Sean McMeekin's Stalin's War: A New History of World War II

McMeekin, Sean. Stalin’s War: A New History of World War II. New York City: Basic Books, 2021.

Sean McMeekin is known for his work early 20^th Century Russian and Ottoman history, with special emphasis on the World War I and Russian Revolution era. In Stalin’s War he takes a deep look into World War II and presents a revisionist narrative that is certain to grab attention. With Stalin’s War, McMeekin seeks to challenge the conventional narrative, that the Second World War was “a heroic struggle between good and evil.” In particular he takes issues with the notion that Hitler was the personal driving force of the worldwide conflict. Instead it should be Stalin, head of the Soviet Union, who encouraged the other great powers to tear each other apart so that his communist nation could swoop in and exert its power over the world. McMeekin points out that Stalin’s influence was felt in both the European and Pacific Wars, while Nazi Germany only had a significant role in the former.

The Nazi-Soviet non-aggression pact enabled Stalin to make a series of easy conquests in Eastern Europe while the Germans fought a much tougher war against the Western Allies.  The Soviets got into a brief war with the Japanese, but were successful. Instead of using their leverage to drive back the Japanese for good, the Soviets gave them a free hand to continue their war with China. This kept Japan and Chiang’s Nationalists embroiled in the slog of war, while Mao’s Communists were able to sit back in their northern strongholds (McMeekin also points out that after 1945 the Soviets gave ample military resources to Mao with which to conquer China. The Americans by contrast withheld aid from Chiang and demanded that he form a peaceful government with the Communists, a totally unrealistic expectation). Stalin’s goal of making the great powers wear each other down through attrition was thrown off when Hitler struck him and rolled back all his 1939-1941 conquests. Now he had to go to the Western Allies for aid.

There is more to the story and this is where American readers will really feel some discomfiture. McMeekin argues that contrary to the myth of the Great Patriotic War held by Russians, the Soviet Union was on the ropes in 1941 and would not have won without lend-lease aid. McMeekin argues that the Anglo-American leaders, Prime Minister Winston Churchill and President Franklin Roosevelt, danced to Stalin’s tune and were thus partly responsible for the following 50 years of communist oppression in Eastern Europe and Asia. In order to appease Stalin, as well as to prioritize the war against Hitler over Japan, they threw several other allies under the bus, among them Poland, the Chetniks in Yugoslavia, and Chiang Kai-Shek’s China. Notably China, which was one of the major Allied powers, received scant attention and resources in comparison to Stalin. This ensured that the Nationalists would start the resumed Civil War with a weaker hand.

There is a lot to unpack in this book and hopefully I have covered the general arguments. Much of the information here has actually been made known already, though aside from the recognition of Stalin’s evil much of it still goes unnoticed by the general public. What McMeekin does here is consolidate it into one large narrative. Boosting his argument is an abundance of recently uncovered documents. Most telling are those from the Russian archives. As well as providing more info on Stalin’s geopolitical goals, they further reveal the Soviet infiltration of other national governments. It turns out that NKVD had numerous agents and assets in prominent positions throughout the British and American governments. A couple in the latter included Harry Dexter White in the treasury department and Alger Hiss in the State Department. These hundreds of spies and assets, who ran the range from full-on Communists to sympathizers, were able to steer their policies to favor Stalin’s. For example, White helped steer the US into a more hard line tone with Japan while Stalin made an uncharacteristically public show of friendship with the rising Asian power. This redirected Japan’s aggression towards America and the European colonies.

While Churchill eventually realized that Stalin was dominating Allied policy, Roosevelt remained acquiescent up to his death. McMeekin is unable to determine whether he was hopelessly naïve, pro-Communist, or whatever, but the main point is that he gave Stalin an incredibly free hand. Even before America entered the war, Roosevelt gave the Soviet Union massive amounts of lend-lease aid practically free of charge, and without the approval of Congress or the American people. The influx of American machinery helped the Soviet Union drive the Wehrmacht away from Moscow in December of 1941 and later score the decisive victory at Stalingrad. Americans also let Soviet officials tour their factories, enabling them to sneak back thousands of patents and other valuable technological information. By contrast Stalin never responded in kind, refusing to let Americans visit Soviet factories or use their airfields to help with transport and bombing. In short the Anglo-American allies placed themselves in a one-way relationship with Stalin. If any American official raised suspicions or complained, Henry Hopkins, Roosevelt’s right-hand man, would remove them (Hopkins sounds like he might be an NKVD asset or communist sympathizer, but McMeekin does not suggest this due to a lack of evidence). This resulted in a pro-Soviet American government. In fact Henry Morgenthau and others in the State Department began to advocate for a vengeful policy towards a defeated Germany that echoed the Soviets in ruthlessness (including the execution-without-trial of German officers).

McMeekin suggests a far better outcome to the war would have come if the Western Allies let Germany and the Soviet Union wear each other down through attrition (in other words turning Stalin’s strategy against him) or at least put more conditions on lend-lease aid to ensure better behavior from their eastern partner. But they didn’t and many of their reasons for going to war were not fulfilled. Tellingly Poland, the invasion of which sparked western intervention, simply traded Nazi tyranny for a Soviet one.

One aspect with Stalin’s War that might be an issue is that by focusing on Stalin, his crimes, and complicity of the Western Allies, McMeekin does not give much attention to German actions. He does describe German crimes such as the intentional starvation of millions of Soviet people to feed Germans and the Jewish Holocaust, but not in any great detail. He spends so little time on German crimes that some may accuse him of downplaying the Nazis’ evil to build up Stalin and his cronies as the big villains. The most egregious aspect of this is McMeekin’s failure to explain Hitler’s motivation for expanding east. Hitler long desired to conquer Eastern Europe and much of Russia, turning the supposedly inferior Slavs into a slave race. The author makes it sound like Hitler felt prodded into warring with Stalin over Soviet actions. Perhaps he attacked earlier than planned, but a conflict was inevitable. While Stalin had a hand in plunging the world into war, Hitler should get more blame than provided in the book.

Ultimately Stalin’s War gives a lengthy and very fresh perspective of World War II that is sure to cause some argument and discomfort. It really takes a hammer to the Western Allied war effort and Roosevelt’s leadership in particular. So far its harshest critics have labeled it a “right-wing conspiracy theory." However strong one may find McMeekin’s argument, it at least challenges people to reconsider the popularly accepted “Good War” narrative. I will definitely check out some of McMeekin's other work.

You can buy the book here.

Rating: Must-Read

 

Rating System

Must-Read: Definite read for history in general

Highly Recommend: Definite read within a certain subject

Adequate: Useful if looking for information or an intro on a certain topic

Pass: Not a good history book, useless, or absolutely farcical