Thursday, September 9, 2021

Price's Northern Offensive (August-September, 1861), Part III: The Fall of Lexington

 

Dave Gallon's Battle of the Hemp Bales

No Relief

September 19 saw a return to sporadic shooting. One reason for the lowered intensity of the fighting was an intercepted Federal message. From it Price learned of Sturgis’ relief column, only a few miles away. He sent Parsons and Jackson’s divisions north to block him. While they moved out, Price shifted his men around, trying to find the most advantageous position from which to launch another assault. Guardsmen with squirrel rifles perched themselves on tree limbs. These sharpshooters had a good view of the Federals in their trenches and caused “many hasty and shallow burials.” When the battle was over, one of these poorly dug graves resulted in a protruding foot.[1]

The situation grew ever more desperate for the defenders. Throughout the 18th, 19th, and 20th no reinforcements appeared to relieve them. Water was running low and many of the wounded were suffering the agony of thirst. On every day the two sides engaged in shootouts, which the defenders had to fight “without water, their parched lips cracking, their tongues swollen, and the blood running down their chins when they bit their cartridges and the saltpeter entered their blistered lips”. Fortunately there were brief rainfalls. As their water sources were gradually cut off, the defenders spread their blankets on the ground to collect the rainwater. Once the blankets were saturated, they “wrung them in their camp-dishes.” Bevier recalled how the Federals would send out a woman to collect water for them. Though the State Guardsmen were “rough and uncouth” and given to hurling “profane language” at the female, they  could not bring themselves to shoot her, and any attempt to stop her physically resulted in fire from the Federal works.[2]

During a September 19 truce that started at 5:00 PM, Price once again gave Mulligan a chance to surrender. He refused despite his men’s dicey situation. In addition to shortages of water and food there was an ammunition problem. Many men could not even fight until some of their comrades were killed and their weapons were made available. Stray bullets killed horses and their carcasses gave off an “unendurable” stench. The men dug a well in search of water, but when none was found they used to solve the dead horse problem. They flung the beasts’ corpses into the failed hole and covered it over with earth.[3]

North of the river, Sturgis personally arrived on September 20 to unite Smith and Scott’s commands, along with his own reinforcements of the 27th and 39th Ohio and Gentry County Home Guards. He set out immediately for Lexington, but Rains’ division went across the Missouri River to block them. Sturgis moved his men west to avoid a fight. His men could hear cannon fire coming from the direction of Lexington. Sturgis marched straight for the river, but an elderly black man intercepted him and warned that Rains’ men had taken the ferry and was lying in wait. Sturgis at first ignored him, but the man’s persistent pleas finally convinced him that he was telling the truth. Sturgis now had to take a detour, marching on a road parallel to the Missouri.[4]

One man who accompanied Sturgis was the journalist Franc Wilkie. Wilkie was so determined to get a glimpse of the battle that he dared to head towards State Guard lines. Sturgis tried to talk him out of it, warning that he would be mistaken for a spy. When Wilkie insisted on parting ways, Sturgis gave up and exclaimed, “You’re a damned fool anyhow, and will be hanged, as you deserve to be!” Wilkie met the Guardsmen and was taken in. This drew the attention of Price. The general, as Sturgis warned, suspected that Wilkie was a spy. Wilkie eventually convinced him that he was just a journalist pursuing a story. He also earned some points when he was confirmed as the writer of a notably impartial account of the Battle of Wilson’s Creek. Price put him in the charge of the provost marshal, with the order to treat Wilkie “like a gentleman.” The journalist got to see the end of the siege and was then let go.[5] Sturgis did not see the end, though. His detour added too much time and there were no boats to cross his men around the thousands-strong screen of Guardsmen.[6]

Another relief effort ended in much greater ignominy, this the one ordered by Colonel Davis at Jefferson City. Half of the 22nd Indiana boarded the steamer War Eagle on September 19. It was a beautiful, clear day. The transports made fair headway up the rapid current of the great Missouri. There was a concern that small pockets of Guardsmen would snipe at the men on deck. “Expectation and speculation were rife among both officers and men as they sat in crowded groups, with arms in hand, in the cabins or upon the decks.” The two halves of the 22nd Indiana and the 26th Indiana linked up under the command of Colonel Hendricks and continued on the War Eagle. The next morning the steamboat stopped. The pilot considered the remaining length of the Missouri River towards Lexington too dangerous.[7]

The War Eagle at rest.

The men got off and marched on foot. In the 22nd Indiana, Major Thomas Tanner begged Colonel Hendricks to allow him to rush ahead with 500 men. Hendricks at first refused, but finally relented. Tanner went ahead with 5 companies, three from the 22nd and two from the 18th. Tanner’s force entered a large field of corn. While traversing it “a heavy volley of musketry” from 60 yards away hit them. Tanner fell from his horse, mortally wounded, and the 500 fired back. After over 5 minutes of firing the men learned to their horror that they had been dueling a picket force from the 26th Indiana. In this fiasco 9 were killed and 12 wounded.[8] Davis summed up the disastrous results of his relief expedition:

“The War Eagle and Iatan have just returned. The three Indiana regiments took possession of all points as far as Glasgow, but unfortunately for their reputation as soldiers their scouts fired into each other, severely wounding Major Tanner and several others, and killing three. They retook the steamer Sunshine 10 miles above Glasgow. The Twenty-sixth Indiana proceeded on for Lexington.”[9]

 

The Hemp Bale Assault


While Sturgis and Davis’ relief efforts floundered, some of Price’s subordinates hatched upon a unique scheme. The Guard would turn hemp bales into moving shields. Protected from bullets and substandard artillery ammunition, they could get close to the Federal earthworks and unleash their shorter-ranged firepower. Most sources credit General Harris for the idea. On the night of September 19, while the truce was in effect, Harris requested 132 bales of hemp to use as entrenchments, capable of withstanding bullets and hopefully the artillery rounds as well. These came from the recently captured warehouses on the river, which contained “a quantity of hemp bales and large coils of rope.” He ordered Captain Turner to see that the bales were sent to the proper points along the line, a job he did with “extraordinary zeal”. There was one snag. Harris ordered the bales wetted, so they would be unable to catch fire and burn the men they were supposed to protect. However, this made them heavier and it was nigh impossible for his exhausted men to shove them uphill towards the line. Harris came up with the simple solution of waiting until they were properly positioned before wetting them.[10]

On the morning of the 20th a number of wagons wheeled down to the warehouse, accompanied by a detail of men to roll out and load up these articles.” The hemp bales were to be “pushed forward towards the enemy’s lines in parallel approaches.” The attack went underway. “Each bale was put in charge of three men and rolled up the hill: by keeping it in front, the men were protected from the enemy's fire, while our riflemen directed their aim at every head that was raised above the breastworks.” Mulligan commended the effectiveness of these moving shields. “Round-shot and bullets were poured against them, but they would only rock a little and then settle back. Heated shot were fired with the hope of setting them on fire, but they had been soaked and would not burn.” Harris’ great improvisation did not go off perfectly. The ropes on one bale came loose and spiraled down the hill, whipping a captain in the face.[11]

Figuring they were close enough, Harris’ men came out from the protection of other hemp bales and charged, taking part of the entrenchments. After an “awful” fight they were driven out, but the hemp bales continued to prove their worth. The commander of the Home Guard contingent, Major Becker, raised a white flag. Whether this was for a truce or a surrender was not known, as Mulligan ordered it promptly taken down. One soldier who dared the hemp bale soldiers was Henry Carico of the 1st Illinois Cavalry. One of his friends was wounded and in need of water for relief. Carico ran for the nearest water source, under the guns of the Rebels, and quickly scooped water into a bucket. The enemy fired on him and put a hole in the bucket. Carico braved the fire. Refusing to lose the water that his thirsty and wounded friend needed, he plugged the hole with one of his fingers and managed to make it back.[12]

Becker once again raised a white flag and once again the Illinoisans expressed their frustration, this time more violently. A lieutenant of the “Irish Brigade” ordered it taken down. A cavalryman turned artillerist then aimed his big gun and angrily blasted the flag with it. He growled that anybody who tried hoisting a white flag again would eat a ball from his cannon. He would not make good on his threat. The enemy was pressing very close, delivering a heavy fire while protected by their makeshift shields. The German Home Guards abandoned their position and Becker raised his third flag. Mulligan was about to see that he was reprimanded for a third time when his captains urged him to finally give in. Reluctantly, he agreed to negotiate a surrender to Price. Seeing that the battle was lost, David H. Palmer committed his latest act of heroism. He quickly seized the US flag, “tore it from the staff and secreted it in my boot.”[13]

 

The Surrender

Having achieved several of his campaign objectives with Mulligan’s surrender, Price gladly reported the fruits of victory: 

“The visible fruits of this almost bloodless victory are very great-about 3,500 prisoners, among whom are Colonels Mulligan, Marshall, Peabody, White, and Grover, Major Van Horn, and 119 other commissioned officers, 5 pieces of artillery and 2 mortars, over 3,000 stands of infantry arms, a large number of sabers, about 750 horses, many sets of cavalry equipments, wagons, teams, and ammunition, more than $100,000 worth of commissary stores, and a large amount of other property. In additional to all this, I obtained the restoration of the great seal of the State and the public records, which had been stolen from their proper custodian, and about $900,000 in money, of which the bank at this place had been robbed, and which I have caused to be returned to it.”

Price also gushed with pride over his men:

“This victory has demonstrated the fitness of our citizen soldiers for the tedious operations of a siege as well as for a dashing charge. they lay for fifty-two hours in the open air without tents or covering, regard-less of the sun and rain and in the very presence of watchful and desperate foe, manfully repelling every assault and patiently awaiting any orders to storm the fortifications. No general ever commanded a braver or a better army. It is composed of the best blood and the bravest men of Missouri.”[14]

The State Guard now had Lexington. There were reports of federal flags being abused. These may have been exaggerated accounts, as the magnanimous Price ordered all captured flags rolled up and placed in boxes. A few flags escaped, one of course hidden in Palmer’s boot. Henry Carico, who had braved the sharpshooters to bring his friend water, wrapped the federal flag of his regiment around his body, hiding it under his clothes. The flag escaped with him to Cairo and he later took a picture with it.[15] One of the best fruits of the State Guards’ victory was the captured enemy weapons, the long range muskets that had made it difficult to approach Mulligan’s line in the first place. Unfortunately for the actual victors, most of these weapons made it into the hands of late arrivals who had no weapons in the first place.[16] Most of the spoils were placed in the courthouse for later distribution. The guard posted at the courthouse to prevent their theft themselves looted the place. Ordnance officer Snyder lamented that “our army was such a free democracy that my feeble efforts to check that petty rapine, and enforce discipline, were but partially successful.”[17]

The front of the courthouse where the State Guard temporarily stashed their prizes.

It was decided that the prisoners would be paroled, as the MSG did not have the capability of keeping and feeding them. Mulligan defiantly refused to be paroled, so he spent much time with Price. The general was very kind to his foe. Mulligan’s 19 year old wife came in from Sedalia and was also treated courteously by the commander of the State Guard. He even gave them the use of a carriage for the following march.[18]

Before leaving, the Illinois soldiers had to endure several less deadly trials. First was the oath. They could not take up arms against Missouri or the Confederacy until they had been officially exchanged. A few escaped the oath by disguising themselves as the enemy, an easy feat considering the State Guard’s ragtag civilian appearance. These men, including Private Palmer and the hidden flag, simply slipped away, anticipating a chance to get back into the fighting sooner rather than later. The majority, after having to take the oath, were forced to listen to an angry speech from Governor Claiborne Jackson. Jackson had ridden up north to witness the aftermath of the State Guard’s latest victory. He harangued the parolees for sticking their noses in Missouri’s business and violating its sovereignty. To offset this, Price gave his own brief speech praising their gallantry. The next step was the march out of Lexington. The State Guard rubbed in their victory by having the band play Dixie. The soldiers were assailed with taunts, stopped by Price as unseemly behavior. General Rains was in charge of the prisoners and reportedly gave them a whole flock of sheep as a food source, though there were many Unionist civilians along the way who donated their own food and water. The Home Guard, fellow Missourians, were also paroled. Some of them in fact came from Lexington itself and simply walked straight home.[19]

Euphoria washed over the State Guard. Anderson certainly remembered it as a happy time. “Doubts and fears were left to the past, and the dawn seemed to appear and brighten the horizon, dissipating the mists and clouds that had shadowed and darkened our earlier fortunes.” Furloughs were offered to many of the veterans, and some of these flat-out refused these gifts, determined to stay with the army in anticipation of next retaking Jefferson City back and fully avenging the initial defeats of June.[20] Price continued the celebratory mood by rewarding Churchill Clark for performance and enthusiasm. He gave him the four captured artillery pieces, creating a new battery.[21]

The aftermath was not so pleasant for the residents of Lexington. Isaac Hockaday left his house to look at the “scene of destruction; Horses Mules Men & Hogs lying in all directions some dead whilst others maimed & mangled.” He saw that the Federals had burned down many of his neighbors’ homes. The farm animals and livestock had been scattered all over, and many of them, as well as all the crops, had been consumed by the armies. “We are almost literally destroyed, between the two different armies.”[22]

 

Back to Square One

The State Guard’s victory was not as fruitful as it might have initially seemed. Price had hoped that by marching into central Missouri and scoring victories he would enable thousands of Missourians to publicly flock to the secessionist cause. “It was a delusive hope,” as both potential soldiers and supporting civilians were more interested in protecting personal life and property than risking themselves for “any mere abstract principle.” Also, hundreds of Guardsmen took on furloughs to help with the harvest at home, or simply to escape danger. Thousands of men did approach to join the Guard during its time at Lexington, but a good number of these dispersed for two reasons. First many prioritized their farms, which were approaching harvest time, and secondly many of the recent volunteers heard of concerning Federal movements.[23]

There were two such Federal movements in late September that threatened Price’s Army. To the south, Jayhawker General Jim Lane re-entered Missouri and led a raid on the town of Osceola, one of Price’s chief supply bases. Wiedemeyer’s contingent of Guardsmen there fired a couple of volleys before the assailants drove them off. Lane’s Kansans then embarked on a drunken spree of looting and violence, burning almost every building down and executing nine civilians. It was a harbinger of the kind of war Missouri would descend into the following year. This event was a logistical blow to the State Guard, but it did lead to increased anti-Union sentiment, a potential motivator of new State Guard recruits. The pro-Confederate Missourians were incensed, with Governor Jackson threatening to have Kansas burned “from one end to the other.” A few weeks later, 300 Guardsmen crossed into Kansas for a retaliatory raid. This is the only known foray into “foreign” territory by the State Guard. They struck the town of Humboldt on October 14, taking its citizenry and Union militia completely off guard. They looted the town and burned much of it down.[24]

General Charles Fremont poses.

The other movement, much more concerning at the moment, was headed by Federal commander Fremont. The Lincoln administration had been deluging Fremont with criticisms of his dallying and ineffective management of his disparate forces. Fremont also heard rumors (which were true) that the War Department was considering his removal after he issued a controversial proclamation on August 30. This proclamation called for martial law and more controversially the emancipation of slaves held by pro-Confederates. Feeling pressure from above, Fremont went all-out in assembling a massive 20,000 man army. He first marched for Price, but his army moved so slow that the State Guard commander caught wind of his approach with plenty of time to spare. Knowing that his men were under-equipped to fight such a large force, he ordered his men south. The order was obeyed, but with some grumbling. The men thought they were unbeatable, and one commented “we thought how silly” General Price was “retreating southward with such a formidable array of men at his command.”[25]

To add insult, the withdrawal happened under ominous weather, with constant rain and gloomy clouds. The rain rendered the roads muddy and soaked the soldiers, an uncomfortable experience given the temperature was falling as well. It was a struggle to find a spot dry enough to mount a tent, and men had to sleep on the chilled ground. At one point the Guardsmen came upon a flooded marsh. The men had to walk through two feet of water so cold that ice was forming on top. They then found the Osage River greatly flooded. All the Rebels had for crossing was one flatboat, which Harris’ division got to use. The rest of the men had to chop down the surrounding timber, using the logs as bases for planks. These hastily constructed rafts had an “irregular and uneven surface”, but they got the job done. The Missourians tied heavy ropes to trees on either side of the river and used these to pull the rafts back and forth. In this manner Price’s army made it over the Osage, albeit slow enough that those who reached the other side took to fishing to pass the time. Some were even able to stay in the homes of sympathetic citizens, enjoying warm meals and dances with the ladies. The Guardsmen reached the town of Neosho, well ahead of Fremont, but it had been whittled down to 7,000 men. Most of the losses were desertions.[26]

Price’s southward withdrawal exposed many to increasing Unionist depredations. One woman in Westport wrote to her mother, “We have been overrun with Jayhawkers at Westport and through this territory and they have robbed and harassed us, and our neighbors have suffered a great deal from them.” The Jayhawkers stole sheep, horses, beds, and other valuables. Men who had not joined either army formed a local militia company and managed to prevent one raid, but they mercifully let the thieves go. The raiders returned in a larger band. The situation continued to escalate, with both sides swelling the ranks of their bands, until actual skirmishes erupted. The Jayhawker raiding of Westport and its neighbors stopped for a time as the risk had gone up. Among the stolen property were the slaves. A woman wrote that “they were all willing to go. The idea of being free seemed a great inducement to them.” To her chagrin the Jayhawkers also stole her carriage, into which all the slaves hopped into before departing.[27]

Fremont’s offensive reached southern Missouri. He was now trying to consolidate the 40,000 men he had spread throughout he state. Confederate commander Ben McCulloch refused to help Price, advising a withdrawal into Arkansas. Price saw such a retreat as catastrophic to morale and a sign of weakness to his fellow Missourians. He tried to hold his ground and his men did repulse a Federal cavalry attack on Springfield, but he too was forced south. Luck struck for the Missouri State Guard. Fremont learned that he had been removed from command. His successor, General David Hunter, inexplicably withdrew his massive force and ceded southern Missouri to the Confederacy and its militia ally.

 

A Hollow Victory

 To many who read about it, Price’s northern offensive looks like a major victory. However, his successful capture of Lexington and subsequent escape, while indeed stirring up support from several regions of Missouri, was owed more to the bungling incompetence of the Union army. There were plenty of Federal troops in Missouri who could have rescued Mulligan’s garrison. Their efforts were ill-timed and uncoordinated. They were too scattered and lacked firm leadership from the top. As a result the State Guard checked their efforts in detail. Price had thousands of men at his disposal and could detach a good portion of them while still far outnumbering Mulligan at Lexington. One Union officer at the time wrote, “The several columns of the Federals in the field are too small to act independently against the enemy in mass, who are operating without the shadow of a doubt as a unit.”[28]

A ball remains lodged in a
column of the courthouse

Aside from the goods taken at Lexington, Price had little to show for his victory. Thousands of the men who joined him on the way north had no interest in sticking around, preferring to scatter to their homes and either help with the fall harvest or conduct anti-Union efforts their way. Despite achieving his junction with Harris’ division, Price returned to southern Missouri with roughly the same number of men he had started with. Furthermore he actually stirred up the hornet’s nest. The embarrassing aspects of the Union’s performance moved Fremont to gather all his forces and launch a major offensive to the south. If Fremont had moved faster, or simply not been recalled, the Federals would have made it all the way to the Arkansas border and overwhelmed any Confederate efforts to stand and fight.

Price would cling to southern Missouri until February the following year. He and others’ vision of a Confederate Missouri came to naught as a Federal army pushed the State Guard, now reforming into part of the Confederate army, into Arkansas. A subsequent defeat at Pea Ridge left Missouri to Federal occupation and a new cycle of violence which involved Confederate guerillas and hard-handed Federals. Price’s northern offensive and the Siege of Lexington remain an interesting incident in the Civil War, a daring movement by a poorly supplied force that was much more successful than it had any right to be.

 

Reenactors actually use hemp bales.

Bibliography

Primary Sources

Anderson, Ephraim. Memoirs: Historical and Personal; including the Campaigns of the First Missouri Confederate Brigade. Saint Louis: Times Printing Co., 1868.

Banasik, Michael E. Confederate Tales of the War in the Trans-Mississippi Part One: 1861. Camp Pope Bookshop, 2010.

Bevier, Robert S. History of the First and Second Missouri Confederate Brigades: Annotated and Illustrated. Booker House Publishing, Inc. October 19, 2012. Kindle Edition.

Doerschuk, Albert N. “Extracts from War-Time Letters, 1861-1864.” Missouri Historical Review, Vol. XXIII No. 1 (October, 1928): 99-110.

Eakins, Joanne Webb Chiles. Missouri State Guard Doctor Leave a Diary in 1861. Two Trails: 1999.

Easley, Virginia (ed.). “Journal of the Civil War in Missouri: The Diary of Henry Martyn Cheavens.” Missouri Historical Review 56, (October 1961): 12-25.

Fremont, John C.  “In Command in Missouri” in Battles and Leaders of the Civil War Vol. I. Century Company, 1887.

Grimes, Absalom. Confederate Mail Runner. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1926.

Hockaday, Isaac. “Letters from the Battle of Lexington: 1861.” Missouri Historical Review 56, (October 1961): 53-58.

Mansur, W.H. “Incident of the Battle of Lexington, Mo.” Confederate Veteran 23 (1915): 496.

Marshall, Randall V. An Historical sketch of the Twenty-Second Regiment Indiana Volunteers. Madison, 1894.

McCausland, Susan A. “The Battle of Lexington as Seen by a Woman.” Missouri Historical Review, Vol. VI No. 3 (April, 1912): 127-135.

McGregor, Andrew McLean. Rambling Reminiscences of an Old Soldier during the War Between the States. Hattiesburg, MS, 1912.

Missouri’s War: The Civil War in Documents. Edited by Silvana R. Siddali. Athens, Ohio: Ohio University Press, 2009.

Mulligan, James A. “The Siege of Lexington” in Battles and Leaders of the Civil War Vol. I. Century Company, 1887.

Palmer, George H. “The Journal of Major George H. Palmer, Medal of Honor Recipient: A Chronicle of His Early Life and Participation in the U.S. Civil and Plains Indian Wars.”

http://freepages.rootsweb.com/~luff/genealogy/PalmerGH_Journal.html#lexington accessed June 14, 2021

Sitton, John James (1842-1915). Collection, 1860-1913. Missouri Historical Society.

Snyder, J.F. “The Capture of Lexington.” Missouri Historical Review, Vol. VII No. 1 (October, 1912): 1-9.

Thompson, Seymour D. Recollections with the Third Iowa Regiment. Cincinnati, 1864.

United States. The War of the Rebellion: A Compilation of the Official Records of the Union and Confederate Armies Vol. III, LIII. Washington D.C. 1894.

Weidemeyer. John C. “Memoirs of a Confederate Soldier, 1861-1865.” Missouri Historical Society

 

Secondary Sources

Benedict, Bryce. Jayhawkers: The Civil War Brigade of James Henry Lane. Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 2009.

Castel, Albert. General Sterling Price and the Civil War in the West. LSU Press, 1993.

Chaffin, Tom. Pathfinder: John Charles Frémont and the Course of American Empire. Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 2014.

Editors of the Missouri Historical Company. History of Lafayette County, Missouri. Saint Louis: Missouri Historical Co., 1881.

-           History of Clay and Platte Counties. Saint Louis: National Historical Company, 1885.

Eddy, Thomas Mears. The Patriotism of Illinois: A Record of the Civil and Military History of the State in the War for the Union, with a History of the Campaigns in which Illinois Soldiers have been conspicuous. Chicago: Clarke & co, 1866.

Johnson, William Foreman. History of Cooper County, Missouri. Topeka, Kansas: Historical Publishing Co., 1919.

Shoemaker, Floyd C. “The Story of the Civil War in Northeast Missouri,” Missouri Historical Review, Vol. VII No. 3 (April, 1913): 113-131.

Wood, Larry. The Siege of Lexington, Missouri: The Battle of the Hemp Bales. History Press. 2014. Kindle Edition.



[1] Wood, Kindle, loc. 1363; McCausland, 134.

[2] Mulligan, 311; Thomas Mears Eddy, The Patriotism of Illinois: A Record of the Civil and Military History of the State in the War for the Union, with a History of the Campaigns in which Illinois Soldiers have been conspicuous, (Chicago: Clarke & co, 1866), 223-224; Bevier, 306.

[3] Wood, Kindle, loc. 1456-1482.

[4] History of Clay and Platte Counties, 219; Nixon, 420.

[5] Wilkie, 41-42, 59.

[6] Wood, Kindle, loc. 1363.

[7] Marshall, 8-9.

[8] Marshall, 9-10.

[9] OR III, 182.

[10] OR III, 189-193; Bevier, 306; Anderson, 73.

[11] OR III, 193; Anderson, 73; Mulligan, 312; Absalom Grimes, Confederate Mail Runner, (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1926), 23.

[12] Wood, Kindle, loc. 1520, 1602.

[13] Wood, Kindle, loc. 1683, 1710; Palmer, 9.

[14] OR III, 188.

[15] Wood, Kindle, loc. 1772.

[16] Anderson, 76.

[17] Snyder, 6.

[18] Wilkie, 47-48.

[19] Wood, Kindle, loc. 1863, 1889.

[20] Anderson, 77.

[21] Banasik, 11.

[22] Hockaday, 55-56.

[23] Snyder, 8-9; Anderson, 77.

[24] Weidemeyer, 4, MHS; Castel, 60; Albert Castel, William Clarke Quantrill: His Life and Times, (University of Oklahoma Press, 1962), 1962, 37-38, 41; Watson Stewart, “Personal Memoirs of Watson Stewart,” http://www.kancoll.org/articles/stewart/ws_section06.htm, accessed March 29, 2021; John W. Fisher Diary, Oct. 1861 to Jan. 1862, 3, 6-9, Wilson’s Creek National Battlefield.

[25] Castel, 56-57; Anderson, 81; John C Fremont, “In Command in Missouri” in Battles and Leaders of the Civil War Vol. I, (Century Company, 1887), 285; Silvana S. Siddali, Missouri’s War: The Civil War in Documents, (Athens: Ohio University Press, 2009), 102-103; Tom Chaffin, Pathfinder: John Charles Frémont and the Course of American Empire, (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 2014), 464- 472.

[26] Bevier, 309, Anderson, 84-86; Grimes, 25.

[27] Albert N. Doerschuk, “Extracts from War-Time Letters, 1861-1864,” Missouri Historical Review, Vol. XXIII No. 1 (October, 1928), 100-102.

[28] OR III, 185.

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