Round Mountain
(November 19)
Though
Opothleyahola talked of neutrality and letting the whites slaughter each other,
his grand scheme was seen in a different light by the Confederacy and its
allies. The McIntosh Creeks, aside from their usual political and cultural
antipathy towards the traditionalists, thought this exodus would encourage
their human property to run away. Slaveholders in other Indian nations felt the
same. Of more strategic concerns was that instead of staying out of the “white
man’s war” as stated, at least many of the males in the exodus would form Union
units and improve the probability of a major Federal invasion from Missouri.[1]
The commander of the Confederate forces was Colonel Douglas Cooper (left). He long had relations with the Nations of Indian Territory, with Opothleyahola’s faction accusing him or stealing. In fact, there was a rumor that he wanted to catch up with Opothleyahola not to fight him, but to bribe him to reveal the location of a supposed great treasure that the chief’s slaves had buried. Such beliefs seem to be more the creation of spiteful Indians. While such planned thievery is not confirmed, Cooper did have a true reputation for drunkenness that would dog his Civil War career.[2]
Cooper’s
army included one white regiment, the 9th Texas Cavalry under
Lieutenant-Colonel Quayle. The rest of his force was made up of Confederate-aligned
Indians. Colonel Daniel N. McIntosh commanded the Creek regiment, and his
brother Colonel Chilly McIntosh a Creek-Seminole battalion. Major John Jumper,
a Seminole chief, had specific command over his own people in this unit and
could use them separately if he wished. A mixed Chickasaw and Choctaw regiment
under Captain R.A. Young also joined. Altogether Cooper started with 1,400 men.[3]
Their pursuit of Opothleyahola got off to a bad start. Evidently they had not had the prep time that the exodus had, and soon men were picking up wild acorns and pulling up roots as they ran out of food. At one point they separated into two columns, hoping to send one ahead to catch up and hold down the Unionists. Instead they found empty campsites. So far Opothleyahola’s plans were working wonderfully.[4]
Opothleyahola rested his people at a partially-constructed fort between the Red Fork of the Arkansas River to the south and Walnut Creek to the north (near present day Yale, Oklahoma). It was here that the first blood was spilled on the metaphorical trail of ice. Around 4 PM the 9th Texas under Lieutenant-Colonel Quayle saw rising smoke and charged in its direction. They found a recently abandoned camp.[5] Opothleyahola’s people learned that the enemy was getting very close. The warriors rushed to find a defensive location and hold off the Confederates. The rest of the people evacuated, but not in the best order. According to participant in the exodus, “One time we saw a little baby sitting on its little blanket in the woods. Everyone was running because an attack was expected and no one had the time to stop and pick up the child. As it saw the people running by, the little child began to wave its little hands. The child had no knowledge that he had been deserted.”[6]Opothleyahola
was aware how close the enemy had closed the gap. He sent his warriors south to
take advantage of some timber near the Round Mountain. Creeks, along with
Seminoles, waited for the Texan riders to arrive. The sun began to set. Around
7 PM, Captain M.J. Brinson led an advance guard of 70 Texans ahead. Soon the
woods in front erupted. This initial volley killed Private John H. Crow, the
first recorded casualty of the campaign. As the Confederates and their horses
reeled, the Creeks sent a pony out. Chased by dogs, the animal ran into the
cavalry and caused further confusion. Despite a reinforcement of 80 men,
Brinson ordered a retreat. He later claimed in his brief report that, 1500
warriors outflanked him on both sides and necessitated a retreat under heavy
fire. He reported only 5 men killed and 1 wounded. It should be noted here that
casualty figures for the campaign are a bit murky, especially since the reports
were only written by the Confederates. Without reports, it’s uncertain how many
of Opothleyahola’s warriors were killed and wounded in the battles, and
Confederate claims of counting dozens to hundreds of dead warriors smacks of
typical self-promoting exaggeration.[7]
 |
| Daniel N. McIntosh, one of Opothleyahola's nemeses in the Creek Nation. He led the 1st Creek regiment. |
Despite
this initial defeat, the Confederates did not give up. But by the time Captain
Young’s Choctaw and Chickasaw Regiment advanced, it was getting dark. Nobody
dared fire for fear of accidentally hitting their friends. Once the
Confederates were within 60 yards of the Unionists Indians, Colonel James
Bourland of Cooper’s staff rode forward and “called to those approaching, asking
if any Texans were there, which was answered by the crack of the enemy’s
rifles.”[8]
As the Choctaws and Chickasaws dismounted, the enemy opened fired on them and
struck two horses. Young advanced his men “8 or 10 paces” from their horses.
They got drove the first line of the enemy after three volleys. The Choctaws
lost 6 horses, either killed or run off after being shot. The wounded animals
could not be found.[9]
As
the shooting went on, elements of four further companies from the 9th
Texas as well as a small contingent of Creeks reinforced the Confederate line.
The last phase of the battle had an air of the surreal. In his battle report, Captain
Young provided this ominous battle image. “The prairie was on fire on my right,
and as we advanced to the attack I could see very distinctly the enemy passing
the fire…they were about 300 yards from me and the prairie was burning very
rapidly, and I may have taken the motion of the grass for men.”[10]
One Texan thought he saw the dark outline of a column of Indians, then realized
it was the grass “whipping about from the prairie fires.” Men shot at anything
that looked like movement, sometimes literally shooting at shadows.[11]
When
the 9th Texas received fire they were also assailed by arrows. One
sergeant further described the night fighting. “It was now dark & we were
fighting by the flash of the enemy’s guns fighting us on 3 sides & had set
the prairie on fire in half a dozen places affording the men light to fight
by.” Warriors moved onto the 9th Texas’ left, specifically on
Company I. and began to fire into its flank. Soldiers reported that they were arrows
assailed them along with the bullets. I’s Captain Stuart ordered the company to
withdraw. As they did so they loaded and fired, slowing down their pursuers.
After half a mile they stopped and resumed their exchange of bullets. After a
third volley Captain Stuart fell when buckshot hit him on the left side of the
head. As he fell to the ground he got out, “Form on me.”[12]
Eventually the Creeks and Seminoles withdrew. Still plagued by darkness and
prairies fires, the Confederates took some time to pursue
Overall the Confederates suffered 6 killed, 4 wounded, and 1 missing for a total of 11. With so few casualties, Cooper was able to name all of them in his report (at least by their surnames). Cooper also made a point to include in his report “Many horses were shot,” indicating that there was considerable loss among the animals in the opening phase.[13]
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| Chilly McIntosh, half-brother of Daniel McIntosh and also a Confederate Indian officer |
The Confederates’ claims of victory ring hollow considering that Opothleyahola’s exodus escaped. Still, they made quite a haul after Round Mountain, finding Opothleyahola’s buggy, 12 wagons, flour, sugar, salt, and many cattle and ponies.[14] Less appetizing was the discovery of two Texan soldiers. Taken prisoner, they had been mutilated and beaten to death, likely by Creek women.[15]
Opothleyahola had gotten away some lost supplies, but his people intact. He also got word of hopeful news. To the east in Missouri 40,000 Union troops under Fremont were threatening to drive secessionist forces from the Bear State, possibly opening up an invasion of Arkansas. General Ben McCulloch, Cooper’s superior, ordered the colonel to abandon his pursuit of the Unionist Indians and come to his aid. The exodus would continue unopposed. However, Fremont’s offensive fizzled out and with little time lost Cooper was allowed to resume his campaign “without delay and with the utmost energy.” A half-Indian scout named Clem Rogers helped him pick up the trail again. [16]
Chusto-Talash
(December 9)
With
weeks having passed, the composition of the Confederate force was somewhat
different this time. Cooper split it into two parts. He was to personally head
north with 430 men in the Choctaw and Chickasaw Mounted Rifles under Major
Mitchell Laflore, 50 men of the Choctaw Battalion under Captain Alfred Wade,
285 men of the 1st Creek Regiment under Colonel D.N. McIntosh, and a
small separate contingent of just 15 Creeks under Captain James Smith. In
addition to the 780 or so men he had on hand, he had ordered another force to
move up the Verdigris River in hopes of cutting off Opothleyahola’s slow-moving
column. This consisted of Colonel John Drew and 500 men of his 1st
Cherokee Regiment and whichever parts of the 9th Texas Cavalry were
available.[17]
Drew’s
Cherokees accidentally marched too far to the northeast and made contact with
the Unionists well before Cooper could reach him. Instead of fighting Drew
separately, however, Opothleyahola sent a messenger asking for a peace
agreement. Drew relayed the message and received permission from Cooper to make
peace. Drew sent a Major Pegg and three other officers to discuss matters
further. Pegg never reached the traditionalist Creek. Instead hundreds of
warriors, adorned with war paint, surrounded and threatened him, and promised
that they would soon attack the Cherokees.[18]
According
to Cooper and Drew’s reports the outnumbered 1st Cherokee quickly
fled, leaving tents as well as some horses and weapons behind. The truth was
somehow more embarrassing than a panicked rout. Most of the Cherokees in Drew’s
regiment were also full bloods and were sympathetic to the Creeks. To their
commander’s surprise, all but 28 (Drew was able to list each one’s name as
present for battle in his report!) decided to join Opothleyahola’s exodus or
slip back home. Driving home how massive this defection was, at least 400 of
them would show up on Opothleyahola’s side in the next battle.[19]
In
light of this event, the threatened attack on the Cherokee camp never came. A
few Confederates continued north, finding Drew and his remainder of men
untouched. Cooper moved back south to receive a reinforcement of Choctaws,
Creeks, and Seminoles, then advanced towards Chusto-Talash (“Caving Banks”). It
was December 9 and finally he was in striking distance of Opothleyahola and his
people at Chusto-Talash. Cooper ordered the Cherokee’s supply train to park on
the prairie with “sufficient guard.” He
divided his army into three columns: the Choctaw and Chickasaws on the right,
the Texans and Cherokees in the center, and the Creek on the left. The columns
“advanced at quick gallop.”[20]
 |
| A section of Bird Creek, where the battle was fought. (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Battle_of_Chusto-Talasah#/media/File:Chusto-Talasah_1.jpg) |
Opothleyahola’s warriors were ready again lined up along a forest “skirting the creek for over 2 miles” and a ravine that cut into the prairie. Bear Creek was an excellent defensive position, with steep 30-foot banks and uneven water depth that meant that any Confederate who stepped in would either be able to cross on foot or fall into a hole. Beyond the creek were thickets, trees, and fallen logs that provided the warriors with protection. At the center of their line was a house and rail fence along with overgrown vegetation. From here Opothleyahola’s men “could like and pour upon the advancing line his deadly fire in comparative safety, while the creek banks on either side covered the house by flank and reverse.”[21]
On
the right the Choctaw and Chickasaw Rifles were to link up with the 9th
Texas and strike the ravine while McIntosh’s Creeks on the left were to try to
turn the western flank of the enemy.[22]
A small group of Unionists attacked the Confederates then fled. The warriors
appeared in the rear of Cooper’s force. Spotting them, McIntosh’s Creeks
“wheeled their horses and with a whoop charged in direction of the enemy.” One,
Private Edward Folsom, shot an enemy Creek off his horse and quickly looted his
body to find a gun and a pocket knife. As it turned out these bold, mounted
warriors were trying to draw the Confederates into a direct assault on their
formidable position. Their plan worked even better than expected. The various
Confederate units rode a mish-mash of various types of horses and ponies. Thus
when they advanced in a body some units went ahead of the others, breaking
cohesion.[23]
On the left the Creeks and a portion of
the 9th Texas attacked. The Texans continuously charged up and down
the creek, sending the enemy running and sometimes without a shot. In time they
and their Creek allies took possession of the creek and exited into the
prairie. With no enemy in sight, the Creeks and Texans advanced a mile towards
the center, where they met stiffer resistance.[24]
Further east, 100 men of the 9th
Texas Cavalry under Quayle charged the ravine and took it. Quayle “marched on
and charged another ravine still farther on the right, but when he got into the
ravine the Indians, who had possession of its mouth, opened a raking fire upon
his men. He ordered them to charge down the ravine, which they did, and put the
enemy to rout.” For the rest of the battle the Texans faced some of the
defected Cherokees.[25]
The
house on the other side of Bear Creek became the center of the fighting. 100
Choctaws and Chickasaws charged the warriors gathered there. “The charge of the
squadron was made in gallant style to the timber below the house, and, there
dismounting, moved up under cover of the fence.” The Choctaw-Chickasaw squadron
drove the Unionists away from the house, but then received “unexpected fire” on
their flank. At the same time they found the underbrush too thick to advance
through while getting pelted with bullets. They withdrew to the house where
more of their regiment came to bolster them. Some like, 25 men under Captain
Joshua Hall, had gotten separated and wasted time trying to find more of the
enemy in the dense forest before heading for the sound of firing. The shooting
around the house and fence “was renewed with increased vigor.” The two sides did
not fight in neat ranks. “The mode of warfare adopted by the enemy,” noted one
Choctaw captain, “compelled us, as you are aware, to abandon strict military
discipline and make use of somewhat similar movements in order to be
successful.” What he referred to was the traditional Indian and frontiersman
way of fighting, where every man found a bit of cover from where to seek out
and shoot his foe.[26]
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| Osprey Publishing has done a couple entries on Indian Civil War soldiers. Here is a color plate showing how various soldiers in the Chickasaw & Choctaw Regiment, which played a large role at Chusto-Talash, looked. |
The firing became so intense that bullets began to fall among and strike the Confederates’ horses in the rear. Seeing the animals panic, the soldiers had to withdraw to prevent their flight or death. Securing them, they were able to resume the fight at the house. Once again the Choctaw and Chickasaw Regiment advanced, turning to face men who had been shooting into their right flank. Just then the warriors who they had driven back reappeared, firing into their left flank and causing another withdrawal back to the house.[27]
Sometime
during the back-and-forth battle at the house, Adjutant-General R.W. Lee of
Cooper’s staff, cheering the men on, was hit. As luck would have it the bullet
hit his pistol-belt, giving him only a contusion. The Choctaws for their part
incurred 1 killed and 9 wounded.[28]
Emboldened by his effective defense, Opothleyahola ordered a counterattack in
the center with an eye on capturing the Confederate horses beyond. He was
unsuccessful as were several other charges throughout the rest of the battle.
Finally Opothleyahola disengaged, his people and warriors retreating safely up
Hominy Creek into the hilly terrain in Cherokee country.[29]
The
battle had lasted four hours. Thanks to the heavy guard left with the wagons,
the Confederates had only been able to throw 1,100 men into the battle. Losses
were 15 killed and 37 wounded for a total of 52. Cooper made the ridiculous
claim that at least 500 of Opothleyahola’s men were killed and wounded. Colonel
D.N. McIntosh was more careful, counting 27 dead foes. If accurate, this
indicates that Opothleyahola suffered comparable losses when one factors in any
wounded or captured. It would prove to be the most even-handed, prolonged
battle of the campaign.[30]
Some
of the Confederate Creeks, honoring an old military tradition, scalped the
enemy dead. Private Folsom, who had scored a kill in the first phase of the
battle, took two scalps from around the contested house, though he admitted he
was not sure if he had killed the owner of the second one. The Confederate
Creeks in general were angered at Opothleyahola. One corporal accused his
exodus as a power play for chieftaincy of the entire Creek Nation. “The act of
secessions served him as a basis upon which he has striven to consummate his
long cherished hopes, seeking to become chieftain, and by misrepresentations he
has induced the most ignorant of his tribe as well a few of the Cherokee to
form an alliance with the Lincoln government.”[31]
Thought
losses in men were light, the Confederates were running dangerously low on
ammunition. Worse, they learned that 100 Cherokees from Fort Gibson had joined
Opothleyahola instead of him. This was in addition those many who had already
defected. It was obvious Cooper would have to suspend his pursuit yet again. He
moved his force towards Fort Gibson to
refit. At the same time he sent a courier to Colonel James McIntosh (no
relation to the Creek McIntoshes) at Van Buren, Arkansas. He wanted McIntosh to
come into Indian Territory with his white soldiers, where “the moral effect of
their presence might repress any outbreak.”
The
campaign was starting to gain attention in Arkansas. There the Confederate
press painted Opothleyahola as a “yankee abolitionist” who threatened to overwhelm Cooper with superior numbers and take over Indian Territory. Then the entire western border of the Confederacy would be in dire peril. This was inaccurate, as Opothleyahola was in fact trying to get his people as far from the Confederacy as possible. Furthermore, he was no abolitionist, being a slaveholder himself, and had only promised the freedom of slaves to encourage black help and likely because Kansas was a free-soil state. McIntosh, a rough-and-ready fighter who had just several months earlier
participated in the victory at Wilson’s Creek, Missouri, would prove to be a
step up from the alcohol-prone Cooper.[32]
Next: Opothleyahola and his people face a new force of Confederates at Chustenahlah, with heavy consequences.
[1] Warde, George Washington Grayson, 60.
[2] White, Wolf Has Come, 60-61.
[3] OR VIII, 5.
[4] White, Wolf Has Come, 51-53.
[5] OR VIII, 5.
[6] Debo, Road to Disappearance, 151-152.
[7] Hatch, Indian Campaigns, 10; OR VIII, 6, 14.
[8] OR VIII, 6.
[9] OR VIII, 14-15.
[10] OR VIII, 6, 15.
[11] White, Wolf Has Come, 57.
[12] Whit Edwards, “The Prairie was on Fire”: Eyewitness
Accounts of the Civil War in the Indian Territory, (Oklahoma Historical
Society, 2001), 5.
[13] OR VIII, 6-7.
[14] OR VIII, 6.
[15] Edwards, Prairie was on Fire, 5.
[16] Hatch, Indian Campaigns, 11-12; OR VIII, 7; Jay Monaghan, Civil War on the Western Border, 1854-1865, (University of Nebraska Press, 1984), 224.
[17] OR VIII, 7.
[18] OR VIII, 7-8, 17; Hatch, Indian Campaigns, 12.
[19] Hatch, Indian Campaigns, 12-13; OR VIII, 17.
[20] OR VIII, 8.
[21] OR VIII, 8-9.
[22] OR VIII, 8-9.
[23] OR VIII, 16, 19; Edwards, Prairie was on Fire, 8.
[24] OR VIII, 16,
18-19.
[25] OR VIII, 18.
[26] OR VIII, 9, 19-20; Hatch, Indian Campaigns, 14.
[27] OR VIII, 9-10.
[28] OR VIII, 10,
15.
[29] Hatch, Indian Campaigns, 15.
[30] OR VIII, 10,
16.
[31] Edwards, Prairie was on Fire, 8.
[32] OR VIII, 11; Hatch, Indian Campaigns, 16; Monaghan, Civil War on the Western Border, 225.
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