberts, 112.
[30] Alberts, 104-106.
[31] Alberts, 117-119.
[32] OR IX, 540; Josephy, 83-84;
Alberts, 120-122.
[33] Alberts, 125.
[34] Alberts, 137.
[35] Thompson,
1996, 291; OR IX, 541.
[36] Frazier, 210; Alberts, 138.
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