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| https://digital.utsa.edu/digital/collection/p9020coll008/id/3031/ |
For
many, the end of the Civil War comes with the surrenders of Robert E. Lee’s and
Joseph Johnston’s Confederate armies in April of 1865. Indeed, these events
sealed the death of the Confederacy. However, the war did not properly end
until early summer. There are two reasons for this. First of all, news traveled
slower back then, even with the recent introductions of new railroads and the
telegraph. Thus it took some time for Confederate forces further west to receive word that their war had been lost. Secondly, defiant elements in the
Confederate government, President Jefferson Davis among them, refused to admit
defeat. Since the head of government never confirmed an overall surrender, the
still sizeable Confederate force west of the Mississippi was unsure as how to proceed.
Some steeled themselves for a final stand, but most got the sense that things
were indeed coming to an unfortunate conclusion. They were keen not to start
any hostile actions which could prove to be unnecessary wastes of life. Yet
such an unnecessary battle would occur.
On
May 12-13 a Federal colonel who had managed not to see any action in his four
years of service led three regiments along the Rio Grande, his purposes still
up for debate. The result was the last proper battle between the forces of the
Union and the Confederacy. It was light in hard casualties of killed and
wounded, but lasted hours and generated controversy. This was the Battle of
Palmito Ranch, fought in the most backwater theatre of the war.
The Border Front
Perhaps “backwater” would not be an entirely accurate term. The Rio Grande, as it does today, forms the boundary between Texas and Mexico. It was the one border of the Confederacy that the Union Navy could not blockade. If they dared send ships up the river, they would violate Mexico’s neutrality. This neutrality was only in regards to the American Civil War itself, for Mexico was undergoing its own civil war at the same time, one injected with a strong dose of foreign invasion as well. Eager to capitalize on the United States’ internal conflict, French Emperor Napoleon III sought to expand his nation’s global influence by intervening in Mexico’s always volatile politics. He backed the conservative Mexican faction, who wanted a monarchy, against the republican Juaristas.
The
Federal government in Washington was of course not pleased with this European
invasion close to their (or rather the Confederates’) southern border. There
was little they could do, however, and approached the southernmost theatre of
war with caution. One wrong move could merge the two wars into a much larger
conflict, one which could see the considerable power of France come to the
Confederacy’s aid. Thus this backwater of the Civil War was also a potential
powder keg for something much larger.
The Texan-Mexican border became a unique theatre of the Civil War. Confederates, Federals, French, and various Mexican factions from the Juaristas to Cortina fought or traded with each other while trying to maintain their borders. It was the safest location for Confederates to trade cotton for weapons and other valuable war materials. For a brief period in late 1863 Union forces actually penetrated up the Rio Grande, but pulled back. By 1865 the Federals maintained a foothold via the island of Brazos Santiago.
Brazos Santiago is situated near the mouth of the Rio Grande River. Although a garrison there restricted Confederate trade with the Gulf, it was not a pleasant place to be. One soldier described it as a “low, sandy beach, destitute of trees, shrubs or grass’ and another complained of “plenty of flies and mosquitoes and sand burrs.” The only way to enter and leave Brazos Santiago was along the Boca Chica Pass on the southern tip and Port Isabel. Both sites were subject to turbulent waters and storms. Brazos Santiago was in short a highly defensible but terrible place to be.[1]
Under these conditions many itched for action. Colonel Robert Jones of the 34th Indiana craved action, and believed he had a reason for it. He believed the Federals needed to advance and take the town of Brownsville, the center of local Confederate power. If Texan Unionists came out in the last months of the war, they might face reprisals when Union forces eventually departed. His superiors rightly dismissed his argumentation, finding any military forays in this barren borderland to be a waste of time, resources, and possibly lives.[2] They were more interested in bringing the Civil War to a definite end without too much further bloodshed.
Before the final collapse of the Confederacy in the East, General Lew Wallace had already made efforts to bring about peace in the Trans-Mississippi. On March 11-12, 1865, he met with General James Slaughter and Colonel John Salomon "Rip" Ford, the major commanders of the border front, on the island of Point Isabel. Wallace wanted to bring about a surrender of Confederate forces along the Rio Grande. Slaughter and Ford, however, thought they were discussing a truce. They felt that military actions in their region could have no effect on the outcome of the war. Why should men kill each other so pointlessly? Wallace was able to play on these feelings and by the end of the meeting Ford and Slaughter seriously considered the idea of ending the war in southern Texas.
 |
| "Rip" Ford |
The major point of contention was how their reentry into the Union would take shape. For example, they wanted gradual, not immediate, emancipation of the slaves. For any truce or negotiated surrender, however, to take place, they needed the approval of Slaughter’s superior, General James Walker. Walker immediately shut down any talk of ending the war and almost outright accused Slaughter of treason for entertaining such ideas. Though Walker had shot down any truce, much less surrender, the commanders on both sides on the Rio Grande believed that “should the forces meet and kill all on both sides it would not effect the result” of the war. Ford and Slaughter, anticipating no more fighting, ordered their forces to split up and concentrate “wherever they could find wood, grass and water,” thus waiting out the rest of the war.
Colonel
Robert Jones, commanding the 34th Indiana miles away on Brazos
Island, resigned his commission, believing he had no further duty to perform
and could back home early. Those higher up had different ideas, however. The
Union feared that the Confederacy would try to make a last stand west of the
Mississippi. Many in Confederate command, such as overall Trans-Mississippi
department commander Kirby Smith, seriously considered such a possibility and
prepared a defense, with Texas believed to be the Union’s next primary target.[3]
Branson’s
Advance
Despite
all the talks about unnecessary fighting, a Federal force surprisingly marched
off of Brazos Santiago onto the Texan mainland on May 11. The culprit was
Colonel Theodore Harvey Barrett. He was marching west in the direction of White’s
Ranch. Colonel Barrett hailed from Minnesota. He was in his mid-twenties when
he joined the 9th Minnesota as a captain. Perhaps to his great
disappointment the 9th did not go south to fight the Confederates,
but found itself on the frontier. It played a supporting role in quelling the
1862 Dakota Uprising, but Barrett himself saw no combat. Tiring of guard and
repair duties on railroads, he worked on becoming an officer in one of the many
black regiments created in 1863. He was unable to escape his predicament,
however, as the 62nd United States Colored Troops Regiment would be stuck on
garrison and fatigue duties, and in much less pleasant environments.[4]
 |
| Colonel Theodore H. Barrett |
Barrett claimed that the movement north of the Rio Grande was to take the many horses around Palmito Ranch and used them for his regiment of Texan Unionists, a cavalry regiment that did not have actually have any mounts. However, because of his chronic inability to see combat, many would accuse him of self-serving motives, an attempt to gain some measure of battlefield glory. One soldier in the 34th Indiana opined that Barrett desired “to establish for himself some notoriety before the war closed.” He would get it.[5]
Initially
Lieutenant-Colonel David Branson would personally led the expedition. Unlike
Barrett he was battle-tested. Starting the war as a private, he had steadily
risen through the ranks while battling at Shiloh and around Vicksburg. Still a
sergeant-major after all this, he applied for an officer role in a black
regiment and ended up under Barrett in the 62nd USCT. Now, with
Barrett’s higher assumption of command, he commanded that same regiment Branson’s
advance force included 250 men from his own 62nd USCT and 50 men
from the 2nd Texas Cavalry.[6]
The
62nd USCT was one of the few regiments of blacks recruited from the
border states. Free blacks in the North and enslaved ones in the fully
rebellious states could easily be recruited into the Army. In border states,
however, where the Emancipation Proclamation held no effect, only slaves of
confirmed pro-Confederate masters could enter service. In late 1863 Missouri
was struggling to raise more troops, and some officials suggested compensating
loyal slaveholders for the recruitment of their blacks. Once elections in
Missouri shifted in favor of Lincoln’s policies, the president allowed the
slaves of loyal masters to enlist, with the promised compensation for their
owners. This saw the birth of the 1st Missouri Colored Infantry. The
regiment eventually headed south to the Gulf and was renamed the 62nd
USCT. All the way until its posting to Brazos Island it had not been sent into
action, performing garrison and labor duties. It had lost a few pickets to
Confederate fire the previous fall during Sterling Price’s attempted reconquest
of Missouri, so there was a modicum of fighting experience.[7]
 |
| Members of the 34th Indiana |
The 34th Indiana, by comparison, had participated in several small actions from New Madrid to Fort Pillow and had become part of Grant’s army in the Vicksburg Campaign. Only in the latter half the war did they find themselves relegated to garrison duty. If the 62nd felt like rookies compared to the Hoosiers, they at least had seen more service than the 2nd Texas Cavalry. This Texan unionist regiment had only recently been formed and had not endured any rigorous campaigning, much less any action.[8]
The
eventual destination of Branson’s column was not White’s but Palmito Ranch and
its surroundings, defended by a small force of Confederate cavalry. The
location “was small and badly supplied…to the passer-by the men appeared
principally to be engaged in fishing, loafing, or picking up newspapers from
the passing steamboats, while their horses strayed off on the surrounding
prairie, grazing.”[9] A New York Herald Article described the
terrain as a “vast sandy plain, interspersed here and there with green prairie
and Mexican chaparral.” Thanks to the close proximity of the Rio Grande, bayous
and lagoons featured in the area as well.[10]
The total number of Confederates that were positioned in the area from Brownsville to Palmito Ranch is unclear. The last official tally listed 1,200 men at the end of March, but by May, when news of Lee’s surrender and Richmond’s fall filtered west, more would have doubtlessly deserted. The make-up of Slaughter’s troops is easier to know. It was virtually all cavalry, along with an artillery battery. The Southern Division of Slaughter’s little army, commanded by Rip Ford, was concentrated near Palmito Ranch. Ford’s force included 9 cavalry companies divided between two battalions. The companies in the two battalions each included 30 men, for a total of 270 men. Carter’s Battalion would arrive later with 120 men, swelling the force to almost 400 men besides artillery. The order of battle at the time of Palmito Ranch would be as follows. Units in southern Texas ignored the conventional practice of using numerical state titles for their regiment (such as 1st Texas) and instead used the names of the units’ commanders. An odd results was that when a commanding officer moved on, a unit would be led by an officer of a different name[11]:
Brigadier-General
James E. Slaughter
Colonel
John S. “Rip” Ford
Giddings Battalion: Captain W. N.
Robinson
Captain Carr’s Company
Captain G.A.
Gibsons’ Cavalry
Captain Owin’s
Company
Captain W.N.
Robinson’s Company
Captain Sander’s
Company
Lieutenant Jesse
Vineyard’s Company
Anderson’s Battalion: Captain D.M.
Wilson
Captain Anderson’s
Company
Captain F.B.S. Cocke’s
Company
Captain D.M. Wilson’s
Company
Carter’s Battalion
3rd Texas Field Battery:
Captain O.G. Jones[12]
Branson’s
men did not have an easy march. The main first obstacle, the Boca Chica River,
had to be crossed under a storm. On the 11th a storm battered a
steamer that Branson had intended to use. The boat’s machinery broke down. The
Federals backtracked and tried again later. Another storm broke out and the
crossing was still difficult. Branson’s men spent nearly the entire night of
the 11th marching.[13]
Branson
wanted to position his men so that they would surround and cut off the 65
Texans at White’s Ranch. A guide led them on a circular movement around the
north of the Confederates towards the Rio Grande. The river would complete the
encirclement for them. As it turned out the Confederates had abandoned their
position, moving west to Palmito Ranch. Finding his men too exhausted, Branson had
his men take cover in the vegetation along the Rio Grande, a mile and a half
north of White’s Ranch.[14]
At
8:30 AM people on the Mexican shore spotted the Federals. They alerted the
Confederates. It turned out that cavalry from the Imperial Mexican Army, the
faction supported by France, was positioned there. In fact they marched up the
south bank of the Rio Grande, threatening to cross over and aid the
Confederates. Now heavily threatened, Branson immediately ordered an advance on
Palmito Ranch.[15]
The Confederates scattered and left the location to the Federals Branson
reported the fruits of his easy victory. “Some horses and cattle were also
captured and a number of prisoners taken.” The prisoners numbered 3 men. They
were too sick to move. Best of all was the capture of 10 days’ rations, and the
Federals took a break to eat.[16]
Around
this time Rip Ford was dining with Slaughter in Brownsville. News came in that
the Federals had advanced. Ford asked Slaughter, “General, what do you intend
to do?” Not living up to his name, the general said, “Retreat.” Likely he was
hoping to avoid any unnecessary bloodshed. In one of his books, Noah Andre
Trudeau theorizes that he simply did not feel that his force, wracked by poor
morale and desertions, was up for a battle, and that he also feared moving out
of Brownsville to rescue Palmito Ranch would leave the town open for dangerous
armies of Mexican bandits. Though he too had arranged the truce with Wallace
earlier in the year, Ford dramatically exclaimed, “You can retreat and go to
hell if you wish! There are my men, and I am going to fight.” He further
explained, “I have held this place against heavy odds. If you lose it without a
fight the people of the Confederacy will hold you accountable for a base
neglect of duty.” It seemed that Ford had felt challenged by this unexpected
enemy movement. Slaughter assented to a fight and Ford readied whoever was
available to move out.[17]
Back
at Palmito Ranch, the Confederates reappeared at 3 PM the Confederates
reappeared. Captain Robinson had gathered 60 men and prepared to attack.
Branson now felt outnumbered and decided he had to pull back and alert Barrett.
He ordered anything that could not be carried destroyed. He then marched his
expedition back to White’s Ranch.[18]
Around this time Barrett received troubling reports that cavalry from the
Imperial Mexican Army had crossed the Rio Grande. It was believed they were
coming to assist the Confederates. Whether true or not, this report fueled
fears of a strong French force right on the border.[19]
Barrett’s
Advance
Originally
Barrett, or so he claims in his report, planned for Branson to come all the way
back to Brazos Island. But now he ordered him to hold his current position. On
the 13th 200 men from the 34th Indiana under
Lieutenant-Colonel Robert Morrison arrived to reinforce Branson. Barrett
arrived as well to take personal command. As many under his command speculated,
he may have seen an opportunity to taste battle before the war was fully over.[20]
Barrett
advanced the 62nd USCT and 2nd Texas Cavalry to Palmito
Ranch while the 34th Indiana, staying at White’s Ranch attempted to
brew some coffee. Barrett’s advance ran into Robinson’s cavalry and skirmishing
ensued. Hoping to bolster his chances, Barrett then commanded the Indianans to
move up and join them. When they arrived Robinson had already fallen back
again.[21]
Barrett
finished what Branson had begun the day before, destroying more supplies and
this time torching any building that had been converted into a barracks. A
source of amusement during this event was the discovery of a letter from a
woman to one of the Confederate cavaliers. In is she asked her lover to “bring
her a pet Yankee” when he returned home. Several Indianans joked that she could
probably tame them personally, “but she had given her lover a hard task.”
Recounting this in an article, Barrett sent four companies of the 34th
under Lieutenant Charles Jones south to Palmito Hill, a height situated within
a bend of the river. [22]
The
Indianans pursued the retreating Texans across the hill. Confusion ensued. The
first issue was the terrain. The chaparral and hill divided the southernmost
company, Company K under Lieutenant Charles Jones, from the others. They thus
were no longer working in unison. Furthermore Barrett had neglected to tell
them when to stop their pursuit. Not knowing when to stop, Jones simply moved
his men until they hit the Rio Grande. There they stopped while further north
the three other companies, under Captain Stillman Montgomery, continued to
press forward. Uncertain as what to do, Jones moved his men back up the hill to
see what their comrades were doing. At the crest they spotted Robinson’s 60 or
so Confederate cavalry. The Indianans fired a few shots and moved onto a ridge
that extended along one side of the hill. There Robinson’s men opened up on
them. The weight of fire notably increased at this point of the battle, enough
that Company K laid down to minimize potential casualties. The Confederate
cavalry slowly tightened its noose around Jones’ men.[23]
About
15 minutes later Montgomery’s segment burst out of the chaparral on the east
side of Palmetto Hill and drove one of Robinson’s squads off. Seeing two
Federal companies joined against him, Robinson ordered a retreat westward,
centering his new position around a knoll. Jones received 10 more men (a good
number for this small a skirmish) and advanced again. Skirmishers from both
sides traded fire with no casualties. Jones’ situation improved further when
Colonel Barrett appeared atop Palmetto Hill with the rest of the 34th
Indiana. From the ranch Barrett had heard the increasing rate of fire and had
decided to advance in bulk. Behind the 34th Indiana came the 62nd
USCT and 2nd Texas.[24]
Barrett
had arrived and for the first time in his life was on the scene of a real fight,
but now that he was here he did not know what to do. There were no clear
objectives in mind. To simply press forward would drive the Confederate cavalry
further west, but to what purpose? With no vision for the battle, Barrett
simply asked Jones how things were going. With no clear orders from his
commander, Jones suggested a two-part attack on the enemy. They were exposed in
their efforts to halt the Federal advance, their southern flank ending some
distance from the river bank. Jones believed he could used the cover of the
chaparral to sneak about 50 of his men around the flank, while the rest of the
Federals kept the Confederates distracted and occupied on their front. Barrett
assented and reinforced Jones with part of the 2nd Teas. After Jones
had gone off to execute his move, Barrett decided send part of the 62nd
under Branson to support him. However he failed to notify Jones that he was
receiving aid, and likewise failed to express to Branson the purpose of his
movement.
Branson’s
black troops advanced in force, causing considerable noise. Hearing this, Jones
investigated and found Branson at the head of his troops. To his surprise
Branson informed him that he had no idea what the plan was, and thus had not
taken the proper precautions in keeping his men quiet. Likewise Branson was
astonished when Jones said he had not been expecting him. Jones improvised and
had Branson’s black troops slip around to the left, strengthening the planned
encirclement of Robinson and his cavalry. What happened next is somewhat
unclear. What is known is that the Confederates were alerted to their danger by
noise. It was either the uninformed arrival of the 62nd or the antsy
firing of a musket. Whatever the case, the Confederates quickly beat it
westward again, spoiling Jones’ plan for an entrapment.[25]
The
Confederates away from the battlefield were not idle. Ford was approaching with
more cavalry and Jones’ light battery. Hearing of Robinson’s peril, he ordered
Lieutenant Vineyard to move on ahead and reinforce the captain with part of the
light battery. Vineyard carried out the order “with promptitude.” Interestingly
Ford’s report mentions a foreign element in his artillery. “Volunteer French
cannoneers” managed some of the guns. Apparently they had decided to cross the
Rio Grande and help out the Confederates. Ford would state that he did not know
their presence in his force until the end of the battle.[26]
 |
| The Civil War Museum at Forth Worth has a diorama of the battle. Here is a photograph of a part showing the reported French artillerists. (https://civilwartalk.com/threads/palmito-ranch-the-final-fury.153913/) |
Lieutenant Charles Jones was not aware of the larger enemy force bearing down on him, but withdrawal was still on his mind. His men had been marching and shooting on little food four hours. With Robinson’s escape and exhaustion setting in, it was time to head back before they collapsed. Jones cautiously kept his men in skirmish formation as they retreated. This would enable them to turn and fight if Robinson attempted a counterattack. Little did Jones know that the Confederates would reappear in far greater numbers.[27]
Jones’
advance force made it back to Palmetto Hill unscathed. Barrett ordered the men
to rest on and around the hill and have lunch. The men gladly dug into hardtack
and salt pork, though a few instead opted to fall asleep. The Federals appeared
to believe that the action was over, a notion that would eventually prove to be
mistaken. This would not have been a grievous error if Barrett had thought to
post pickets to the west. The colonel likely believed that he had scored a
victory and was content to have gotten some real action before the war was
completely ended. After his men had their rest, he would lead them northeast to
Point Isabel and from there head back to Brazos Island.[28]
The Confederate
Counter-Attack
 |
| (https://www.tshaonline.org/handbook/entries/palmito-ranch-battle-of) |
Rip Ford finally linked up with Robinson. After getting a handle on the situation, he rode forward to scout out the enemy on Palmetto Hill. As one of his relatives and aides recounts, Ford felt the historicity of the moment, though without realizing he held the numerical advantage. “This may be the last fight of the war, and from the number of Union men I see before me, I am going to be whipped.”[29]
Ford
believed he was outnumbered 800 to 300. In fact it was 500 to 300. Though this
still put him at a numerical disadvantage, he had artillery (whereas the
Federals had not one big gun) and a more mobile, horsed force. He believed that
quick maneuver could secure a victory for his men. The plan was to speed his
cavalry north to Palmito Ranch. From there they would cut off the Federals, who
were dangerously located within a loop of the Rio Grande. If Barrett and his
subordinate officers failed to notice what the Texans were doing, they would be
entrapped, necessitating either a fierce breakout attempt or surrender.[30]
Captain
G.A. Gibson was to command the northern flanking column. Alongside the cavalry
he would have the use of some artillery.
Ford would give Gibson plenty of time to move before he launched the
frontal attack on Palmetto Hill. This way the Federals would not notice their
predicament until it was too late. As for the holding force, Robinson was to
assume command of the left wing, Captain Wilson the right. Using the chaparral
as cover, they would advance forward when the time came, supported by the
remaining artillery.[31]
Ford’s
plan almost immediately came undone. An officer from the 62nd USCT
was lounging near Palmito Ranch when he suddenly saw a column of mounted men
heading his way. From his northern position he was also able to see Ford’s
other units form for an attack. This next phase of the battle properly opened
when Texans came out of the chaparral and fired a volley. Barrett immediately
ordered the 34th Indiana to form a battle line along the top of
Palmetto Hill. As they moved into formation one soldier fell from a Rebel
bullet. After hours of skirmishing, this was only the first casualty that the
34th suffered. Companies B and E, under Lieutenant Abraham Templer,
advanced to form a skirmish line.[32]
Around
4 PM the Confederates moved cavalry and artillery north into the chaparral.
Ford readied an assault. Jones’ battery was split, with one section on the
left, another on the road, and a third in reserve. Captain Robinson was to lead
the bulk of the cavalry, with Anderson’s battalion on his right and Giddings’
on his left. Ford directed two companies of cavalry to turn the Federal right
flank. From the chaparral a section of artillery under Lieutenant Gregory
flanked the Federal right. They opened fire and surprised the Federals. In his
report Ford says the shells “annoyed” the enemy, indicating that they did not
cause too many casualties.[33]
But
for purposes of morale they were effective, for the Federals’ greatest problem
was their lack of artillery. The Indianans standing on the hill grew very
nervous as Confederate shells flew over them and tore up the ground. Once ball
ricocheted right off the ground, narrowly missing a large grouping of men. Fortunately
for them the growing clouds of smoke soon obscured the hill, making it
difficult for the Confederate gunners to fire accurately.[34]
In the middle of this fight a steamboat suddenly appeared on the Rio Grande. It
belonged to the King and Kenedy company and its crew had not expected to come
upon a battle. The Confederates mistook it for Federal reinforcements and fired
two shells at it. The men onboard communicated that they were non-combatants
and were left unscathed.[35]
Around
this time Barrett’s inexperience in actual battle showed up again. He struggled
to make a decision, and then he ignored the obvious one, which was to move to
the ranch before Gibson’s cavalry cut him off. Instead his next move was to
deploy the 62nd USCT on the right flank. Branson noted that his
regiment had been moved to lower, exposed ground. He asked Barrett if he could
move them further north to higher ground. Barrett assented, but failed to
account for a resultant gap that opened between the black and white units.[36]
Among
the few casualties of this skirmishing was Private Henry Ellis of the 62nd
USCT. A wounded Confederate shot him in ankle. Ellis mounted a horse and left,
blood streaming off his right foot. Perhaps he was the “severely wounded”
solider who was given to Dr. Allen of the 62nd regiment and acting
surgeon Godfrey Bohrer of the 34th. They had chosen a location for a
field hospital, though this hospital likely consisted of just one ambulance
wagon.[37]
Casualties might have been light so far, but Barrett was starting to find his
situation “extremely critical.” He had no artillery, so the Confederate big
guns proved to be a great problem. Barrett conferred with his subordinates, who
all insisted that they needed to get going. Under all this advice, Barrett
finally said, “Very well then, we will retreat in good order, and in good order
let it be.”[38]
48
men of the 34th Indiana served as the rear guard, or so Barrett
reported. In fact they were the skirmish line. Ford observed that these
unfortunate men had not pulled back with the rest of the force, dangerously
exposing themselves. The reason was that Barrett had ordered an immediate
withdrawal of the 62nd without first getting the Indianans and
Texans in on the plan. Those on the Palmetto Hill, believing that the 62nd
had given way and was fleeing, felt exposed in their position and also began a
retreat. This caused further problems for the 48 skirmishers in front of the
hill, who were still fighting and unaware that they had been abandoned.[39]
Also among the abandoned was Dr. Allen, Godfrey Bohrer, and the handful of wounded. Having overheard the plan to retreat, Bohrer was getting his ambulance wagon ready to move with the wounded when “the 34th and 62d had disappeared over a hill some 200 or 300 yards in our rear.” Bohrer told the “ambulance driver to move out as rapidly as was safe and to select as good a track as possible, in order that the ambulance might not be turned over.” Despite the rough terrain, the wagon caught up to the bulk of the 34th Indiana, saving the wounded.[40]
Ford
saw how the Federal force had split apart in its disorganized retreat. He rode
back to his men and exclaimed, “Men, we have whipped the enemy in all our
previous fights! We can do it again!” What followed was the final Confederate
cavalry charge of the war. After shouting “Rip! Rip!” repeatedly in approval of
their commander, 200 horsemen sped towards Templer’s exposed skirmishers. The
Indianans had no time to form an effective defense. As men desperately fired
their muskets or scrambled to load them, horsemen rode right into them,
knocking and trampling many foot soldiers. The Indianans surrendered.[41]
Meanwhile
the flanking column under Gibson to the north would fail to cut off the Federal
retreat. Jeffrey Hunt, writing on the battle, thinks that the Confederates had
further to go cut Barrett off from the main road, but speculates that the real
reason they failed in their mission was that Gibson’s superior Captain Cocke
arrived and demanded that he take charge. General Slaughter had ordered Cocke to
watch out for a possible cross-border intrusion by Cortina’s Mexicans, but
Cocke wanted to be with his men when he heard that a fight had broken out at
Palmito Ranch. Hunt thinks the few minutes it took for Cocke to clear things up
and take command gave the Federals just enough time to prevent entrapment.[42]
According
to acting surgeon Bohrer, the Indianans were once again asked to provide a rear
guard. Colonel Jones protested, pointing out that his men had been continuously
on the move since the morning and were too exhausted to fight. He also pointed
out that Barrett had been moving his men on the double-quick for a very long
time. Realizing this, Barrett ordered the 62nd, out ahead, to take
it slow. The 34th Indiana caught up and the 62nd now
provided the rear guard. About half fanned out as skirmishers in a
three-quarter mile line.[43]
When
the 62nd came up, the fleeing 34th Indiana ran through
the skirmish line, almost disrupting it. Branson pleaded, “For God’s sake, men,
don’t break my ranks.” Somehow he was able to somewhat sort out the mess. The
34th Indiana continued its retreat out of formation, and the 62nd
skirmish line was not entirely neat, either.[44]
Barrett rode up to the disintegrating 34th and offered whiskey if
they would get organized. The soldiers responded they did not need to liquor up
for courage and offered to turn and fight. Barrett promised that once they
reached the ranch they would stop and make a stand. This heartened the men and
earned the colonel some cheers, his one moment of popularity throughout the
whole battle.[45]
The Last Shots
Despite
their encouragement earlier, many of the Indianans had grown absolutely
demoralized. The 34th’s ranks fell apart, many falling behind, and
haversacks, canteens, and other pieces of gear littered their route. Those
wounded not fortunate to be on the ambulance also fell on the wayside. Private
Lee Ewing, a Confederate, discovered one “wounded, thirsty [and] suffering
agonies.” Ewing compassionately rescued the man and saved his life. Allegedly
(our source is Barrett, who wanted to absolve himself of blame for his defeat) Colonel
Morrison did nothing to stop this, overwhelmed by the same feelings of
futility.
The
saddest sight was Sergeant John Smith, hobbling along as he tried to carry both
the US and regimental flags. Under the weight of the banners, his feet were
plagued with great pain and he collapsed in the brush alongside the road. Smith
lay down for a while, then hid the regimental flag. He tore the national colors
from their staff and hid it under his jacket, then tried to cross the Rio
Grande into Mexico. Shots, theorized to have come from French soldiers, forced
him back. He wound up a prisoner and the Confederates got the flags, incredible
trophies for the side that ultimately had lost the war.[46]
Elsewhere
the commander was having second thoughts about such displays of attempted
bravery. Barrett had now abandoned his promise to hold the line at Palmito
Ranch and planned to retreat, if necessary, all the way to Brazos Island.
Feeling he was needed to manage the rear guard, he ordered Colonel Morrison to
lead the head of the retreat. But then he remembered how out of it Morrison had
become since his regiment fell apart. He sent a pair of staff officers to keep
a watch on Morrison and ensure that the rear guard’s efforts were not in vain.[47]
Said
rear guard had to constantly stop and fight Ford’s Texans. Cocke’s flanking
force in particular was dangerous. Having failed to execute their part of the
plan earlier, they made repeated attempts to successfully get around the
Federals’ right flank while their artillery held them in place. The 62nd
USCT came up with a T-shaped formation, the skirmish line forming the head
while the rest formed a line to face Ford’s main pursuing force. Each time they
were able to hold the Confederates off and resume their retreat. They did not do
this without loss. One black sergeant, David Clark, somehow got separated and hid
in nearby brush. The following day he would be discovered and taken by Confederates,
the last Federal soldier to be captured.
If
future testimony from Barrett and others is to be believed, Colonel Morrison failed
to manage the retreat as well as Branson did with his 62nd USCT. He
was completely uninterested in forming skirmishers to protect his left flank,
despite the dire situation. Barrett’s staff officers had to ignore the chain of
command and gathered 20 or so Indianan volunteers to form the skirmish line.
Technically this assumption of authority, if it was not inferred or given along
with the rest of Barrett’s instructions, was a military offense, but in light
of the situation it was the right thing to do.[48]
The
Federals had one more hurdle, the Boca Chica Pass. If they got through it they
would reach the Gulf of Mexico and the Federal batteries there. An advantage here
was that the land narrowed into a peninsula, which prevented any further possibility
of flanking by the Confederates. Company F of the 62nd, under
Captain Fred Coffin, was the rearmost unit of the Federals. They found
themselves separated from their comrades by tidewater from the nearby Rio
Grande. The Confederates, hoping to snatch this unit, dismounted and fired at
them. Even General Slaughter joined in with his revolver. Coffin’s men
withstood the fire and crossed to safety. While the 34th Indiana
escaped through the Boca Chica Pass, the 62nd held the line along
the tidewater, resisting further attempts to drive them back.[49]
Possibly
the last volley of the war occurred at sunset, at a spot between White’s Ranch
and the Boca Chica. The 62nd USCT had the honor, firing at the
pursuing Texans. Colonel Branson turned to one of his company commanders and
said, “That winds up the war.”[50]
The actual last shots of the land war occurred after the 62nd fully
traversed the Boca Chica Pass and joined the Indianans and Unionist Texans
along the Gulf. There Federal batteries at the pass and the USS Isabella
directed their big guns at the still pursuing Confederates. Finally the Federals
had some serious heavy firepower, and it kept Slaughter and Ford’s Texans at
bay. The shells failed to produce any casualties, but caused some
consternation. One shell exploded right by an underage teen soldier. Startled,
he turned and fired at the shell’s point of impact while unleashing a “very
profane expletive.” The boy’s profanity and decision to fire his weapon into
the ground caused laughter among his unit.[51]
In
the final stage of the Confederate pursuit General Slaughter finally arrived to
find his artillery firing at the Federals. Skirmishers on both sides fired at
each other as well, but it was so dark that nobody was hit. Slaughter rode up
to Ford and asked rhetorically “You are going to camp here to-night, are you
not?” Ford answered, “No, sir.” Perhaps sensing that Ford needed encouragement.
Slaughter announced, “I have ordered down several wagons loaded with
subsistence and forage.” Ford was uneasy about staying out this far, however.
“I am not going to stop here in reach of the infantry forces on Brazos Island
and allow them a chance to gobble me up before daylight.” Slaughter could not
get Ford to fight, so the Confederates withdrew. It was a wise decision. There
was no need to prolong the battle with the war about the end. Enough
last-minute glory had been won. Also both of the Confederates’ advantages had
been neutralized. The Federals now had big guns to challenge their artillery,
and their mounted mobility was also lost, with one report summing up, “The
pursuit lasted for nearly 7 miles, when the artillery horses were greatly
fatigued, some of them had given out, and the cavalry horses were jaded.”[52]
Thus ended the last battle of the Civil War.
Aftershocks
Reported
Federal losses were 115 in total. According to battlefields.org the casualty total
was actually slightly higher at 117. Because the scale of the battle was so
small, the names of many of these casualties survive in histories of the
battle, lending more personality to what are usually heavy lists of numbers
(for the sake of brevity in this blog I will not list all the names, though
they can be found in Jeffrey Hunt’s book on the battle). The 62nd
USCT reported 5 wounded and 2 captured. The 2nd Texas also suffered
in its one and only battle with 1 killed, 2 wounded, and 27 captured or missing.
Among the pair of wounded was Sergeant Orvin Crippen who, perhaps nervous in
his first battle, accidentally shot and fractured his right hand. The dead man
was Private Matthew Robinson. He had just enlisted two months earlier in March
for the substantial hundred dollar bounty. Perhaps he sensed the war was coming
to its end and expected to sit out the remainder in safety. Instead he had
signed up at just the right place and time to take a bullet and die.
 |
| Private John J. Williams, listed by many as the last man killed in the Civil War |
The 34th Indiana had it the worst. 76, many of them wounded, fell into enemy hands. The one confirmed kill was Private John J. Williams. Historians generally agree that he was the last man to be killed in the Civil War. He fell dead from a bullet at Palmetto Hill. Of course the significance of his demise was not known by the Confederates. They unceremoniously looted his corpse, though fortunately his fellow Hoosiers had rescued his money and sent it home to his widow. Confederate casualties are unclear. It was most likely at 6 killed and wounded and 3 captured when the 62nd USCT first took Palmito Ranch. There are disputes as to exactly how many died. At least 1 is confirmed, with a secondhand but informed report listing the dead at 3. Regardless, they suffered 9 casualties. This was tiny compared to the Federals’ overall of 115, but in terms of hard casualties of killed and wounded the two sides were probably not too far apart.[53]
On
May 14 the belligerents discussed the parole of prisoners. The Confederates
readily agreed. They did not have the resources in Brownsville to hold 100 men
prisoner. To Rip Ford and his men’s credit, the prisoners were all treated
properly regardless of background. This may have been because they knew the war
was about over and did not want to implicate themselves in any last minute
controversies. Still, it was remarkable that they treated the Unionist Texans
and two blacks as well as the Indianans. Just a year earlier at Fort Pillow,
Tennessee, loyalists and blacks had been singled out and brutally murdered by
Confederate troops under General Nathan Bedford Forrest. The Confederates’
commendable behavior after Palmito Ranch signaled that some were ready for
America’s wounds to heal.[54]
The
war soon ended without any further battles. The Federals, reinforced and under
the leadership of Brigadier-General Egbert Brown, made a push on Brownsville
before hostilities were officially over, but no violence occurred. On May 26
Confederate General Kirby Smith surrendered almost all remaining Confederate soldiers
west of the Mississippi (General Stand Watie and his brigade of Indians would
lay down their arms the following month).
Though
the war was over, its last battle still made a splash. Well after the event, The
New York Times broke news of the
battle to the home front. It was a shock to Americans in the East, especially
those in the Union camp who had been celebrating or reflecting on their final
victory. The headline was sensational: “An Indiana Regiment Cut to Pieces –
Eighty Survivors out of Three Hundred Men - Maximilians Soldiers with the
Rebels.” It spoke of a disastrous last-minute and possibly pointless defeat,
and the third section played into current fears of a war with France and its
Imperialist state in Mexico.[55]
The
Union high command for its part could not let go of the battle. It was a
disastrous end to what many saw as an unnecessary campaign. In July and August
of 1865 a court-martial was convened at Brownsville to determine blame for the
defeat. This court-martial, more than the scant official reports, provides much
of the information used in Jeffrey Hunt’s history of the battle. Unfortunately
I was not able to find the court-martial online so I had to heavily rely on
Hunt’s secondhand tome. Hopefully someday I can get my hands on other sources
so as to not merely summarize large chunks of a rather fine book.
In
particular the presiding officers wanted to know how the operation turned into
a rout, how the Indianan skirmishers had been so easily cut off and captured,
and how the 34th had lost both its colors and the national flag. The
main subject was Colonel Morrison. Barrett led the charge, or rather four
charges. The first charge was that Morrison had disobeyed orders to retreat “in
good order.” The second was that he had failed to notify all elements of his
command, resulting in the capture of his skirmishers. The third was that he had
simply given up and would not perform his orders. The fourth and final charge
was that he had failed to keep his men properly drilled and disciplined after
taking over from Colonel Jones. This final charge not only cast aspersions on
his leadership, but on the regiment’s character as a whole.[56]
Oddly
enough, Morrison had been unable to obtain legal counsel and now got to examine
Barrett and other officers himself. He was quick to throw the blame on Barrett,
rightly pointing out that he had marched the 34th exhaustion and had
been responsible for the skirmish line. In fact, as the court-martial
progressed, Barrett gradually became the target. It did not help that one of
his staff officers, William Durkee, contradicted his account of the battle on
several points.[57]
Furthermore General Brown, who had led the 34th Indiana in its march
on Brownsville near the end of May, confirmed that the soldiers in that
regiment had behaved just fine, repudiating Barrett’s fourth charge that
Morrison had let his men grow lax and undisciplined. Colonel Branson helped
turn the blame on Barrett by claiming his superior had managed the battle line
at Palmetto Hill, and thus held at least some blame for what happened to the
skirmishers. Finally Rip Ford himself appeared and further hammered Barrett by revealing
that he had retreated from a numerically inferior force (albeit one armed with cannon).
The
court-martial ended on August 28 with Morrison cleared of his charges.[58]
Though not officially charged as he was not the subject of inquiry, Barrett
suffered a severe hit in reputation. The Indianan acting surgeon Bohrer, twenty
years later, would sum up the general feeling of veterans towards their
commander in the National Tribune.
“Col. Barrett, to say the least, showed no ability as a brigade commander.”[59]
Instead of achieving last-minute glory, as many bitter men thought he was attempting
to do, Barrett gained infamy, and at that not great infamy, as even those who
know of the Battle of Palmito Ranch are not likely to know his name.
The Last Battle?
There
is actually some dispute as to whether Palmito Ranch deserves the designation
of the last battle of the Civil War. Just the day before Branson marched his
men off of Brazos Santiago, 25 men of the 1st Florida Cavalry (US),
reached Eufaula, Alabama after escorting a shipment of mail to other soldiers
in the state. Lieutenant Joseph Carroll, commanding the detachment, decided to
rest in the town. Confederate resistance had been totally broken. The only
rebels in the area were those trying to get home and rebuild their lives. They
were so relaxed that many received permission to leave Eufaula and spend time
with family members nearby.
Carroll’s
plan was to stay until May 19, assemble at Hobdy’s Bridge, and ride home. Then
he learned that violent “guerillas” (quotation marks from websource) were
operating in the area. He pulled his men out ahead of schedule on the 17th.
However, he had neglected to inform those visiting their families. They arrived
on the 19th to find no sight of Carroll. They crossed the wooden
bridge on their own, only to be fired upon by the guerillas. One man, Corporal
John Skinner, was killed. Thus many claim him to be the last man killed in the
Civil War. Additionally the guerillas wounded three other Floridians, one
suffering no less than four wounds.
This
is something of a microcosm of Palmito Ranch. A Union commander, in this case
Lieutenant Carroll, ordered a withdrawal without informing all of his men, and
as a consequence disaster struck. Also in both cases the Federals suffered a defeat
at the very end of the war. There is some dispute as to whether Palmito Ranch
or Hobdy’s Bridge saw the last soldier killed is the unclear nature of their assailants
in the latter engagement. The message to Carroll talked of pro-Confederate
guerillas. Since they may have been local civilians, it would not be an
official encounter between Union and Confederate forces. However, they may have
also been Confederate soldiers who could not bring themselves to quit and
wanted a final taste of Unionist blood. Also, guerillas were active parts of
the Confederate war effort in various theatres of the war, so it could still be
classed as a Civil War action.
On
the other hand, it was less an engagement and more of an ambush that sent Union
cavalry running. Therefore Hobdy’s Bridge could be said to not be the last
battle of the Civil War, but still feature the last shot of the land war and
the last man killed. Unfortunately for the three wounded men, the Federal
government did not recognize the ambush as part of the Civil War proper and
more the action of disgruntled outlaws. Also complicating matters was the fact
that they had been on leave rather than active duty. This disqualified the
Floridians of any pensions for being wounded in service. Fortunately somebody
pointed out that by assembling at Hobdy’s Bridge they had returned to active
duty, even if the war was practically over. They got their pensions.[60]
As
for the true last shot of the war, that honor goes to the CSS Shenandoah. The Confederate raider, out in Arctic Waters, had
no knowledge of the war’s definite end and fired upon American whalers on June
22, 1865. Fortunately its crew got confirmation of the war’s end before they
executed their plan to attack San Francisco.
A Senseless
Battle
The
Battle of Palmito Ranch was unnecessary. At best Barrett may have been
justified in driving off the Confederates near Brazos to take their horses.
They were ragged, and desertion was rampant, so it was reasonable to assume
that they would bolt rather than fight. At first this seemed to be the case. As
soon as Robinson led his Texans back to spar with Branson’s foray, however,
Barrett should have withdrawn the 62nd USCT back to Brazos and then
waited for any potential orders to advance and cap off the Union’s ultimate
victory with the seizure of Brownsville. Instead he advanced the rest of his
force and brought on a battle that ended with over a hundred of his men in
enemy hands and the near-destruction of the remainder. Many accused Barrett of
trying to snatch some glory for himself by winning a battle, however small. If
true, and I find it likely, Barrett caused needless suffering and death all
because he felt that he had missed out on the war.
For
Rip Ford and the Texans the battle had produced a last burst of glory. Being
the victors, they did not appear to process how senseless much of the battle
had been. Retaliating against a strike at Palmito Ranch was understandable. Trying
to trap Barrett’s army was also understandable. However the Confederates
continued to chase the Federals all the way to the Gulf Coast, their blood up.
Potentially, if they managed to force Barrett’s men into another stand-up fight
between Palmito Ranch and Brazos Santiago, the casualty list could have
lengthened.
Thankfully
Rip Ford, once his men encountered Federal batteries and ships, wisely called
off any further pursuit, even over the demands of his superior General
Slaughter. With the Battle of Palmito Ranch, the Confederates could claim the
last victory of the war and assuage some of their sense of honor. It was a
consolation prize they could boast of as they tried to rebuild their homes.
Sources
https://www.battlefields.org/learn/civil-war/battles/palmito-ranch
Bohrer, Godfrey.
“The Last Battle.” National Tribune,
October 8, 1885.Ford, John S. Rip Ford’s
Texas. Austin: University of Texas Press, 1987.
Hunt, Jeffery
William. The Last Battle of the Civil
War: Palmetto Ranch. University of Texas Press, 2002.
Marvel, William.
“Battle of Palmito Ranch: American Civil War’s Final Battle.” https://www.historynet.com/battle-of-palmetto-ranch-american-civil-wars-final-battle/?f.
“Last Man Killed
in the Civil War.” https://www.exploresouthernhistory.com/hobdys2.html.
“Newspaper
Account of the Battle of Palmito Ranch,” New
Berne Times, June 2, 1865, https://www.newspapers.com/article/2216693/newspaper_account_of_the_battle_of/.
Robert, Oral M. Confederate Military History Vol. XI: Texas.
Confederate Publishing Company, 1899.
Trudeau, Noah
Andre. Out of the Storm: The End of the
Civil War, April-June 1865. Louisiana State University Press, 1995.
-
Like Men of War:
Black Troops in the Civil War, 1862-1865. Boston: Little, Brown, & Company,
1998.
United States. The War of
the Rebellion: A Compilation of the Official Records of the Union and
Confederate Armies Vol. XLVIII part 1.
Washington D.C. 1894.
[1] Noah Andre Trudeau, Out of the Storm: The End of the Civil War,
April-June 1865, (Louisiana State University Press, 1995), 299; Jeffrey Hunt,
The Last Battle of the Civil War: Palmetto
Ranch, (University of Texas Press, 2002) 21.
[2] Trudeau, Out of the Storm, 300.
[3] Hunt, Last Battle, 31-39, 50-51; Oral M. Roberts, Confederate Military History Vol. XI: Texas, (Confederate
Publishing Company, 1899), 122.
[4] Hunt, Last Battle, 54-55.
[5] Hunt, Last Battle, 57, 60-61; Trudeau, Like Men of War, 442.
[6] OR XLVIII, 265-266; Hunt, Last Battle, 60-61.
[7] Noah Andre Trudeau, Like Men of War: Black Troops in the Civil
War, 1862-1865, (Boston: Little, Brown, & Company, 1998), 435-438.
[8] Hunt, Last Battle, 65-66.
[9] “Newspaper
Account of the Battle of Palmito Ranch,” New
Berne Times, June 2, 1865, https://www.newspapers.com/article/2216693/newspaper_account_of_the_battle_of/
[10] Trudeau, Like Men of War, 445.
[11] William Marvel, “Battle of
Palmito Ranch: American Civil War’s Final Battle,” https://www.historynet.com/battle-of-palmetto-ranch-american-civil-wars-final-battle/?f.
[12] Hunt, Last Battle, 170-171; https://www.historynet.com/battle-of-palmetto-ranch-american-civil-wars-final-battle/?f
[13] OR XLVIII, 266-267.
[14] OR XLVIII, 267-268; Hunt, Last Battle, 58.
[15] OR XLVIII, 268.
[16] OR XLVIII, 266. 268; Roberts, Military History, 122.
[17] Ford, Rip Ford’s Texas, 389; Trudeau, Out
of the Storm, 303.
[18] OR XLVIII, 266; Roberts, Military History, 122; Hunt, Last Battle, 63.
[19] OR XLVIII, 267.
[20] OR XLVIII, 266; Hunt, Last Battle, 63.
[21] Hunt, Last Battle, 68-69.
[22] OR XLVIII, 266; Hunt, Last Battle, 68-69; Godfrey Bohrer, “The
Last Battle,” National Tribune,
October 8, 1885.
[23] Hunt, Last Battle, 69-71.
[24] Hunt, Last Battle, 71-72.
[25] Trudeau, Like Men of War, 446; Hunt, Last
Battle, 73-78.
[26] Roberts, Military History, 122-123.
[27] Hunt, Last Battle, 85.
[28] Hunt, Last Battle, 86-87.
[29] Ford, John S. Rip Ford’s Texas, 390.
[30] Hunt, Last Battle, 89.
[31] Ford, John S. Rip Ford’s Texas, 390.
[32] Hunt, Last Battle, 91-92.
[33] OR XLVIII, 266,
268; Roberts, Military History, 123.
[34] Hunt, Last Battle, 92.
[35] Ford, John S. Rip Ford’s Texas, 390-391.
[36] Hunt, Last Battle, 93-94.
[37] Trudeau, Like Men of War, 446; Bohrer, “Last Battle,” National Tribune, October 8, 1885.
[38] OR XLVIII, 266; Hunt, Last Battle, 94.
[39] OR XLVIII, 266; Roberts, Military History, 123; Hunt, Last Battle, 95.
[40] Bohrer, “Last Battle,” National Tribune, October 8, 1885.
[41] Hunt, Last Battle, 96-97.
[42] Hunt, Last Battle, 105.
[43] Hunt, Last Battle, 98-99; OR XLVIII, 266-267.
[44] OR XLVIII, 268; Hunt, Last Battle, 99-100.
[45] Bohrer, “Last Battle,” National Tribune, October 8, 1885; Hunt,
Last Battle, 100-101.
[46] Hunt, Last Battle, 106-110, 125.
[47] Hunt, Last Battle, 107-112.
[48] Hunt, Last Battle, 112-115; Marvel, “Palmito Ranch,” https://www.historynet.com/battle-of-palmetto-ranch-american-civil-wars-final-battle/?f.
[49] Hunt, Last Battle, 118-121; Marvel, “Palmito Ranch,” https://www.historynet.com/battle-of-palmetto-ranch-american-civil-wars-final-battle/?f.
[50] OR XLVIII, 267.
[51] Hunt, Last Battle, 122.
[52] Roberts, Military History, 123-125.
[53] OR XLVIII,
267-268; https://www.battlefields.org/learn/civil-war/battles/palmito-ranch;
Hunt, Last Battle, 125-128.
[54] Hunt, Last Battle, 133-135.
[55] Hunt, Last Battle, 1.
[56] Hunt, Last Battle, 152-153.
[57] Hunt, Last Battle, 153-156.
[58] Hunt, Last Battle, 156-163.
[59] Bohrer, “Last Battle,” National Tribune, October 8, 1885.
[60] “Last Man Killed in the Civil
War,” https://www.exploresouthernhistory.com/hobdys2.html.
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