The Last Battle: Palmito Ranch (May 12-13, 1865)

 

https://digital.utsa.edu/digital/collection/p9020coll008/id/3031/

For many, the end of the Civil War comes with the surrenders of Robert E. Lee’s and Joseph Johnston’s Confederate armies in April of 1865. Indeed, these events sealed the death of the Confederacy. However, the war did not properly end until early summer. There are two reasons for this. First of all, news traveled slower back then, even with the recent introductions of new railroads and the telegraph. Thus it took some time for Confederate forces further west to receive word that their war had been lost. Secondly, defiant elements in the Confederate government, President Jefferson Davis among them, refused to admit defeat. Since the head of government never confirmed an overall surrender, the still sizeable Confederate force west of the Mississippi was unsure as how to proceed. Some steeled themselves for a final stand, but most got the sense that things were indeed coming to an unfortunate conclusion. They were keen not to start any hostile actions which could prove to be unnecessary wastes of life. Yet such an unnecessary battle would occur.

On May 12-13 a Federal colonel who had managed not to see any action in his four years of service led three regiments along the Rio Grande, his purposes still up for debate. The result was the last proper battle between the forces of the Union and the Confederacy. It was light in hard casualties of killed and wounded, but lasted hours and generated controversy. This was the Battle of Palmito Ranch, fought in the most backwater theatre of the war.

 

The Border Front

Perhaps “backwater” would not be an entirely accurate term. The Rio Grande, as it does today, forms the boundary between Texas and Mexico. It was the one border of the Confederacy that the Union Navy could not blockade. If they dared send ships up the river, they would violate Mexico’s neutrality. This neutrality was only in regards to the American Civil War itself, for Mexico was undergoing its own civil war at the same time, one injected with a strong dose of foreign invasion as well. Eager to capitalize on the United States’ internal conflict, French Emperor Napoleon III sought to expand his nation’s global influence by intervening in Mexico’s always volatile politics. He backed the conservative Mexican faction, who wanted a monarchy, against the republican Juaristas.

The Battle-turned-Massacre of Baxter Springs

 On October 6, 1863, the site of Baxter Springs, in Kansas just a couple miles from the Indian Territory border, hosted one of the more infamous moments of the Civil War. It saw the only clash of, up to that time, two of the most successful military commanders of Trans-Mississippi theatre. About a hundred Federals, along with a fair number of civilians, marched with Major General James Blunt to Fort Baxter, en route to Arkansas. As fate would have it, a few hundred guerillas were also nearby. Their leader was none other than Colonel William Quantrill, the most feared and notorious bushwhacker from Missouri. This clash is classified as a battle, but most prefer to call it the Baxter Springs Massacre.

Quantrill Heads to Texas

William Quantrill, the son of an Ohio schoolteacher and migrant to Missouri, began his career as a bushwhacker near the end of 1861. Starting with just ten men, he built up a fearsome reputation with an impressive series of raids. By the end of 1862 he directly commanded over 150 men. After wintering in Arkansas with General Sterling Price’s Confederate soldiers, they returned in spring 1863 to pick up where they left off.[1] This time the guerillas faced more formidable opposition. Major General Thomas Ewing Jr., a former judge, commanded the Federal District of the Border. Kansas had long been the victim of Quantrill’s raids and he was determined to stop them. He undertook harsher measures to contain and hopefully stop the scourge of the border.

Arkansas Summer Campaign Part III: Cotton Plant

 If they were to successfully make their way to Little Rock, General Samuel Curtis and his Army of the Southwest needed to hook up with Commander Augustus Kilty’s White River expedition and much needed supplies. The Confederates, assuming that Curtis was retreating instead of marching to meet Kilty, made a move to strike him. Little did they know they would be fighting a critical battle that would determine the course of the war in 1862 Arkansas.

 

Cotton Plant (or Hill's Plantation or Cache River)

Study map of Battle of Cotton Plant (Wikimedia)

On July 7 Curtis started his army towards Clarendon, the final leg of the march. To reach there he would first need to cross the Cache River. The Confederates had already made moves to hold the Cache River crossing. Brigadier-General Albert Rust led 5,000 men in the area. This force included Texas cavalry (six regiments) and Arkansan infantry. Rust ordered Colonel William Parsons to secure the crossing with the 12^th and 16^th Texas Cavalry (1,000 men in all). The 12^th and 16^th did not move up together and the former stopped 6 miles south of the crossing in order to wait for the other. By failing to secure the crossing with his 12^th regiment, Parsons gave the Federals time to take it.[1] The area around the Cache River was heavily wooded, with plenty of swampland as well. As Federals and Confederates alike had to deal with branches, clouds of mosquitoes, and wet ground while a plethora of animals hooted, screeched, and flapped in the background. One Texan said it felt like a primeval world.[2]

Arkansas Summer Campaign Part II: The White River Supply Run

 

Following the skirmish near Searcy, the Union Army of the Southwest would temporarily ground to a halt. With no good base of supplies, especially food, in northern Arkansas, Curtis would need the US Navy, patrolling most of the Mississippi River, to enable a successful drive on Little Rock. This following supply run would be quite the adventure, full of controversial actions from both sides.

Foraging War

His momentum halted after the Battle of Searcy Landing, Curtis ordered his generals Steele, Carr, and Osterhaus, to send out scouting and foraging expeditions to ascertain enemy strength and improve their supply situation. These foraging and scouting forays exposed the Army of the Southwest to a newly popular form of warfare in Arkansas: that of the guerilla. The history of the 9^th Illinois Cavalry (in Steele’s Division), lists several such encounters. On one May day a private E.J. Jenkins “was foully murdered” by a party of bushwhackers, who had secreted themselves in a corn-crib at Cotton Plant. Another Illinoisan rushed ahead to avenge his partner, but was killed himself. Jenkins did not actually die immediately, but lingered on another day with five bullet wounds.[1]

Curtis and his generals discussed the recent surge of guerilla attacks. Osterhaus’ Third Division had gotten the worst of them, and the German-American was outraged by the treatment of Federal prisoners. The guerillas often beat and mutilated them before killing them. Curtis was similarly outraged and gave Osterhaus and his men permission to forego mercy. “…Such villains” are “not to be taken as prisoners.”[2]

Arkansas Summer Campaign Part 1: Operations around Searcy

Many historians like to write that people overlook the Trans-Mississippi theatre of the Civil War. While not as heavily covered as other parts of the war, there has actually been quite a bit written on it in the past 30 to 40 years. Scholarship has greatly expanded on Sibley’s New Mexico Campaign, Pea Ridge, Prairie Grove, and the battles in Indian Territory. Even when these books and articles began to pop up there had been a good amount on Wilson’s Creek and the Red River campaign. However, there are parts that are still rarely covered. This post gets into one of these parts.

The Arkansas summer campaign of 1862 is barely covered in histories. It was nestled between the Pea Ridge and Prairie Grove Campaigns, each centered around a large and significant battle. General Samuel Curtis’ drive to take Little Rock, the capital of Arkansas, mostly saw skirmishes and a handful of smaller, if intense, battles. It’s most prominent place in the histories is the last chapter of William Shea’s Pea Ridge: Civil War Campaign in the West. Because the campaign failed to seriously alter the course of the Civil War, it is understandably overlooked. However it in fact gave the Confederates another chance to turn the tide in the Trans-Mississippi and the small skirmishes and battles can still be interesting to study.

Curtis after Pea Ridge

On March 6-8, General Earl Van Dorn’s attempt to restore Confederate fortunes in Missouri came to an end at the Battle of Pea Ridge. After his defeat, Van Dorn was ordered to bring his army east of the Mississippi and help stop General Ulysses S. Grant’s momentum in Tennessee. The Union Army of the Southwest, the victor of Pea Ridge, was bloodied and far out on its supply line, so it withdrew back into Missouri. General Samuel Curtis, its commander, was enthused at having scored a victory. In his previous tenure in the Army he had failed to experience any combat. He had gotten a good deal of it and also come off with a major success. Feelings were high.

Stand Watie's Raid and the Second Battle of Cabin Creek

 

This is the last of a series looking at the battles that involved the 1^st Kansas Colored Regiment. After their participation in the Camden Expedition (read here), they returned to garrison and fatigue duties. With a year still left in the war and their placement in war-torn Indian Territory, it was inevitable that they would experience more violence in some form. This occurred during a major raid of northern Indian Territory, conducted by Cherokee Colonel Stand Watie and the Texan General Richard Gano. This raid climaxed with an assault on a wagon train at Cabin Creek, the sight of a 1^st Kansas victory. Though this blog post is centered around the Second Battle of Cabin Creek, the 1^st Kansas was only present in two smaller, related incidents. The first was a fight and massacre at Flat Rock Creek and the second a brief encounter after the raid in which the infantry did not engage. For the historical background of Cabin Creek, I refer you to my post on the July battle there.

Back in Indian Territory, the men in the 1^st Kansas Colored found themselves working in hay collecting detachments. This hay fed the horses, mules, cows, and other animal essential for transporting supplies or providing food and milk. These detachments were constant targets of raids and many small fights ensued. In these casualty-light skirmishes, either the Federals drove off the mounted raiders with a few volleys or the Confederates got to the hay and set it on fire. Since the assailants came in small bands, the Federals were not prepared for any sizeable raiding force. This is one factor that would lead to disaster in September of 1864.[1]

 

Wagons for Indian Territory

Stand Watie

In three years of war, Indian Territory was in a bad place. Battles, raids, internecine violence, and theft had absolutely devastated the countryside. Most of the Indians still living in the warzone were soldiers themselves. The families of pro-Union soldiers sought refuge in Kansas and those on the other side went to Texas. Neutral Indians either tried to lay low or took refuge with the others. Thousands of pro-Union refugees remained in Indian Territory and clustered around Fort Gibson. This boosted the logistical drain on the Union’s Trans-Mississippi forces and necessitated continual supply runs. In the summer of 1864 the Arkansas River flooded, enabling steamboats to travel in. This was a swifter alternative to long, dragging wagon trains.[2]

Both sides found themselves in straitened circumstances, but the Confederates had the worst of it. Their morale throughout Indian Territory was at an all-time low. Desertions occurred at an alarming rate, and so many of the quitters were going over to join the Union side that one general groused it would be better to simply hunt them down and kill them as soon as they ran off. [3] Desperate to turn things around, Colonel Stand Watie, the head of the pro-Confederate Cherokees, had been pushing for a major raid since the start of the 1864. One officer, reporting the Indian’s request “to create a diversion with the enemy” between Forts Smith and Gibson, commented, “This has been a favorite expedition with Colonel Watie for some time.”[4]

The Poison Spring Massacre (April 18, 1864) part 2

If you have not read the first half, look here.

Below are two images from reenactments of the battle. I doubt they recreate the massacre for family audiences.

Final Push

On the Union left Companies C and I, 1^st Kansas Colored, saw about a hundred men in blue coats pass along their front. They assumed they were from the 2^nd Kansas Cavalry as well as sharpshooters from the 18^th Iowa. They were soon corrected when hundreds of Confederate cavalry appeared alongside them Cabell had ordered Crawford, who to this point had only skirmished, to move all of his available men forward. Gibbons “immediately ordered the men to fire, which was kept up for a few minutes only, but with such effect as to check the enemy’s advance.” Among the men commended in Gibbons’ report was First Sergeant Berry, a black officer who urged his men to think of freedom and hold their place.[1]

Gibbons ordered his men 60 yards back. They fired a volley, but made another withdrawal when they saw the rest of the regiment in retreat. Crawford’s Confederates “moved rapidly and steadily forward, firing volley upon volley” at the black troops. Gibbons attempted to mount his horse. He tripped on his saber halfway up and the horse “became scared and dragged me about 5 yards.” His infantry left him behind and he was left alone against the on-rush of screaming Rebels. “I need not say I mounted quick and rode away quicker.”[2]

The Poison Spring Massacre (April 18, 1864) part 1

 

On April 18, 1864, the 1^st Kansas Colored Regiment faced its worst day. A foraging expedition turned into a desperate battle, and the battle concluded with their heaviest losses. While many of the former slaves and their white officers fell in combat, the worst came after the battle had been lost. The wounded were targeted for a racial and revenge-motivated killing spree at the hands of the victors. The Battle of Poison Spring was not the largest battle of General Frederick Steele’s Camden Expedition in Arkansas, but it gained an infamous place in Civil War history. Arkansas citizens in the area did not call it a battle, but the Poison Spring Massacre. It helped usher in 1864 as perhaps the cruelest year of the Civil War.

The Northern Hook

The Camden Expedition was in fact part of the Red River Campaign. Major-General Henry W. Halleck, Chief-of-Staff of the Army, was determined to see the conquest of Texas and its cotton bundles. General Ulysses Grant, recently promoted to Lieutenant-General over all Federal forces, had wanted Major-General Nathaniel Banks (one of several notoriously incompetent political generals), to descend upon Mobile, Alabama, one of the last functioning major ports in the South. Halleck, however, won his case for Banks to advance on Texas instead. There were legitimate military objectives. Texas, largely untouched beyond its Gulf coastline, contained vast amounts of cattle and other supplies that it could still slip east past the Union-occupied Mississippi River. Also, the Lincoln Administration still feared that the French, waging their war in Mexico just to the south, might still potentially form an alliance with the Confederacy. A large Federal presence in Texas could dissuade this. More controversially there were political and economic motives as well. Lincoln hoped to install a pro-Union government in conquered Texan territory that would of course in turn hold pro-Lincoln voters. Above all the Federals coveted Texas’ vast amounts of cotton. Since Texas had a land border with Mexico, it could bypass the Union naval blockade and send cotton directly to French and Mexican middlemen.

The First Battle of Cabin Creek (June 30-July 2, 1863)

 

This is something of a follow-up to my post on the Battle of Island Mound. This covers the next significant battle of the 1^st Kansas at Cabin Creek. Though I am going through the regiment’s battles, this post is not primarily focused on them outside the opening. While the Battle of Cabin Creek saw more men and had more significance in a strategic sense, I actually found even less information on the fighting itself then I did on Island Mound.  Thus this is more of a prelude on a planned future post covering the Battle of Honey Springs.

 

The 1^st Kansas Joins the U.S. Army

After Island Mound, the 1^st Kansas Colored Regiment saw no action for a long while. It still experienced a major event at the start of 1863. Lincoln’s Emancipation Proclamation went into effect. This proclamation declared all slaves in rebellious territories free and further authorized the use of black soldiers in the armed services. The 1^st Kansas Colored Regiment was now officially recognized as part of the US Army and would also receive Federal pay. On January 8 Brigadier-General General James G. Blunt, who was assigned command of the Department of Kansas and was expected to deal with the mostly Confederate-held Indian Territory, personally inspected the regiment at Fort Scott. The order and discipline of the soldiers impressed him and Blunt determined to utilize them when for his major 1863 campaign.

Price's Northern Offensive (August-September, 1861), Part III: The Fall of Lexington

 

Dave Gallon's Battle of the Hemp Bales

No Relief

September 19 saw a return to sporadic shooting. One reason for the lowered intensity of the fighting was an intercepted Federal message. From it Price learned of Sturgis’ relief column, only a few miles away. He sent Parsons and Jackson’s divisions north to block him. While they moved out, Price shifted his men around, trying to find the most advantageous position from which to launch another assault. Guardsmen with squirrel rifles perched themselves on tree limbs. These sharpshooters had a good view of the Federals in their trenches and caused “many hasty and shallow burials.” When the battle was over, one of these poorly dug graves resulted in a protruding foot.[1]

The situation grew ever more desperate for the defenders. Throughout the 18^th, 19^th, and 20^th no reinforcements appeared to relieve them. Water was running low and many of the wounded were suffering the agony of thirst. On every day the two sides engaged in shootouts, which the defenders had to fight “without water, their parched lips cracking, their tongues swollen, and the blood running down their chins when they bit their cartridges and the saltpeter entered their blistered lips”. Fortunately there were brief rainfalls. As their water sources were gradually cut off, the defenders spread their blankets on the ground to collect the rainwater. Once the blankets were saturated, they “wrung them in their camp-dishes.” Bevier recalled how the Federals would send out a woman to collect water for them. Though the State Guardsmen were “rough and uncouth” and given to hurling “profane language” at the female, they  could not bring themselves to shoot her, and any attempt to stop her physically resulted in fire from the Federal works.[2]

Price's Northern Offensive (August-September, 1861), Part II: The Siege of Lexington

The Fight of September 13

The Missouri State Guard was in sight of Lexington. Price wasted little time in attempting to seize the town. He deployed his infantry and artillery and gunned for a bridge which would quickly take his force into the town. When the Rebels crossed the bridge, Mulligan sent out two companies of the 13^th Missouri as well as company K of the 23^rd Illinois. The two sides confronted each other within the cornfields of farmer Isaac Hockaday, the Federals behind hemp bales and the State Guardsmen behind a fence. Hockaday had gone out to look for his neighbor so they could organize an evacuation. Instead he found himself cut off from his family as his corn field turned into a fire zone. Later reflecting on the chaos around his and his neighbors’ homes, and the ensuing destruction to their property, he wrote sadly, “I feel as if we had better lost all of our negroes than suffered as we have already…” Price withdrew from the indecisive skirmish. The Federals took advantage of this break in action to burn the bridge. With more of his army pulling up, Price changed the direction of his attack. He wheeled his army to come from the west on Independence Road.[1]

Price’s new avenue of attack scattered some cavalry pickets. Six companies of Federal infantry exited the town to meet the Guardsmen, hiding in hedges and cornfields on the east side of the road. At the head of Price’s force were horse soldiers. The Federals held their fire until they were just about 150 yards away. Then they revealed themselves. The sudden deluge of fire frightened the horses and the cavalry had to spur away. This gave the infantry problems. The horses ran over a couple unfortunates and others had to run to get out of the way. This also meant they went into battle with a distinct air of confusion, not helped by the well-concealed Federals in the cornfield. After getting behind the infantry, the cavalrymen got off their unreliable mounts and returned to the front to fight it out on foot.[2]

Price's Northern Offensive (August-September, 1861), Part I: The Roads to Lexington

 

When noon struck on August 10, 1861, the hills and fields around Wilson’s Creek were covered with the dead, dying, and maimed. The Confederate Army, along with the allied Missouri State Guard, had won the second major battle of the Civil War. Earlier that year Missouri had voted to stay in the Union, but only as a neutral bystander in the emerging conflict. Unconditional Unionists and Secessionists alike had other plans, trying to seize control of Missouri’s arsenals. The pro-Confederate governor, Claiborne Jackson reorganized the militia into the Missouri State Guard and placed it under the command of former governor, state senator, and Mexican War veteran Sterling Price. The State Guard was ostensibly meant to protect Missouri’s armed neutrality and after the start of hostilities to protect the state from Federal intervention without necessarily joining the Confederacy. As a result many of the men in its ranks favored their home state over the idea of a Confederate nation and some even switched sides when they felt that it was better for Missouri to stay in the Union.

Sterling Price, command of the State Guard. Before
the war he was a prominent politicians who served
in both Missouri and the US House of Representatives
as well as governor of Missouri from 1853 to 1857.

The Missouri State Guard consisted on nine divisions, each representing one of nine military districts. These were not proper divisions, being all over the place in size. Most were brigade-sized, save for the Eighth Division which included thousands of Bushwhackers and other participants as well as victims of Bleeding Kansas. Between the lack of Federal funding, inconsistent Confederate support, and fast-moving events, the State Guard was chronically short on supplies, logistics, and time for drill and discipline.

The Battle of Island Mound (October 29, 1862)

Well before the 54^th Massachusetts stormed Fort Wagner and well before contrabands-turned-soldiers repulsed a Confederate assault at Milliken’s Bend, a regiment of black soldiers, many of them only recently escaped from slavery, fought and bled against Rebel forces, near the Kansas-Missouri border. Far from the central command in Washington D.C., Unionists in the Trans-Mississippi were able to act somewhat independently. This unfortunately resulted in violent guerilla bands called Jayhawkers, who entered into a mutual war of terror with Rebel Bushwhackers. There was a positive, however, the first regiment of black soldiers. This unit, the 1^st Kansas Colored, was hastily formed and entered into battle before Lincoln even authorized the creation of black regiments. Their trial of fire was the Battle of Island Mound, a furious skirmish with Confederate partisans in western Missouri.

This battle is mostly known simply for being the first use of a full black regiment in a Civil War battle. There are scant sources on it and actual primary sources can be counted on one hand. I plan to make this an ongoing series that covers the battle history of the 1^st Kansas. Not only was it the first true, if unauthorized, black regiment to fight for the Union, it fought in the Trans-Mississippi theatre (my area of focus), and in contrast to the more famous 54^th Massachusetts actually had a good win-loss record.