McClellan's War is Ethan Rafuse's 2005 attempt to truly decipher what Union General George B. McClellan, the first commander of the Army of the Potomac, was doing in the early third of the Civil War. For most of Civil War historiography, McClellan has been blamed for the Union's lack of success in Virginia. He was too egotistical in dealing with the President and other political leaders. He was needlessly cautious, displaying a mental handicap that prevented him from dealing several critical blows against Lee's Confederate Army. It does not help that McClellan was often in opposition to the deified Abraham Lincoln, even to the point of running against him for president. Historians and documentarians thus have depicted him as something of an arch-nemesis. Rafuse is one of several historians that have found this view of McClellan to be flawed, perhaps even cartoonish. In his 400 page tome he focuses primarily on McClellan's political and strategic beliefs and how they influenced his conduct of the war from 1861-1862.
The first quarter of the book fleshes out McClellan's background. He grew up in a Whig family. Many within the Whig political party, such as Henry Clay, emphasized compromise and careful rational thinking to solve political problems. When the Whig Party met its demise, McClellan shifted his views over to the Douglas Democrats. Like the Whigs, Stephen Douglas of Illinois stressed compromise to smooth over partisan differences and oppose extremism. He viewed both Secessionists and Republicans, especially Radical Republicans, as extremely dangerous. Though he sided with the Union, he was deeply concerned by the growing influence of abolitionist politics on war policy. He believed that this would stiffen Confederate resistance because of fears of a race war.
