Many
historians like to write that people overlook the Trans-Mississippi theatre of
the Civil War. While not as heavily covered as other parts of the war, there
has actually been quite a bit written on it in the past 30 to 40 years.
Scholarship has greatly expanded on Sibley’s New Mexico Campaign, Pea Ridge,
Prairie Grove, and the battles in Indian Territory. Even when these books and
articles began to pop up there had been a good amount on Wilson’s Creek and the
Red River campaign. However, there are parts that are still rarely covered.
This post gets into one of these parts.
The Arkansas summer campaign of 1862 is barely covered in histories. It was nestled between the Pea Ridge and Prairie Grove Campaigns, each centered around a large and significant battle. General Samuel Curtis’ drive to take Little Rock, the capital of Arkansas, mostly saw skirmishes and a handful of smaller, if intense, battles. It’s most prominent place in the histories is the last chapter of William Shea’s Pea Ridge: Civil War Campaign in the West. Because the campaign failed to seriously alter the course of the Civil War, it is understandably overlooked. However it in fact gave the Confederates another chance to turn the tide in the Trans-Mississippi and the small skirmishes and battles can still be interesting to study.
Curtis after Pea
Ridge
On March 6-8, General Earl Van Dorn’s attempt to restore Confederate fortunes in Missouri came to an end at the Battle of Pea Ridge. After his defeat, Van Dorn was ordered to bring his army east of the Mississippi and help stop General Ulysses S. Grant’s momentum in Tennessee. The Union Army of the Southwest, the victor of Pea Ridge, was bloodied and far out on its supply line, so it withdrew back into Missouri. General Samuel Curtis, its commander, was enthused at having scored a victory. In his previous tenure in the Army he had failed to experience any combat. He had gotten a good deal of it and also come off with a major success. Feelings were high.
 |
| General Samuel R. Curtis |
The Army of the Southwest rested up in late March and April. General Curtis took this time to engage in one of his favorite hobbies, taking walks through woods and fields to find and observe various plants and flowers. Though he enjoyed this, he began to get antsy. He had commanded his first battle and done well Now he wanted to follow up with further campaigning and success. Then he suffered the terrible news that his 20 year old daughter, Sadie, had died of typhoid fever. He fell into a melancholic mood. He wanted to go back home, but he felt that none of the other major officers in his army were capable of leading an Arkansas campaign.[1]
A
new campaign was indeed in the works. General Henry W. Halleck, Curtis’
superior, did not want to pursue any further operations deep into Arkansas.
Instead the Army of the Southwest was to head east and assist in conquering the
Mississippi River. Following its rest and refitting, the Army of the Southwest
had 18,483 men, with 5,498 being cavalry. The final destination was likely
Memphis, Tennessee.[2]
The
first step of the campaign was to traverse the Ozarks and woods of Southern
Missouri in an easterly route towards West Plains. The going was tough, but
eventually they reached more open, flat terrain at West Plains. Curtis fired
off messages asking for various rations and supplies. Though warned that such
supplies would be difficult to bring south, he kept his army marching for the
Arkansas border. On April 29 Curtis, losing his melancholy amidst this
campaigning, led his army into the state. He took personal command of his
cavalry and guided it quickly into the northeastern town of Batesville. The
tiny Confederate force there fled.[3]
 |
| Peter Osterhaus was one of the more proven German officers in the Union Army, having performed very well at Wilson's Creek and Pea Ridge. |
Halleck sent General Frederick Steele to reinforce Curtis with a division. Just after Curtis got these men, however, Halleck reduced the Army of the Southwest. He sent 8,000 men east of the Mississippi. Having been deprived of so many men mid-campaign, Curtis stopped to reorganize his army into three divisions. Steele’s First Division was primarily made up of Indiana troops. Eugene Carr’s Second Division included the Illinoisans and Iowans, and Peter Osterhaus’ Third Division was made up of Missourians, the majority of them Germans.[4]
At
the start of May Halleck revealed why he had taken men away from Curtis while
giving him Steele. The mission had changed. The general had heard of the
stripping of Arkansas’ defenses and believed the state could be quickly conquered
for the Union. The Army of the Southwest was now to gun for the capital of
Little Rock. Understanding the supply difficulties such a movement would
entail, Halleck assured his subordinate that supplies would be dropped off from
the Mississippi and White Rivers.[5]
Hindman’s
Miracle
Curtis
may have moved more aggressively if he knew the state of Confederate affairs.
Confederate commanders east of the Mississippi had practically ordered all
units in Arkansas to move across the river. While this strengthened their
chances against the Union thrust east of the Mississippi, it left Arkansas
completely exposed. The only units present were disorganized and small in
number.[6]
Arkansas’
Governor, Henry Rector, was furious and rightly fearful about the conditions of
his state’s defense. Virtually no soldiers stood between the Federals and the
capital of Little Rock. He had himself and the state archives evacuated to Hot
Springs, then fired off a dramatic message to President Jefferson Davis. In
this message he threatened that Arkansas would secede from the Confederacy if
no aid came.[7] If
Rector was serious and not simply bloviating in order to get his way, General
Thomas Hindman, a native of Arkansas, came to the rescue. Hindman was likewise
upset with the virtual abandonment of his home state. He believed that once it
fell, so would Indian Territory. The Confederacy would also lose any chance of
regaining a strong foothold in Missouri. Hindman convinced Rector to hand over
his remaining state troops to the Confederacy. The governor likely figured out
that Hindman was genuine in his stated intentions to recover the war effort in
the Trans-Mississippi.[8]
 |
| Thomas C. Hindman |
Hindman
set up a massive recruitment and conscription drive, and had officers collect
data on each region’s resources. With this data he also worked to restore
logistical conditions. Through charitable contributions from civilians, Hindman’s
growing army acquired much ammunition. He even had cannon barrels, decoratively
placed in the corner-posts of important buildings, removed and mounted.[9]
One soldier, Silas Turnbo, recalled the formation of the 27th
Arkansas Infantry. “We were at first allowed to retain our horses, and passed
as a cavalry command. Our arms were chiefly old squirrel-rifles and shot-guns.
A few of the men had seen service under the earlier call for troops. While the
remainder were ‘raw hands.’”[10]
Hindman
may have been low on experienced men among the Arkansans, but he found willing and
veteran warriors in the remnant of the Missouri State Guard. These Missourians
could not join the army until their commanding generals, James Rains and George
McBride, were accepted into official Confederate service. Still, “they were
tried soldiers, full of zeal for the cause, and it would have been a serious
misfortune” not to accept their integration. Generals in Louisiana and Texas
also proved willing to send men to Arkansas, as their states would be next
should their neighbor fall.[11]
Finally
Hindman authorized the creation of guerilla units. These irregular soldiers
were to bedevil the Federals whenever and wherever possible. This sanctioning
of what many considered illegal warfare was necessary to buy time while he
tried to raise up a new army at Little Rock. This would prove to be Hindman’s
smartest, if most controversial, decision during his time in command. Combined
with Curtis’ lengthening supply lines, the guerilla attacks would put the
Federals in a rough situation.[12]
 |
| Former Arkansas governor John Selden Roane assisted Hindman in restoring Arkansas' defense. He was appointed a brigadier-general and managed some of the attempts to halt or delay the Union advance. |
Hindman’s other controversial act was the institution martial law. He did this because the previous abandonment by the army and Curtis’ penetrations had emboldened Unionists to disregard civil authority. Rector’s state government was unable to collect taxes and prosecute suspected criminals. Hindman restored civil authority and some semblance of order. However, he also angered many who saw his actions at tyrannical. He seized much civilian property, and ordered cotton bales that could not be brought out of the Federals’ path burned. The richer Arkansans, who were specifically deprived of wagons, cotton, and other source of wealth, acted together and protested to President Davis. They wanted Hindman gone. Not until the end of summer would the president act in response to this.[13]
Battle of Searcy
Landing (or Whitney's Lane)
 |
| A short book on the battle. Unfortunately it's only available at a hefty price. |
While he prepped for his drive on Little Rock, Curtis sent out scouting and foraging parties to determine enemy strength and positions and to supply his army. These forays would result in countless little scraps and skirmishes. On May 17 foragers from Colonel George Waring’s 4th Missouri Cavalry encountered a Confederate group at the Little Red River. The Rebels got the better of this tiny fight, seizing 5 wagons and 24 mules. Waring reported 7 Federals missing. Waring reported back to Osterhaus that the enemy appeared to be concentrated at West Point with two ferry boats. [14]
Curtis
began his march on May 19. Meanwhile, part of Osterhaus’ division crossed the
Little Red River at Searcy. The German ordered the Third Division to
consolidate at Searcy Landing. He believed the Confederates were planning to
strike a lightly-defended bridge nearby. The 4th Iowa Cavalry under
Colonel Porter held this point and awaited their reinforcements. Confederates,
either Arkansas guerillas or Texans, struck the pickets at Hilcher’s Ferry.
Osterhaus ordered two companies of the 4th Iowa to reinforce the
pickets.[15]
Waring
led much of the 4th Missouri Cavalry to escort three companies (F,
G, and H) of the 17th Missouri Volunteers (infantry) on a foraging
expedition. Waring arranged the foragers in a triangular arrangement, with a
wide farm field in the center. 7 teams of foragers collected food, mostly corn,
into their wagons. Then the Confederates struck them. Waring reported, “I heard
the war-whoop of the Texas Rangers, and saw them in a large body advancing
toward me in a gallop…on the main road leading from Searcy to West Point.” The
cavalry rushed back, shouting, “They are coming; they are coming” to the
infantry. The Missourian infantry “stood their ground, notwithstanding they
were completely wrapped up in the masses of the rebels.”[16]
Waring
sent a few riders to notify the main force of the attack. Company H of the 17th
Missouri went “behind the fences on both sides of the road” to gain protection
against the enemy cavalry. Waring positioned his cavalry at the end of the
road. The foragers were still split up, so he wanted to prevent the Texans from
cutting the companies off of the 17th Missouri from each other. The
enemy kept pouring in, so Major Kielmansegge of the 4th Missouri
Cavalry ordered Company H to retreat.[17]
Company
H set up another line along a fence which their commander, Lieutenant Henry
Neun, had already thrown down in anticipation. The Texans overwhelmed this
line. Neun claimed his company was “almost annihilated.” Company H fell apart.
Enemy cavalry surrounded Neun and shot him in the left shoulder. Just as Neun
was about to surrender, Company F emerged and rescued him. Another, Private
Wurges, was not so lucky. Right as he surrenderd a Texan cut his head with a
Bowie knife.[18]
Close
by, Company F under Lieutenant August Fischer looked for a place to set up a
line. Fischer saw woods on his left and a field surrounded by a fence on his
right. He chose the fenced field, believing it would be a more defensible
position. Around 80 Texan horsemen charged his 27 Missourians. They repulsed
them, but Fischer then saw “that great numbers of the enemy were rapidly
crowding into the field and were gradually encircling us.” He ordered his men
to get into the woods, but make sure they kept in order. The woods proved to be
no refuge. “…The woods around us were swarming with the enemy, who attacked us
from all sides.” Soon only Fischer and a Sergeant Schaub were left fighting.
Fischer ordered Schaub to surrender, “which I also did.” The lieutenant handed
his sword and revolver to his captors. Fischer calmed that after five minutes a
Rebel shot him in the shoulder.[19]
Captain
Wilhelmi, commanding Company G, moved his men on the double quick. They marched
through the woods into the field happened upon 50 Texans in their front and on their
right. He “ordered the command to halt and fired on them with good effect.” The
Texans counter-fired with no effect and withdrew into the woods. Wilhelmi moved
Company G to the other side of Company H and formed a skirmish line. There they
sparred with 150 Texans. 5 Federals were wounded in this exchange, but their
side won out, sending the Confederates retreating “to the bushes.” These little
victories were offset by the news that the Texans had cut off the road in their
rear. This also meant they were surrounded. Waring reported, “While entirely
surrounded by the enemy and constantly subjected to the attacks of parties of
50 or 60 men coming out of the wood firing and returning under cover, I was
able to bring the wounded to the forage wagons and to collect the guns and arms
lying about the field.”[20]
 |
| Franz Hassendeubel |
Colonel Franz Hassendeubel, commander of the 17th Missouri, had arrived back at Searcy Landing after the foragers had already headed out. He “heard a brisk firing” and sent as much of his remaining regiment as he could. This was three companies under Lieutenant-Colonel Cramer, 100 men in all. 20 men from the 6th Missouri Cavalry went along. Hassendeubel sent the remainder, 250 men and 4 artillery pieces to the bridge in the event of an attack from Searcy.[21] Captain John J. Kaegi of the 17th Missouri offered to scout ahead. He did so along with a 4th Missouri cavalryman. “Riding up a little hill about 150 yards in front of the advance guard of our regiment we were in sight of a troop of cavalry, drawn up in line on the road…” Kaegi took out his revolver and fired three shots at the Confederates before riding back to report. Acting on his information, a company of infantry went up the hill and set up a skirmish line. Their fire sent the Texans off the road.[22]
Colonel
Waring, according to his report, was planning a desperate attack on the Texans
to break through the cordon. But then he “heard infantry firing. Hassendeubel’s
reinforcements “came in time to save the rest of their regimental brethren…”[23]
The Texans guarding Lieutenant Fischer and his fellow prisoners fled at the
oncoming reinforcements. The newcomers thus freed Company F.[24]
The
17th’s four ambulances, escorted by 12 men, came to collect the dead
and wounded. The Confederates struck the ambulance train. They “took the mules,
broke the ambulances, and made Dr. Krumisck, Third Missouri Volunteers, a
prisoner.” taking the regimental surgeon prisoner. This incident was severely
criticized by Curtis and Osterhaus. Lieutenant-Colonel Cramer heard the attack
on the ambulances and “swept with his command back through the timber.”[25]
Curtis was displeased, not just with an attack on a medical team, but with how
it succeeded at all. “…I am not yet informed how it was that such advance
movements were not properly protected with the little howitzers and why my
troops were so surprised.”[26]
Osterhaus
reached Searcy Landing at 11:30 AM. He sent all available cavalry in pursuit of
the enemy. They did not meet any Confederates. The Federals did recognize a
dead Confederate on the field. He was actually a civilian who had spied for
them, and Osterhaus concluded that the Confederates, unaware of his allegiance,
had forced him into action.[27]
Osterhaus
estimated that up to 300 of his men engaged in the skirmish. 17th
Missouri lost of this he counted 14 killed, 31 wounded, and 2 missing for a
total of 47. The 4th Missouri Cavalry suffered 1 killed and 1
wounded to raise the total to 49. This was hefty considering the small numbers
involved in the main part of the action.[28]
A
heavy rain of 36 hours struck the region. This was a major setback for Curtis’
advance. “Now dry creeks are impassable and several days will transpire before
I can cross streams, and during this time my bread supplies will probably run
short. The country here and below cannot furnish flour, and I must depend
mainly on the trains for bread.”[29]
The May 19 Battle of Searcy Landing is also known more shortly as the Battle of
Searcy, or as the Battle of Whitney’s Lane. This small battle also led to misinformation
that the Confederates had up to 20,000 men. This halted the Union advance and
Osterhaus’ Third Division spent the next few weeks skirmishing with guerillas
and detachments of Confederates. This gave Hindman valuable time to recruit more
Arkansans and hold more Texan units in his state. Considering the dire state of
the Confederacy in Arkansas just a couple weeks earlier, it was incredible that
it might now have a chance to survive.[30]
[1] William L. Shea & Earl J.
Hess, Pea Ridge: Civil War Campaign in
the West, (University of North Carolina Press. 1992) 289-290.
[2] Harvey Hanna, “The Battle of
Cotton Plant, Arkansas: 7 July, 1862,” (https://www.academia.edu/467854/The_Battle_of_Cotton_Plant),
2.
[3] Shea, Pea Ridge, 291-292.
[4] Shea, Pea Ridge, 293-295; Harvey Hanna, “The Battle of Cotton Plant,
Arkansas: 7 July, 1862,” (https://www.academia.edu/467854/The_Battle_of_Cotton_Plant),
2.
[5] Shea, Pea Ridge, 295-296; Harvey, “Battle of Cotton Plant,” 3.
[6] “Action at
Whitney’s Lane.” https://encyclopediaofarkansas.net/entries/action-at-whitneys-lane-2794/
[7] Harvey, “Battle of Cotton
Plant,” 4-5.
[8] OR XIII, 30-31.
[9] OR XIII, 32, 34.
[10] Michael E. Banasik, Confederate Tales of the War in the Trans-Mississippi Part Two: 1862, (Camp Pope Bookshop, 2011), 90.
[11] OR XIII, 33.
[12] Shea, Pea Ridge, 297.
[13] William L. Shea, Fields of Blood: The Prairie Grove Campaign,
(Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2009), 5-9.
[14] OR XIII, 68-69.
[15] “Action at
Whitney’s Lane.” https://encyclopediaofarkansas.net/entries/action-at-whitneys-lane-2794/;
OR XIII, 70.
[16] OR XIII, 70, 73-75, 79.
[17] OR XIII, 74, 79.
[18] OR XIII, 79.
[19] OR XIII, 78.
[20] OR XIII, 74.
[21] OR XIII, 70-71.
[22] OR XIII, 77.
[23] OR XIII, 71, 74.
[24] OR XIII, 78.
[25] OR XIII, 69, 71-72.
[26] OR XIII, 69.
[27] OR XIII, 70-71.
[28] OR XIII, 71.
[29] OR XIII, 69-70.
[30] OR XIII, 87;
“Action at Whitney’s Lane.” https://encyclopediaofarkansas.net/entries/action-at-whitneys-lane-2794/
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