Arkansas Summer Campaign Part III: Cotton Plant

 If they were to successfully make their way to Little Rock, General Samuel Curtis and his Army of the Southwest needed to hook up with Commander Augustus Kilty’s White River expedition and much needed supplies. The Confederates, assuming that Curtis was retreating instead of marching to meet Kilty, made a move to strike him. Little did they know they would be fighting a critical battle that would determine the course of the war in 1862 Arkansas.

 

Cotton Plant (or Hill's Plantation or Cache River)

Study map of Battle of Cotton Plant (Wikimedia)

On July 7 Curtis started his army towards Clarendon, the final leg of the march. To reach there he would first need to cross the Cache River. The Confederates had already made moves to hold the Cache River crossing. Brigadier-General Albert Rust led 5,000 men in the area. This force included Texas cavalry (six regiments) and Arkansan infantry. Rust ordered Colonel William Parsons to secure the crossing with the 12^th and 16^th Texas Cavalry (1,000 men in all). The 12^th and 16^th did not move up together and the former stopped 6 miles south of the crossing in order to wait for the other. By failing to secure the crossing with his 12^th regiment, Parsons gave the Federals time to take it.[1] The area around the Cache River was heavily wooded, with plenty of swampland as well. As Federals and Confederates alike had to deal with branches, clouds of mosquitoes, and wet ground while a plethora of animals hooted, screeched, and flapped in the background. One Texan said it felt like a primeval world.[2]

Arkansas Summer Campaign Part II: The White River Supply Run

 

Following the skirmish near Searcy, the Union Army of the Southwest would temporarily ground to a halt. With no good base of supplies, especially food, in northern Arkansas, Curtis would need the US Navy, patrolling most of the Mississippi River, to enable a successful drive on Little Rock. This following supply run would be quite the adventure, full of controversial actions from both sides.

Foraging War

His momentum halted after the Battle of Searcy Landing, Curtis ordered his generals Steele, Carr, and Osterhaus, to send out scouting and foraging expeditions to ascertain enemy strength and improve their supply situation. These foraging and scouting forays exposed the Army of the Southwest to a newly popular form of warfare in Arkansas: that of the guerilla. The history of the 9^th Illinois Cavalry (in Steele’s Division), lists several such encounters. On one May day a private E.J. Jenkins “was foully murdered” by a party of bushwhackers, who had secreted themselves in a corn-crib at Cotton Plant. Another Illinoisan rushed ahead to avenge his partner, but was killed himself. Jenkins did not actually die immediately, but lingered on another day with five bullet wounds.[1]

Curtis and his generals discussed the recent surge of guerilla attacks. Osterhaus’ Third Division had gotten the worst of them, and the German-American was outraged by the treatment of Federal prisoners. The guerillas often beat and mutilated them before killing them. Curtis was similarly outraged and gave Osterhaus and his men permission to forego mercy. “…Such villains” are “not to be taken as prisoners.”[2]

Arkansas Summer Campaign Part 1: Operations around Searcy

Many historians like to write that people overlook the Trans-Mississippi theatre of the Civil War. While not as heavily covered as other parts of the war, there has actually been quite a bit written on it in the past 30 to 40 years. Scholarship has greatly expanded on Sibley’s New Mexico Campaign, Pea Ridge, Prairie Grove, and the battles in Indian Territory. Even when these books and articles began to pop up there had been a good amount on Wilson’s Creek and the Red River campaign. However, there are parts that are still rarely covered. This post gets into one of these parts.

The Arkansas summer campaign of 1862 is barely covered in histories. It was nestled between the Pea Ridge and Prairie Grove Campaigns, each centered around a large and significant battle. General Samuel Curtis’ drive to take Little Rock, the capital of Arkansas, mostly saw skirmishes and a handful of smaller, if intense, battles. It’s most prominent place in the histories is the last chapter of William Shea’s Pea Ridge: Civil War Campaign in the West. Because the campaign failed to seriously alter the course of the Civil War, it is understandably overlooked. However it in fact gave the Confederates another chance to turn the tide in the Trans-Mississippi and the small skirmishes and battles can still be interesting to study.

Curtis after Pea Ridge

On March 6-8, General Earl Van Dorn’s attempt to restore Confederate fortunes in Missouri came to an end at the Battle of Pea Ridge. After his defeat, Van Dorn was ordered to bring his army east of the Mississippi and help stop General Ulysses S. Grant’s momentum in Tennessee. The Union Army of the Southwest, the victor of Pea Ridge, was bloodied and far out on its supply line, so it withdrew back into Missouri. General Samuel Curtis, its commander, was enthused at having scored a victory. In his previous tenure in the Army he had failed to experience any combat. He had gotten a good deal of it and also come off with a major success. Feelings were high.

The Poison Spring Massacre (April 18, 1864) part 2

If you have not read the first half, look here.

Below are two images from reenactments of the battle. I doubt they recreate the massacre for family audiences.

Final Push

On the Union left Companies C and I, 1^st Kansas Colored, saw about a hundred men in blue coats pass along their front. They assumed they were from the 2^nd Kansas Cavalry as well as sharpshooters from the 18^th Iowa. They were soon corrected when hundreds of Confederate cavalry appeared alongside them Cabell had ordered Crawford, who to this point had only skirmished, to move all of his available men forward. Gibbons “immediately ordered the men to fire, which was kept up for a few minutes only, but with such effect as to check the enemy’s advance.” Among the men commended in Gibbons’ report was First Sergeant Berry, a black officer who urged his men to think of freedom and hold their place.[1]

Gibbons ordered his men 60 yards back. They fired a volley, but made another withdrawal when they saw the rest of the regiment in retreat. Crawford’s Confederates “moved rapidly and steadily forward, firing volley upon volley” at the black troops. Gibbons attempted to mount his horse. He tripped on his saber halfway up and the horse “became scared and dragged me about 5 yards.” His infantry left him behind and he was left alone against the on-rush of screaming Rebels. “I need not say I mounted quick and rode away quicker.”[2]

The Poison Spring Massacre (April 18, 1864) part 1

 

On April 18, 1864, the 1^st Kansas Colored Regiment faced its worst day. A foraging expedition turned into a desperate battle, and the battle concluded with their heaviest losses. While many of the former slaves and their white officers fell in combat, the worst came after the battle had been lost. The wounded were targeted for a racial and revenge-motivated killing spree at the hands of the victors. The Battle of Poison Spring was not the largest battle of General Frederick Steele’s Camden Expedition in Arkansas, but it gained an infamous place in Civil War history. Arkansas citizens in the area did not call it a battle, but the Poison Spring Massacre. It helped usher in 1864 as perhaps the cruelest year of the Civil War.

The Northern Hook

The Camden Expedition was in fact part of the Red River Campaign. Major-General Henry W. Halleck, Chief-of-Staff of the Army, was determined to see the conquest of Texas and its cotton bundles. General Ulysses Grant, recently promoted to Lieutenant-General over all Federal forces, had wanted Major-General Nathaniel Banks (one of several notoriously incompetent political generals), to descend upon Mobile, Alabama, one of the last functioning major ports in the South. Halleck, however, won his case for Banks to advance on Texas instead. There were legitimate military objectives. Texas, largely untouched beyond its Gulf coastline, contained vast amounts of cattle and other supplies that it could still slip east past the Union-occupied Mississippi River. Also, the Lincoln Administration still feared that the French, waging their war in Mexico just to the south, might still potentially form an alliance with the Confederacy. A large Federal presence in Texas could dissuade this. More controversially there were political and economic motives as well. Lincoln hoped to install a pro-Union government in conquered Texan territory that would of course in turn hold pro-Lincoln voters. Above all the Federals coveted Texas’ vast amounts of cotton. Since Texas had a land border with Mexico, it could bypass the Union naval blockade and send cotton directly to French and Mexican middlemen.