The Battle of Santa Rosa Island (October 9, 1861)

 

Florida is not commonly associated with Civil War battles. I’ve already written on the Battle of Olustee, the largest and bloodiest confrontation in the state between Union and Confederate forces. While Florida is rightly seen as a sideshow theatre for most of the Civil War, it was considered important in 1861. One of the few remaining Federal outposts on southern soil in earl 1861 was Fort Pickens, situated on the western end of Santa Rosa Island in Pensacola Harbor. Secessionists had been trying to get the Federals to evacuate, and at times seriously considered an assault that would have made Pickens, not Sumter, the name associated with the start of the war.

Facing a heavy Federal blockade, the Confederates were keen to dislodge the Union presence on Santa Rosa Island. If they did so, they could construct more naval vessels and even send them out to challenge the blockade. In October of 1861 the Confederates launched their only major offensive action against the island, resulting in one of the few Floridian battles.

 

Across the Bay

General Braxton Bragg

As the war continued to shape up throughout 1861, Confederate president Jefferson Davis put his personal friend General Braxton Bragg in charge of Florida. Davis may have thought that this was a prime posting for his old army pal, as Fort Pickens remained a high-profile target. If it was taken, the harbor could be freed for both ship construction and naval operations. Bragg, however, was more concerned with his defensive obligations, expressing to his wife “This is a fearful responsibility.” He had to defend Florida with just 6,000 men. On a professional level he would much rather be in charge of the more important and critical New Orleans. Regardless of where he was, he would need success to advance his career friend, and he wrote to Davis for reinforcements. The president got him several regiments of additional men. Bragg’s numbers swelled to about 8,100 men, and these made up the Army of the Pensacola.[1]

Bragg’s main focus remained Pensacola and its access to the sea. The Pensacola Navy Yard was one of only three shipyards in the South. Its entrance was protected by three Forts. Two of them, McRae and Barrancas, were on the mainland. McRae was to the west of Santa Rosa Island. Barrancas was to the north, west of Warrington and the Naval Yard. All along the coast which ended in the Naval Yard, Bragg had placed batteries.  The third, Fort Pickens, was on Santa Rosa Island, situated near the west end of a long, then strip of land. Thanks to its separation from the main landmass, the island and fort were still held by Union troops.[2]

Trail of Blood on Ice Part III: Descent into Tragedy

 

Chustenahlah (December 26)

James McIntosh

Colonel Cooper received word that Colonel James McIntosh had forwarded part of his men to him so that he would have more numbers and ammunition to get back on the trail of Opothleyahola. The plan was that Cooper would travel up the Arkansas River and get in front of the rebellious Indians. McIntosh would go up the Verdigris River and head west, trapped the target between two forces. But it would be some time before Cooper was ready. McIntosh, a highly aggressive officer who often put himself at risk, knew that to wait would give Opothleyahola respite from pursuit and worse more distance. He thus resolved to move at once.[1] McIntosh had at his disposal 4 companies of his own 2^nd Arkansas Mounted Riflemen, 5 companies of the South Kansas-Texas Regiment, the 3^rd Texas Cavalry, 6^th Texas Cavalry, and a single company of Texans under Captain Bennett. Like Cooper, he led a mounted force ideal for moving quickly across large stretches of uninhabited territory. He had 1,380 men in total. These soldiers were surprised to be in action. With the first phase of winter having come, the men were busy constructing comfortable wood cabins near Van Buren. But winter rest would not come quite yet.[2]

Back on Fort Gibson, on December 24, Cooper received the ammunition he had ordered. He moved out, but sent Stand Watie and the 2^nd Cherokee ahead to link up with McIntosh. Watie was of the pro-Confederate Cherokee faction and so were the men in his regiment. Unlike Drew’s 1^st Cherokee, this regiment was in no danger of defecting.[3] Despite his quickness to move upon gaining ammunition, Cooper would miss out on the climactic battle of the Trail of Blood on Ice.

Trail of Blood on Ice Part II: Cooper Gives Chase

 

Round Mountain (November 19)

Though Opothleyahola talked of neutrality and letting the whites slaughter each other, his grand scheme was seen in a different light by the Confederacy and its allies. The McIntosh Creeks, aside from their usual political and cultural antipathy towards the traditionalists, thought this exodus would encourage their human property to run away. Slaveholders in other Indian nations felt the same. Of more strategic concerns was that instead of staying out of the “white man’s war” as stated, at least many of the males in the exodus would form Union units and improve the probability of a major Federal invasion from Missouri.[1]

The commander of the Confederate forces was Colonel Douglas Cooper (left). He long had relations with the Nations of Indian Territory, with Opothleyahola’s faction accusing him or stealing. In fact, there was a rumor that he wanted to catch up with Opothleyahola not to fight him, but to bribe him to reveal the location of a supposed great treasure that the chief’s slaves had buried. Such beliefs seem to be more the creation of spiteful Indians. While such planned thievery is not confirmed, Cooper did have a true reputation for drunkenness that would dog his Civil War career.[2]

Trail of Blood on Ice Part I: A Creek Nation Divided

 

In the American Civil War the Union Army did not hit Indian Territory until well into 1862, and only in full force in mid-1863. However, there was one major campaign, perhaps the most tragic one of all. In a period 35-45 years earlier the members of the Five Civilized Tribes and been driven off their land in the East by the executive and unconstitutional power of US President Andrew Jackson. For the Cherokees, the forced relocation to what is now Oklahoma became known as the Trail of Tears. The events at the end of 1861 would be known as the Trail of Blood on Ice.

 

Primary sources for the campaign are somewhat scarce for somebody running a blog out of Illinois. I was limited to letters contained in The Prairie Was on Fire, a wonderful source for anybody who wants firsthand accounts of the Civil War in Indian Territory, and the official battle and campaign reports. Aside from a letter in which Indian agent Carruth communicates with Creek chief Opothleyahola, they are all from the Confederate perspective. As for the secondary sources, the best was Now the Wolf Has Come, a book that seeks to reframe the campaign entirely from the Creek’s perspective. The two authors of the book, Christine and Benton White, do alert the reader that the Creeks’ biases come to the fore, so keep that in mind when some heavy accusations are made against white figures such as General Douglas Cooper. I also tried to flesh out the sources with web sources, chiefly from the Oklahoma Historical Society, but I decided not to include them because the information was so brief and already covered in the books.

The Creek chief named in the image and below (https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/3/34/Opothle_Yaholo.jpg)

Opothleyahola

When the Civil War began to take shape, the Confederacy was keen to make the Cherokee, Chickasaw, Choctaw, Creek, and Seminole nations allies. They hoped they would serve as a buffer force between Kansas and Texas. The task for many of these nations was actually not too hard, thanks to shared cultural traditions and the Federal Government’s abandonment of protection and services. The latter factor was caused by the Union’s prioritization of beating Confederates further east.

However, many Indians also opposed an alliance with the Confederacy because they preferred the Union, or, in the case of the following individual, did not want to get wrapped up in a “white man’s war.” His name was Opothleyahola. He was of the Creek Nation (their official names is Muscogee, but for the sake of lining up with my sources I will refer to them as Creek). His name stood out in stark contrast to the other major Creek chiefs, who had taken up western names. This was very symbolic. Opothleyahola was a deeply conservative traditionalist who despised much of white culture. To him whites were demons responsible for all that had befallen the Creeks. He was more not likely to be seen in the suit and shirt of the whites, and he rejected Christianity.

Opothleyahola was old enough to have been present when the great Pan-Indian Shawnee Tecumseh visited the Creeks. Tecumseh had preached that the Indians must return to their old ways of living and makes themselves pure of both the physical and cultural encroachments of the white men. Opothleyahola was struck by Tecumseh’s words and had been on the side of the Red Sticks in the Creek Civil War. It was during this event that he gained a dislike for the opposing Creeks’ white American allies. Now he saw himself as the protector of the Creeks’ old ways.[1]

His arch-enemies were the McIntosh family. Back during the days of Indian removal, the McIntosh faction had voluntarily decided to head west. Their journey west was not the mournful procession that the rest of the Creeks would face. They even entered their new lands on steamboats, and brought their slaves with them. Having first dibs at their new home, they quickly grabbed much of the best farmland and set up farms and plantations.[2]

By contrast the rest of the Creeks, the majority of them, had a miserable time of it when they were forced out of what is now Alabama. As they trekked west they fell into destitution, constantly cheated by more unsavory whites, exposed to the elements, forced to endure long marches in rough conditions. When they finally arrived the McIntosh faction was wary. They agreed to let this second wave of migration stay as long as they accepted the laws they had already set up.[3]

It took time to adjust to the new country. The majority of Creeks built settlements along the rivers, but, being unfamiliar with the weather and natural cycles of Indian Territory, found themselves hit by flooding that wrecked their homes, drowned valuable livestock, and propagated the spread of diseases. Through it all Opothleyahola sought to do what he could to revive his peoples’ prosperity.[4]

Helping the Creeks rebuild were Baptist, Methodist, and Presbyterian missionaries. Most were white, though at least one was black. They set up schools at which the Creek children could receive education and learn how to read and write. For this case Opothleyahola made an exception, as he understood that such talents would help his people deal with further intrusions from the United States. Despite his efforts, the mixed-bloods were more willing or likely to attend the new schools. Not only did this tie them more to American culture, it guaranteed that they would have educational advantages over the other Creeks.[5] Opothleyahola also held black slaves, just like most wealthier Creeks. It should be noted, however, that slavery by the Creeks had existed before the arrival of the whites. The only adjustment made to it was that only blacks could be held in bondage.

When these mixed-bloods began to respond positively to an alliance with the Confederacy, it was only natural that Opothleyahola would stand in opposition.

Planning the Exodus

During the pre-war Secession crisis, militant Texans surged into Indian Territory, keen to seize Federal property. Colonel William Emory of the Federal forces entered the territory to determine if the Union should maintain their handful of scattered posts: Forts Arbuckle, Cobb, Gibson, and Washita. As it turned out, soldiers had already evacuated Fort Cobb. For his part Emory, fearing an attack on Fort Washita, evacuated that site as well, and the garrison of Fort Arbuckle joined him without orders. The Union was abandoning Indian Territory and with it protection from the Comanches and Kiowa. The new Confederate forces assumed command of the forts.[6]

It did not help that the government agent assigned to the Creeks was an Alabamian secessionist named William Garrett. He ensured that none of the Creeks could easily and directly communicate with the Federal government. At the same time the federal government was aware of Garrett’s duplicity and withheld the promised annuities for fear that the agent would divert them to the Confederacy. They may as well have sent them, for by withholding them the Creeks felt further abandoned by the government and more open to Confederate overtures.[7] As bonds between the Creeks and white southerners tightened, the Creek General Council passed a law requiring all free blacks to go into servitude. They were allowed to choose their master, but that could not have been much of a relief.[8]

Opothleyahola looked on these developments in dismay. Already hostile to the whites, he did not want to see his people risk their lives and their nation in an alliance with the same people who had dispossessed them a generation earlier. He and others held the mixed-bloods back from making such an alliance. One Creek, James Scott, was ten when he saw aged chief. He recounted that his “heart was sad at all the war talk. He visited the homes of his followers or any of the Indians and gave them encouragement to face all these things, but above all things to stay out of the war. It was no affair of the Indians.”[9] In June he and many of the full-blooded chiefs left to attend a council of Great Plains Indians. This was a major political mistake. With most of their opposition out of the way, pro-Southern mixed-blood chiefs were able to meet with Confederate officials and other Indian leaders. Naturally they allied with the Confederacy, and the new deals they struck were actually more favorable than those made with the Federal government.[10]

John Ross letter to Opothleyahola

Feeling betrayed, neutral and Unionist Creeks joined with like-minded people from the other Indian groups to seek aid from the Union. William Garrett noted these developments with alarm. Technically the Creek Nation was allied with the Confederacy, but according to his estimates there was a severe division. The Lower Creeks were mostly pro-Confederate, but the Upper Creeks largely went against. Overall he counted 1,675 “Southern” Creek warriors and 1,575 “Northern” Creek warriors, a nearly-50-50 division though the Confederate faction was now better armed. John Ross, President of the Cherokee Nation, was sympathetic to Opothleyahola and had previously backed his efforts to keep Indian Territory neutral. But Ross had to cave in to pressure when a rival faction of pro-Confederate Cherokees threatened to supersede his authority. Now he begged the aged Creek not to give the Confederates and their Indian allies any pretext to attack him. But his pleas went ignored. Indian vs. Indian violence looked more likely every day. In her history of the creeks, the historian Angie Debo noted that this was a tragic repeat of history, as earlier in the century Creeks had divided in a larger conflict between a still young United States and the older European powers in the War of 1812.[11]

Opothleyahola was encouraged by a response to his messages north. It was from E.H. Carruth, another US Indian agent. “I am authorized to inform you that the President will not forget you. Our Army will soon go South, and those of your people who are true and loyal to the Government will be treated as friends…The commissioners from the Confederates States have deceived you. They have got two tongues. They wanted to get the Indians to fight, and they would rob and plunder you if they can get you into trouble…His soldiers will soon drive these men who have violated your homes from the land they have treacherously entered.” Carruth sent further letters to various loyal leaders among the Indian peoples. Each letter requested that some of their best men be sent to Kansas to meet with Federal authorities and then to Washington to meet President Lincoln. Each letter also promised protection for whoever refused to ally with the Confederacy and the short arrival of Federal troops.[12]

The anti-Confederate Creeks had a plan on how to gather without attracting premature attention. Some Creek families with herds of pigs and cattle would round up their animals and slaughter a large portion of them. The dead animals’ meat was dried preserved. Families and small groups would leave their homes and take planned out routes to a great gathering place. Each had a bundle of sticks. Each morning they would dispose of a stick until there was none left. As the sticks were thrown away, these small groupings began to converge.[13]

Opothleyahola went with a rearguard of armed, mounted men. One night while they camped in a grove of oak, a white man named John Taylor rode to them. The Confederates were aware that something was happening and had sent Taylor, a merchant and trader, to talk the Creek chieftain into surrender. He warned that if he and the others continued on their course, there would be war and suffering in Indian Territory. Opothleyahola, who had been sitting on a log, met Taylor’s words with silence. At this moment the White learned that he was surrounded by Creeks, their rifles leveled at him. Opothleyahola declared him their prisoner. He hoped that by taking Taylor with him, he would cause confusion among the Confederates as to what had happened.[14]

The size of Opothleyahola’s exodus has been estimated as high as 8,000 people, with 1,500 of those men armed for battle. It was not entirely a Creek affair. Inspired by Tecumseh, Opothleyahola had reached out to others unwilling to ally with the Confederacy. To quote Now the Wolf Has Come, “Let the white men slay one another until the earth was soaked in their venomous blood…Let the many peoples join as brothers of the same fire; Let them all shun the white man’s war, and the gods would protect them.” Many had already been looking for a way out of the war. Among those who heeded the Creek chief’s call were Delawares, Kickapoos, Seminoles, and Shawnees. There were also hundreds of enslaved and free blacks. Although Opothleyahola had no abolitionists aspirations, there were runaway slaves in his group, riding ponies they had stolen from their masters. Seeing an anti-Confederate exodus, this was an opportunity to escape enslavement for free-soil Kansas. The massive body of people moved north as one unified body on November 15.[15]

Actually, Opothleyahola had another option on his mind, one that might remove any need to interact with US government. To the west of Indian Territory were the Comanche. The Comanche are rightly among the most well-known Indian peoples. After mastering the horse, they dominated the western plains for centuries. Maps in 1861 showed the western borders of Texas and Indian Territory, but in reality these regions often fell into Comancheria. The fierce Comanche warriors, often alongside their Kiowa allies, constantly warred on their neighbors, including the displaced nations in Indian Territory. Now Opothleyahola called for a great alliance. As Indians, they should all stand together, staying free of the emerging Civil War. A few Comanches were moved by his entreaties and some would even join his exodus. The rest, however, were dismissive. The Comanche had reigned supreme and could not imagine their destruction by the Americans, much less if they were busy slaughtering each other.[16]

https://buchananej.wixsite.com/7-
cherokee-clans/the-wild-potato

So Kansas it was. As it moved the north, the great exodus absorbed several smaller groups, such as the Yuchis and Alabamas. Naturally with all these culture mingling together, tensions rose. Some of the Indian peoples would refuse to interact with traditional enemies. The Delawares killed a fox, a sacred animal of the Cherokee Potato Clan (emblematic mask pictured left). Fortunately Opothleyahola had the natural presence and ability to defuse these situations before they broke his movement apart. [17] So far the great chief had quelled fighting among those in his charge, but soon he would need to manage fighting against the true enemies. The Confederates and their Indian allies would not allow these differing Creeks and their friends to reach Kansas unmolested.

Next: Two battles erupt on the Trail of Blood on Ice.

---

[1] Christine Schultz White and Benton R. White, Now the Wolf Has Come: The Creek Nation in the Civil War, (Texas A&M University Press, 1996), 19-20.

[2] Angie Debo, Road to Disappearance: A History of the Creek Indians, (Oklahoma Press, 1941), 95.

[3] Debo, Road to Disappearance, 100-102.

[4] Debo, Road to Disappearance, 108.

[5] Debo, Road to Disappearance, 120; Mary Jane Warde, George Washington Grayson and the Creek Nation, 1843-1920, (University of Oklahoma Press, 1999), 41-42.

[6] Thom Hatch, The Blue, the Gray, & the Red: Indian Campaigns of the Civil War, (Mechanicsburg, Pennsylvania: Stackpole, 2003), 2.

[7] Debo, Road to Disappearance, 142.

[8] Debo, Road to Disappearance, 143.

[9] Debo, Road to Disappearance, 151.

[10] Debo, Road to Disappearance, 144-146.

[11] Debo, Road to Disappearance, 149-150; Hatch, Indian Campaigns, 7.

[12] United States, The War of the Rebellion: A Compilation of the Official Records of the Union and Confederate Armies Vol. VIII. (Washington D.C. 1883), 25-26.

[13] White, Wolf Has Come, 15; Debo, Road to Disappearance, 151.

[14] White, Wolf Has Come, 20-22.

[15] Hatch, Indian Campaigns, 8; White, Wolf Has Come, 23; Warde, George Washington Grayson, 60; Edwards, Prairie was on Fire, 13.

[16] White, Wolf Has Come, 24-25.

[17] White, Wolf Has Come, 36-38.

Battle of Belmont (November 7, 1861) Part III: Grant on the Run

 

Grant had finally given his men a battle. They had for the most part acquitted themselves well, though discipline broke down once they reached Camp Johnston. They had tasted victory. Now they would taste defeat and its consequences.

 

Comic strip I found (https://emergingcivilwar.com/2021/08/05/the-battle-of-belmont-as-told-in-a-comic-strip/)

From Advance to Withdrawal

One consequence of the Federals’ premature celebration in Camp Johnston was that the Confederates, lying along the riverbank to the northeast, had time to collect and rally themselves.[1] Though he groused about it in his memoirs, Grant did not mention his force’s breakdown in discipline in report. He instead claimed that Belmont was on low ground and would be battered by enemy cannon fire. With no wagons to carry all the captured goods, he ordered the camp set on fire. The Federals carried with them captured horses and dragged off three artillery pieces. Just after the flame started the Confederates opened fire from across the river. They reasoned that since the camp was coming on fire there was no Confederates there. One shell from the Lady Polk, one of the larger pieces, struck the ground and caused Grant’s horse to whinny and rear up.[2]

When the Confederates later returned they found burned bodies of wounded men left behind in the tents. They believed the Federals had murdered them upon discovery and then left their corpses to burn alongside their dwellings. More likely the Federals failed to notice them or forgot them, so that they were burned alive. In addition to the rumors that they had bayoneted many of the wounded, this incensed and drove the Confederates. [3]

Battle of Belmont (November 7, 1861) Part II: Grant on the Attack

 

The Battle of Belmont can be divided into two phases: The Federals on the attack and the Federals on the retreat. This section covers the former. It was Grant’s first significant battle and the only one where he would be around the front line. Despite this, he is fairly absent from the drive on Belmont. Even in Nathaniel C. Hughes’ comprehensive study of the battle it is usually McClernand or Dougherty who make the wider decisions. Grant appears to have been content to devise the general battle plan and then let his subordinates take initiative. Most accounts place him staying in close proximity to Dougherty, and he did come under fire many times, with one horse shot out from under him. Likely he gave general directions to his brigade commanders and approved their choices, which were sound up to the taking of Camp Johnston.

Battle of Belmont (November 7, 1861) Part I: The Set-Up

In late 1861 Grant sported a longer beard. This photo also shows him well-dressed. This is a stark difference from the more humbly-dressed and shorter-bearded soldier that most are familiar with.

In most of the years between his departure from the Army and his return in the Civil War, Ulysses S. Grant had become a sad, obscure figure. His attempts to forge a career consistently came to naught, and in 1861 he was working as a clerk at his father’s store. Thanks to his West Point background and Mexican War experience, he suddenly became valued when war erupted. Even then it took special help from Illinois Congressman Elihu Washburne to get him a commission as colonel.

Grant quickly settled back into the role as an army officer. He performed creditably in Missouri, whipping his regiment into shape, fostering good relations with the civilians of a divided state, and looking for scattered pro-Confederate militia to defeat or drive off. Though he had fought no considerable battle, he got a promotion to brigadier-general and command over the District of Southeast Missouri. Soon one of America’s most famous generals would have his first battle as commander.

 

Where Three States Meet

Grant’s jurisdiction was not just southeast Missouri, but the southern tip of Illinois and possibly the Kentucky shore on the Mississippi River.  At first it seemed that his main opponent was General M. Jeff Thompson. Thompson commanded a division of the Confederate-aligned Missouri State Guard. Instead of uniting with Price’s main army of militia, Thompson waged guerilla-style warfare in his part of Missouri. As for Kentucky, both sides of the Civil War wooed it, but the border slave state remained inflexibly neutral. Union and Confederate forces struggled to restrain their desires to plant troops in the state. Whoever violated Kentucky’s neutrality first could send it into the arms of the opposition (see my post on Mill Springs for more background on this situation). Fortunately for the Union, the Confederate commanders in western Tennessee were not the Southern Cause’s best.          

                                Gideon Pillow                                                             Leonidas Polk

One of them was General Gideon Pillow. Pillow was the only general which Grant openly despised in his recollections of the war. Pillow was of aggressive temperament and yearned for glory. In the summer of 1861 he planned to fortify Columbus, Kentucky. With its high banks, Columbus provided an ideal place to control traffic along the northern Mississippi. It was also close to Cairo, Illinois, which stood at the junction of the Mississippi and Ohio Rivers. North and south of Columbus stood 150 foot high bluffs. To the south were the Chalk Bluffs. To the north were ones with strains of iron. These were called the Iron Banks, and stood between Columbus and any Union thrust from Cairo.

The Battle of Mill Springs Part I: The Contested Border

 

Early in the Civil War the Union and Confederate armies tried to win over the more indecisive border areas separating North and South. A key early victory could convince tens of thousands of fence-sitters to firmly pledge allegiance to one side. In Kentucky’s case, the battle that cemented Kentucky’s stay in the Union was a battle north of Mill Springs. The Battle of Mill Springs is the widely accepted name of the battle, used at both the battlefield site and its official website. However the battle sported a record number of names based on the various locations around the battlefield: The Battle of Beech Grove, the Battle of Cliff Creek, the Battle of the Cumberland, of Fishing Creek, Logan’s Crossroads, Logan’s Fields, Somerset, Webb’s Crossroads, and more. In fact, Mill Springs was south of the Cumberland River, while the fighting occurred on the north side.[1] This was also the first major battle for General George H. Thomas, one of the Union’s most revered generals.

 

Kentucky Shifts Union

It initially looked like Kentucky, birthplace of both the Union and Confederate presidents, would join the Confederate cause. John C. Breckinridge, former vice-president and failed pro-Southern Democrat presidential candidate, held considerable influence over the state and Governor Beriah Magoffin was sympathetic to secession. The Kentucky State Guard under General Simon B. Buckner was also mostly composed of secessionists while the Unionists had no comparable military force. However, enough Unionists existed in the state legislature to force a compromise stance of neutrality. Political observers pointed out that by taking a different course from the Northern states, Kentucky still affirmed the South’s goal of state sovereignty. President Lincoln agreed that the state held considerable Confederate sympathies, but pointed out that at least its residents were not actively fighting the Union. On the other hand Kentucky still traded horses, mules, salt and even ammunition to the Confederacy.

Price's Northern Offensive (August-September, 1861), Part III: The Fall of Lexington

 

Dave Gallon's Battle of the Hemp Bales

No Relief

September 19 saw a return to sporadic shooting. One reason for the lowered intensity of the fighting was an intercepted Federal message. From it Price learned of Sturgis’ relief column, only a few miles away. He sent Parsons and Jackson’s divisions north to block him. While they moved out, Price shifted his men around, trying to find the most advantageous position from which to launch another assault. Guardsmen with squirrel rifles perched themselves on tree limbs. These sharpshooters had a good view of the Federals in their trenches and caused “many hasty and shallow burials.” When the battle was over, one of these poorly dug graves resulted in a protruding foot.[1]

The situation grew ever more desperate for the defenders. Throughout the 18^th, 19^th, and 20^th no reinforcements appeared to relieve them. Water was running low and many of the wounded were suffering the agony of thirst. On every day the two sides engaged in shootouts, which the defenders had to fight “without water, their parched lips cracking, their tongues swollen, and the blood running down their chins when they bit their cartridges and the saltpeter entered their blistered lips”. Fortunately there were brief rainfalls. As their water sources were gradually cut off, the defenders spread their blankets on the ground to collect the rainwater. Once the blankets were saturated, they “wrung them in their camp-dishes.” Bevier recalled how the Federals would send out a woman to collect water for them. Though the State Guardsmen were “rough and uncouth” and given to hurling “profane language” at the female, they  could not bring themselves to shoot her, and any attempt to stop her physically resulted in fire from the Federal works.[2]

Price's Northern Offensive (August-September, 1861), Part II: The Siege of Lexington

The Fight of September 13

The Missouri State Guard was in sight of Lexington. Price wasted little time in attempting to seize the town. He deployed his infantry and artillery and gunned for a bridge which would quickly take his force into the town. When the Rebels crossed the bridge, Mulligan sent out two companies of the 13^th Missouri as well as company K of the 23^rd Illinois. The two sides confronted each other within the cornfields of farmer Isaac Hockaday, the Federals behind hemp bales and the State Guardsmen behind a fence. Hockaday had gone out to look for his neighbor so they could organize an evacuation. Instead he found himself cut off from his family as his corn field turned into a fire zone. Later reflecting on the chaos around his and his neighbors’ homes, and the ensuing destruction to their property, he wrote sadly, “I feel as if we had better lost all of our negroes than suffered as we have already…” Price withdrew from the indecisive skirmish. The Federals took advantage of this break in action to burn the bridge. With more of his army pulling up, Price changed the direction of his attack. He wheeled his army to come from the west on Independence Road.[1]

Price’s new avenue of attack scattered some cavalry pickets. Six companies of Federal infantry exited the town to meet the Guardsmen, hiding in hedges and cornfields on the east side of the road. At the head of Price’s force were horse soldiers. The Federals held their fire until they were just about 150 yards away. Then they revealed themselves. The sudden deluge of fire frightened the horses and the cavalry had to spur away. This gave the infantry problems. The horses ran over a couple unfortunates and others had to run to get out of the way. This also meant they went into battle with a distinct air of confusion, not helped by the well-concealed Federals in the cornfield. After getting behind the infantry, the cavalrymen got off their unreliable mounts and returned to the front to fight it out on foot.[2]

Price's Northern Offensive (August-September, 1861), Part I: The Roads to Lexington

 

When noon struck on August 10, 1861, the hills and fields around Wilson’s Creek were covered with the dead, dying, and maimed. The Confederate Army, along with the allied Missouri State Guard, had won the second major battle of the Civil War. Earlier that year Missouri had voted to stay in the Union, but only as a neutral bystander in the emerging conflict. Unconditional Unionists and Secessionists alike had other plans, trying to seize control of Missouri’s arsenals. The pro-Confederate governor, Claiborne Jackson reorganized the militia into the Missouri State Guard and placed it under the command of former governor, state senator, and Mexican War veteran Sterling Price. The State Guard was ostensibly meant to protect Missouri’s armed neutrality and after the start of hostilities to protect the state from Federal intervention without necessarily joining the Confederacy. As a result many of the men in its ranks favored their home state over the idea of a Confederate nation and some even switched sides when they felt that it was better for Missouri to stay in the Union.

Sterling Price, command of the State Guard. Before
the war he was a prominent politicians who served
in both Missouri and the US House of Representatives
as well as governor of Missouri from 1853 to 1857.

The Missouri State Guard consisted on nine divisions, each representing one of nine military districts. These were not proper divisions, being all over the place in size. Most were brigade-sized, save for the Eighth Division which included thousands of Bushwhackers and other participants as well as victims of Bleeding Kansas. Between the lack of Federal funding, inconsistent Confederate support, and fast-moving events, the State Guard was chronically short on supplies, logistics, and time for drill and discipline.

The New Mexico Campaign, 1861-1862 Part VII: Remembrance and Assessment

 

Remembrance & Historiography

At the end of the campaign Albert Peticolas, having just endured the horrid retreat from New Mexico, noted in his journal that “our operations out here will all be lost in history, when such great struggles are going on nearer home…”[1] The Civil War in the Southwest would indeed be considered a sideshow, though it would receive a few articles in Battles and Leaders of the Civil War. One of the writers, Brigadier-General Latham Anderson, attempted to argue the importance of the campaign. He wrote that if Sibley’s men had reached California, they would have doubtlessly created a strong presence in the state and created large implications for the Union war effort. With California’s coastline added to Confederate territory, the already strained Union blockade would have lost any effectiveness. However, such grand ramifications, even when expressed by a Civil War veteran and late 19^th Century general, remain speculative as Sibley’s campaign was done in before it could ever get out of New Mexico.[2] Only one Confederate, Teel, provided an article in which he castigated Sibley. “He did not husband his resources, and was too prone to let the morrow take care of itself,” he wrote. Teel believed that if Baylor had been given command, “the result might have been different.”[3] There was some argument among the Union contributors over Canby’s leadership, but this failed to spark any great historical inquiry into the campaign.

Some veterans kept memories of the campaign more alive through unit histories or published speeches. Once these survivors had died off, the war for the Far West became a piece of trivia, unknown by many. It often did not garner a mention in general Civil War histories, including Bruce Catton’s centennial trilogy. This is not to say that historians totally forgot about it. Several books were published in the 50s and 60s. Sibley’s campaign was presented in Robert Lee Kerby’s The Confederate Invasion of New Mexico and Arizona (1958), Martin Hardwick Hall’s Sibley’s New Mexico Campaign (1960), and several other works. Hall’s account of the campaign was the expansion of a doctoral dissertation, fleshed out with a wealth of newly discovered sources. Arthur Wright’s The Civil War in the Southwest (1964), is actually oriented around the adventures of James Carleton’s California Column rather than Sibley’s battles with Canby and the Coloradans.

The New Mexico Campaign, 1861-1862 Part II: Confederate Arizona and Sibley's Scheme

Confederate Arizona

 

Further Fights with the Federals

By late summer of 1861, the Confederacy had a firm foothold in New Mexico Territory. Confederate Arizona was the first conquest of the emerging nation and it was hoped that it would just be the first of many. Recognizing that Canby’s Union force would soon largely outnumber the Confederates, Baylor appointed native Hispanics to prominent posts in an effort to win over the majority of the population and keep his position secure until more aid could arrive from the east.[1] Even with the establishment of a new government, the violence still raged between Texan and Federal forces. Small groups of Baylor’s men and Federals got into several skirmishes. In these the Texans usually claimed victory. The first such victory came when they beat off a Union raid on a Confederate horse herd. On the night of September 24 a small force of Federal Hispanic volunteers under Captain John H. Minks were investigating the town of Alamosa when they heard what sounded like an Indian war whoop. Instead of Indians they found Texan pickets. After a short firefight the Texans withdrew. The following day Minks found himself and his volunteers in a poor position. The Texan commander, Captain Bethel Coopwood, had been sent to scout the area around Fort Craig and now stood between Minks and safety at his home base. The New Mexican Volunteers made a dash for it, but a good chunk was force into a fight. An hour long firefight ensued, with the Texans enjoying the benefits of two high ridges. The Federals attempted to fight their way out towards Fort Craig. With a spyglass Minks saw that 60 horsemen were about to charge his line.  He surrendered along with a few wagons, but most of his men had already got away, the skirmish giving them time to put some distance towards Fort Craig. The Texans escaped with 2 killed and 10 wounded. In addition to those captured on the 25^th, the Federals lost about a dozen killed and wounded in these engagements.[2]