McClellan's War is Ethan Rafuse's 2005 attempt to truly decipher what Union General George B. McClellan, the first commander of the Army of the Potomac, was doing in the early third of the Civil War. For most of Civil War historiography, McClellan has been blamed for the Union's lack of success in Virginia. He was too egotistical in dealing with the President and other political leaders. He was needlessly cautious, displaying a mental handicap that prevented him from dealing several critical blows against Lee's Confederate Army. It does not help that McClellan was often in opposition to the deified Abraham Lincoln, even to the point of running against him for president. Historians and documentarians thus have depicted him as something of an arch-nemesis. Rafuse is one of several historians that have found this view of McClellan to be flawed, perhaps even cartoonish. In his 400 page tome he focuses primarily on McClellan's political and strategic beliefs and how they influenced his conduct of the war from 1861-1862.
The first quarter of the book fleshes out McClellan's background. He grew up in a Whig family. Many within the Whig political party, such as Henry Clay, emphasized compromise and careful rational thinking to solve political problems. When the Whig Party met its demise, McClellan shifted his views over to the Douglas Democrats. Like the Whigs, Stephen Douglas of Illinois stressed compromise to smooth over partisan differences and oppose extremism. He viewed both Secessionists and Republicans, especially Radical Republicans, as extremely dangerous. Though he sided with the Union, he was deeply concerned by the growing influence of abolitionist politics on war policy. He believed that this would stiffen Confederate resistance because of fears of a race war.
McClellan's military idol was General Winfield Scott, whom he served under in the Mexican War. Scott was a firm believer in discipline among his soldiers and leniency towards the Mexican civilian population (in a conflict where many Americans failed to show restraint). Acting on his Whig-Douglas Democrat beliefs and his emulation of his mentor, McClellan believed that the Union should wage a soft war on the South. By enforcing discipline within his army and respecting civilian property (including their ownership of slaves), he hoped that the majority of Southerners would reject the extremists that led them into secession. Going back to McClellan's military influences, he stressed the need for a well-running modern war machine. He would take his time establishing bases of operations.
McClellan's soft hand as well as slow generalship was at odds with much of Northern opinion. Northerners wanted to see glorious strikes against the Confederacy and were impatient with McClellan's pre-occupation with training and logistics. Rafuse takes a fair and even-handed approach to analyzing McClellan's generalship. Though exasperated himself, Lincoln patiently stuck with the general until after the Seven Days Battles, when the Union Army was driven back from Richmond. Rafuse argues that McClellan acted rationally during the Seven Days Battles, but is less generous with his behavior during the Second Bull Run campaign. Lincoln ordered McClellan to send parts of his army to General John Pope. Pope advocated a tougher form of war. Rafuse believes that McClellan deliberately slowed down reinforcements to Pope so as to undermine him and thus repudiate a hard war policy. Once he regained control of his army, he was effectively able to halt Lee's invasion, but passed up an opportunity for a decisive blow at Antietam. Soon Lincoln removed him and the Union pursued a much more destructive hard war.
Overall, Rafuse does an admirable job trying to understand how McClellan waged war by digging into the development of his political and military beliefs. His analysis of military campaigns shows an attempt at even-handedness, providing both praise and criticism. This is valuable as many Civil War buffs and historians operate off the premise that McClellan was a delusional and ineffectual egotist. My one small complain is that Rafuse still does not fully explain why McClellan was so tactically aloof at Antietam. Still, this is a great book that challenges some assumptions and can get readers thinking.
You can buy the book here.
Rating: Highly Recommend
Rating System
Must-Read: Definite read for history in general
Highly Recommend: Definite read within a certain subject
Recommend: Good for further information or info on a certain topic
Adequate: Useful if looking for further information certain topic
Pass: Awful, only useful for examining bad or ideologically-tainted history
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