On
April 18, 1864, the 1st Kansas Colored Regiment faced its worst day.
A foraging expedition turned into a desperate battle, and the battle concluded
with their heaviest losses. While many of the former slaves and their white
officers fell in combat, the worst came after the battle had been lost. The
wounded were targeted for a racial and revenge-motivated killing spree at the
hands of the victors. The Battle of Poison Spring was not the largest battle of
General Frederick Steele’s Camden Expedition in Arkansas, but it gained an
infamous place in Civil War history. Arkansas citizens in the area did not call
it a battle, but the Poison Spring Massacre. It helped usher in 1864 as perhaps
the cruelest year of the Civil War.
The Northern
Hook
The
Camden Expedition was in fact part of the Red River Campaign. Major-General Henry
W. Halleck, Chief-of-Staff of the Army, was determined to see the conquest of
Texas and its cotton bundles. General Ulysses Grant, recently promoted to
Lieutenant-General over all Federal forces, had wanted Major-General Nathaniel
Banks (one of several notoriously incompetent political generals), to descend
upon Mobile, Alabama, one of the last functioning major ports in the South.
Halleck, however, won his case for Banks to advance on Texas instead. There
were legitimate military objectives. Texas, largely untouched beyond its Gulf
coastline, contained vast amounts of cattle and other supplies that it could
still slip east past the Union-occupied Mississippi River. Also, the Lincoln
Administration still feared that the French, waging their war in Mexico just to
the south, might still potentially form an alliance with the Confederacy. A
large Federal presence in Texas could dissuade this. More controversially there
were political and economic motives as well. Lincoln hoped to install a
pro-Union government in conquered Texan territory that would of course in turn
hold pro-Lincoln voters. Above all the Federals coveted Texas’ vast amounts of
cotton. Since Texas had a land border with Mexico, it could bypass the Union
naval blockade and send cotton directly to French and Mexican middlemen.
General
Nathaniel Banks, with the aid of Rear-Admiral David Porter’s fleet, would
proceed up the Red River. Halleck searched about for other forces to bolster
the invasion numbers and ensure success. He selected General Frederick Steele
and his army in Arkansas. He desired Steele to march south into Louisiana and
link up with Banks at Shreveport in the same state. Steele was reluctant,
citing the difficulties of marching through rural Arkansas. To work in
conjunction with Banks, he would have to march his men over bad roads through a
region with little forage and plenty of anti-Union guerillas. Of course he had
no choice but to obey, with even the President eager to see the campaign
executed. Steele would not be able to start until April, when Banks’ campaign
was already well under way.[1]
Frederick Steele
Unlike
the politician-turned-general Banks, Frederick Steele was a true soldier, a
West Point graduate. He started off the war with just a battalion at the 1861
Battle of Wilson’s Creek, Missouri. He participated in various operations along
the Mississippi River, finally rising to divisional commander in the Vicksburg
Campaign. Once that city fell, he came to Arkansas and assumed command of all
Federal forces in the state. There his army had an easy time of it, quickly
taking Little Rock and then staying put for a while. His men enjoyed their stay
at Little Rock, finding it the sole pleasant place in Arkansas. Despite this
they were not fans of their commander, whose soft treatment of pro-Confederate
civilians came to paint him as a secret opponent of the Union war effort.[2]
To get to Shreveport, Steele was to march through the rest of Arkansas. First he would go southwest towards Arkadelphia with 8,500 men. There he would link up with the Frontier Division, 4,000 men, under Brigadier-General John M. Thayer. Thayer was not a West Pointer, but had been a brigadier-general in the Nebraska territorial militia against the Pawnees. He spent the first two years of the war under General Grant and rose to command of a division in the Vicksburg Campaign. Like Steele he was sent west along with an upgrade in command. He now controlled the District of the Frontier, including units in Indian Territory and western Arkansas.[3] Among these was the 1st Kansas Colored. Since helping conquer Indian Territory they had been involved in garrison duties. These included protecting Unionists and freed slaves, getting farms started, and replenishing losses with new recruits. They also went through the drama of divisions among white Unionists (over whether or not to embrace radical Republican policies) and personal disputes among their officers.[4] Now they were to embark on their highest-profile campaign, a campaign which many politicians and generals hoped would shorten the war.
John Milton Thayer in bust and photo. Thayer was an ardent Republican and
was one of the first two senators from Nebraska after it achieved statehood.
Steele’s
force, after a late start of a couple days, reached Arkadelphia on March 29,
but Thayer failed to meet him on time. Waiting a couple more days, he continued
on without the Frontier Division. There were several reasons for Thayer’s
delay. One was the fact that his recently created division was spread all
around Indian Territory and needed time to consolidate. They were currently low
on extra provisions. This meant that they would have to continually stop and
forage. Next was the mountainous terrain, which Thayer probably accounted for
in planning out his march. Less under his control were heavy rains which turned
stretches of roads between the Arkansas hills into mudholes. Sappers and miners
with the Frontier Division had to constantly make these roads passable. They
also had to remove various man-made obstacles, the Confederates having felled
trees at difficult spots. Then there were the Southern partisans. These small
bands watched Thayer’s men from afar and made quick attacks if they felt they
had an isolated target. The firefights that broke out favored the Federals, as
they were armed with long range rifles and Sharps carbines. The citizenry in
general was unnerved by the presence of 1st Kansas Colored Regiment.
Colored troops had served in the state, but only on garrison and labor duties.
This was the first time black soldiers had entered the state to seek out and
fight the enemy.[5]
On the Confederate side, Major-General Sterling Price (left) assumed command in Arkansas on March 16. Price was a Missourian and had led his state’s militia army in the first year of the war. His predecessor, Theophilus Holmes, had been removed for stated reasons of poor health. Though indeed suffering physically, he had also proven widely incompetent in managing Rebel forces in Arkansas. Price also had his critics. He was an obstinate individual who constantly butted heads with his peers and alternately created consternation and suspicion with his ceaseless calls for a campaign to liberate his home state from Federal authority. General Edmund Kirby Smith, overall head of the Confederacy’s Trans-Mississippi Department, only viewed him as a temporary replacement. Regardless, Price would still have a chance to prove himself in battle. With Steele marching south through Arkansas, Smith instructed Price to hold off the Federals until General Richard Taylor in Louisiana and East Texas hopefully stopped Banks’ invasion.[6]
With
much of his men sent south to contest Banks, Price only had around 3,200
cavalrymen to contest over 12,000 Federals. Unwilling to risk a full battle
with his comparatively petty force, he sent John Marmaduke and Jo Shelby on raids
to harass and slow down Steele. Price suspected that Steele was heading for the
Confederacy’s new Arkansas capital at Camden, a commercial center and the
second largest city in the state, and accordingly moved his men up to Prairie
D’Ane to block the way. While Steele in fact only viewed the capital as a stepping
stone towards reaching Shreveport, following events would see his campaign
become the Camden Expedition.[7]
Thayer’s
Frontier Division finally linked up with Steele’s column on April 6, just south
of the Little Missouri River. Though this gave Steele an even more commanding
advantage in numbers, Thayer brought few rations to feed all of the extra mouths.
With his enlarged army facing a food crisis, Steele sent a message to Little
Rock requesting 30 days’ rations for 15,000 men, then headed for the main
Confederate force at Prairie D’Ane. The following march of Steele’s combined
force was very unpleasant. Frequent rains turned the roads to mud. At one point
they had to avoid the road altogether and wade through Cypress Bayou.[8]
Price was expecting his own reinforcements from the west. These came in the form of Brigadier-General Samuel B. Maxey’s Division from Indian Territory. Maxey was a former superintendent of Indian Affairs. In December of 1863, the end of a disastrous year for the Confederates in Indian Territory, Kirby Smith removed the incompetent William Steele (no relation to Frederick Steele). He promoted Maxey to his place and charged him with restoring Rebel fortunes in his region. In response to calls for reinforcements, he brought Colonel Tandy Walker’s Choctaw Brigade (made up of Choctaw Indians) and all his white troops, three regiments of Texas Cavalry and a battery. Price also received a cavalry division under Brigadier-General James F. Fagan.[9]
On
April 13 Maxey’s force linked up with Price. Price immediately threw Maxey and
Fagan’s divisions in the direction of the town of Moscow. General Thomas
Dockery’s brigade, out front, assaulted Federal forces lined up amidst timber
and took a battery. The Federals pushed back with superior numbers and retook
the guns. Despite beating off Dockery’s assault, the Federals themselves were
outnumbered by Price’s force in its entirety and retreated from Moscow. Price
learned that he was gain more reinforcements. Down south Banks’ attempted
invasion of Texas had floundered and he was now in retreat, pursued by General
Richard Taylor. Porter’s fleet had gotten trapped in receded waters, along with
the infantry. Taylor urged Kirby Smith to send more men so he could annihilate
the trapped and highly vulnerable Red River Expedition. Smith, however, saw
Steele’s expedition in Arkansas as the more pressing threat and diverted not
only reinforcements, but parts of Taylor’s army as well, to meet it. This
enraged Taylor and most historians agree that Smith blundered in failing to
seize the opportunity to bag both an entire Federal fleet and army.[10]
In
a post-war article for Battles and
Leaders of the Civil War, Smith argued in defense of his decision. “I
deemed it imprudent to follow Banks…with my whole force, and leave Steele so
near Shreveport. Even had I been able to throw Banks across the Atchafalaya,
the high water of that stream would have arrested my farther progress….I
confidently hoped, if I could reach Steele with my infantry, to beat him at a
distance from his depot, in a poor country, and with my large cavalry force to
destroy his army. The prize would have been the Arkansas Valley and the
powerful fortifications of Little Rock. Steele’s defeat or retreat would leave
me in position promptly to support Taylor’s operations against Banks.” Picking
apart Smith’s argument is a subject for another time. What’s important was that
Steele’s situation in Arkansas was getting rather dicey.[11]
Food Shortages
Despite
Fagan and Maxey’s additional men, Price still refused to give battle and instead
retreated. Steele’s army reached Prairie D’Ane to find no one, then, on April
15, following a brief encounter with Marmaduke’s cavalry, reached Camden to
find it likewise abandoned. The town was a hotbed of secessionism and civilian
reaction was horrified. One wrote, “The awful day of all days – the dread event
feared for years. About 6 O’clock, an enemy infuriated by combat & hunger
came rushing down our main street and diverging into the cross streets.” These
was a special flavor to this occupation that surely infuriated the good
citizens of Camden. The 1st Kansas Colored and its sister regiment
the 2nd Kansas Colored marched down the streets holding arms. One
woman wrote, “Only one thing stirred my Southern blood to heat was when a negro
regiment passed my home going to fight our own dear men.” Steele holed up in
the town, knowing he could not advance all of his men further without provisions.
His men terrorized the locals by barging into their homes and demanding food.
With rations for Little Rock not arriving yet, if at all, he sent out foraging
expeditions to strip the countryside of food. This set the stage for the Battle
of Poison Spring.[12]
On
April 16 Colonel James M. Williams learned that he was to lead one such
expedition. Over 500 men from his own 1st Kansas Colored was to form
the bulk of the team. On April 17, at 5 A.M., the foraging expedition lined up
in front of General Thayer’s headquarters. The number of wagons was an
impressive 198. The wagons’ escort included over 500 men of the 1st
Kansas of course, with Major Richard G. Ward taking specific command. Williams
also had under him 75 of the 2nd Kansas Cavalry, 50 from the 6th
Kansas Cavalry, 70 of the 14th Kansas Cavalry, and two guns and
their crews from the 2nd Indiana Battery. Overall he had nearly 700
men. He was nervous about this mission, feeling exposed in the hostile
countryside, and sought to move “as rapidly as possible.”[13]
Williams’
target was 5,000 bushels of corn. Small groups of Confederates saw the Federals
coming for the corn and tried to deny them this food. They succeeded in burning
about half of the bushels.[14]
On the first day of the march Williams’ large wagon train fanned out and
collected the remaining corn from the countryside. According to surviving
writings from the civilian populace, the white Kansas cavalry behaved
abominably, taking not just corn, but ransacking their homes and taking
everything from soap to chickens to wedding slippers. There is no record of the
actions of the 1st Kansas Colored and historians have taken the
positive assumption that they stuck to the mission and did not terrorize the
locals. If so, it was likely because they and their officers were aware of how
whites would respond to blacks looting whites. A more cynical student might
recognize that mounted soldiers operating in small groups away from the base of
command would find it much easier to target homes, ransack them, and make a
quick getaway then the black infantry that had to stick close to the wagons.
Regardless of how restrained these soldiers were, the Confederates would pin
the looting on them to justify their actions at Poison Spring.[15]
On
the 18th Williams linked up with elements of the 18th
Iowa Infantry and more troopers from the 2nd, 6th, and 14th
Kansas Cavalry. He also now had an additional two howitzers. This force had
already encountered an enemy presence, with Lieutenant Phillips of the 6th
Kansas reporting brief fights with scattered Confederate elements. On paper
this junction boosted Williams’ command to over 1,000 men. However, they had
marched so long that around a hundred of the black infantry were unable to go
on while much of the cavalry had gone too far out to be of immediate use.
Since
this post is primarily concerned with the Battle of Poison Spring, I will not
detail the entire order of battle for the Confederate and Union forces in Arkansas,
just the groups involved. This is the Union order of battle for Poison Spring.
It was made up of units from all three of Thayer’s brigades.
Colonel James M. Williams
18th Iowa: Captain
William M. Duncan
1st Kansas Colored
Infantry: Major Richard C. Ward
2nd Kansas Cavalry (two detachments):
Lieutenants Mitchell & Ross
6th Kansas Cavalry (two detachments):
Lieutenants Henderson & Phillips
14th Kansas Cavalry (two detachments):Lieutenants
Utt & Smith
2nd Indiana Battery:
Lieutenant W.W. Haines[16]
The Confederates
Get Wind
This
is a general overview of Confederate forces, with a specific order of battle
for those at Poison Spring. On the Confederate side Price commanded cavalry
divisions under Brigadier-General James F. Fagan, Brigadier-General John S.
Marmaduke, and Brigadier-General Samuel B. Maxey. Infantry included Brigadier-General
Mosby M. Parsons’ Missouri Division, Major General John G. Walker’s Texas
Division, Brigadier-General Thomas J. Churchill’s Arkansas Division, and a
brigade under Colonel William A. Crawford. Here is the specific force engaged
at Poison Spring. Marmaduke had initial command, but Maxey had seniority and
assumed command once he arrived on the field. Thus I have chosen to list
Maxey’s Division first.
Brigadier-General Samuel B. Maxey (Commander)
Gano’s Brigade: Colonel Charles
DeMorse
29th Texas:
Major J.A. Carroll
30th Texas:
Lieutenant-Colonel N.W. Battle
31st Texas:
Major Michael Looscan
Welch’s Texas Company:
Lieutenant Frank M. Gano
Texas Battery: Captain
W. Butler Krumbhaar
Second Indian Brigade: Colonel Tandy
Walker
1st Regiment:
Lieutenant-Colonel James Riley
2nd Regiment:
Colonel Simpson W. Folsom
Brigadier-General John S. Marmaduke
Greene’s Brigade: Colonel Colton
Greene
3rd Missouri:
Lieutenant-Colonel L.A. Campbell
4th Missouri:
Lieutenant-Colonel William J. Preston
7th Missouri:
Colonel Solomon G. Kitchen
8th Missouri:
Colonel William L. Jeffers
10th
Missouri: Colonel Robert R. Lawther
Missouri Battery:
Captain S.S. Harris
Shelby’s Iron Brigade:
Brigadier-General Joseph O. Shelby
1st Missouri
Battalion: Major Benjamin Elliott
5th Missouri:
Colonel B. Frank Gordon
11th
Missouri: Colonel M.W. Smith
12th
Missouri: Colonel David Shanks
Hunter’s Missouri
Regiment: Colonel De Witt C. Hunter
Missouri Battery:
Captain Richard A. Collins
Brigadier-General
James F. Fagan (Brigadier-General William L. Cabell commanding)
1st Arkansas:
Colonel James C. Monroe
2nd Arkansas:
Colonel T.J. Morgan
4th Arkansas:
Colonel A. Gordon
7th Arkansas:
Colonel John F. Hill
Arkansas Battalion:
Lieutenant-Colonel Thomas M. Gunter
7th Arkansas
Field Battery: Lieutenant William D. Blocher
Crawford’s Brigade: Colonel William
A. Crawford
2nd Arkansas:
Captain O.B. Tebbs
Crawford’s Arkansas
Regiment: Colonel William A. Crawford
Wright’s Arkansas
Regiment: Colonel John C. Wright
Arkansas Battalion:
Major James T. Poe
Arkansas Battalion:
Major E.L. McMurtrey[17]
On
April 17 scouts from Colonel Colton Greene’s brigade spotted Williams’ foraging
expedition and reported to Marmaduke. Marmaduke planned to strike the wagon
train, but learned that its guard was actually quite heavy. He only had about
500 men on hand. He called for Fagan to come to his aid. Then through Fagan he
messaged Price for reinforcements. Price sent Maxey’s division. The size of the
various units involved varied widely. Cabell’s brigade, for example, had 1,200
men while Crawford’s had a mere 300. The Confederate Indian Brigade consisted
of only two regiments, with about 700 men between them (Choctaw regiments had
lost much of their men after the disastrous defeat at Honey Springs the
previous summer). Overall they would still dwarf Williams’ thousand plus force.
The Confederate leaders hoped not only to destroy the Federal foragers, but
also seize what by then would be vehicles loaded with food.[18]
There
is a minor controversy over whether Williams was aware of the intercepting
force. In the Daily Topeka, about two
years later, Major Richard Ward claimed that local slaves had warned him of
Marmaduke’s force, but Williams assured him there was no danger. Ward accused
Williams of fatal negligence. Williams responded to Ward’s article, saying that
he had in fact known of the enemy force. By claiming this he had to confess that
he lied, but only to maintain his officers and his men’s confidence by not
frightening them. Ian Michael Spurgeon, a historian who covered the 1st
Kansas Colored, disbelieves Williams’ explanation, arguing that Ward and others
in the regiment, who had stood firmly in hot fights at Island Mound and Honey Springs,
would not have had a serious break in morale if they learned of an impending
attack. He believes that Williams chose to admit to lying rather than claim an
ignorance that exposed his men to a heinous atrocity.[19]
The
Federals came upon a thin line of Marmaduke’s pickets. They pursued them to a
much more sizeable picket line. This was Cabell’s brigade. Williams halted the
wagon train, parking it as close as possible, and sent its guards up to bolster
his line. Their location, near Poison Spring, “was in thick timber and Cypress
Swamps.” The former terrain feature provided some wonderful cover and obscured
the fact that their force was much smaller than the enemy’s. The latter feature
made it difficult for larger forces to maneuver. While this constrained the
Federals, it also prevented the Confederates from fully enveloping them. The
opposing lines on the north end of the field were bisected by the road to
Camden. In the Federal rear was Lee’s Plantation.[20]
Cabell
sent the 2nd Arkansas Cavalry two miles back to detect and delay any
enemy reinforcements from Camden. On the main line of battle he put his own
brigade on the left of the road, Crawford’s on the right, and his artillery in
the center. Around this point Maxey arrived and, having seniority, assumed
overall command. However he recognized that Marmaduke, having been on the field
longer, would have more knowledge of the ground and the enemy. He “consulted
with him freely and with great advantage.” Maxey’s division took position on
the south, perpendicular to the rest of the Rebel force, with DeMorse’s Texans
on the right and Tandy Walker’s Choctaws on the left. Colonel Greene’s brigade
also arrived and Marmaduke placed it a mile to Cabell’s rear as a reserve.
Greene forwarded Captain Harris’ Missouri Battery to aid Crawford’s brigade.[21]
Williams
was not yet aware of the numbers arrayed against him. He had two guns from the
2nd Indiana Battery deployed they opened fire to see if the enemy had any
guns of their own and how many. This little barrage also provided time and
cover for various foraging parties to rush back and further strengthen
Williams’ line. There was no artillery response, only some fire from the
Confederate skirmishers. Williams centered his line, of course, on the 1st
Kansas, his own regiment and the largest unit at his disposal. It faced east,
though the unfolding battle would see its right flank turn at an angle to form
a backwards “L.” He placed the cavalry on his flanks, part of the 14th
Kansas on the left and parts of the 2nd and 6th on the
right. Captain Duncan and his detachment of the 18th Iowa was to
stay in the rear with the train, the howitzers, and the rest of the cavalry.
They were “to keep a sharp lookout” for any additional Confederates who might
get into Williams’ flank and rear.[22]
The Main
Stand-Off
Maxey planned an all-out assault with his division on the left, but had difficulty getting it to start thanks to the rough, brush-covered terrain, particularly the wooded ravine between them and the enemy. His own division struggled to get into place to assail the enemy right, one Texan remembering “we were somewhat retarded by the dense thickets, and undergrowth on our route, and frequent halts had to be made to reform our necessarily broken line.” He estimated that his attack began half an hour late. Colonel DeMorse noted that he struggled to find a suitable spot for Krumbhaar’s howitzers. His and Tandy Walker’s dismounted cavalry “found great difficulty in preserving alignment and connection. The ground was very irregular and brushy, and at one time Captain Krumbhaar sent me word that he could not move the battery any further.” Krumbhaar solved his problem by having some of his men pull the thick saplings out of the way so the pieces could be moved up.[23]
One
Texan, losing sight of the rest of his unit while navigating the brush,
mistakenly walked into Williams’ line and asked for Colonel DeMorse. From this
information the colonel deduced that he was an enemy soldier who had gotten
separated and lost from his unit. From him he learned he was facing part of
Price’s force, and judging from how he phrased it in his report may have
mistakenly concluded that Price was personally conducting the battle himself.[24]
The
Kansas cavalry Williams’ right flank advanced 400 yards “when a brisk fire of
musketry was opened upon them from the brush, which they returned with true
gallantry.” Their opponent was the 29th Texas Cavalry, the same unit
that had suffered defeat at the hands of the 1st Kansas Colored at
Honey Springs. They had climbed up a “steep ascent” and taken position along a
fence, from which they now blasted away at the white Kansan cavalry. DeMorse’s
Confederates got the better of this encounter, unhorsing many Federals and also
wounding Lieutenant Henderson of the 6th Kansas in the stomach. The
Federal cavalry fell back. DeMorse ordered his skirmishers to advance through a
hollow and motioned Krumbhaar’s Battery to a hilltop at the edge of the field.[25]
With
the cavalry falling back on both flanks, Williams changed the position of the 1st
Kansas. The Federal line “was now nearly in the form of the segment of a
circle, the convex side being outward or toward the enemy.” The center and left
companies of the 1st Kansas faced east against Marmaduke, with two
companies on the right facing “due south” against Maxey.[26]
A six-gun battery bombarded the north and center of the colored troops while 4
howitzers struck the southern flank. According to Major Ward, this was “the
severest artillery fire that” the 1st Kansas Colored had ever been
under.[27]
With
the Kansas Colored Volunteers hard pressed, Williams sent a message to Captain
Duncan ordering up four of his companies. Duncan was unable to comply, stating
that he himself was pressed by Maxey’s Division and could not spare any men.
Phillips’ detachment of 20 men from the 6th Kansas, taking position
in some timber, had spotted an approaching Confederate regiment supported by
two guns. Duncan wheeled his infantry into an orchard by the road to face this
fresh foe.[28]
The
Confederate artillery was terribly effective, firing from the Federals’ front
and right. This produced “an incessant and well-directed cross-fire of shot and
shell.” Ward was able to reduce casualties among the 1st Kansas
Colored by ordering them to lie down behind the crest of the rise they occupied.
This concealed them from the enemy artillery, throwing off their aim. This
ended when one shell fragment hit a soldier between the shoulders. The victim
“jumped up and spun around for a moment in great agony.” One of the Confederate
artillery officers saw this happen and, having the range of the 1st
Kansas, adjusted the guns accordingly. The adjusted barrage “swept nearly every
foot of the ground a few paces in front of the colored infantry.” The 1st
Kansas had avoided massive artillery-induced casualties by just a few feet.[29]
Down
to the south, Maxey’s Division fell back after a brisk firefight with the
rightmost companies of the 1st Kansas. The Federal musketry, a blend
of bullets and buckshot, was so hot that DeMorse incorrectly estimated that he
was outnumbered (Gregory Urwin suggests that the Confederates might have
inflated enemy numbers to cover the fact that under 500 colored troops repeatedly
repulsed over 1,000 white troops). At least half of the Texan brigade fell into
disarray and ran for the cover of the timber. The assault was renewed when
Krumbhaar expertly aimed his howitzers, loaded with shells that had quick
two-second fuses, and opened fire. “The effect was immediately discernible” and
with a “loud shout” Walker and DeMorse’s brigades moved forward again with much
more success.[30]
Tandy Walker
Further
west, the Choctaws hesitated to cross the ravine towards the 18th
Iowa. Walker (rightly based on DeMorse’s repulse to his right) feared that his
men would get tangled in the wooded ravine and make prime targets for Duncan’s
Iowans. He also reported enemy cavalry on his left. This was a skirmish line
from the 6th Kansas Cavalry. (In one of his articles on the battle,
Urwin fails to note the actual presence of the cavalry, arguing that Tandy
Walker’s line actually extended past the 18th Iowa. He thus makes
the assumption that Walker invented the presence of cavalry in his report to
cover his inaction in comparison to DeMorse).[31]
As
the Confederate assaults unfolded, Williams realized he was severely
outmatched. “…Still I resolved to defend the train to the last hoping that
re-enforcements would come up from Camden.”[32]
From the east Cabell’s brigade advanced. Once the Confederates were within 100
yards, the opposing companies 1st Kansas opened fire. For about 15
minutes the sides exchanged shots until the Rebels fell back. The Confederates
quickly collected themselves “and, their artillery again unleashing their
“infernal cross-fires,” advanced against [Williams’] lines, this time with
colors flying and continuous cheering, so loud as to drown even the roar of the
musketry.”[33] The
next round of fighting lasted about as long as the last, a quarter hour, and
was reported by Williams to have “raged with desperate fury.” The 29th
Texas in particular was filled with rage when, finally able to close in on
their foe, recognized their tormentors from Honey Springs. One or more of them
shouted, “You First Kansas Niggers now buck to the Twenty-ninth Texas!”[34]
While
their comrades weathered the assaults of DeMorse and Cabell’s brigades, Companies
C and I of the 1st Kansas, under Lieutenant William Gibbons, took
position on the far left on the north side of the road alongside one of the
guns. They remained outside of the main fight, skirmishing with Crawford’s
dismounted cavalry. They knew that Major Ward and the majority of the regiment
were heavily engaged, but could not see what was happening thanks to the smoke
of battle. The gun they covered ran out of canister and had to resort to solid
shot for the remaining duration of the battle.[35]
With
mounting casualties and still no reinforcements from Camden in sight, Williams
prepared for a retreat. Major Ward was left to manage the main firing line
while Williams rode for the 18th Iowa. He intended to reposition
them to cover the withdrawal. Along the way he ordered the 2nd Indiana
guns back as too many artillerists had been killed and wounded. After he had
done this a bullet struck his horse. While Williams waited for a fresh mount,
the Indianan gunners got off one last “parting shot.” Private Alonzo Hinshaw
double-loaded his gun with canister and fired a blast that had a “terrific”
impact. This halted the Confederate advance, prompting Maxey to finally move
forward Greene’s brigade from reserve. Major Ward, knowing that Williams needed
to get to the 18th Indiana, gave his superior his horse.[36]
During
this incident the 1st Kansas Colored repulsed the Confederates once
again. Williams reported that about half of Ward’s firing line was killed or
wounded, yet bragged later on in a newspaper article that their ranks were
still perfectly formed. He claimed that the soldiers fixed bayonets and begged,
“Colonel, let us charge ‘em!” However brave and resilient they were, it was
only a matter of time before the Confederates’ numerical superiority got to
work.[37]
[1] Ludwell H.
Johnson, Red River Campaign: Politics
& Cotton in the Civil War, (Kent State University Press, 1993), 31-35,
40, 85; A more complex look at Federal designs on Texas and some of the earlier
campaigns to achieve them can be found in the first couple chapters of Donald Frazier’s
Tempest over Texas: The Fall and Winter
Campaigns of 1863-1864, (State House Press, 2020)
[2] Thomas A. DeBlack, “An Overview
of the Camden Expedition” in All Cut to
Pieces and Gone to Hell: The Civil War, Race Relations, and the Battle of
Poison Spring, (Little Rock: August House, 2003), 14-15.
[3] Thomas A.
DeBlack, “An Overview of the Camden Expedition” in All Cut to Pieces and Gone to Hell: The Civil War, Race Relations, and
the Battle of Poison Spring, (Little Rock: August House, 2003), 15; Ezra
Warner, Generals in Blue: Lives of
the Union Commanders, (Baton Rouge: LSU Press, 1964), 499.
[4] Ian Michael Spurgeon, Soldiers in the Army of Freedom: The 1st Kansas Colored, the Civil War's First African American Combat Unit, (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 2014), 180-193.
[5] Thomas A.
DeBlack, “An Overview of the Camden Expedition” in All Cut to Pieces and Gone to Hell: The Civil War, Race Relations, and
the Battle of Poison Spring, (Little Rock: August House, 2003), 15; Spurgeon,
Army of Freedom, 194; Britton, Union Indian Brigade, 347-348; Gregory J. W. Urwin, “’We Cannot Treat Negroes…as
Prisoners of War’: Racial Atrocities and Reprisals in Civil War Arkansas”
in Black Flag over Dixie:
Racial Atrocities and Reprisals in the Civil War, (Southern Illinois University Press, 2005), 133.
[6] Albert Castel, General Sterling Price and the Civil War in
the West, (LSU Press, 1993), 171-173.
[7] Thomas A.
DeBlack, “An Overview of the Camden Expedition” in All Cut to Pieces and Gone to Hell: The Civil War, Race Relations, and
the Battle of Poison Spring, (Little Rock: August House, 2003), 16, 19;
Gregory J.W. Urwin, “Poison Spring and Jenkins’ Ferry: Racial Atrocities during
the Camden Expedition” in All Cut to
Pieces and Gone to Hell: The Civil War, Race Relations, and the Battle of
Poison Spring, (Little Rock: August House, 2003), 107.
[8] Thomas A.
DeBlack, “An Overview of the Camden Expedition” in All Cut to Pieces and Gone to Hell: The Civil War, Race Relations, and
the Battle of Poison Spring, (Little Rock: August House, 2003), 19;
Johnson, Red River Campaign, 171,
179.
[9] Wiley Britton, The Union Indian Brigade in the Civil War,
(Kansas City: F. Hudson Publishing Co., 1922), 341-342, 359.
[10] OR XXXIV, part
1, 780-781; Johnson, Red River Campaign,
181-182.
[11] E. Kirby Smith, “The Defense of
the Red River” in Battles and Leaders of
the Civil War Vol. IV, (New York: Century Company, 1888), 372.
[12] Thomas A. DeBlack, “An Overview
of the Camden Expedition” in All Cut to
Pieces and Gone to Hell: The Civil War, Race Relations, and the Battle of
Poison Spring, (Little Rock: August House, 2003), 19-20; Gregory J.W.
Urwin, “Poison Spring and Jenkins’ Ferry: Racial Atrocities during the Camden
Expedition” in All Cut to Pieces and Gone
to Hell: The Civil War, Race Relations, and the Battle of Poison Spring,
(Little Rock: August House, 2003), 107-109.
[13] OR XXXIV, part 1, 743; Spurgeon,
Army of Freedom, 197-198.
[14] Gregory J.W.
Urwin, “Poison Spring and Jenkins’ Ferry: Racial Atrocities during the Camden
Expedition” in All Cut to Pieces and Gone
to Hell: The Civil War, Race Relations, and the Battle of Poison Spring,
(Little Rock: August House, 2003), 109-110.
[15] OR XXXIV, part
1, 743; Gregory J. W. Urwin, “’We Cannot Treat
Negroes…as Prisoners of War’: Racial Atrocities and Reprisals in Civil War
Arkansas” in Black Flag over
Dixie: Racial Atrocities and Reprisals in the Civil War, (Southern Illinois University Press, 2005), 118,
137-138.
[16] OR XXXIV, part 1, 743-744, 748.
[17] OR XXXIV, part 1, 784-785.
[18] OR XXXIV, part
1, 781, 819, 825, 848.; Gregory J.W. Urwin, “Poison Spring and Jenkins’ Ferry:
Racial Atrocities during the Camden Expedition” in All Cut to Pieces and Gone to Hell: The Civil War, Race Relations, and
the Battle of Poison Spring, (Little Rock: August House, 2003), 112.
[19] Spurgeon, Army of Freedom, 198-199.
[20] OR XXXIV, part 1, 744; Mark Christ, “War to the Knife,” 402.
[21] OR XXXIV, part 1, 791, 819, 828,
843.
[22] OR XXXIV, part 1, 744.
[23] OR XXXIV, part 1, 842, 846, 849;
Spurgeon, Army of Freedom, 202.
[24] OR XXXIV, part 1, 744.
[25] OR XXXIV, part 1, 744, 846-847.
[26] OR XXXIV, part 1, 752; Spurgeon,
Army of Freedom, 203.
[27] OR XXXIV, part 1, 752.
[28] OR XXXIV, part 1, 744, 748, 750.
[29] OR XXXIV, part 1, 745; Britton, Union Indian Brigade, 366.
[30] OR XXXIV, part 1, 847; Gregory
J.W. Urwin, “Poison Spring and Jenkins’ Ferry: Racial Atrocities during the
Camden Expedition” in All Cut to Pieces
and Gone to Hell: The Civil War, Race Relations, and the Battle of Poison
Spring, (Little Rock: August House, 2003), 117; Gregory J. W. Urwin, “’We Cannot Treat Negroes…as Prisoners of War’:
Racial Atrocities and Reprisals in Civil War Arkansas” in Black Flag over Dixie: Racial Atrocities and
Reprisals in the Civil War, (Southern
Illinois University Press, 2005), 134.
[31] Gregory J.W. Urwin,
“Poison Spring and Jenkins’ Ferry: Racial Atrocities during the Camden
Expedition” in All Cut to Pieces and Gone
to Hell: The Civil War, Race Relations, and the Battle of Poison Spring,
(Little Rock: August House, 2003), 118; Spurgeon, Army of Freedom, 208.
[32] OR XXXIV, part 1, 745.
[33] OR XXXIV, part 1, 745, 752.
[34] OR XXXIV, part
1, 745; Gregory J.W. Urwin, “Poison Spring and Jenkins’ Ferry: Racial
Atrocities during the Camden Expedition” in All
Cut to Pieces and Gone to Hell: The Civil War, Race Relations, and the Battle
of Poison Spring, (Little Rock: August House, 2003), 119.
[35] OR XXXIV, part 1, 755.
[36] OR XXXIV, part
1, 745, 752-753; Gregory J.W. Urwin, “Poison Spring and Jenkins’ Ferry: Racial
Atrocities during the Camden Expedition” in All
Cut to Pieces and Gone to Hell: The Civil War, Race Relations, and the Battle
of Poison Spring, (Little Rock: August House, 2003), 121.
[37] OR XXXIV, 744; Spurgeon, Army of Freedom, 209.
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