This
is something of a follow-up to my post on the Battle of Island Mound. This
covers the next significant battle of the 1st Kansas at Cabin Creek.
Though I am going through the regiment’s battles, this post is not primarily
focused on them outside the opening. While the Battle of Cabin Creek saw more
men and had more significance in a strategic sense, I actually found even less
information on the fighting itself then I did on Island Mound. Thus this is more of a prelude on a planned
future post covering the Battle of Honey Springs.
The 1st Kansas Joins the U.S. Army
After Island Mound, the 1st Kansas Colored Regiment saw no action for a long while. It still experienced a major event at the start of 1863. Lincoln’s Emancipation Proclamation went into effect. This proclamation declared all slaves in rebellious territories free and further authorized the use of black soldiers in the armed services. The 1st Kansas Colored Regiment was now officially recognized as part of the US Army and would also receive Federal pay. On January 8 Brigadier-General General James G. Blunt, who was assigned command of the Department of Kansas and was expected to deal with the mostly Confederate-held Indian Territory, personally inspected the regiment at Fort Scott. The order and discipline of the soldiers impressed him and Blunt determined to utilize them when for his major 1863 campaign.
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| Captain William D. Matthews |
Despite their acceptance into official army ranks, the men and officers of the 1st Kansas were not wholly satisfied. The unit included Captain William D. Matthews, a black officer. Matthews hailed from Maryland, where he started life as a slave. At some point he became free and moved to Kansas, where he ran a restaurant. Out of this restaurant he ran a major stop on the Underground Railroad and helped many slaves to safety. As a prominent black figure, he raised one of the companies of the 1st Kansas himself. Matthews had the understanding that he and other non-white officers would receive their proper commissions. He himself had a letter from Kansas politician and soldier James Lane that authorized his rank of captain. The Federal government, however, would not abide black officers. Therefore, even when white officers in the regiment protested, Matthews would fail to receive his officer’s commission and attendant benefits for some time. Still, the soldiers were now officially free men once their term of service ended.[1]
While
awaiting their first major campaign, the 1st Kansas experienced one
notable incident of violence. On My 18, 25 of its men joined 20 from the white
2nd Kansas Battery on a forage mission near Sherwood, Missouri.
While they were loading corn on their wagons, a Confederate raider group
suddenly appeared and attacked them. The Rebels completely caught the foragers
off guard and most without their weapons. They slaughtered 16 men and captured
5. Most of the casualties were the black soldiers of the 1st Kansas,
a telling sign that they were specifically targeted. James Williams led a
larger force to investigate what he labeled a massacre. They discovered a
grisly sight. Williams wrote, “Men were found with their brains beaten out with
clubs, and the bloody weapons left by their sides, and their bodies most horribly
mutilated.” The investigating party came upon John Bishop, a paroled
Confederate soldier. They recognized items from one of the victims on his
person and executed him on the spot. The remains of the soldiers were so
mutilated that Williams ordered them placed in a barn. They then set the barn
on fire, cremating the dead Federals as well as Bishop. Williams was
unsatisfied that justice had been done. Learning of local civilian support for
the guerillas, he ordered “that the region of the country within a radius of
five miles from the scene of the conflict should be devastated.” Williams had
his men ravage the countryside while exchanging shots with Confederate
guerillas. Captain John R. Graton wrote to his wife that conducting such
warfare was “pretty hard,” then shrugged, “but war is serious business.”[2]
Soon, however, the 1st Kansas would finally leave the guerilla
warfare along the Kansas-Missouri border for the equally nasty conflict in
Indian Territory.
Indian Territory
The
current commander of Confederate forces in Indian Territory was William Steele.
Steele actually hailed from New York, but gradually transformed into a
Southerner. His mother was a Floridian, and while serving in Texas in the 1850s
he married into a local family. He served in Confederate Arizona as a colonel
and earned a promotion to brigadier-general by 1863. His promotion to command in
Indian Territory immediately caused dissension with Douglas H. Cooper,
commander of the Confederate Indian Brigade. As an Indian agent before the war,
Cooper had long-held, deep relations with the peoples in Indian Territory and
felt that he was a natural choice to lead in the area, but his proclivity to
drunkenness had slowed his career. In addition to tensions with his main
subordinate, Steele found himself with almost no supplies or proper troops.
Pro-Confederate civilians in the territory cried out for protection against
criminal gangs or the removal of Unionist elements. Some clamored to be given
the means to move to the safety of north Texas. Throughout the early months of
1863 Steele worked to restore his department’s strength and resources.[3]
Steele
had every reason to be concerned. Indian Territory saw several Indian peoples
split between the Union and Confederacy. Most of the Unionists had been driven
out, but it was only a matter of time before these same people prodded the
Federal Army to reassert its control. For its part the US Government finally
wanted to return the many Cherokee refugees, those who sided with their
president John Ross against their pro-Confederate brethren in Kansas, to their
homes. Blunt charged Colonel William Phillips, who had been providing the
Unionist Cherokees protection and food, with preparing the way with his Union
Indian Brigade. Blunt ordered him to clear out Confederate guerillas in
anticipation of a major summer offensive and occupation. Phillips had mainly
contended with guerillas along the Missouri and Arkansas borders. Now he headed
a small invasion force.
 |
| Colonel William Addison Phillips. Growing up as a farmer, he became a contributor to the New York Tribune and brought attention to the unscrupulous behavior of the pro-slavery faction in pre-war Kansas. He became a firm anti-slavery man and a firm advocate for the rights of Cherokees during and after the war. (https://legendsofkansas.com/william-phillips/) |
Phillips soon became popular with the Pro-Union inhabitants of Indian Territory. Aside from pushing back Rebels, he escorted hundreds of threatened Unionist Indians to safety at For Gibson. He further allowed small groups from his brigade to go on furlough so they could protect their families from Confederate raids. By early April Phillips occupied Fort Gibson and Park Hill, with both his Indians and an additional 7,000 returning refugees. However this fort was at the end of a long and heavily exposed supply line. Supplies had to be hauled over a long route. With most of Indian Territory still under enemy control, Phillips planned to hold out at Fort Gibson for the time being.[4]
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| Stand Watie |
Phillips’ main antagonist throughout this period was Stand Watie, a pro-Confederate Cherokee and colonel of an Indian regiment. Phillips had many Cherokees in his own brigade so there was a strong element of internecine warfare. Though he had been in several battles, foremost among them the one at Pea Ridge in early 1862, Watie specialized more in raids. Throughout the spring of 1863 he conducted several raids on the animal herds at Fort Gibson as well as the wagon trains. On May 20 Watie, with the help of some Texans, led his largest such operation. In the following fight they killed 26 of Phillip’s men and nabbed 1,500 cattle. Another raid that month was far less fruitful. The targeted Federal wagon train reached the fort with two wagons of dead Indians.[5]
Watie
also harassed the enemy’s women and children. With all the men in the Union
army, it was up to their families to manage the crops. The day after the major
cattle raid, Watie returned “and robbed the women and children of everything
they could find, and took off horses, cattle, wagons, farming utensils,
&c., drove off the inhabitants, and laid open their farms to be entered and
eaten up by stock.” The Union-aligned Cherokees thus lost much of their food
for the rest of the year.[6] With
low supplies and an estimated 5,000 Confederate soldiers in striking distance,
Phillips asked Blunt for aid in men and material. Blunt organized supply
convoys, but it would take some time for him to gather a proper army. Eight of
his regiments and three batteries had been sent east to bolster Grant’s latest
campaign against Vicksburg.[7]
Blunt
needed to act quickly. Fort Gibson’s garrison was running low on food and
sickness was now spreading. If the Confederates stopped or seized the latest
wagon train, Blunt would lose his foothold in Indian Territory. Steele and
other officers on the Confederate side sensed this. Steele planned for a
junction to waylay the wagons and take the supplies for his own department.
Stand Watie drove for Cabin Creek and had his men prepare defenses along its
southern bank. The humble appearance of the Cabin Creek battlefield today fails
to convey the location’s historical importance. The ford at Cabin Creek was one
of the major transportation routes of Indian Territory. Thousands of years ago
the Osage followed a buffalo herd over it and named the route the “Osage
Trace.” with the arrival of Europeans the trail became a major immigration
route, and many famous figure such as Sam Houston crossed the creek. Aside from
the two designated battles, the ford also saw several smaller scale actions
throughout the war and frequent trips back and forth by William Quantrill’s
infamous band of bushwhackers. Cabin Creek ran into the Grand River, and the
ford itself was three miles above said river.[8]
In
addition to his 1st Cherokee, Watie also commanded a mixed Cherokee
and Creek regiment, part of the 29th Texas Cavalry, and part of the
5th Texas Partisan Rangers. The 5th Texas Partisan
Rangers had originally served in a lawmaking capacity, seeking out draft
dodgers, deserters, and runaway slaves. Their most infamous moment was the mass
hanging of Union sympathizers at Gainesville, Texas in October, 1862. By 1863 the
authorities had sent them to Indian Territory in anticipation of a possible
Federal invasion.[9]
While
the Texans and Cherokees set up, Steele worked to bring in men from another
source. This source, General William L. Cabell moved out of Northwestern
Arkansas with orders to unite with Watie at Cabin Creek. Steele further ordered
Douglas Cooper to bolster Watie’s force “with every man that can possibly be
spared.” The Confederates had an abundance of mounted men. However their only
artillery was a mountain battery with almost no ammunition. Hearing of Cabell’s
imminent junction with Watie and the size of the Federal force guarding the
wagon train, Steele had confidence that an estimated 1,400 Confederates would
handily defeat the enemy.[10]
The Battle
Knowing
that of course the Confederates would go for his critical supplies, Colonel
William A. Phillips sent 600 mounted men from the 3rd Indian Home
Guards and a howitzer under Major John L. Foreman to bolster the train’s
protection. The train itself was a hodgepodge of units under Colonel James
Monroe Williams. In addition to his 1st Kansas Colored and Foreman’s
detachment, his force included three companies of the 2nd Colorado
Infantry (led by Theodore Dodd, a veteran and hero of the New Mexico Campaign),
Company B of the 3rd Wisconsin Cavalry, Company C of the 9th
Kansas Cavalry, Company B of the 14th Kansas Cavalry, and a part of
the 2nd Kansas Battery. All told, Williams put his mish-mash force
at around 900 men.[11]
On
June 29 Foreman’s Indians came upon a recently made trail. Foreman sent
Lieutenant Luke F. Parsons and 20 Cherokees out to discover what had made the
trail. On June 30, they came upon 30 pickets from Stand Watie’s regiment.
Skirmishers from the 3rd Indian Home Guards drove back the pickets,
killing 3 and capturing the same number. The Rebels withdrew over Cabin Creek
and the main body of the enemy came in view.[12]
The wagon train, with nearly 1,000 Federal troops, was almost at the crossing.
Watie was in position, but there was no sign of Cabell and his Arkansans. The
reason was obvious. Heavy rains had come and gone for the past week, drowning
out river crossings and swelling up small creeks, including Cabin Creek. Cabell
needed to cross the Grand and Spring Rivers, but these were swollen. Thus Watie
lost what would have been a massive numerical advantage. Throughout this
General Steele proved oblivious to what was happening, even writing several
days after the battle that he expected Cabell to link up with Watie.[13]
On
July 1 the rest of the Federal force arrived. Williams ordered several
howitzers from his and Foreman’s units to move forward and shell the enemy. The
Confederates fired at the Union Indians, but they were silenced by the
artillery barrage. The Federals pushed their way to the creek, but found it too
swollen to cross. In fact the “creek” was now a small river with deep, fast
water and steep sides going up 30 feet. The rains had also made the trail
slippery. The
Federals stopped for the night, waiting for Cabin Creek to recede.[14]
Williams
and the other officers conferred and planned out their assault. Williams, Dodd,
and Foreman also personally conducted reconnaissance. The next day, with the
water receded, Williams put his plan into action. The two guns of the 2nd
Kansas guns would go on the left flank. Two howitzers would go in the center,
200 yards from the Confederate line. The remaining howitzer would go on the
right. The howitzers in the right and center would support an attempt to cross
the receded Cabin Creek. The crossing itself would start as a column of attack.
Foreman would head this attack with a company of his Indians. The 1st
Kansas Colored would go second. A battalion of Coloradans would go third, and
the rest of the Indian Home Guards and three companies of cavalry would come in
last. To ensure the wagons’ protection, Williams left the remainder on guard
duty under Dodd.[15]
At
8 AM on July 2, The Federal guns opened up a 40 minute cannonade. The
bombardment forced the Confederates into hiding. The infantry and cavalry
advanced under the eyes of hidden Rebels in the trees. Watie instructed these
men to observe Williams’ movements and communicate them to his hiding, waiting
ranks. As planned, Foreman’s Indians went first and were nearly across when
“they were met by a violent fire of musketry from the enemy, who had concealed
themselves behind logs in the thick brush which lined the opposite shore.”
Foreman, personally leading his men on horseback, was a favored target. Five
bullets took down his horse. Two hit the man himself and his soldiers withdrew
in confusion.[16]
Williams
quickly took control of the situation. He sent the detachment from the 9th
Kansas Cavalry to the front with the Indian Home Guards behind them. Before
resuming the advance, he ordered another artillery barrage, this one lasting 20
minutes. He also had the 1st Kansas Colored take up a supporting
fire position on the north bank. He then ordered the men forward at the
double-quick. The 9th Kansas
advanced on horseback. One report claims they brandished their sabers while the
history of the Union Indian Brigade says they actually held their carbines. Their
horses powered through the water and bullets. Then the Indians advanced. Though
crossing under fire and up to their arm-pits in water, the advancing infantry
made it with only a handful of wounded. The successful crossing was helped by
the covering fire of the 1st Kansas.[17]
The
Federals were now able to form a battle line on the other side of the creek in
front of the Confederate position. Williams put most of his cavalry on his
right to block any flanking attempt. Williams sent the 1st Kansas
into a charge against the concealed Confederates, driving them out. Under
mounting pressure, the Rebel line broke. Watie rallied whoever he could
alongside the edge of the prairie. He still held up hope for Cooper and
Cabell’s reinforcements, but these reinforcements were still held up by swollen
river crossings. The Union wagon train was able to continue on its way to Fort
Gibson. Many of the Confederates tried to escape by crossing the Grand River. In
their retreat many riders and their horses drowned trying to cross the Grand
River. Later that day their dead bodies floated past Fort Gibson.[18]
The Foothold Tightened
The
First Battle of Cabin Creek took place over two days, yet was a skirmish in
scope. The Union suffered 3 killed and 30 wounded.[19]
Confederate casualties are unreported. The history of the Union Indian Brigade
suggests it numbered at around 50 killed, 9 captured, and an unknown number
wounded. The number of killed, at least, seems exaggerated.[20] Regardless,
losses must have been heavy enough to prompt their rout. The deciding factor in
the battle was likely the Federal artillery. Williams had five guns while Watie
had none. This enabled him to bombard and soften the enemy up from a good
distance. Along with supporting fire from the 1st Kansas Colored,
the cavalry and infantry covered a difficult river crossing and greatly decreased casualties.
While
the battle was small, it spawned great consequences for the war in Indian
Territory. It notably occurred on July 1-2, when the Battle of Gettysburg was
in full swing and the Siege of Vicksburg was drawing to its conclusion. At the
same time the Army of the Cumberland was beginning a campaign that would
maneuver the Confederates out of Tennessee and away from the vital railroad junction
of Chattanooga. Though the Battle of Cabin Creek occurred on a peripheral
front, it added to the series of mid-summer disasters for the Confederacy. The
safe arrival of the wagon train at Fort Gibson, along with about 1,000 more
soldiers, put the balance far into the Union’s favor. Having failed to break
Fort Gibson’s supply line, the Confederates now had to protect their valuable
locations and supplies against a large and well-supplied Union force. General
Blunt personally arrived on July 11 and planned to seize his newfound
advantage.[21]
However, it was not over for the Confederates. The various forces that had been
unable to unite at Cabin Creek would do so two weeks later at Honey Springs.
Bibliography
Abel,
Annie Heloise. The American Indian in the
Civil War, 1862-1865. Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1992.
Britton,
Wiley. The Union Indian Brigade in the
Civil War. Kansas City: F. Hudson Publishing Co., 1922.
Cunningham, Frank. General Stand Watie’s Confederate Indians, revised edition. University of Oklahoma Press, September 15, 1998, Kindle Edition.
Grear, Charles D. “Fifth Texas Partisan Rangers.” https://www.tshaonline.org/handbook/entries/fifth-texas-partisan-rangers
Josephy, Alvin M. The Civil War in the American West. New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1991.
Lull,
Robert W. Civil War General and Indian
Fighter James M. Williams: Leader of the 1st Kansas Colored
Volunteer Infantry and the 8th U.S. Cavalry. Denton, Texas:
University of North Texas Press, 2013.
Spurgeon, Ian Michael.
Soldiers in the Army of Freedom: The 1st Kansas Colored, the Civil War's First
African American Combat Unit. Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 2014.
Trudeau,
Noah Andre. Like Men of War: Black Troops
in the Civil War, 1862-1865. Boston: Little, Brown, & Company, 1998.
United States. Annual Report of the Commissioner of Indian Affairs for the Year of 1863. Washington: Government Printing Office, 1863.
The War of the Rebellion: A Compilation of the Official Records of the Union and Confederate Armies Vol. XXII Parts 1 & 2. Washington D.C. 1898.
"William Adams Phillips - Free State Promoter." https://legendsofkansas.com/william-phillips. accessed October 25, 2021.
'William
Matthews.” https://www.civilwarvirtualmuseum.org/1861-1862/african-americans-in-the-war/william-matthews.php. accessed October 24, 2021.
[1] Spurgeon, 109-111; “William
Matthews,” https://www.civilwarvirtualmuseum.org/1861-1862/african-americans-in-the-war/william-matthews.php,
accessed October 24, 1861.
[2] Lull, 68-72; Trudeau, 103-104.
[3] Abel, 244, 247; Warner, 289.
[4] Crowe, 101-102;
Wiley Britton, The Union Indian Brigade
in the Civil War, (Kansas City: F. Hudson Publishing Co., 1922), 249; Alvin
M. Josephy, The Civil War in the American
West, (New York: Alfred A. Knopf,
1991), 369-371.
[5] Cunningham, loc. 107-108; Crowe,
102.
[6] Annual Report of the Commissioner of Indian
Affairs for the Year of 1863, 179; Crowe, 102.
[7] Crowe, 102; Josephy, 369-371.
[8] Cunningham,
loc. 113; Stephen L. Warren, The Second
Battle of Cabin Creek: Brilliant Victory, (The History Press, 2012, hoopla
edition), loc. 14; Britton, 260.
[9] Lull, 83
Charles D. Grear, “Fifth Texas Partisan Rangers”
https://www.tshaonline.org/handbook/entries/fifth-texas-partisan-rangers
[10] OR XXII, part
2, 902, 903.
[11] OR XXII, part
1, 378-381.
[12] OR XXII, part 1, 378-380, 382.
[13] OR XXII, part 1, 379.
[14] OR XXII, part 1, 380; Lull, 81;
Britton, 261.
[15] OR XXII, part 1, 380-381;
Britton, 261-262.
[16] OR XXII, part 1, 380; Britton,
263.
[17] OR XXII, part 1, 380-381;
Britton, 264.
[18] OR XXII, part 1, 379, 381-382;
Cunningham, loc. 114.
[19] OR XXII, part 1, 382.
[20] Britton, 265,
[21] Abel, 285-286.
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