Monday, January 9, 2023

Battle of Belmont (November 7, 1861) Part I: The Set-Up

In late 1861 Grant sported a longer beard. This photo also shows him well-dressed. This is a stark difference from the more humbly-dressed and shorter-bearded soldier that most are familiar with.

In most of the years between his departure from the Army and his return in the Civil War, Ulysses S. Grant had become a sad, obscure figure. His attempts to forge a career consistently came to naught, and in 1861 he was working as a clerk at his father’s store. Thanks to his West Point background and Mexican War experience, he suddenly became valued when war erupted. Even then it took special help from Illinois Congressman Elihu Washburne to get him a commission as colonel.

Grant quickly settled back into the role as an army officer. He performed creditably in Missouri, whipping his regiment into shape, fostering good relations with the civilians of a divided state, and looking for scattered pro-Confederate militia to defeat or drive off. Though he had fought no considerable battle, he got a promotion to brigadier-general and command over the District of Southeast Missouri. Soon one of America’s most famous generals would have his first battle as commander.

 

Where Three States Meet

Grant’s jurisdiction was not just southeast Missouri, but the southern tip of Illinois and possibly the Kentucky shore on the Mississippi River.  At first it seemed that his main opponent was General M. Jeff Thompson. Thompson commanded a division of the Confederate-aligned Missouri State Guard. Instead of uniting with Price’s main army of militia, Thompson waged guerilla-style warfare in his part of Missouri. As for Kentucky, both sides of the Civil War wooed it, but the border slave state remained inflexibly neutral. Union and Confederate forces struggled to restrain their desires to plant troops in the state. Whoever violated Kentucky’s neutrality first could send it into the arms of the opposition (see my post on Mill Springs for more background on this situation). Fortunately for the Union, the Confederate commanders in western Tennessee were not the Southern Cause’s best.          


                                Gideon Pillow                                                             Leonidas Polk

One of them was General Gideon Pillow. Pillow was the only general which Grant openly despised in his recollections of the war. Pillow was of aggressive temperament and yearned for glory. In the summer of 1861 he planned to fortify Columbus, Kentucky. With its high banks, Columbus provided an ideal place to control traffic along the northern Mississippi. It was also close to Cairo, Illinois, which stood at the junction of the Mississippi and Ohio Rivers. North and south of Columbus stood 150 foot high bluffs. To the south were the Chalk Bluffs. To the north were ones with strains of iron. These were called the Iron Banks, and stood between Columbus and any Union thrust from Cairo.

While there was proper military reasoning behind Pillow’s plan, it completely ignored the political bomb it would detonate by violating Kentucky’s neutrality. Fortunately for the Confederacy at that moment, Leonidas Polk, a friend of Confederate President Jefferson Davis, took command and stopped him.[1] Polk had undergone a West Point education. Upon finding God in his tenure there, he made the startling choice to become a man of the cloth just as he graduated. He specifically became an Episcopal bishop. Because of his friendship with Jefferson Davis, he earned a commission as major general despite having had no actual military experience outside of West Point. Outside of his personal courage, the Fighting Bishop, as he would be called, would not disprove any doubters about his ability as a general.

Polk’s caution would evaporate. In late August Kentucky voted in a Unionist legislature. Alarmed, Polk ordered a force under Colonel Gustav Waagner to take Belmont, Missouri. He arrived there one September 2. Polk also gave Pillow the go-ahead to seize Columbus. Pillow got there on September 3. A Confederate flag, raised by sympathetic civilians, had already been raised there. This was a grave blunder that pushed Kentucky towards an anti-Confederate stance. Pillow next targeted Paducah.[2]

On the same day Polk made this move, September 2, Grant arrived in Cairo to assume his new duties as head of the District of Southeast Missouri. Grant responded instantaneously. He sent a message to Fremont declaring his plans to march to Paducah, Kentucky, and counter Polk’s movement. He wanted to start at 6:30 on September 5. As 6:30 came and went, he received no reply. Fearing that valuable time was lost, the general said, I can wait no longer. I will go if it costs me my commission!” He acted without Fremont’s permission. There were many steamers and river sailors in town, so in a few hours he was ferrying two regiments and a battery south towards Paducah. He reached it on September 6. The citizenry came out of their homes “looking pale and frightened at the presence of the invader.” Grant positioned his soldiers as best as he could on the roads and left gunboats for further support. Grant managed to soothe Paducah’s people by assuring them they could go on with their lives without fear of harassment. However he did get the sense that his place leaned more Confederate than Union. By taking Paducah, Grant deprived Polk of another important point in Kentucky.[3]

Grant also sought to maintain non-belligerent relations with Kentucky’s government. Though 4,000 Confederates had already entered the state, the legislature was still upset with Grant’s movement. Grant explained the situation “and my action was approved by the majority of that body.” Afterwards Grant retired to Cairo where he belatedly received official permission to take Paducah. However he was also “reprimanded…for my correspondence with the legislature and warned against a repetition of the offense.”[4] Grant may have received criticism for acting without orders, “but the wisdom of his movement was so apparent that the matter was dropped by Gen. Fremont, and he received commendation at Washington for his prompt action.” Indeed, if he had not acted, the Confederate column under Pillow, which was already en route, would have shortly seized Paducah.[5]

Grant was understandably enthusiastic from his military and political success. His own wife Julia came to visit him in Paducah. A daughter of a slaveholding Missouri family sympathetic to the Confederate cause, she was by now a firm Unionist, inspired by her husband’s rapid rise. Grant was not entirely satisfied, however. With around 20,000 men at his disposal he wanted to strike for Columbus, but Fremont would not give him his permission. Since this would be an actual major battle and not the quick seizure of an unoccupied town like Paducah, Grant dared not act on his own initiative as before.[6]

Whereas Grant defused tensions with Kentucky’s government, Polk failed to do so. It did not help that he had entered the state first, while Grant had the excuse of reacting to a threatening movement. The Kentucky Senate sent a message to Polk, saying they were “profoundly astonished” at his violation of the state’s neutrality. Polk defended his actions to them, claiming that though they did not outright commit to the Union war effort, they did cooperate with the Federal government against the Confederacy by providing resources such as timber for boats. Pro-Confederate Kentuckians did not agree with the bishop. They tried to convince the Confederates to apologize and withdraw their forces from the state. Polk obstinately refused, and claimed that a few victories against the Federals would encourage the Kentuckians to “rally strongly to our support for their emancipation.”[7]

On September 21, General Albert Sidney Johnston (commander of all Confederate forces between Mississippi and the Appalachians) specifically gave Polk the task of defending the Cumberland, Mississippi, and Tennessee Rivers. Polk was uneasy about defending all three waterways, as his force was already thinned out. He hoped that the construction of Fort Henry on the Tennessee and Fort Donelson on the Cumberland would be completed quickly, as these would fortify those rivers and allow him to concentrate on the Mississippi.[8]

The Confederates fortified Columbus. For green troops the labor was intensive. On one particularly rough “dark and stormy night,” General Pillow stood by on horseback, directing the work. One older Mexican War veteran audaciously told him, “Old Gid, if you think there is so much hurry for this work, suppose you get down and help us a while.” Pillow obligingly got off his horse and physically helped out for several hours, gaining him popularity among his men. When they had finished they had three tiers of artillery lines and upwards to 17,000 men. Altogether they had 140 varied guns defending the town. They also ran a mine-laden chain across the river. The purpose of this chain was to block or better yet cripple Federal ships. Then the massive array of firepower from shore could send them to the bottom of the Mississippi. Some took to calling this location the “Gibraltar of the Mississippi.”[9]

Confederate defenses, from https://www.columbusky.com/battle-of-belmont.php

Polk and Pillow did not have a good relationship. Back in the summer, Pillow had enthusiastically responded to Jeff Thompson’s calls for a Confederate intervention to support the Missouri State Guard. Pillow had organized a force to cross over the river and take pressure off of Sterling Price and his Confederate ally General Benjamin McCulloch. However, Polk then assumed command and had refused to support the movement, instead wanting to strengthen Confederate positions east of the Mississippi. Next Polk’s presence reduced Pillow’s status. Instead of leading an army himself, he now had to take orders from a man he disagreed with. One English observer noted that Pillow was “eternally carping” against Polk.[10]

A.S. Johnston ordered Polk to send 5,000 men east to Forts Henry and Donelson, crucial defensive points. Both Polk and Pillow disapproved of the move. The former composed a message claiming that to lose any men would expose Columbus to the Federal force at Cairo. Johnston refused to see it this way and Pillow received orders to lead the men east to Clarksville, Tennessee.[11]

 

Grant’s Army

John McClernand

Settling into his role at Cairo, Grant got acquainted with his officers and troops. The most notable of his subordinates was General John A. McClernand, like him and President Lincoln an Illinoisan. McClernand had quickly established himself as an important ally to Lincoln. Both lawyers and politicians, they had known each other well before the war, both lawyers. Though not friends, Lincoln did respect him and found him valuable in the early days of secession. They, Governor Richard Yates, and US Representative John Logan all knew that southern Illinois could realistically join the Confederacy or at least furnish additional manpower to its army. Cairo and its environs were known as “Little Egypt.” This area was heavily Democrat in politics, populated by Tennessee migrants, and a strong trade relationship with Missouri, Kentucky, and Tennessee. Already a regiment’s worth of men had already crossed the river to sign up with the secessionists.

McClernand and his associates knew that by controlling the Mississippi River, the Confederacy would cut off the Northwest from trade and lead to mass economic decline. McClernand and Logan had been able to prevent any serious secessionist movements and had also filled volunteer recruitment quotas in one of the more anti-war regions in the North. For their assistance, Lincoln readily gave them commissions in the Union Army, with McClernand as Brigadier-General and John Logan as Colonel of the 31st Illinois.[12]

Because of his incredible connections with fellow politicians (and ones in high places), McClernand often corresponded with them on military matters. This was a serious breach of military etiquette. For example, he could go over Grant’s head with direct messages to President Lincoln. Because of his relationship with Lincoln, Grant kept a careful eye on him and also watched his own words and actions. He never knew what his subordinate brigadier might report to the commander-in-chief.[13]

McClernand headed the Cairo brigade. Grant also had at his disposal the 22nd Illinois and 7th Iowa. In charge of these he put Colonel Henry Dougherty. Dougherty was also not a military academy graduate, but he had been a soldier. An orphan at age 6 in North Carolina, he headed west as soon as he could, working as a trapper and then joining US forces in the Mexican War. He had proved his bravery and toughness many times over. After further adventuring, he rejoined the army for the war, and gained an election as colonel of the 22nd Illinois. He gained Grant’s respect for his dogged pursuit of Missouri State Guard elements in Missouri. Since he had to command a brigade now, Dougherty placed his 22nd under Lieutenant-Colonel H.E. Hart.[14]

It was not a secessionist uprising or Thompson’s guerillas that plagued Federal forces at Cairo, but the temptations of town and early war supply issues. McClernand and Grant struggled to end frequent epidemics of drunkenness. The bars, brothels, and other establishments of Cairo saw discipline break down as intoxicated enlisted men mingled freely with intoxicated officers. This problem would not be sorted out until near the close of the year.[15]

It was still fairly early in the war, and the Union soldiers were not uniformly garbed. In October the 22nd Illinois still wore gray. A soldier in the 7th Iowa said his men were “ragged as birds” and many were attire in civilian clothing. The Iowans finally received blue jackets, but not overcoats, forcing them to use their woolen blankets for extra warmth or protection from the rain. The Iowans and others also believed that the Illinoisans were receiving preferential treatment.[16]

Weapons were another concern. Governor Yates was slow to respond to McClernand’s requests for better arms as Illinois had so many units clamoring for too few available weapons. Some units received Springfield muskets. Others got Austrian rifles. The kick of these weapons was unpleasantly great and men cursed as their butts “kicked” into their shoulders. Captain Alexander Bielaski, a Polish immigrant and staff officer to McClernand, tried to acquire lances for the cavalry. Determined to fix these issues, Grant traveled to Springfield and successfully pressed his case. By November updated arms alongside proper uniforms and overcoats arrived in Cairo. Still, many men wielded the inferior muskets, many of which would burst in the midst of the heated fighting at Belmont.[17]

Grant was determined to give his men more practical experience. He ordered small reconnaissance missions into Missouri and Kentucky so the men would march in hostile country and perhaps skirmish with similarly small groups of Confederates. He also sent gunboats to spar with batteries along the east bank. The Soldiers in Cairo could hear these exchanges, and they familiarized them with the sound of battle, however distant and limited.[18]

Despite these attempts to keep the men sharp and busy, “They were growing impatient at lying idle so long, almost in hearing of the guns of the enemy they had volunteered to fight against. Grant “asked on one or two occasions to be allowed to move against Columbus” to no luck. That October Fremont was much more concerned about Price’s Missouri State Guard and simply had Grant make movements to prevent Polk and Pillow from reinforcing Missouri. By the end of the month Grant’s sizeable force of 20,000 was divided into several columns between Cairo, Paducah, and southeast Missouri.[19]

 

The “Demonstration”

On November 1 Fremont ordered Grant to be ready to march out and demonstrate against the Confederates along the Mississippi “without, however, attacking the enemy.” General C.F. Smith, commanding at Paducah, Kentucky, also received orders telling him to cooperate with Grant.[20] The next day Grant received more specific instructions to send columns out of Cape Girardeau and Bird’s Point to drive Thompson’s guerillas out of southeast Missouri. From these points Grant chose Colonels Joseph Plummer and Richard Oglesby as commanders. Oglesby was to leave Bird’s Point with most of the 11th, 18th, and 29th Illinois, along with three companies of cavalry and a section of artillery. Grant sent Colonel Richard Oglesby to Commerce, Missouri. Plummer from Cape Girardeau would join Oglesby there. Once combined they were to seek out and “destroy” Thompson’s guerilla force. Oglesby was to ensure that his men did not forage. Grant believed the citizenry was not necessarily pro-Confederate in this region and it would be unwise to make them so.[21]

On November 5 Fremont ordered Grant to demonstrate against Columbus. The objective was to prevent Polk from reinforcing Price (in reality A.S. Johnston wanted the Fighting Bishop to focus only on his side of the Mississippi). Grant was only able to collect 3,000 (3,114 to be precise) of his men for this task. This force included McClernand and Dougherty’s brigades.[22] Though he was only ordered catch the enemy’s attention and keep his focus off of Missouri, Grant “saw that the officers and men were elated at the prospect of at last having the opportunity of doing what they had volunteered to do – fight the enemies of their country. I did not see how I could maintain discipline” if they returned to Cairo without any fighting.[23]

10 days after the Battle of Belmont, Grant would claim to have received a message from Colonel Lew Wallace warning that the Confederates were crossing troops to Belmont to cut off Oglesby. Thus he had to rescue his subordinate in Missouri. There is no other evidence of this correspondence. It is possible that Grant made this up to justify his aggressive thrust. He ordered Oglesby to turn east towards Belmont, and for Colonel W.H.L. Wallace with the remainder of the 11th Illinois to join him. If Grant, Oglesby, and Wallace were able to link up, they would have over 6,000 troops.[24]

Grant’s 20,000 men were now divided into 7 groups which he hoped would somewhat converge. He had 3,000 men under him heading for Belmont. Oglesby had 4,000 and Plummer 3,000. Lew Wallace had 400 men in his column, which was heading to unite with Oglesby. Colonel J. Cook had 800 men advancing south along the west side of the Mississippi. C.F. Smith n Kentucky had, 3,800 men, 3,000 of them approaching Columbus from the north to provide a distraction, while 800 headed towards Viola. Smith was to prevent the Confederates from sending any units into Grant’s rear. Grant ordered these groups to unite, some against Belmont and the rest against Jeff Thompson’s Missouri guerillas.[25]

Henry Walke of the USS Tyler

Grant’s fleet departed Cairo at 9 PM on the 6th. The soldiers wondered where they were going. When the first ship, the gunboat Tyler, under Commander Henry Walke, turned onto the Mississippi River, excitement spread through the ranks. “We are going to attack Columbus!” one exclaimed. The soldiers cheered and waved their hats. Then, once Cairo fell out of sight, they suddenly went quiet, as the prospect of meeting the enemy in deadly combat hit them. A couple hours later Grant stopped his boats on the Kentucky shore. Suspiciously inquisitive farmers approached. Though he believed they were spies, Grant let them poke around. He had only given his main subordinates pieces of his plans, so they could not divulge any critical information. Also, as Hughes speculates in his history of the battle, Grant may have hoped they would interpret the Kentucky landing as the starting point of a landward thrust at Columbus. For the most part the Federal rank-and-file found it hard to sleep, anticipating action. Many stayed up late boasting of how they were going to overrun Columbus’ defenses in great charges.[26]

South at Columbus, General Leonidas Polk congratulated his friend Jefferson Davis for his official election as President of the Confederate States of America, then wrote out a letter of resignation. Polk felt he had done his duty, organizing defenses along the eastern bank of the Mississippi River until Albert Sidney Johnston arrived to take command. The inexperienced general was likely overwhelmed by the monumental task of defending the Confederacy’s vital waterways, and already longed to return to the pulpit.[27] If he was to resign, it would not be without one final burst of excitement.

From the other side of the river, Thompson, faced with converging Union columns, fired off an alarming message to Polk. The bishop was more alarmed by an early morning warning from a staff officer. Grant’s fleet had been spotted heading towards the vicinity of Columbus. Polk had Colonel James Tappan gather his men around Belmont. He next ordered Pillow, who was all set to head to the Forts Henry and Donelson area, to turn back reinforce Tappan. However Polk expected the main force of the enemy to come down the east side of the Mississippi and positioned the rest of his force accordingly, with Brigadier-General J.P. McCown getting ready to the north of town. McCown was to move up the east bank. Outside Columbus Polk had some of the artillery moved up so that they could better sight and bombard the gunboats.[28]

Map of the Belmont area from Battles and Leaders of the Civil War.

Tappan’s camp, Camp Johnston, included the 13th Arkansas, Captain Beltzhoover’s Watson Battery, and two companies of Lieutenant-Colonel John Miller’s 1st Mississippi Cavalry Battalion. Pillow’s reinforcements did not bolster this force much. Pillow claims that though he had four regiments, measles and other diseases had reduced them to around 500 men. Belmont itself was known for its river crossing, and businessmen envisioned it as a future railroad terminus as the Mobile and Ohio railroad sat just on the other side of the Mississippi. To the north lay Hunter’s Landing and Hunter’s Farm with its cornfields. A road went through the farm property towards Tappan’s camp. A mile south from the riverbank, the road hit the Bird’s Point Road, which went southwest. The Hunter’s Farm Road continued towards the east into Belmont. Belmont itself, despite its emergence as a transportation hub, was really just two or three buildings (depending on which source you read). The trees around Camp Johnston had been felled, so that the Kentucky shore batteries had a clear line of sight should Federals swarm the area.[29]

On the 7th Grant heard that the Confederates had crossed men over from Belmont to Kentucky. He was feeling much more confident now. Commander Henry Walke, in charge of the boats, took the Lexington and Tyler up ahead to scout out the river by Columbus and Belmont and engage the batteries. They did not get far before they “were met by such a dense fog as to render any further progress hazardous and unfeasible.” The gunboats turned back without having performed any reconnaissance or test of Confederate defenses.[30]

 

Disembarkation

The next morning saw an encounter both with Confederates and geese when a transport stopped on the Missouri shore at Hunter’s Landing, the “lowest point on the Missouri shore where a landing can be effected in security from the rebel batteries.” Hunter's Landing was named for the owner of the farm and cornfield just to the south. Hunter's fields were surrounded by dense woods and thickets. Confederate pickets fired at the landed troops. Those Federals not engaged with the pickets practiced their aim on a flock of geese which had been peacefully gathering by the transport.[31] The west bank of the Mississippi was marshy and “cut up with sloughs.” Between the shore and Belmont were many forests.[32]

McClernand’s brigade unloaded first, followed by Dougherty’s. McClernand ordered his cavalry forward to scout out the woods. On the road to Belmont he placed the 27th Illinois first, the 30th, with a section of Taylor’s Battery, and the 31st with the rest of the battery. After his brigade came Dougherty’s with the 7th Iowa and the 22nd Illinois.[33] To guard the transports, Dougherty left 3 companies of the 22nd Illinois and 2 of the 7th Iowa, under the command of Captain John Detrich. After the rest of the force marched inland, one of Grant’s aides rode back to Detrich and ordered him to take his men north to a ravine along where a road ran to the river. Detrich was to block any Confederate force that might appear on this route. The enemy on the Iron Banks spotted them and opened fire with their artillery. The ravine thankfully provided protection so that not one man was hit.[34]

Walke’s two gunboats headed further east to provide a diversion. At 8:30 a Louisiana battery under McCown spotted the Federal ships and opened fire. The first shells landed far short of the target and they adjusted their guns. Captain S.D.H. Hamilton’s battery and then Major A.P. Stewart’s joined in. The Federal ships, turning in a circular motion to minimize the chance of being hit, responded against the Iron Banks of Columbus. The naval gunners had the range, but could not make out any targets on the heights. The Confederates’ firepower was incredible, but so many of their shells overshot that effectively targeted the transports instead, much to Walke’s nervousness.[35]


These shells were the fire to threaten Grant’s landing force under fire. Thanks to the woods, they could not sail with accuracy. Those that came closest hit the sandbank near the transports, disconcerting men who had been assured they would be out of range. Further in the shells burst harmlessly among the trees, far from the blue-clad targets. The Federals next bumped into mounted cavalry pickets. [36] Chief Medical Officer John H. Brinton, waiting his turn to disembark on a transport, recalled the first time he was under fire:

I saw a puff of smoke afar off, and in a few seconds a huge projectile flew past us, and far above our heads. It was not exactly in line, and was rather high, and so passed harmlessly by, falling far to our right. But the man who fired this shot soon improved his aim, for when the next puff showed itself, it seemed to give birth to a black line, at first well up above the Mississippi, but gradually sinking as it came nearer. It seemed to me to be making a bee-line for my eye, but fortunately changed its mind, and passing above our heads, and apparently between our smoke pipes, buried itself in the dirt of the Missouri bank of the river.

Brinton was overcome with a desire to collect the shot as a memento. He paid two blacks “half a dollar apiece” to collect the shell and bring it to him. As an officer, Brinton, got to mount a horse when he came ashore. When he got on his steed it began to buck about, stepping back and forth in agitation. Brinton tried to soothe it by stroking its neck, but it only seemed to grow wilder. Finally, a laughing soldier pointed out that the end of Brinton’s scabbard was poking into the animal’s hind quarters, and somehow the end of the scabbard had fallen off to expose the sharp point of the sword. Brinton removed his sword and scabbard and trusted it to a doctor under him.[37] The time for merriment was passing, however. The Federals were marching towards what for most would be their first battle. Colonel Buford encouraged his 27th Illinois with these words: “We are sufficient in number, are well armed, General Grant is our commander, but the Lord of Hosts is our leader and our guide.”[38]

 

The Confederates Race to Readiness

The Confederate infantry camped around Columbus heard the bombardment and rushed to the nearest bluff to see what was happening. They saw the impressive sight of a line of Federal ships, two of them bombarding the their shore. Henry Morton Stanley (yes, that Henry Morton Stanley) of the 6th Arkansas Infantry remembered “we novices were delighted to hear the sound of so many cannon. We received a few shots in return, but they were too harmless to do more than add to the charm of excitement.”[39]

This “spirited little artillery duel” was impressive, but so far yielded no hits. This changed when one parrott gun in Stewart’s Battery “exploded in a thousand atoms.” The shards killed two gunners and wounded another. The green artillerists were shocked and for a time stopped firing.[40] At 9 AM Walke withdrew, believing his two gunboats could not withstand the thick counter-fire too long and fearing that a longer duel would indirectly strand the infantry by damaging the transports and hitting anyone not unloaded yet.[41]

Colonel Tappan, commander of Camp Johnston, had been in Columbus for the night. As soon as he heard firing, he raced for a skiff so he could reach his 13th Arkansas at Belmont. Fortunately several boats were at Columbus’ docks, having just unloaded their shipments. Other steamers would be able to reach this spot later that morning. This would later enable the Confederates to send timely reinforcements across the river. Pillow also rushed Belmont. As it happened his brigade had not yet replenished its ammunition. Thus they rushed towards a confrontation with low ammunition.[42] As a general, Pillow ranked above Tappan and took command. Beltzhoover’s Watson Battery, under directions from Tappan, had divided into three sections of two guns, each covering one of the roads that would lead Grant to Camp Johnston. Pillow changed this arrangement, putting all six guns at the edge of the woods against just one road.[43]

Pillow formed his battle line. He put Colonel John Wright’s 13th Tennessee on the far left of Beltzhoover’s battery. The 21st and 22nd Tennessee came next. Robert Russell’s 12th Tennessee made up the right flank. This line stretched across the main road towards Belmont, with much of it out in the open in the adjoining cornfield. The fortunate right flank, the 12th Tennessee, enjoyed the protection of the woods. The 13th Tennessee was on the left, in mostly open ground. Tappan’s 13th Arkansas went onto the left flank, between the 13th Tennessee and rest of Pillow’s men. It also enjoyed the cover of the woods. Even better, they had a good supply of ammunition and would not run out like many of Pillow’s Tennessee regiments. Pillow further ordered Wright of the 13th Tennessee to send a company onto the Bird’s Point Road to the southwest. Wright selected Company A under Captain Matt Rhea.

As for the regiments in the center, they felt dangerously exposed out in the field, with the approaching Federals in protective woods. One soldier said it was like “fighting a duel with his enemy behind a tree and he in the open field.” The 22nd Tennessee at least had a small ridge in the middle of the field, and they knelt behind it to get some kind of protection. Other officers at the battle later noted that Pillow could have set up his line further back, using the woods, ravines, and abatis around the camp to break up the Federal advance. Colonel Thomas Freeman of the 22nd Tennessee claimed that “no worse arrangement of our forces could have been made.” He spent the bulk of his fairly lengthy report using the power of hindsight to devise better strategies for the battle, using the woods, ravines, and other terrain features to flank the enemy or catch him out in the open. William Polk’s article in Battles and Leaders backed up this claim, saying that Pillow’s mistake was compounded by the fact that most of his men were green.[44] Like their Union opponents, most of the men in the Confederate ranks were about to face their first battle. The 13th Tennessee history stated, “It was the maiden fight of the regiment and every man felt that he was ‘on his mettle.’”[45] There would shortly be plenty of opportunity for men on both sides to prove their “mettle.”

Next: Grant and Pillow’s forces clash north of Belmont.

 

Sources

Primary Sources

Banasik, Michael E. Confederate Tales of the War in the Trans-Mississippi Part One: 1861. Camp Pope Bookshop, 2010.

Barnwell, 371.

Brinton, John H. Personal Memoirs of John H. Brinton, Major and Surgeon U.S.V., 1861-1865. New York: Neale Publishing Company.

Chetlain, Augustus Louis. Recollections of Seventy Years. Galena: Gazette Publishing Company, 1899.

Grant, Ulysses S. Personal Memoirs. Penguin Books, 1999. First printing 1885.

Logan, John A. The Volunteer Soldier of America. R.S. Deale and Company, 1887.

Montgomery, Frank A. Reminiscences of a Mississippian in Peace and War. Cincinnati: R. Clarke, 1901.

Polk, William M. “General Polk and the Battle of Belmont” in Battles and Leaders of the Civil War Vol. I. Century Company, 1887, 348-357.

Sample, Alvan E. A History of Company “A”, 30th Illinois Infantry. Lyons, 1907.

Smith, Henry I. History of the Seventh Iowa Veteran Volunteer Infantry during the Civil War. Madison City: E. Hitchcock, 1903.

Stanley, Dorothy (ed.). The Autobiography of Sir Henry Morton Stanley. London: Sampson Low, Marston and Co. Ltd, 1909.

Stanton, Donald. (ed.) Civil War Reminiscences of General M. Jeff Thompson. Morningside Bookshop, 1988.

Stevenson, William G. Thirteen Months in the Rebel Army. New York: A.S. Barnes & Burr, 1862.

Vaughan, Alfred J. Personal Record of the Thirteenth Regiment, Tennessee Infantry. Memphis: Press of S.C. Toof & Co., 1897.

Walke, Henry. “The Gun-Boats at Belmont and Fort Henry” in Battles and Leaders of the Civil War Vol. I. Century Company, 1887, 358-367.

Wills, Charles Wright. Army Life of an Illinois Soldier. Washington, D.C.: Globe Printing Company, 1906.

 

Secondary Sources

Bonekemper, Edward H. Ulysses S. Grant: A Victor, Not a Butcher, the Military Genius of the Man Who Won the Civil War. Washington, D.C.: Regnery Publishing, 2004.

Chernow, Ron. Grant. Penguin Books, 2017.

Hess, Earl J. The Civil War in the West: Victory and Defeat from the Appalachians to the Mississippi. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2012.

Hughes, Jr. Nathaniel Cheairs. The Battle of Belmont: Grant Strikes South. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1991.

            - The Life and Wars of Gideon Pillow. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1993.

Kiper, Richard L. Major General John Alexander McClernand: Politician in Uniform. Kent: Kent State University Press, 1999.

Parks, Joseph Howard. General Leonidas Polk, C.S.A.: The Fighting Bishop. Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1992.

Polk, William M. Leonidas Polk, Bishop and General. New York: Longmans, Green, and Co., 1915.



[1] Nathaniel Cheairs Hughes Jr., The Battle of Belmont: Grant Strikes South, (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1991), 1-3, 36.

[2] Hughes, Battle of Belmont, 4; Earl J. Hess, The Civil War in the West: Victory and Defeat from the Appalachians to the Mississippi, (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2012), 14.

[3] John A. Logan, The Volunteer Soldier of America, (R.S. Deale and Company, 1887), 620; Hughes, Battle of Belmont, 5; Ulysses S. Grant, Personal Memoirs, (Penguin Books, 1999. First printing 1885), 140-141; Ron Chernow, Grant, (Penguin Books, 2017), 154; Ulysses S. Grant: A Victor, Not a Butcher, the Military Genius of the Man Who Won the Civil War, (Washington, D.C.: Regnery Publishing, 2004), 18.

[4] Grant, Personal Memoirs, 141.

[5] Augustus Louis Chetlain, Recollections of Seventy Years, (Galena: Gazette Publishing Company, 1899), 81; Hess, Civil War in the West, 14.

[6] Chernow, Grant, 155-156.

[7] Joseph Howard Parks, General Leonidas Polk, C.S.A.: The Fighting Bishop, (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1992), 183-185.

[8] William M. Polk, Leonidas Polk, Bishop and General, (New York: Longmans, Green, and Co., 1915), 36.

[9] Hughes, Battle of Belmont, 36-37; William G. Stevenson, Thirteen Months in the Rebel Army, (New York: A.S. Barnes & Burr, 1862), 63-64; Dorothy Stanley (ed.), The Autobiography of Sir Henry Morton Stanley, (London: Sampson Low, Marston and Co. Ltd, 1909), 175.

[10] Nathaniel Cheairs Hughes Jr., The Life and Wars of Gideon Pillow, (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1993), 196.

[11] Hughes, Gideon J. Pillow, 196.

[12] Richard L. Kiper, Major General John Alexander McClernand: Politician in Uniform, (Kent: Kent State University Press, 1999), 22-25; Hughes, Battle of Belmont, 14.

[13] Kiper, Politician in Uniform, 39.

[14] Hughes, Battle of Belmont, 87-88; OR III, 291.

[15] Kiper, Politician in Uniform, 33-34.

[16] Hughes, Battle of Belmont, 22.

[17] Hughes, Battle of Belmont, 22-23; Kiper, Politician in Uniform, 34-35; OR III, 289.

[18] Hughes, Battle of Belmont, 24-25.

[19] Grant, Personal Memoirs, 142-143.

[20] OR III, 267-268.

[21] OR III, 268; Hughes, Battle of Belmont, 45-46.

[22] Hughes, Battle of Belmont, 46; OR III, 269.

[23] Grant, Personal Memoirs, 143.

[24] OR III, 269-270; Hughes, Battle of Belmont, 51-52.

[25] Hughes, Battle of Belmont, 55-56; OR III, 273.

[26] Hughes, Battle of Belmont, 49-50.

[27] Hughes, Battle of Belmont, 47-48.

[28] OR III, 306-307, 360; Hughes, Battle of Belmont, 65-66; Polk, “Bishop and General,” 39.

[29] OR III, 306, 325; Hughes, Battle of Belmont, 82-83; Frank A. Montgomery, Reminiscences of a Mississippian in Peace and War, (Cincinnati: R. Clarke, 1901), 64; William M. Polk, “General Polk and the Battle of Belmont” in Battles and Leaders of the Civil War Vol. I., (Century Company, 1887), 348.

[30] Grant, Personal Memoirs, 144; OR III, 275.

[31] OR III, 270; Hughes, Battle of Belmont, 57.

[32] Grant, Personal Memoirs, 144.

[33] OR III, 270, 278

[34] OR III, 291, 294.

[35] Henry Walke, “The Gun-Boats at Belmont and Fort Henry” in Battles and Leaders of the Civil War Vol. I., (Century Company, 1887), 361; Hughes, Battle of Belmont, 59, 61, 66.

[36] Hughes, Battle of Belmont, 84; Smith, Seventh Iowa, 11.

[37] John H. Brinton, Personal Memoirs of John H. Brinton, Major and Surgeon U.S.V., 1861-1865, (New York: Neale Publishing Company), 72-74.

[38] Hughes, Battle of Belmont, 78.

[39] Banasik, Confederate Tales of the War, 152; Stanley, Sir Henry Morton Stanley, 175.

[40] Hughes, Battle of Belmont, 66-67.

[41] Walke, “The Gun-Boats at Belmont and Fort Henry,” 361

[42] Hughes, Battle of Belmont, 68-69, 71

[43] OR III, 359-360.

[44] OR III, 325, 333, 339-341, 358; Hughes, Battle of Belmont, 74-75, 77; Vaughan, Thirteenth Regiment, 12; Polk, “General Polk and the Battle of Belmont,” 354-355.

[45] Vaughan, Thirteenth Regiment, 12.

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