Thursday, March 31, 2022

The Poison Spring Massacre (April 18, 1864) part 1

 

On April 18, 1864, the 1st Kansas Colored Regiment faced its worst day. A foraging expedition turned into a desperate battle, and the battle concluded with their heaviest losses. While many of the former slaves and their white officers fell in combat, the worst came after the battle had been lost. The wounded were targeted for a racial and revenge-motivated killing spree at the hands of the victors. The Battle of Poison Spring was not the largest battle of General Frederick Steele’s Camden Expedition in Arkansas, but it gained an infamous place in Civil War history. Arkansas citizens in the area did not call it a battle, but the Poison Spring Massacre. It helped usher in 1864 as perhaps the cruelest year of the Civil War.


The Northern Hook


The Camden Expedition was in fact part of the Red River Campaign. Major-General Henry W. Halleck, Chief-of-Staff of the Army, was determined to see the conquest of Texas and its cotton bundles. General Ulysses Grant, recently promoted to Lieutenant-General over all Federal forces, had wanted Major-General Nathaniel Banks (one of several notoriously incompetent political generals), to descend upon Mobile, Alabama, one of the last functioning major ports in the South. Halleck, however, won his case for Banks to advance on Texas instead. There were legitimate military objectives. Texas, largely untouched beyond its Gulf coastline, contained vast amounts of cattle and other supplies that it could still slip east past the Union-occupied Mississippi River. Also, the Lincoln Administration still feared that the French, waging their war in Mexico just to the south, might still potentially form an alliance with the Confederacy. A large Federal presence in Texas could dissuade this. More controversially there were political and economic motives as well. Lincoln hoped to install a pro-Union government in conquered Texan territory that would of course in turn hold pro-Lincoln voters. Above all the Federals coveted Texas’ vast amounts of cotton. Since Texas had a land border with Mexico, it could bypass the Union naval blockade and send cotton directly to French and Mexican middlemen.

General Nathaniel Banks, with the aid of Rear-Admiral David Porter’s fleet, would proceed up the Red River. Halleck searched about for other forces to bolster the invasion numbers and ensure success. He selected General Frederick Steele and his army in Arkansas. He desired Steele to march south into Louisiana and link up with Banks at Shreveport in the same state. Steele was reluctant, citing the difficulties of marching through rural Arkansas. To work in conjunction with Banks, he would have to march his men over bad roads through a region with little forage and plenty of anti-Union guerillas. Of course he had no choice but to obey, with even the President eager to see the campaign executed. Steele would not be able to start until April, when Banks’ campaign was already well under way.[1]

Frederick Steele

Unlike the politician-turned-general Banks, Frederick Steele was a true soldier, a West Point graduate. He started off the war with just a battalion at the 1861 Battle of Wilson’s Creek, Missouri. He participated in various operations along the Mississippi River, finally rising to divisional commander in the Vicksburg Campaign. Once that city fell, he came to Arkansas and assumed command of all Federal forces in the state. There his army had an easy time of it, quickly taking Little Rock and then staying put for a while. His men enjoyed their stay at Little Rock, finding it the sole pleasant place in Arkansas. Despite this they were not fans of their commander, whose soft treatment of pro-Confederate civilians came to paint him as a secret opponent of the Union war effort.[2]

To get to Shreveport, Steele was to march through the rest of Arkansas. First he would go southwest towards Arkadelphia with 8,500 men. There he would link up with the Frontier Division, 4,000 men, under Brigadier-General John M. Thayer. Thayer was not a West Pointer, but had been a brigadier-general in the Nebraska territorial militia against the Pawnees. He spent the first two years of the war under General Grant and rose to command of a division in the Vicksburg Campaign. Like Steele he was sent west along with an upgrade in command. He now controlled the District of the Frontier, including units in Indian Territory and western Arkansas.[3] Among these was the 1st Kansas Colored. Since helping conquer Indian Territory they had been involved in garrison duties. These included protecting Unionists and freed slaves, getting farms started, and replenishing losses with new recruits. They also went through the drama of divisions among white Unionists (over whether or not to embrace radical Republican policies) and personal disputes among their officers.[4] Now they were to embark on their highest-profile campaign, a campaign which many politicians and generals hoped would shorten the war.

John Milton Thayer in bust and photo. Thayer was an ardent Republican and
was one of the first two senators from Nebraska after it achieved statehood.

Steele’s force, after a late start of a couple days, reached Arkadelphia on March 29, but Thayer failed to meet him on time. Waiting a couple more days, he continued on without the Frontier Division. There were several reasons for Thayer’s delay. One was the fact that his recently created division was spread all around Indian Territory and needed time to consolidate. They were currently low on extra provisions. This meant that they would have to continually stop and forage. Next was the mountainous terrain, which Thayer probably accounted for in planning out his march. Less under his control were heavy rains which turned stretches of roads between the Arkansas hills into mudholes. Sappers and miners with the Frontier Division had to constantly make these roads passable. They also had to remove various man-made obstacles, the Confederates having felled trees at difficult spots. Then there were the Southern partisans. These small bands watched Thayer’s men from afar and made quick attacks if they felt they had an isolated target. The firefights that broke out favored the Federals, as they were armed with long range rifles and Sharps carbines. The citizenry in general was unnerved by the presence of 1st Kansas Colored Regiment. Colored troops had served in the state, but only on garrison and labor duties. This was the first time black soldiers had entered the state to seek out and fight the enemy.[5]

 


On the Confederate side, Major-General Sterling Price (left) assumed command in Arkansas on March 16. Price was a Missourian and had led his state’s militia army in the first year of the war. His predecessor, Theophilus Holmes, had been removed for stated reasons of poor health. Though indeed suffering physically, he had also proven widely incompetent in managing Rebel forces in Arkansas. Price also had his critics. He was an obstinate individual who constantly butted heads with his peers and alternately created consternation and suspicion with his ceaseless calls for a campaign to liberate his home state from Federal authority. General Edmund Kirby Smith, overall head of the Confederacy’s Trans-Mississippi Department, only viewed him as a temporary replacement. Regardless, Price would still have a chance to prove himself in battle. With Steele marching south through Arkansas, Smith instructed Price to hold off the Federals until General Richard Taylor in Louisiana and East Texas hopefully stopped Banks’ invasion.[6]

With much of his men sent south to contest Banks, Price only had around 3,200 cavalrymen to contest over 12,000 Federals. Unwilling to risk a full battle with his comparatively petty force, he sent John Marmaduke and Jo Shelby on raids to harass and slow down Steele. Price suspected that Steele was heading for the Confederacy’s new Arkansas capital at Camden, a commercial center and the second largest city in the state, and accordingly moved his men up to Prairie D’Ane to block the way. While Steele in fact only viewed the capital as a stepping stone towards reaching Shreveport, following events would see his campaign become the Camden Expedition.[7]

 

Thayer’s Frontier Division finally linked up with Steele’s column on April 6, just south of the Little Missouri River. Though this gave Steele an even more commanding advantage in numbers, Thayer brought few rations to feed all of the extra mouths. With his enlarged army facing a food crisis, Steele sent a message to Little Rock requesting 30 days’ rations for 15,000 men, then headed for the main Confederate force at Prairie D’Ane. The following march of Steele’s combined force was very unpleasant. Frequent rains turned the roads to mud. At one point they had to avoid the road altogether and wade through Cypress Bayou.[8]

Price was expecting his own reinforcements from the west. These came in the form of Brigadier-General Samuel B. Maxey’s Division from Indian Territory. Maxey was a former superintendent of Indian Affairs. In December of 1863, the end of a disastrous year for the Confederates in Indian Territory, Kirby Smith removed the incompetent William Steele (no relation to Frederick Steele). He promoted Maxey to his place and charged him with restoring Rebel fortunes in his region. In response to calls for reinforcements, he brought Colonel Tandy Walker’s Choctaw Brigade (made up of Choctaw Indians) and all his white troops, three regiments of Texas Cavalry and a battery. Price also received a cavalry division under Brigadier-General James F. Fagan.[9]

On April 13 Maxey’s force linked up with Price. Price immediately threw Maxey and Fagan’s divisions in the direction of the town of Moscow. General Thomas Dockery’s brigade, out front, assaulted Federal forces lined up amidst timber and took a battery. The Federals pushed back with superior numbers and retook the guns. Despite beating off Dockery’s assault, the Federals themselves were outnumbered by Price’s force in its entirety and retreated from Moscow. Price learned that he was gain more reinforcements. Down south Banks’ attempted invasion of Texas had floundered and he was now in retreat, pursued by General Richard Taylor. Porter’s fleet had gotten trapped in receded waters, along with the infantry. Taylor urged Kirby Smith to send more men so he could annihilate the trapped and highly vulnerable Red River Expedition. Smith, however, saw Steele’s expedition in Arkansas as the more pressing threat and diverted not only reinforcements, but parts of Taylor’s army as well, to meet it. This enraged Taylor and most historians agree that Smith blundered in failing to seize the opportunity to bag both an entire Federal fleet and army.[10]

In a post-war article for Battles and Leaders of the Civil War, Smith argued in defense of his decision. “I deemed it imprudent to follow Banks…with my whole force, and leave Steele so near Shreveport. Even had I been able to throw Banks across the Atchafalaya, the high water of that stream would have arrested my farther progress….I confidently hoped, if I could reach Steele with my infantry, to beat him at a distance from his depot, in a poor country, and with my large cavalry force to destroy his army. The prize would have been the Arkansas Valley and the powerful fortifications of Little Rock. Steele’s defeat or retreat would leave me in position promptly to support Taylor’s operations against Banks.” Picking apart Smith’s argument is a subject for another time. What’s important was that Steele’s situation in Arkansas was getting rather dicey.[11]

 

Food Shortages

Despite Fagan and Maxey’s additional men, Price still refused to give battle and instead retreated. Steele’s army reached Prairie D’Ane to find no one, then, on April 15, following a brief encounter with Marmaduke’s cavalry, reached Camden to find it likewise abandoned. The town was a hotbed of secessionism and civilian reaction was horrified. One wrote, “The awful day of all days – the dread event feared for years. About 6 O’clock, an enemy infuriated by combat & hunger came rushing down our main street and diverging into the cross streets.” These was a special flavor to this occupation that surely infuriated the good citizens of Camden. The 1st Kansas Colored and its sister regiment the 2nd Kansas Colored marched down the streets holding arms. One woman wrote, “Only one thing stirred my Southern blood to heat was when a negro regiment passed my home going to fight our own dear men.” Steele holed up in the town, knowing he could not advance all of his men further without provisions. His men terrorized the locals by barging into their homes and demanding food. With rations for Little Rock not arriving yet, if at all, he sent out foraging expeditions to strip the countryside of food. This set the stage for the Battle of Poison Spring.[12]

On April 16 Colonel James M. Williams learned that he was to lead one such expedition. Over 500 men from his own 1st Kansas Colored was to form the bulk of the team. On April 17, at 5 A.M., the foraging expedition lined up in front of General Thayer’s headquarters. The number of wagons was an impressive 198. The wagons’ escort included over 500 men of the 1st Kansas of course, with Major Richard G. Ward taking specific command. Williams also had under him 75 of the 2nd Kansas Cavalry, 50 from the 6th Kansas Cavalry, 70 of the 14th Kansas Cavalry, and two guns and their crews from the 2nd Indiana Battery. Overall he had nearly 700 men. He was nervous about this mission, feeling exposed in the hostile countryside, and sought to move “as rapidly as possible.”[13]

Williams’ target was 5,000 bushels of corn. Small groups of Confederates saw the Federals coming for the corn and tried to deny them this food. They succeeded in burning about half of the bushels.[14] On the first day of the march Williams’ large wagon train fanned out and collected the remaining corn from the countryside. According to surviving writings from the civilian populace, the white Kansas cavalry behaved abominably, taking not just corn, but ransacking their homes and taking everything from soap to chickens to wedding slippers. There is no record of the actions of the 1st Kansas Colored and historians have taken the positive assumption that they stuck to the mission and did not terrorize the locals. If so, it was likely because they and their officers were aware of how whites would respond to blacks looting whites. A more cynical student might recognize that mounted soldiers operating in small groups away from the base of command would find it much easier to target homes, ransack them, and make a quick getaway then the black infantry that had to stick close to the wagons. Regardless of how restrained these soldiers were, the Confederates would pin the looting on them to justify their actions at Poison Spring.[15]

On the 18th Williams linked up with elements of the 18th Iowa Infantry and more troopers from the 2nd, 6th, and 14th Kansas Cavalry. He also now had an additional two howitzers. This force had already encountered an enemy presence, with Lieutenant Phillips of the 6th Kansas reporting brief fights with scattered Confederate elements. On paper this junction boosted Williams’ command to over 1,000 men. However, they had marched so long that around a hundred of the black infantry were unable to go on while much of the cavalry had gone too far out to be of immediate use.

Since this post is primarily concerned with the Battle of Poison Spring, I will not detail the entire order of battle for the Confederate and Union forces in Arkansas, just the groups involved. This is the Union order of battle for Poison Spring. It was made up of units from all three of Thayer’s brigades.

Colonel James M. Williams


            18th Iowa: Captain William M. Duncan

            1st Kansas Colored Infantry: Major Richard C. Ward

            2nd Kansas Cavalry (two detachments): Lieutenants Mitchell & Ross

            6th Kansas Cavalry (two detachments): Lieutenants Henderson & Phillips

            14th Kansas Cavalry (two detachments):Lieutenants Utt & Smith

2nd Indiana Battery: Lieutenant W.W. Haines[16]

 

The Confederates Get Wind

This is a general overview of Confederate forces, with a specific order of battle for those at Poison Spring. On the Confederate side Price commanded cavalry divisions under Brigadier-General James F. Fagan, Brigadier-General John S. Marmaduke, and Brigadier-General Samuel B. Maxey. Infantry included Brigadier-General Mosby M. Parsons’ Missouri Division, Major General John G. Walker’s Texas Division, Brigadier-General Thomas J. Churchill’s Arkansas Division, and a brigade under Colonel William A. Crawford. Here is the specific force engaged at Poison Spring. Marmaduke had initial command, but Maxey had seniority and assumed command once he arrived on the field. Thus I have chosen to list Maxey’s Division first.

Brigadier-General Samuel B. Maxey (Commander)


            Gano’s Brigade: Colonel Charles DeMorse

                        29th Texas: Major J.A. Carroll

                        30th Texas: Lieutenant-Colonel N.W. Battle

                        31st Texas: Major Michael Looscan

                        Welch’s Texas Company: Lieutenant Frank M. Gano

                        Texas Battery: Captain W. Butler Krumbhaar

            Second Indian Brigade: Colonel Tandy Walker

                        1st Regiment: Lieutenant-Colonel James Riley

                        2nd Regiment: Colonel Simpson W. Folsom

Brigadier-General John S. Marmaduke


            Greene’s Brigade: Colonel Colton Greene

                        3rd Missouri: Lieutenant-Colonel L.A. Campbell

                        4th Missouri: Lieutenant-Colonel William J. Preston

                        7th Missouri: Colonel Solomon G. Kitchen

                        8th Missouri: Colonel William L. Jeffers

                        10th Missouri: Colonel Robert R. Lawther

                        Missouri Battery: Captain S.S. Harris

            Shelby’s Iron Brigade: Brigadier-General Joseph O. Shelby

                        1st Missouri Battalion: Major Benjamin Elliott

                        5th Missouri: Colonel B. Frank Gordon

                        11th Missouri: Colonel M.W. Smith

                        12th Missouri: Colonel David Shanks

                        Hunter’s Missouri Regiment: Colonel De Witt C. Hunter

                        Missouri Battery: Captain Richard A. Collins

Brigadier-General James F. Fagan (Brigadier-General William L. Cabell commanding)

            Cabell’s Brigade: Brigadier-General William L. Cabell

                        1st Arkansas: Colonel James C. Monroe

                        2nd Arkansas: Colonel T.J. Morgan

                        4th Arkansas: Colonel A. Gordon

                        7th Arkansas: Colonel John F. Hill

                        Arkansas Battalion: Lieutenant-Colonel Thomas M. Gunter

                        7th Arkansas Field Battery: Lieutenant William D. Blocher

            Crawford’s Brigade: Colonel William A. Crawford

                        2nd Arkansas: Captain O.B. Tebbs

                        Crawford’s Arkansas Regiment: Colonel William A. Crawford

                        Wright’s Arkansas Regiment: Colonel John C. Wright

                        Arkansas Battalion: Major James T. Poe

                        Arkansas Battalion: Major E.L. McMurtrey[17]

 

On April 17 scouts from Colonel Colton Greene’s brigade spotted Williams’ foraging expedition and reported to Marmaduke. Marmaduke planned to strike the wagon train, but learned that its guard was actually quite heavy. He only had about 500 men on hand. He called for Fagan to come to his aid. Then through Fagan he messaged Price for reinforcements. Price sent Maxey’s division. The size of the various units involved varied widely. Cabell’s brigade, for example, had 1,200 men while Crawford’s had a mere 300. The Confederate Indian Brigade consisted of only two regiments, with about 700 men between them (Choctaw regiments had lost much of their men after the disastrous defeat at Honey Springs the previous summer). Overall they would still dwarf Williams’ thousand plus force. The Confederate leaders hoped not only to destroy the Federal foragers, but also seize what by then would be vehicles loaded with food.[18]

There is a minor controversy over whether Williams was aware of the intercepting force. In the Daily Topeka, about two years later, Major Richard Ward claimed that local slaves had warned him of Marmaduke’s force, but Williams assured him there was no danger. Ward accused Williams of fatal negligence. Williams responded to Ward’s article, saying that he had in fact known of the enemy force. By claiming this he had to confess that he lied, but only to maintain his officers and his men’s confidence by not frightening them. Ian Michael Spurgeon, a historian who covered the 1st Kansas Colored, disbelieves Williams’ explanation, arguing that Ward and others in the regiment, who had stood firmly in hot fights at Island Mound and Honey Springs, would not have had a serious break in morale if they learned of an impending attack. He believes that Williams chose to admit to lying rather than claim an ignorance that exposed his men to a heinous atrocity.[19]

The Federals came upon a thin line of Marmaduke’s pickets. They pursued them to a much more sizeable picket line. This was Cabell’s brigade. Williams halted the wagon train, parking it as close as possible, and sent its guards up to bolster his line. Their location, near Poison Spring, “was in thick timber and Cypress Swamps.” The former terrain feature provided some wonderful cover and obscured the fact that their force was much smaller than the enemy’s. The latter feature made it difficult for larger forces to maneuver. While this constrained the Federals, it also prevented the Confederates from fully enveloping them. The opposing lines on the north end of the field were bisected by the road to Camden. In the Federal rear was Lee’s Plantation.[20]

Cabell sent the 2nd Arkansas Cavalry two miles back to detect and delay any enemy reinforcements from Camden. On the main line of battle he put his own brigade on the left of the road, Crawford’s on the right, and his artillery in the center. Around this point Maxey arrived and, having seniority, assumed overall command. However he recognized that Marmaduke, having been on the field longer, would have more knowledge of the ground and the enemy. He “consulted with him freely and with great advantage.” Maxey’s division took position on the south, perpendicular to the rest of the Rebel force, with DeMorse’s Texans on the right and Tandy Walker’s Choctaws on the left. Colonel Greene’s brigade also arrived and Marmaduke placed it a mile to Cabell’s rear as a reserve. Greene forwarded Captain Harris’ Missouri Battery to aid Crawford’s brigade.[21]

Williams was not yet aware of the numbers arrayed against him. He had two guns from the 2nd Indiana Battery deployed  they opened fire to see if the enemy had any guns of their own and how many. This little barrage also provided time and cover for various foraging parties to rush back and further strengthen Williams’ line. There was no artillery response, only some fire from the Confederate skirmishers. Williams centered his line, of course, on the 1st Kansas, his own regiment and the largest unit at his disposal. It faced east, though the unfolding battle would see its right flank turn at an angle to form a backwards “L.” He placed the cavalry on his flanks, part of the 14th Kansas on the left and parts of the 2nd and 6th on the right. Captain Duncan and his detachment of the 18th Iowa was to stay in the rear with the train, the howitzers, and the rest of the cavalry. They were “to keep a sharp lookout” for any additional Confederates who might get into Williams’ flank and rear.[22]

 

The Main Stand-Off


Maxey planned an all-out assault with his division on the left, but had difficulty getting it to start thanks to the rough, brush-covered terrain, particularly the wooded ravine between them and the enemy. His own division struggled to get into place to assail the enemy right, one Texan remembering “we were somewhat retarded by the dense thickets, and undergrowth on our route, and frequent halts had to be made to reform our necessarily broken line.” He estimated that his attack began half an hour late. Colonel DeMorse noted that he struggled to find a suitable spot for Krumbhaar’s howitzers. His and Tandy Walker’s dismounted cavalry “found great difficulty in preserving alignment and connection. The ground was very irregular and brushy, and at one time Captain Krumbhaar sent me word that he could not move the battery any further.” Krumbhaar solved his problem by having some of his men pull the thick saplings out of the way so the pieces could be moved up.[23]

One Texan, losing sight of the rest of his unit while navigating the brush, mistakenly walked into Williams’ line and asked for Colonel DeMorse. From this information the colonel deduced that he was an enemy soldier who had gotten separated and lost from his unit. From him he learned he was facing part of Price’s force, and judging from how he phrased it in his report may have mistakenly concluded that Price was personally conducting the battle himself.[24]

The Kansas cavalry Williams’ right flank advanced 400 yards “when a brisk fire of musketry was opened upon them from the brush, which they returned with true gallantry.” Their opponent was the 29th Texas Cavalry, the same unit that had suffered defeat at the hands of the 1st Kansas Colored at Honey Springs. They had climbed up a “steep ascent” and taken position along a fence, from which they now blasted away at the white Kansan cavalry. DeMorse’s Confederates got the better of this encounter, unhorsing many Federals and also wounding Lieutenant Henderson of the 6th Kansas in the stomach. The Federal cavalry fell back. DeMorse ordered his skirmishers to advance through a hollow and motioned Krumbhaar’s Battery to a hilltop at the edge of the field.[25]

With the cavalry falling back on both flanks, Williams changed the position of the 1st Kansas. The Federal line “was now nearly in the form of the segment of a circle, the convex side being outward or toward the enemy.” The center and left companies of the 1st Kansas faced east against Marmaduke, with two companies on the right facing “due south” against Maxey.[26] A six-gun battery bombarded the north and center of the colored troops while 4 howitzers struck the southern flank. According to Major Ward, this was “the severest artillery fire that” the 1st Kansas Colored had ever been under.[27]

With the Kansas Colored Volunteers hard pressed, Williams sent a message to Captain Duncan ordering up four of his companies. Duncan was unable to comply, stating that he himself was pressed by Maxey’s Division and could not spare any men. Phillips’ detachment of 20 men from the 6th Kansas, taking position in some timber, had spotted an approaching Confederate regiment supported by two guns. Duncan wheeled his infantry into an orchard by the road to face this fresh foe.[28]

The Confederate artillery was terribly effective, firing from the Federals’ front and right. This produced “an incessant and well-directed cross-fire of shot and shell.” Ward was able to reduce casualties among the 1st Kansas Colored by ordering them to lie down behind the crest of the rise they occupied. This concealed them from the enemy artillery, throwing off their aim. This ended when one shell fragment hit a soldier between the shoulders. The victim “jumped up and spun around for a moment in great agony.” One of the Confederate artillery officers saw this happen and, having the range of the 1st Kansas, adjusted the guns accordingly. The adjusted barrage “swept nearly every foot of the ground a few paces in front of the colored infantry.” The 1st Kansas had avoided massive artillery-induced casualties by just a few feet.[29]

Down to the south, Maxey’s Division fell back after a brisk firefight with the rightmost companies of the 1st Kansas. The Federal musketry, a blend of bullets and buckshot, was so hot that DeMorse incorrectly estimated that he was outnumbered (Gregory Urwin suggests that the Confederates might have inflated enemy numbers to cover the fact that under 500 colored troops repeatedly repulsed over 1,000 white troops). At least half of the Texan brigade fell into disarray and ran for the cover of the timber. The assault was renewed when Krumbhaar expertly aimed his howitzers, loaded with shells that had quick two-second fuses, and opened fire. “The effect was immediately discernible” and with a “loud shout” Walker and DeMorse’s brigades moved forward again with much more success.[30]

Tandy Walker

Further west, the Choctaws hesitated to cross the ravine towards the 18th Iowa. Walker (rightly based on DeMorse’s repulse to his right) feared that his men would get tangled in the wooded ravine and make prime targets for Duncan’s Iowans. He also reported enemy cavalry on his left. This was a skirmish line from the 6th Kansas Cavalry. (In one of his articles on the battle, Urwin fails to note the actual presence of the cavalry, arguing that Tandy Walker’s line actually extended past the 18th Iowa. He thus makes the assumption that Walker invented the presence of cavalry in his report to cover his inaction in comparison to DeMorse).[31]

As the Confederate assaults unfolded, Williams realized he was severely outmatched. “…Still I resolved to defend the train to the last hoping that re-enforcements would come up from Camden.”[32] From the east Cabell’s brigade advanced. Once the Confederates were within 100 yards, the opposing companies 1st Kansas opened fire. For about 15 minutes the sides exchanged shots until the Rebels fell back. The Confederates quickly collected themselves “and, their artillery again unleashing their “infernal cross-fires,” advanced against [Williams’] lines, this time with colors flying and continuous cheering, so loud as to drown even the roar of the musketry.”[33] The next round of fighting lasted about as long as the last, a quarter hour, and was reported by Williams to have “raged with desperate fury.” The 29th Texas in particular was filled with rage when, finally able to close in on their foe, recognized their tormentors from Honey Springs. One or more of them shouted, “You First Kansas Niggers now buck to the Twenty-ninth Texas!”[34]

While their comrades weathered the assaults of DeMorse and Cabell’s brigades, Companies C and I of the 1st Kansas, under Lieutenant William Gibbons, took position on the far left on the north side of the road alongside one of the guns. They remained outside of the main fight, skirmishing with Crawford’s dismounted cavalry. They knew that Major Ward and the majority of the regiment were heavily engaged, but could not see what was happening thanks to the smoke of battle. The gun they covered ran out of canister and had to resort to solid shot for the remaining duration of the battle.[35]

With mounting casualties and still no reinforcements from Camden in sight, Williams prepared for a retreat. Major Ward was left to manage the main firing line while Williams rode for the 18th Iowa. He intended to reposition them to cover the withdrawal. Along the way he ordered the 2nd Indiana guns back as too many artillerists had been killed and wounded. After he had done this a bullet struck his horse. While Williams waited for a fresh mount, the Indianan gunners got off one last “parting shot.” Private Alonzo Hinshaw double-loaded his gun with canister and fired a blast that had a “terrific” impact. This halted the Confederate advance, prompting Maxey to finally move forward Greene’s brigade from reserve. Major Ward, knowing that Williams needed to get to the 18th Indiana, gave his superior his horse.[36]

During this incident the 1st Kansas Colored repulsed the Confederates once again. Williams reported that about half of Ward’s firing line was killed or wounded, yet bragged later on in a newspaper article that their ranks were still perfectly formed. He claimed that the soldiers fixed bayonets and begged, “Colonel, let us charge ‘em!” However brave and resilient they were, it was only a matter of time before the Confederates’ numerical superiority got to work.[37]



[1] Ludwell H. Johnson, Red River Campaign: Politics & Cotton in the Civil War, (Kent State University Press, 1993), 31-35, 40, 85; A more complex look at Federal designs on Texas and some of the earlier campaigns to achieve them can be found in the first couple chapters of Donald Frazier’s Tempest over Texas: The Fall and Winter Campaigns of 1863-1864, (State House Press, 2020)

[2] Thomas A. DeBlack, “An Overview of the Camden Expedition” in All Cut to Pieces and Gone to Hell: The Civil War, Race Relations, and the Battle of Poison Spring, (Little Rock: August House, 2003), 14-15.

[3] Thomas A. DeBlack, “An Overview of the Camden Expedition” in All Cut to Pieces and Gone to Hell: The Civil War, Race Relations, and the Battle of Poison Spring, (Little Rock: August House, 2003), 15; Ezra Warner, Generals in Blue: Lives of the Union Commanders, (Baton Rouge: LSU Press, 1964), 499.

[4] Ian Michael Spurgeon, Soldiers in the Army of Freedom: The 1st Kansas Colored, the Civil War's First African American Combat Unit, (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 2014), 180-193.

[5] Thomas A. DeBlack, “An Overview of the Camden Expedition” in All Cut to Pieces and Gone to Hell: The Civil War, Race Relations, and the Battle of Poison Spring, (Little Rock: August House, 2003), 15; Spurgeon, Army of Freedom, 194; Britton, Union Indian Brigade, 347-348; Gregory J. W. Urwin, “’We Cannot Treat Negroes…as Prisoners of War’: Racial Atrocities and Reprisals in Civil War Arkansas” in Black Flag over Dixie: Racial Atrocities and Reprisals in the Civil War, (Southern Illinois University Press, 2005), 133.

[6] Albert Castel, General Sterling Price and the Civil War in the West, (LSU Press, 1993), 171-173.

[7] Thomas A. DeBlack, “An Overview of the Camden Expedition” in All Cut to Pieces and Gone to Hell: The Civil War, Race Relations, and the Battle of Poison Spring, (Little Rock: August House, 2003), 16, 19; Gregory J.W. Urwin, “Poison Spring and Jenkins’ Ferry: Racial Atrocities during the Camden Expedition” in All Cut to Pieces and Gone to Hell: The Civil War, Race Relations, and the Battle of Poison Spring, (Little Rock: August House, 2003), 107.

[8] Thomas A. DeBlack, “An Overview of the Camden Expedition” in All Cut to Pieces and Gone to Hell: The Civil War, Race Relations, and the Battle of Poison Spring, (Little Rock: August House, 2003), 19; Johnson, Red River Campaign, 171, 179.

[9] Wiley Britton, The Union Indian Brigade in the Civil War, (Kansas City: F. Hudson Publishing Co., 1922), 341-342, 359.

[10] OR XXXIV, part 1, 780-781; Johnson, Red River Campaign, 181-182.

[11] E. Kirby Smith, “The Defense of the Red River” in Battles and Leaders of the Civil War Vol. IV, (New York: Century Company, 1888), 372.

[12] Thomas A. DeBlack, “An Overview of the Camden Expedition” in All Cut to Pieces and Gone to Hell: The Civil War, Race Relations, and the Battle of Poison Spring, (Little Rock: August House, 2003), 19-20; Gregory J.W. Urwin, “Poison Spring and Jenkins’ Ferry: Racial Atrocities during the Camden Expedition” in All Cut to Pieces and Gone to Hell: The Civil War, Race Relations, and the Battle of Poison Spring, (Little Rock: August House, 2003), 107-109.

[13] OR XXXIV, part 1, 743; Spurgeon, Army of Freedom, 197-198.

[14] Gregory J.W. Urwin, “Poison Spring and Jenkins’ Ferry: Racial Atrocities during the Camden Expedition” in All Cut to Pieces and Gone to Hell: The Civil War, Race Relations, and the Battle of Poison Spring, (Little Rock: August House, 2003), 109-110.

[15] OR XXXIV, part 1, 743; Gregory J. W. Urwin, “’We Cannot Treat Negroes…as Prisoners of War’: Racial Atrocities and Reprisals in Civil War Arkansas” in Black Flag over Dixie: Racial Atrocities and Reprisals in the Civil War, (Southern Illinois University Press, 2005), 118, 137-138.

[16] OR XXXIV, part 1, 743-744, 748.

[17] OR XXXIV, part 1, 784-785.

[18] OR XXXIV, part 1, 781, 819, 825, 848.; Gregory J.W. Urwin, “Poison Spring and Jenkins’ Ferry: Racial Atrocities during the Camden Expedition” in All Cut to Pieces and Gone to Hell: The Civil War, Race Relations, and the Battle of Poison Spring, (Little Rock: August House, 2003), 112.

[19] Spurgeon, Army of Freedom, 198-199.

[20] OR XXXIV, part 1, 744; Mark Christ, “War to the Knife,” 402.

[21] OR XXXIV, part 1, 791, 819, 828, 843.

[22] OR XXXIV, part 1, 744.

[23] OR XXXIV, part 1, 842, 846, 849; Spurgeon, Army of Freedom, 202.

[24] OR XXXIV, part 1, 744.

[25] OR XXXIV, part 1, 744, 846-847.

[26] OR XXXIV, part 1, 752; Spurgeon, Army of Freedom, 203.

[27] OR XXXIV, part 1, 752.

[28] OR XXXIV, part 1, 744, 748, 750.

[29] OR XXXIV, part 1, 745; Britton, Union Indian Brigade, 366.

[30] OR XXXIV, part 1, 847; Gregory J.W. Urwin, “Poison Spring and Jenkins’ Ferry: Racial Atrocities during the Camden Expedition” in All Cut to Pieces and Gone to Hell: The Civil War, Race Relations, and the Battle of Poison Spring, (Little Rock: August House, 2003), 117; Gregory J. W. Urwin, “’We Cannot Treat Negroes…as Prisoners of War’: Racial Atrocities and Reprisals in Civil War Arkansas” in Black Flag over Dixie: Racial Atrocities and Reprisals in the Civil War, (Southern Illinois University Press, 2005), 134.

[31] Gregory J.W. Urwin, “Poison Spring and Jenkins’ Ferry: Racial Atrocities during the Camden Expedition” in All Cut to Pieces and Gone to Hell: The Civil War, Race Relations, and the Battle of Poison Spring, (Little Rock: August House, 2003), 118; Spurgeon, Army of Freedom, 208.

[32] OR XXXIV, part 1, 745.

[33] OR XXXIV, part 1, 745, 752.

[34] OR XXXIV, part 1, 745; Gregory J.W. Urwin, “Poison Spring and Jenkins’ Ferry: Racial Atrocities during the Camden Expedition” in All Cut to Pieces and Gone to Hell: The Civil War, Race Relations, and the Battle of Poison Spring, (Little Rock: August House, 2003), 119.

[35] OR XXXIV, part 1, 755.

[36] OR XXXIV, part 1, 745, 752-753; Gregory J.W. Urwin, “Poison Spring and Jenkins’ Ferry: Racial Atrocities during the Camden Expedition” in All Cut to Pieces and Gone to Hell: The Civil War, Race Relations, and the Battle of Poison Spring, (Little Rock: August House, 2003), 121.

[37] OR XXXIV, 744; Spurgeon, Army of Freedom, 209.

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