When
noon struck on August 10, 1861, the hills and fields around Wilson’s Creek were
covered with the dead, dying, and maimed. The Confederate Army, along with the
allied Missouri State Guard, had won the second major battle of the Civil War.
Earlier that year Missouri had voted to stay in the Union, but only as a
neutral bystander in the emerging conflict. Unconditional Unionists and
Secessionists alike had other plans, trying to seize control of Missouri’s
arsenals. The pro-Confederate governor, Claiborne Jackson reorganized the
militia into the Missouri State Guard and placed it under the command of former
governor, state senator, and Mexican War veteran Sterling Price. The State
Guard was ostensibly meant to protect Missouri’s armed neutrality and after the
start of hostilities to protect the state from Federal intervention without necessarily
joining the Confederacy. As a result many of the men in its ranks favored their
home state over the idea of a Confederate nation and some even switched sides
when they felt that it was better for Missouri to stay in the Union.
 |
| Sterling Price, command of the State Guard. Before the war he was a prominent politicians who served in both Missouri and the US House of Representatives as well as governor of Missouri from 1853 to 1857. |
The Missouri State Guard consisted on nine divisions, each representing one of nine military districts. These were not proper divisions, being all over the place in size. Most were brigade-sized, save for the Eighth Division which included thousands of Bushwhackers and other participants as well as victims of Bleeding Kansas. Between the lack of Federal funding, inconsistent Confederate support, and fast-moving events, the State Guard was chronically short on supplies, logistics, and time for drill and discipline.
Union
General Nathaniel Lyon’s hastily assembled force quickly knocked Price’s army
off balance and drove it to the southern reaches of the state. Fortunately the
Confederacy sent a small force under General Benjamin McCulloch to the rescue. At the Battle of Wilson's Creek (August 10, 1861) the Confederate-State Guard alliance had now defeated (and killed) Lyon and
routed his army. It reoccupied the major town of Springfield. Tensions rose
between the armies, with the Confederates feeling that the State Guard was
undisciplined and unreliable and the Guardsmen in turn feeling that their
allies were uncaring to the predicament of their state.
 |
| Nathaniel Lyon was the Missouri State Guard's arch-enemy. His defeat and death at Wilson's Creek put the initiative back in Rebel hands. |
Having
managed to work together for victory, McCulloch and Price now argued as to what
to do next. Though McCulloch had taken command for the duration of the
campaign, the State Guard was the force of a non-Confederate state and had no
obligation to follow his commands. Troublingly Price was a stubborn and
prideful man, and it was only a matter of time before he butted heads with this
outsider. McCulloch wanted to solidify their victory by taking a strong
defensive position in southern Missouri, centered around Springfield. Though
this would leave at least half the state in Federal hands, it would allow for
easy support from Confederate states and allies in Indian Territory. Price, on
the other hand, wanted to go for it all. Pockets of the State Guard as well as
Secessionist civilians were now trapped in Federal territory. Price believed
that to gain popular support and secure Missouri’s place in the Confederacy,
they needed to strike now while they had the upper hand.
McCulloch
pointed out that their victorious forces were severely low on supplies and
could not sustain any major offensive. Worse, much of McCulloch’s army was
undergoing expiring enlistments. McCulloch further doubted that Price’s army
was up to the challenge. It was poorly supplied and poorly disciplined. Price
would not hear such talk. He said he would go with or without McCulloch’s aid. With
most of his present army going home due to the end of enlistment terms,
McCulloch realized he would have barely anybody to cover a defense of southern
Missouri while Price went on his adventure. He decided to withdraw south into
Arkansas. Price planned a thrust towards Lexington, a major town sited on the Missouri
River.
Harris’ War
Price’s
Northern Missouri Campaign had two major objectives. One was to take the bank
at Lexington, which held money that could fund the State Guard’s war efforts.
The Federals had taken the money for themselves The main motive behind the
seizure was not to arm the Federals, nor was it part of a greedy grab by the
head of the Union war effort in the west, Charles Fremont (though the Union
general was associated with much corruption). It was instead a response to an
earlier action by Governor Claiborne Jackson. When pursuing armed neutrality,
Jackson had taken from the state’s school fund as well as forced loans from the
banks to arm the State Guard. The money was merely taken out to prevent the
enemy from using it, a smart move considering following events.[1]
Another
more urgent matter was the rescue of Thomas A Harris’ Second Division. Being in
the northeasternmost part of the state, Harris’ division had been separated
from the rest of the State Guard by Lyon’s movements. In the wake of the
Booneville debacle, a messenger reached Harris, naming him the general of all Northern
Missouri. Harris’ division was separated from the rest of the State Guard and
had to lie low as it received recruits. Throughout the summer he tried to
prevent reinforcements from reaching Lyon with small, but noticeable military
movements. These induced Fremont, overall commander of Federal forces, to
divert precious manpower and supplies from Lyon, though given Fremont’s dilatoriness
these Federals may have never made it to Springfield in the first place.
Harris’ recruiting and raiding efforts went quite well thanks to Federal
mismanagement. The commanding Federal officers had been heavy-handed and
intrusive in managing northern Missouri, resulting in a pro-State Guard
population. With considerable civilian support, guerilla style movements, and
awkward Federal responses, the impromptu guerilla general “gave infinite
trouble to the Federal forces in northeastern Missouri.”[2]
The
fighting in northern Missouri was a less violent precursor to the future
irregular warfare that would be endemic to the state. Several companies of the
3rd Iowa, along with a company of German Home Guards, went on one of
many forays into northeastern Missouri to bring Harris’ State Guardsmen to
heel. The Federals marched through an abandoned part of the countryside, with
empty farmsteads. Every now and then a couple mounted men would appear,
scouting out the foray before riding out of sight. The Iowan-Missourian team
finally ran into pickets and a brief firefight ensued. Only a couple men were
wounded and the Rebels fled. After their tiny brush, the Federals deployed
their small battery and shelled out a barn that proved to be empty. This was
the average type of action in this part of Missouri. More memorable was what
happened to the Federals’ transport. They had taken the train in search of
Harris’ men. Upon their return to the train station, they were surprised “to
see the railroad depot and the trains of cars we had left behind in flames!”
More brisk skirmishing broke out between the Federals and the culprits, mounted
State Guardsmen. The Rebels withdrew, but brought up their own artillery piece
and shelled the Iowans and Germans. They disabled one Federal gun and blasted
dirt over the infantry. Finally another train with reinforcements came,
thankfully slow enough that it did not crash as it came upon a torn rail. This
finally drove off the Rebels.[3]
Further
south and to the west, a regiment of German immigrants under Colonel Stifel
took up base at Lexington. Though so far removed from the main battles and
Harris and Thompson’s guerilla fighting, they were not inactive. Their main
task was to prevent Northern Missourians from crossing the Missouri River to
the south towards Price’s force. On July 12 the Federals boarded the steamer White Cloud and went towards Blue Mills
Landing to destroy the ferry boats there. State Guardsmen, anticipating their
arrival, ambushed them from shore. Stifel lost 1 killed and 12 wounded. Still,
he was able to burn a ferry-boat as well as a warehouse. The Germans also found
and carried off a cache of weapons.[4]
Stifel’s
regiment left Lexington on August 15, not before Rebels fired on their
departing steamer and inflicted a couple more wounded casualties. Major Frederick
Becker stayed behind to garrison the town. Becker was loud and possibly a
drunkard, but decent at drilling and training the troops. In his charge was a
whole new unit of Unionists recruited from the region. Reinforcements,
including the 1st Illinois Cavalry were on the way. It was during
this time that Henry Routt, hoping to raise a new regiment of Missouri State
Guards and become a colonel, arrived outside with a few hundred men. They began
to enter the town and even made arrests of prominent Lexington Unionists. Of
course this could not go unchallenged and fighting broke out in both the woods
outside and on the streets themselves. The Guardsmen, most of them mounted,
would charge into the town in small groups and then be thrown out, one bayoneted
right off his horse. When the skirmishing ended, casualties were light. Eight
of the assailants were killed against only one single Federal. Over the next
several days, hundreds of Rebels flooded onto the outskirts of town until Routt
felt he had a force strong enough to begin favorable negotiations. He demanded
Becker’s surrender, but the German Becker obstinately refused and Routt
eventually had to abandon the exaggeratedly called “siege.”
 |
| An old photo of Lexington's Masonic College. Nearly a million dollars was locked in its basement. It also became the centerpiece of the Federal defenses there. |
Lexington
remained a target, however. The basement of the Masonic college there now held
nearly a million dollars, the money meant for the State Guard but confiscated
by the Union. Price believed the prominent town would both provide his army
with a needed boost in purchasing power and a place to link up with Harris.[5]
News of the recent victories, brought by men who had fought
at Wilson’s Creek or been at Springfield, “greatly stimulated” State Guard
recruitment in northern Missouri. Even better the Federals at Kansas City and
Fort Leavenworth had taken a defensive posture and so did nothing to stop
hundreds of men from preparing to join Price’s army. Delegates from said army
arrived in Clay County at the start of September. They explained the needs of
the State Guard, especially clothing. The residents were willing, and
“committees were appointed for each township to secure additional aid, and
especially to furnish cloth to the patriotic Southern ladies, who gladly agreed
to make it up into clothing for ‘the boys’ in the tented field.” As for
Unionists, they fled or found themselves driven off by Secessionists.[6]
Price Moves
North
 |
| Lexington located in Lafayette County (left) and the state (right). (courtesy of Wikipedia) |
Price
left only 400 men under Colonel T.T. Taylor to hold Springfield. Another small
force took up residence in Osceola, a town which would serve as a supply base. One
might think that Price’s force would have been greatly reduced by the time he
reached Lexington, but there were in fact many enthusiastic volunteers that
hopped onto his army, as well as scattered elements of the State Guard who had
been unable or unwilling to leave their home counties to join the campaign in
the south. The western border counties of Missouri were the most reliably
Secessionist, as its inhabitants had a long, violent history with free soilers
in Kansas. By the time Price reached Lexington he would have an army of 18,000.
The Guardsmen moved out with enthusiasm, though as ever their appearance was
somewhat ramshackle. “The arms of our command were such as could be gathered
from the family arsenals, and were consequently of almost every conceivable
character and description. The column marched in double file, and being
cavalry, made quite an imposing appearance. The country, at first thickly
wooded, in a few miles became open, with long stretches of prairie on every
side, skirted here and there by narrow strips of woodland.”[7]
Price continued towards Lexington “with an
army increasing hourly in numbers and enthusiasm.” As usual the State Guard
relied on a friendly citizenry for its supplies. Price joyfully reported that
“citizens vied with each other in feeding my almost famished soldiers.” One
soldier gleefully recalled: “Often fruit and water were dispensed with fair
hands; bright eyes greeted us joyously, and rosy lips murmured forth hopes for
our success and triumph.”[8]
Including
those who would join at the Siege of Lexington, this is the State Guard’s order
of battle.
Missouri
State Guard: Major General Sterling Price
2nd Division:
Brigadier-General Thomas A. Harris
4th Division: Colonel
Benjamin S. Rives[9]
6th Division:
Brigadier-General Mosby M. Parsons
7th Division:
Brigadier-General James H. McBride
8th Division:
Brigadier-General James S. Rains
Resistance at Dry Wood
Federal resistance to Price’s march was for a short time
negligible. Their presence in northwestern Missouri consisted of small pockets
of men, sometimes less than a regiment. The first serious challenge to the
Missouri State Guard came from several fort across the border in Kansas. The
Federals stationed in Fort Leavenworth found themselves affected by Price’s
northern march. Pockets of Guardsmen had disrupted their mail routes and
telegraph communications. Nearby at Fort Scott, Jim Lane, the infamous
Jayhawker and virtual leader of Kansas’ soldiery, was determined to do
something. Lane’s Kansans had in fact already led several raids across the border
against Secessionist towns. Their depredations drove many Missourians to
support Price. Lane had about 800 men at Fort Scott, both “regular and
irregular” cavalry. He had a further 250 men “stationed in log buildings” at
Barnesville, a town to the northeast that almost straddled the Kansas-Missouri
border.[10] This was not much in
comparison to the enemy’s force, but perhaps it could disrupt their plans.
 |
| James Lane, Jayhawker, poses with weapons |
Price was also aware of this Federal presence on the border
and wanted to at least shove it aside. Alexander Steen assembled
horsemen from various regiments and moved in the direction of Fort Scott. On
September 1 he clashed with some Kansans in tall grass. The men could barely see
each other and their shots went high and wild. Steen finally withdrew in the face
of superior numbers, though he suffered no losses. Shortly the State Guard sent
out a larger force. The column that departed from Price’s camp was three miles
long and mounted.[11]
This fast moving force headed towards Dry Wood Creek.
One of Lane’s subordinates, Colonel Weer, led a detachment
tending to grazing mules. State Guard cavalry suddenly came upon them, drove
them off, and seized the mules. All available Union cavalry assembled and gave
pursuit. They reached Dry Wood Creek and learned that Price’s sizeable army was
camped near there. The immediate suspicion of Lane and the other officers was
that Fort Scott was the target of this Rebel force. Lane put Colonel James
Montgomery, another infamous Jayhawker, in charge of a small force, armed with
Sharps rifles and a howitzer, that would attempt to stall Price. The Kansans hid
in the dense trees around Dry Wood Creek. Their ambush was successful, catching
the Missourians by total surprise.[12]
The
following fight occurred in grass 7 to 8 feet in height. Montgomery’s men were
severely outnumbered and outgunned, but thankfully the tall vegetation concealed
their numerical weakness. Their one howitzer squared off against 7 artillery
pieces. Many of Price’s men had yet to actually be in a battle, and when they
arrived on the smoke strewn battlefield, those who had eagerly anticipated a
fight changed their minds when they heard the shrieks of shells passing right
over their heads. “One man immediately volunteered his services to remain…and
another man said if no one else could be got to stay, he would help hold the
horses.” Casualties were not heavy, though artillery captain Hiram Bledsoe
received a wound.[13]
The
tall dry grass proved to be a danger. In several spots the fighting started
fires and kept the men tending to the combustible artillery caissons on their
toes. The State Guardsmen attempted two flanking assaults, both of which were stopped.
After an hour and a half of fighting, the heavily outnumbered Kansans saw no
hope for victory and retreated for the safety of Fort Scott. The tall grass concealed
their withdrawal, buying some time before the Missourians realized that their prey
was getting away. In their zeal to pursue the fleeing Unionists, “five or six”
mounted state guardsmen drove right into a mud hole. Men and mounts were
tangled up, thrashing about to escape. A couple unfortunates did not make it
before the riders behind them, unable to slow down, trampled and injured them. Another
group of pursuers was stopped when a volley, fired by concealed foes in the cornfield,
slew their flagbearer. With night approaching, Price called off any further
pursuit. Feeling that his men had already prevented any further trouble from Lane,
he unwilling to bring the Missouri State Guard into Kansas. Following
Missouri’s outward claims of fighting for state sovereignty, he considered its western
neighbor foreign territory. Price did
promise that if the Jayhawkers returned and caused more trouble, he would do
his best to retaliate on Kansan soil.[14]
Lane
had hastily assembled a battery of three guns and these marched out to
reinforce the cavalry. However, they found the cavalry in retreat. Too disorganized
to offer any further resistance, the outnumbered Federals withdrew. The
Guardsmen were pleased with their victory. They were filled with especial glee,
as their enemies this time were the hated Jayhawkers. “Many of those who had
been plundered and outraged by them were in our ranks,” noted one veteran. A doctor
in the State Guard, learning of Lane’s cross-border raids, claimed that the
Federal “Dutch” were “robbing murdering, raping, and burning” Missourians. He
also claimed to have heard some revelatory statements from Kansans prisoners.
They said they were promised the farms of Confederate men if the Confederates
were killed. In the Skirmish at Dry Wood, the Missourians lost 2 killed and 23
wounded, the Federals 5 killed and 6 wounded.[15]
On
the following march the Guardsmen made 50 miles in 29 hours. They outpaced the
supply train and were forced to wait in rain, unable to cook anything and
bereft of any other rations. The march on September 11 and 12 was also rough,
but now supportive civilians waited for the Guardsmen with pitchers of water as
well as treats to consume.[16]
With Price’s army moving into the area, other State Guard contingents grew
emboldened. On September 5, about 800 Guardsmen attacked a recently formed Home
Guards unit at Booneville. The skirmish ended in a draw, but produced some fatalities.[17]
The State Guard
Gets Closer
The further north the main body of the State Guard went, the more recruits came in. One soldier likened the growth of Price’s army to a snowball. The State Guard also continued to deal with their long-running logistical issues. Fortunately many civilians were firm supporters of their cause. They would go to the soldiers with “buckets and pitchers of water” to help quench their thirst. The most appreciated treats for the marchers were the “cakes and coffee”. However underequipped the men were, whichever Federal garrison that was on its next stop was sure to be overwhelmed if it was not evacuated.
The
next such outpost was at Warrensburg. The commander there, Colonel Everett
Peabody, was not prepared to face such an army with his little group, so he had
his 13th Missouri Infantry pull out for Lexington. They burned a coupe
broken wagons, as well as the bridges over the Blackwater River and Davis
Creek. Having slowed down the State Guards with his sabotage, Peabody was able to
reach and reinforce Lexington on September 11. For the Federals, the night of
September 11 was an uneasy one, as skirmishers of the State Guards closely
followed Peabody’s still retreating men. “It was
a night of fearful anxiety; none knew at what moment the enemy would be upon
our devoted little band, and the hours passed in silence.” There was
some skirmishing, but for the most part the night went by only in suspenseful
silence.[18]
Lexington
was near, but a storm on the morning of the 12th further delayed Price’s
advance until 10 in the morning. In order to make up for lost time, the
commander led the mounted arm of his force ahead, hoping to catch any further
retreating Federals before they could reach the safety of Lexington. Failing
this, he had his men settle down until the foot infantry could catch up. That
day the worried Federal commander sent a message to General Charles Fremont
through colonel Jefferson Davis. It read: "Ten
or fifteen thousand men, under Price, Jackson & Co., are reported near
Warrensburg, moving on to this post. We will hold out. Strengthen us; we will
require it." The commander was James Mulligan.[19]
James Mulligan
 |
| James Mulligan |
On
August 30, Mulligan had received word that Marshall’s 1st Illinois
Cavalry was “hemmed in” at the town of Tipton and “could neither advance nor
return”. General Jefferson C. Davis ordered him to attempt a rescue of
Marshall. Mulligan’s 23rd Illinois set off with three days’ rations.
The trek to Tipton took nine days, so they were forced to forage from the
countryside. When they finally reached their destination they found neither
Marshall’s cavalry nor the enemy. Mulligan went for the friendly territory
around Lexington, where he was pleased to find the 1st Illinois
Cavalry in addition to 350 Home Guards (Unionist Missouri militia). He was less
pleased when he received a message from Colonel Peabody of the 13th
Missouri of his retreat from Warrensburg.
In
later writings Mulligan estimated that he had a force of 2,780 men and only one
six-pounder cannon. In fact he may have had closer to 3,500 men (one theory
suggests that he left out the Home Guards). More curious is his low estimate of
artillery. He certainly had more than one six-pounder, in fact seven of them
along with two brass mortars managed by the Pirner Brothers. It’s possible that
in his Battles & Leaders article he
tried to put a more heroic slant to his defense of Lexington. It also might have
just have been a mistake in remembrance.[21]
Here
is the order of battle for the Union side.
Union:
Colonel James Mulligan
1st Illinois Cavalry:
Thomas A. Marshall
23rd Illinois Volunteer
Infantry: James Mulligan
13th Missouri Infantry:
Colonel Everett Peabody
27th Missouri Mounted
Infantry (detachment): Lieutenant-Colonel Benjamin W. Grover
United States Reserve Corps (battalion):
Major Robert T. Van Horn
Missouri Home Guards: Major
Frederick W. Becker
Expecting Price at any moment, the assortment of Federals set about building trenches and barricades. The latter of these, were constructed from the trees arranged in front of the Masonic College. Now the beautiful arrangement was torn down for the purpose of violence.[22] One Union colonel described the layout of the defenses, centered on a Masonic College:
"The college is on a bluff about 200 feet above low-water mark, and from 15 to 30 feet higher than North or Main street. Third street runs along the top of the bluff. Close to and surrounding the college building was a rectangular fort of sods and earth about 12 feet thick and 12 feet high; with bastions at the angles and embrasures for guns. At a distance of 200 to 800 feet was an irregular line of earthworks protected by numerous traverses, occasional redoubts, a good ditch, trous-de-loup, wires, etc., etc. Still farther on the west and north were rifle-pits. The works would have required 10,000 or 15,000 men to occupy them fully. All the ground from the fortifications to the river was then covered with scattering timber. The spring just north and outside of fortifications, was in a deep wooded ravine..."[23]
Progress
on the fortifications went adequately enough when on September 13 the first
part of Price’s army appeared. The battle for Lexington was to begin in earnest.
[1] James A. Mulligan, “The Siege of
Lexington,” from Battles and Leaders of
the Civil War Vol. 1, (Century Company, 1887), 307; Albert Castel, General Sterling Price and the Civil War in
the West, (LSU Press, 1993), 49.
[2] Floyd C.
Shoemaker, “The Story of the Civil War in Northeast Missouri,” Missouri Historical Review, Vol. VII
No. 3 (April, 1913), 113-114; Robert S. Bevier, History of the First and Second Missouri Confederate Brigades:
Annotated and Illustrated, (Saint Louis: Bryan, Brand, & Co., 1879),
51-52; History of Lafayette County,
Missouri, 339; Seymour D. Thompson, Recollections
with the Third Iowa Regiment, (Cincinnati, 1864), 44.
[3] Thompson, 48-57,
[4] Editors of the National
Historical Company, History of Clay and
Platte Counties, (Saint Louis: National Historical Company, 1885), 204-205.
[5] Larry Wood, The Siege of Lexington, Missouri: The Battle of the Hemp Bales,
(History Press, 2014, E-Book), loc. 346-370; Castel, 50.
[6] History of Clay and Platte Counties, 205-206.
[7] Return I. Holcombe, History of Greene County, Missouri, (St.
Louis: Western Historical Company, 1883), 367-368; John M. Weidemeyer, “Memoirs
of a Confederate Soldier, 1861-1865,” 3; Wood, 2014, loc. 477-497Anderson, 24.
[8] OR III, 185-186; Anderson, 26,
52.
[9] The Divisional commander was
William Y. Slack. Slack had been wounded at Wilson’s Creek so Rives took
temporary command.
[10] OR III, 162-163; Castel, 49.
[11] “Letter to Col. Thomas Snead,
September 1, 186,”.Steen, Alexander E. Papers; Bryce Benedict, Jayhawkers:
The Civil War Brigade of James Henry Lane, (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 2009),
73-74; Anderson, 50.
[12] Charles W.
Goodlander, Memoirs and Recollections of
C.W. Goodlander of the Early Day of Fort Scott, (Fort Scott, Kansas:
Monitor Printing Co., 1899), 43-44; Jay Monaghan, The Civil War on the Western Border, 1854-1865, (Boston: First
Bison Book Publishing, 1955), 185; Hugh Dunn Fisher, The Gun and the Gospel: Early Kansas and Chaplain Fisher, (Kansas
City: Hudson-Kimberly Publishing Company, 1902), 162.
[13] John J. Sitton
Memoir, Sitton, John James (1842-1915). Collection, 1860-1913; OR III, 163.
Anderson, 50-51.
[14] Anderson, 52; McGregor, 4; OR
LIII, 435-346; Benedict, 74-76.
[15] Goodlander,
45-46; Anderson, 52; OR III, 163; Dr. John Wyatt, “A Confederate Diary (August
1, 1861-January 9, 1862) Part 1,” White
River Valley Historical Quarterly. Vol. 36 No 3, (Winter 1997). https://thelibrary.org/lochist/periodicals/wrv/V36/N3/W97toc.htm
Accessed February 27, 2020.
[16] John J. Sitton Memoir, Sitton,
John James (1842-1915);
[17] William Foreman Johnson, History of Cooper County, Missouri,
(Topeka, Kansas: Historical Publishing Co., 1919), 191-192.
[18] Wood, Kindle, loc. 477-511, 531;
OR III< 308.
[19] OR III, 171,186.
[20] Franc B. Wilkie, Pen and Powder, (Boston: Ticknor and
Company, 1883), 45-46; Wood, Kindle, loc. 396.
[21] Mulligan, 313.
[22] James A.
Mulligan, “The Siege of Lexington,” from Battles
and Leaders of the Civil War Vol. 1, (Century Company, 1887), 307: OR III,
172; Susan A. McCausland, “The Battle of Lexington as Seen by a Woman,” Missouri Historical Review, Vol. VI No.
3 (April, 1912), 129.
[23] Mulligan, 308.
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