If they were to successfully make their way to Little Rock, General Samuel Curtis and his Army of the Southwest needed to hook up with Commander Augustus Kilty’s White River expedition and much needed supplies. The Confederates, assuming that Curtis was retreating instead of marching to meet Kilty, made a move to strike him. Little did they know they would be fighting a critical battle that would determine the course of the war in 1862 Arkansas.
Cotton Plant (or Hill's Plantation or Cache River)
Study map of Battle of Cotton Plant (Wikimedia)
On
July 7 Curtis started his army towards Clarendon, the final leg of the march.
To reach there he would first need to cross the Cache River. The Confederates
had already made moves to hold the Cache River crossing. Brigadier-General Albert
Rust led 5,000 men in the area. This force included Texas cavalry (six
regiments) and Arkansan infantry. Rust ordered Colonel William Parsons to secure
the crossing with the 12th and 16th Texas Cavalry (1,000
men in all). The 12th and 16th did not move up together
and the former stopped 6 miles south of the crossing in order to wait for the
other. By failing to secure the crossing with his 12th regiment,
Parsons gave the Federals time to take it.[1]
The area around the Cache River was heavily wooded, with plenty of swampland as
well. As Federals and Confederates alike had to deal with branches, clouds of
mosquitoes, and wet ground while a plethora of animals hooted, screeched, and
flapped in the background. One Texan said it felt like a primeval world.[2]
On
the Union side, General Steele directed Colonel Charles Hovey to move part of
his brigade across the Cache River. They would scout out the area and remove
any guerillas in the woods. The rest of his men were to remove an obstruction
on the river. Hovey selected 4 companies of the 11th Wisconsin, 4 of
his own 33rd Illinois, and an artillery piece and crew from the 1st
Indiana Cavalry. Hovey put his numbers at 400. However graduate student Harvey
Hanna, in his paper on the upcoming battle, investigated the muster rolls of
the regiments and found that the two infantry regiments alone were able to
field 759 men.[3]
 |
| Colonel Charles Hovey |
Hovey
had beaten Parsons to the crossing. The Texan colonel now moved his men
northeast on the Des Arc Road towards Hill’s Plantation. His plan was to defeat
Hovey and then secure the crossing. He would give battle with the 12th
Texas, the only unit on hand. He advanced, creating an advance guard of 70 men.
20 of these went further ahead as a skirmish line. Behind the skirmish line and advance guard
was the rest of the regiment.[4]
The following account of the Battle of Cotton Plant is likely not too accurate.
For a small battle its reports and accounts are surprisingly contradictory. One
issue is that the main Confederate officers failed to write down any report
with which to test differing Federal accounts (a handful of soldiers’ accounts
provides some information in this regard). The timing and nature of events in
the Union reports failed to gel, to the point that they created a post-battle
spat between Colonel Hovey and the second-in-command of the 1st
Indiana Cavalry.
One
Federal fell into enemy hands, and Hovey ordered Harris to investigate with six
companies of his 11th Wisconsin. Captain Miller’s Company A of the
33rd Illinois was also there in skirmish formation. Harris advanced
for just half a mile down the Des Arc Road when he “fell into an ambush”
against Parsons’ skirmish line. The woods swarmed with rebels and the firing
was sharp.” In fact it was not a planned ambush. The two sides had simply been
unable to see each other because of the brush and the Confederate skirmishers
had the fortune to see their enemies first. The two riders at the head of
Parsons’ skirmish line had just exited a cypress swamp, “In which mud was knee
deep to our horses,” when they found Federal horsemen.[5]
There
was also no immediate firing. Both of the surprised sides stared at each other
for a bit before the Federals opened fire. David Vance of the 12th
Texas was among the first casualties, and what a casualty he was. “I don’t know
much…about the battle, for at the very first volley, a one-ounce ball hit my
left cheek, coming out the back of my neck….The man on my right went down and
then the one on my left. And at about the same time another ball hit the right
side of my neck.” Vance blacked out, then regained his senses to find his horse
falling down with three wounds. David Vance would lay badly wounded for this
phase of the battle, and for half an hour became a prisoner. When he saw an
opportunity, he crawled over to Texan lines and survived.[6]
The
initial fight was chaotic and quite bloody. Initially the Federals had the
advantage thanks to having rifles against shorter-ranged shotguns. “The
distance was so great that their poor guns did no serious damage, while the
powerful rifles in the hands of our men with deadly effect upon the enemy.” However,
rifles took longer to reload, while the double-barreled shotguns among the
Texans had an additional charge ready to fire. They closed the distance and
their weapons now became effective. The Wisconsin skirmishers fell back, but
the Texans advanced into resistance from Company A of the 33rd
Illinois. The fighting continued hotly, the 33rd Illinois’ history
recalling, “A few feet above our head the trees were almost swept clean by the
leaden balls fired above us. Leaves and twigs and limbs severed from the trees
by the leaden storm, dropped upon us like hail.”[7]
Hovey
and his company commanders tried to organize their resistance. Captain Miller
and Lieutenant Chesebro’s companies formed the main battle line. The sole
cannon deployed on the side of the road with part of the woods for protection.[8]
Fortunately for the Confederates the rest of the 12th Texas, as well
as the 16th Texas, arrived.
The 16th Texas bumped into the Federals. One soldier wrote
home, “The firing soon opened between them and out advance, and our boys soon
found them secreted in the bushes on the right and in front, our company being
next to the advance was ordered to their assistance. We charged through a very
bad cypress swamp…” After further firing, the Texans withdrew into the brush
and trees of the woods.[9]
Colonel
Harris ordered an advance of the 11th Wisconsin, leading his men
into another “murderous fire.” The Federal withdrew this time with “some little
confusion.” Capitalizing, the Texans charged. One of them wounded Colonel
Harris. The officer “still kept his horse and, though fainting, fought.” The
Federals fell back behind felled timbers, giving them “every advantage in
position/ Facing this formidable line, the Confederates temporarily withdrew to
the other side of the swamp.[10]
The
Confederates redirected their attack against the small cannon. One of the
gunners started to hook the gun to the horses when the animals panicked. This
sudden movement unfastened the strap and the limber wagon moved forward without
its cannon. A captain in the 33rd Illinois said to his men, “Steady,
boys; save the gun.” Sergeant Edward Pike, along with a friend, rushed to the
gun, grabbed its trail, and began to pull it “as if it had been a baby wagon.
He worked to hitch it back onto the wagon. Several enemy rider rode up to the
caisson, grabbing at the horse bridles. Some of Pike’s comrades also came to
the rescue, helping pull away the gun (Pike earned a Medal of Honor for this
action). Hovey “ordered the gun up the road in haste and the infantry into the corn
field.” During the withdrawal a Texan cavalryman rode down upon Sergeant Harvey
Dutton. The Illinoisan had just fired his musket. Unable to get away, he
grabbed his revolver from his belt and gunned down the horseman.[11]
 |
| Grave of Sergeant Edward Pike (https://www.waymarking.com/gallery/image.aspx?f=1&guid=a4e42139-1e3f-44b7-a981-20a19c45b4a0) |
The writer of the 33rd Illinois’ regimental history, Virgil Way, recalled a false alarm. A soldier named A.O. Anderson “came to me writhing in pain, and with a face ghostly white, and stated that he had been shot through the body.” Way told him to go to the rear and find a surgeon. Not long after “Anderson was back again and using his gun in the busiest manner.” Way said, “I though you had gone back to die.” Anderson smiled, pointing at “a deep dent in his U.S. plate, which was just over the pit of his stomach.”[12]
Mounted
Texans “came charging at full speed.” Hovey’s men fired, briefly slowing the
mounted foes. After another volley “riderless horses rushed wildly in all
directions.” A third volley sent the rest of them feeling “in great disorder.”
During these attacks a spent musket ball struck Hovey’s chest. He pulled it out
of his uniform and remarked, “the rebellion did not seem to have much force in
it.” Hovey decided to hold his position at the corn field. A large mounted
enemy column, perhaps the same unit, lined up just out of range of the Federal
muskets. Once they had formed, one shouted, “Charge! Charge on the corn field!”
Strangely “the charge was not made.” The column of Texans then moved again with
the intent of cutting off Hovey in the rear. Hovey shifted some of his infantry
and blocked this move.[13]
Around this time General Rust advanced with the rest of his 5,000 Texans and
Arkansans. However he only sent on regiment to actually reinforce Parsons,
passing up an opportunity to demolish Hovey.[14]
After
blocking another flanking movement, Hovey decided to push his men forward,
though he had to stretch out his less than 400 men. By this point the 11th
Wisconsin formed his left flank and the 33rd Illinois his right, the
cavalry gun in the center with a small protection force. The Texans slowly fell
back. As the infantry advanced, they “heard a shout in the rear” and learned
that more of the 1st Indiana Cavalry, under Lieutenant-Colonel
William F. Wood, had arrived with two more guns. Wood’s men had been
skirmishing with Texan horsemen when they heard the heavy fire from Hill’s
Plantation. The infantry greeted these arrivals “with demonstrations of joy,
cheering [them] enthusiastically.” Hovey met Wood, pointed out the position of
the Confederates, and said “pitch into them.” Wood put his guns into the center
of the line and his cavalry on the flanks. “The woods were now alive with shot
and shell.” The Texans wavered and retreated. Two companies of Indiana Cavalry
drove into their right flank and “poured volley after volley from their carbine
and revolvers.” This dashing assault had its consequences. One captain was
killed. A lieutenant was thrown from his horse and another had his steed shot
out from under him. Regardless, the charge was successful, turning the retreat
into a rout.[15]
Wood’s
involvement actually created a controversy within the ranks of the Army of the
Southwest. Hovey raised many objections about Wood’s report, which differed in
several aspects of his own and appeared to overestimate the role of the
cavalry. For example, Wood claimed that when he arrived the Confederates were
advancing. Hovey maintained that he had already sent them into retreat. Hovey
also claimed that Wood’s cavalry charge was rash and “sacrificed life
unnecessarily” and against his orders, though he admitted that he made no move
to “countermand” the lieutenant’s decision. Wood insisted that the colonel had
supported him, even exclaiming, “Yes; let the cavalry charge!” Hovey also
disputed Wood’s claim that the cavalry made the furthest pursuit of the enemy,
and that it was in fact the infantry who accomplished this.
Wood
defended his claim by pointing out that the pursuit went out of his line of
view, so it was possible that he failed to see the infantry continue it after
his horsemen had stopped. Colonel Conrad Baker of the 1st Indiana
rushed to his subordinate’s defense, pointing out that Hovey’s objections were
a stark departure from his congratulatory assessment of Wood in his report. Years
later the 33rd Illinois regimental history, which was not shy about
recounting glorious actions by its colonel and other members of the unit, also
backed Wood by saying the enemy broke after his cavalry charge. Wood insisted
that he only reported the facts as he perceived them, and asked for a court of
inquiry to clear his name. General Curtis took Wood’s side, finding some of
Hovey’s claims to conflict with the reports and words of other officers.[16]
On
the other side of the Chase River, Curtis ordered General William P. Benton to
protect Hovey’s flank. Benton arrived to see Hovey’s brigade already victorious
and in pursuit of the Confederates. Benton, as senior officer, took command and
ordered Hovey to send part of the 33rd Illinois forward as
skirmishers. Benton soon “much to my admiration and astonishment” found Hovey
and his staff “in the extreme front of the line of skirmishers, throwing shell
into the enemy’s camp.” The Texans withdrew for good.[17]
Hovey was determined to add on to his victory. He sent most of the 11th
Wisconsin Infantry and the 1st Indiana Cavalry in pursuit. They
reached Bayou De View and its bridge. They drove the Confederates out with fire
from their artillery pieces, and just in time. The enemy had made preparations
to burn the bridge and deny its use to Curtis’ army.[18]
Losses
in Hovey’s Brigade were 9 wounded in the 33rd Illinois, 1 killed and
9 wounded in the 1st Indiana Cavalry, and 5 killed and 39 wounded in
the 11th Wisconsin. Confederate casualties are uncertain. Federal
reports varied greatly, with one claiming “over 200 killed and many wounded.” The
Official Records do not record Confederate losses, but one source suggests that
Hovey overestimated enemy casualties and fabricated the hundred plus dead
enemies on the field. The 12th Texas Cavalry reported 14 killed
outright, 36 wounded, and 2 missing. The 18th Texas Cavalry was said
to have similar casualties.[19]
Steele
was impressed by Hovey’s performance and endorsed a promotion to
brigadier-general. General Henry W. Halleck sent the endorsement to Secretary
of War Edwin M. Stanton. Stanton supported the promotion as well, but Congress
denied it, likely having learned of Hovey’s exaggerations.[20]
Hindman’s
assessment of the battle was negative, though he did not have the most accurate
details:
…Curtis’ advance crossed Cache Rive and
attacked General Rust, whose command, after an engagement of about thirty
minutes, retreated in great disorder across White River…No report of this
affair was ever received, though often called for; consequently I am not able
to give any of the details. My instructions for devastating the country were
not executed.
Hindman
believed that Rust had failed in his main objective, to prevent Curtis’ union
with Fitch and Kilty.[21]
He would soon be relieved of that belief.
Article on the battle (https://www.newspapers.com/clip/6527401/12-jul-1862-battle-at-cotton-plant/)
Fruitless End
Back
on June 28, Commander Kilty and Colonel Fitch started another attempt to run
their supplies up the White River. After scattering enemy cavalry in another
skirmish, they received a message from General Hindman, directed to General
Ulysses S. Grant, concerning the recent wave of guerilla attack throughout
Arkansas. Hindman argued that the guerillas were in fact Confederate troops, as
he had authorized their organization and the Confederate government paid them.
If the Federals carried out their treats against the citizens of Monroe County,
he would retaliate on Federal prisoners. Fitch wrote a response, claiming that
Hindman’s directives were “but an encouragement to rapine and murder upon the
part of those in this State…You must be aware that your captains of tens will
soon become little else than highway banditti, more terrible to citizens of
your own State than to soldiers and sailors of the United States…Your threat
will not deter me from executing the letter of my proclamation in every case in
which my judgment dictates its propriety or necessity.”[22]
After
this exchange, the fleet headed for Clarendon. They got there on the 30th,
and were received by guerilla fire from the river bank. They also encountered
Texas cavalry. The Texans withdrew rather than fight. The boats encountered a
“very narrow and crooked” part of the river, “with sharp turns.” Fitch sent
parties on shore to visit suspected Secessionist plantations and seize horses
and mules. That evening a scouting party ran into the Texas cavalry again.
Fitch’s men stayed at Clarendon until July 3, gathering food and supplies to be
given to Curtis’ army when it finally arrived.[23]
On
July 4 a river fleet under Lieutenant James W. Shirk left Crockett’s Bluff.
When the boats Adams’ Bluff guerillas fired from the east bank. The gunboats
responded with shells. In further retaliation Shirk ordered the destruction of
a ferry boat. On July 5 the fleet reached Aberdeen, linking up with Fitch’s
brigade. At 6:30 that evening guerillas fired on the Lexington, killing Chief Engineer Huber and wounding another. Shirk
“caused the woods to be well scoured with grape, canister, and shell.”[24]
On
July 5 a scouting party found Confederates 2 miles from Aberdeen. The next
morning 200 men from the 24th Indiana went out on reconnaissance, with
200 men from the 43rd Indiana half an hour behind them. A third
column with men from the 34th and 46th Indiana followed
with a howitzer. Fitch personally led this group. Lieutenant-Colonel Cameron
commanded the remainder of the brigade. The 24th encountered mounted
Confederates and repulsed a charge. The horsemen used the woods to cover their
movements, and reappeared in the front, flank, and rear of the Indianans. The
Hoosiers were still able to drive them back. Fitch ordered a pursuit, but
called it off after 3 miles. It was a hot day and infantry could not hope to
catch up to cavalry. This brief skirmish resulted in 1 killed and 21 wounded
for the Federals, and more for the Confederates.[25]
On
the 7th the Indianans and boats moved back up the river with plans
to meet near Clarendon and then move on Devall’s Bluff. On the way there
Fitch’s men scattered another camp of cavalry. At the town a steamer arrived
bearing messages from General Grant. Grant could not send any reinforcements.
With the water too shallow for Shirk’s fleet, no sign of Curtis, and their
numbers too small, the Federals decided to return to St. Charles on July 9. If
they had been able to hang on just a day longer. they would have given Curtis
the supplies needed to complete the campaign.[26]
Following
the Battle of Cotton Plant, Curtis ordered a fateful one day rest at Hills’
Plantation. The next day they went on the march. The withdrawing Confederates
filled the wells and ponds with disgusting ditch water. One soldier described
it as “covered several inches thick with a green and nauseating scum. Pushing
it aside, the men drank eagerly of the pestilential ditch water.” The
Confederates dried up other wells, and in some cases threw rails into them.[27]
The soldiers survived on corn bread and beef, and ravaged any corn field they
passed by.[28]
The
presence of hundreds of black slaves added to the logistical strain. “On our
march the negroes fairly swarmed around us, coming from every mansion, log
cabin, and habitable place in the whole region.” One Illinoisan was impressed
by their determination. Though there was little food to share “they got along
some way, and never returned to their old masters and mistresses.”[29]
All throughout the summer campaigning, the Army of the Southwest had freed
thousands of slaves. Curtis had no authority to liberate them, but the blacks
forced his hand by fleeing their places of servitude on a large scale. Curtis’
men seized printing presses and churned out thousands of emancipation forms to
somewhat legalize the stream of refugees. They handed these papers out to
blacks, who then followed the army until they were in safely held Union
territory. At least 3,000 followed Curtis, while others rushed north for
Missouri.[30]
While
the soldiers understandably seized food to keep up their strength, they went
out of their way to burn Arkansas homes. They justified their actions by saying
their inhabitants were fervent Secessionists. One recalled a “fine
mansion…occupied by some ladies, who were very violent in their opinions, as well
as insolent to our officers and soldiers.” Finally some Federals set fire to
the building and “what had been an inviting mansion, with trees and shrubbery,
was but a shapeless mass of charred beams.”[31]
The
Army of the Southwest reached Clarendon on July 10. The exhausted 33rd
Illinois immediately fell asleep, only to wake up the following morning “frying
in the hot sun, and it was not long until the whole regiment was bathing in
White River.” By this point, however, the promised ships had left. One soldier lamented
“No one can tell how much we suffered from disappointment, nor how aggravating
it was, to be so near our supplies, and thus be thwarted in getting them.” Some
ascribed the failure to link up to with Kilty’s fleet to the capture of Curtis’
messengers by Confederates. Because of this they could not coordinate their
rendezvous. Unable to form a well-supplied base of operations in the swamps and
lowlands, Curtis moved his force to Helena, a 60 mile march with more scummy
water and very little food. In some units three quarters of the men fell out,
“lying sick and exhausted along the roadside for thirty miles in the rear. It
required days for them all to come up, many having to be brought in wagons sent
for them.” This was the end of the summer campaign in Arkansas. Little Rock
would remain in Confederate hands well into 1863.[32]
Final Assessment
The
1862 summer campaigning in Arkansas saw no major advances for the Union and
little counter-advance by the Confederates. Because of this the battles of
Searcy Landing, St. Charles, and Cotton Plant are rarely if ever mentioned in
histories (though some naval histories do have interest in the fatal shot to
the Mound City at St. Charles). After
Hindman’s arrival and improvements to the Confederate situation in Arkansas, narratives
tend to jump forward to the build-up to the Battle of Prairie Grove, in which the
Federals decisively established their presence in northern Arkansas.
However,
the events of summer 1862 did have some bearing on how the war progressed in the
Trans-Mississippi theatre. Back in the spring the Confederacy was dangerously exposed
and the Union Army did try to capitalize on the situation. Thanks to General Hindman’s
quick creation of a defensive force, as well as the encouragement and implementation
of guerillas in both Arkansas and Missouri, he brought valuable time. The battles
of Searcy Landing and Cotton Plant, while hardly major tactical victories, derailed
two Union advances. After Searcy Landing Curtis stalled long enough for Hindman
to build up more of a proper force. While Hindman was completely unaware of its
benefits, the Battle of Cotton Plant delayed the Federals long enough, just by one
day, to prevent their link-up with the White River Expedition. Without these failed attempts to capture the Confederate capital at Little Rock, there would have been no Battle of Prairie Grove.
In terms of leadership, neither Curtis nor Hindman personally directed a battle. Though he failed, Curtis was by no means a bad general. He attempted to fill out his directives to seize Arkansas as best as he could with the available information. His failure to fully capitalize on Confederate weakness in late spring and early summer was borne about by unexpected resistance near Searcy Landing. He had the right idea in linking up with supplies on the White River, but understandably found it difficult to coordinate with the navy. Hindman's organizational miracle was a mix of efficiency and luck. Within a short time he had assembled a force good enough to hold off Federal advances. His organization of guerilla outfits was also essential to his success, though this also generated great controversy and contributed to the escalating violence in the Trans-Mississippi. His successes through his subordinates at the battles were more a matter of luck. He thought Cotton Plant was a disastrous defeat, his thwarting of Curtis' link-up with the White River fleet an unintentional accomplishment. His actual battlefield command at Prairie Grove would prove to be greatly underwhelming.
Understandably
the events in this series will never have any thorough examination outside of close-up studies
of the war in Arkansas or particular figures such as Samuel Curtis and Thomas Hindman.
Still, they should receive some acknowledgment for prolonging the war, by however
many weeks or months, in the Trans-Mississippi.
Sources for Whole Series
9th
Illinois Cavalry Regiment. History of the
Ninth Regiment Illinois Cavalry Volunteers. Chicago: Donohue &
Henneberry, 1888.
“Action at
Hill’s Plantation.” https://encyclopediaofarkansas.net/entries/action-at-hills-plantation-511/ accessed
November 10, 2022.
“Action at
Whitney’s Lane.” https://encyclopediaofarkansas.net/entries/action-at-whitneys-lane-2794/ accessed
November 3, 2022.
Banasik,
Michael E. Confederate Tales of the War
in the Trans-Mississippi Part Two: 1862. Camp Pope Bookshop, 2011.
Bringhurst,
Thomas H. History of the Forty-Sixth
Regiment Indiana Volunteer Infantry: September, 1861 – September, 1865.
Logansport: Wilson, Humphreys & Co, 1888.
Gallaway, B. P. The Ragged Rebel: A Common Soldier in W.H.
Parsons’ Texas Cavalry, 1861-1865. Austin: University of Texas Press, 1988.
Hanna, Harvey.
“The Battle of Cotton Plant, Arkansas: 7 July, 1862.” https://www.academia.edu/467854/The_Battle_of_Cotton_Plant.
Hanna, Harvey.
“The Battle of St. Charles, Arkansas: 17 June, 1862.” https://www.scribd.com/document/35200860/The-Battle-of-St-Charles, 2010.
Shea. William L.
& Hess, Earl J. Pea Ridge: Civil War
Campaign in the West. University of North Carolina Press. 1992.
Shea, William L.
Fields of Blood: The Prairie Grove
Campaign. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2009.
United
States. The War of the Rebellion: A
Compilation of the Official Records of the Union and Confederate Armies Vol.
XIII. Washington D.C. 1898.
Walker, Jeanie
Mort. Life of Capt. Joseph Fry, the Cuban
Martyr. Hartford: J.B. Burr Publishing Co., 1877.
Way, Virgil
Gilman. History of the Thirty-Third
Regiment Illinois Volunteer Infantry in the Civil War. Gibson City: The
Regimental Association, 1902.
[1] “Action at Hill’s Plantation,” https://encyclopediaofarkansas.net/entries/action-at-hills-plantation-511/; Harvey, “Battle of Cotton
Plant,” 12.
[2] Gallaway, The Ragged Rebel, 45.
[3] OR XIII, 141, 143; Harvey,
“Battle of Cotton Plant,” 12-13.
[4] “Action at Hill’s Plantation,” https://encyclopediaofarkansas.net/entries/action-at-hills-plantation-511/; Harvey, “Battle of Cotton
Plant,” 14.
[5] OR XIII, 143; “Action at Hill’s
Plantation,” https://encyclopediaofarkansas.net/entries/action-at-hills-plantation-511/; Gallaway, The Ragged Rebel, 45-46.
[6] Gallaway, The Ragged Rebel, 46-47, 49-50.
[7] Way, Thirty-Third Regiment Illinois, 78; Gallaway, The Ragged Rebel, 47.
[8] OR XIII, 143.
[9] OR XIII, 143; Harvey, “Battle of
Cotton Plant,” 15.
[10] OR XIII, 143-144; Harvey,
“Battle of Cotton Plant,” 18.
[11] OR XIII, 144; Way, Thirty-Third Regiment Illinois, 28, 79.
[12] Way, Thirty-Third Regiment Illinois, 28.
[13] OR XIII, 144; Way, Thirty-Third Regiment Illinois, 28.
[14] “Action at
Hill’s Plantation,” https://encyclopediaofarkansas.net/entries/action-at-hills-plantation-511/.
[15] OR XIII, 144, 146-147.
[16] OR XIII, 146, 148-151; Way, Thirty-Third Regiment Illinois, 28.
[17] OR XIII, 142-143.
[18] OR XIII, 145-146.
[19] OR XIII, 145, 147; Harvey,
“Battle of Cotton Plant,” 20.
[20] OR XIII, 142; Harvey, “Battle of
Cotton Plant,” 20.
[21] OR XIII, 37.
[22] OR XIII, 107-109.
[23] OR XIII, 107-108.
[24] OR XIII, 115.
[25] OR XIII, 109-110.
[26] OR XIII, 113,
115.
[27] Harvey, “Battle of Cotton
Plant,” 20; Way, Thirty-Third Regiment
Illinois, 29.
[28] “A Soldier’s Account of the March
of General Curtis’ Column” from Chicago
Times, August 7, 1886 in 9th Illinois, Ninth Regiment Illinois Cavalry, 49.
[29] “A Soldier’s Account of the
March of General Curtis’ Column” from Chicago
Times, August 7, 1886 in 9th Illinois, Ninth Regiment Illinois Cavalry, 49.
[30] Shea, Pea Ridge, 301-302.
[31] “A Soldier’s Account of the
March of General Curtis’ Column” from Chicago
Times, August 7, 1886 in 9th Illinois, Ninth Regiment Illinois Cavalry, 49-50.
[32] “Action at
Hill’s Plantation,” https://encyclopediaofarkansas.net/entries/action-at-hills-plantation-511/; Way, Thirty-Third Regiment Illinois, 29; “A
Soldier’s Account of the March of General Curtis’ Column” from Chicago Times, August 7, 1886 in 9th
Illinois, Ninth Regiment Illinois Cavalry,
50.
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