The Battle of Mill Springs Part I: The Contested Border

 

Early in the Civil War the Union and Confederate armies tried to win over the more indecisive border areas separating North and South. A key early victory could convince tens of thousands of fence-sitters to firmly pledge allegiance to one side. In Kentucky’s case, the battle that cemented Kentucky’s stay in the Union was a battle north of Mill Springs. The Battle of Mill Springs is the widely accepted name of the battle, used at both the battlefield site and its official website. However the battle sported a record number of names based on the various locations around the battlefield: The Battle of Beech Grove, the Battle of Cliff Creek, the Battle of the Cumberland, of Fishing Creek, Logan’s Crossroads, Logan’s Fields, Somerset, Webb’s Crossroads, and more. In fact, Mill Springs was south of the Cumberland River, while the fighting occurred on the north side.[1] This was also the first major battle for General George H. Thomas, one of the Union’s most revered generals.

 

Kentucky Shifts Union

It initially looked like Kentucky, birthplace of both the Union and Confederate presidents, would join the Confederate cause. John C. Breckinridge, former vice-president and failed pro-Southern Democrat presidential candidate, held considerable influence over the state and Governor Beriah Magoffin was sympathetic to secession. The Kentucky State Guard under General Simon B. Buckner was also mostly composed of secessionists while the Unionists had no comparable military force. However, enough Unionists existed in the state legislature to force a compromise stance of neutrality. Political observers pointed out that by taking a different course from the Northern states, Kentucky still affirmed the South’s goal of state sovereignty. President Lincoln agreed that the state held considerable Confederate sympathies, but pointed out that at least its residents were not actively fighting the Union. On the other hand Kentucky still traded horses, mules, salt and even ammunition to the Confederacy.

Governor Beriah Magoffin. He was sympathetic to the Southern cause, but after
Abraham Lincoln's election he tried to create a compromise to stop secession.

To his credit Governor Magoffin refused to favor either the Union or Confederate war effort, sympathetic to the latter, but wary of inviting Kentucky to an aggressive Federal invasion. He declined to furnish troops for either side in order to respect the legislature’s compromise. Less prudent men acted without his approval and thousands of Kentucky’s young men joined up with the Federal or Confederate army. By September things changed. August elections saw more Unionists in the state legislature, placing Kentucky, “so far as the legislature can do, in attitude of hostility to the South.” Then Confederate forces under Leonidas Polk and Felix Zollicoffer, occupied parts of the state to contest their opponents’ latest movements, with Polk in particular feeling threatened by the Union presence along the Mississippi River. Kentucky now officially came out on the side of the Union, though many within still itched to pitch in with the Confederacy.[2]

The Union Army could now post men inside the state. The boisterous General William “Bull” Nelson initially managed the troops in eastern Kentucky, preparing for an invasion of East Tennessee. Soon the more level-headed General George H. Thomas took his place. Thomas, headquartered at Camp Dick Robinson, found himself in a frustrating situation. He lacked transportation, lacked fully-equipped soldiers, and had little in the way of qualified staff officers and money. To make matters worse, politicians and other civilians congregated at Camp Dick Robinson to give him military advice “more zealous than wise.” In one incident Senator Andrew Johnston of Tennessee and J.J. Crittenden of Kentucky arrived to much fanfare from the troops. The soldiers, having not quite dropped their civilian attitude, called out for speeches, which the politicians eagerly agreed to. Even Sherman found himself roped into delivering one. As they unfolded their long-winded monologues, Thomas withdrew to one of his offices and paced back and forth “in growing irritation.” The soldiers then cried out for Thomas to make a speech. Thomas, hearing this from his officer, growled, “This speech-making! I won’t speak! What does a man want to make a speech for, anyhow?” He then withdrew to his personal quarters and slammed the door shut behind him.[3]

George H. Thomas

Thomas was not yet the revered “Old Pap” who Union veterans would idolize. The main factor was that he was a Virginian, and a native-born one from a fairly affluent family. His southern background caused distrust among both the troops and his superiors. One historian wrote that in spite of his excellent pre-war service, he “remained largely unproven and highly unpopular in some influential political circles.” One point of contention was the Virginia Military Institute’s attempt to hire him as an instructor back in March of 1861. That state had not yet seceded, but Thomas appeared to vacillate, expressing both his refusal to go against a state exercising its constitutional right and a similar refusal to fight the Union. Many painted him as an opportunist who, not securing a major position in the Confederacy, went to the Union for personal advancement. He had also served in General Robert Patterson’s force in the Shenandoah Valley. Patterson had been charged with keeping the Confederate forces there locked up so McDowell could defeat the Rebels around Bull Run. Patterson failed thanks and the Confederates escaped to Bull Run to secure a victory. Though only a subordinate, Thomas caught some of the flack for his superior’s failure and aroused the suspicion that he let the Confederates get away. Regardless, Thomas’ meritorious service in pre-war days gave him enough defenders and he was raised to the rank of brigadier-general. Thomas soon began to show his potential as, short of staff officers, he personally took on many responsibilities and got his green troops into shape with constant drills. He also had to educate those he selected to be his staff.[4]

 

The Thin Gray Line

Zollicoffer pre and during war

General Albert Sidney Johnston, a personal friend of Confederate president Jefferson C. Davis, commanded all forces between the Mississippi River and the Appalachian Mountains. His eastern flank was 128 miles of East Kentucky border. Initially General Felix Kirk Zollicoffer was in charge. Zollicoffer was a prominent Tennessee newspaper editor and politician with some military experience from the Seminole Wars. Though he supported the moderate Union ticket in the 1860 election, he opted to join the Confederacy a brigadier-general. Zollicoffer, as did other generals along Johnston’s vast defense line, was stretched dangerously thin. Worse, many of his men held outdated weapons, including flintlock muskets. Short of men, Zollicoffer’s strategy was to keep the Federals off balance with a series of small offensives in eastern Kentucky. 800 men struck Barbourville on September 19, driving off the Union Home Guard and ransacking their camp. More victories over the Union Home Guard followed at the Creek Salt Works and other locations. Tasting success, Zollicoffer cemented himself as an aggressive, if not wholly qualified, military commander.[5]

George B. Crittenden

Late in November, Albert Sidney Johnston put George B. Crittenden, a Kentuckian from a prominent family, in charge of his eastern flank. He was to command East and Middle Tennessee, with the Chattanooga-Nashville Railroad serving as his western boundary. Johnston also gave military authority over “such portion of Kentucky as you may any time hold.” Crittenden was very much a political choice for command. His family background was the stuff of romanticized historical fiction. His father was moderate congressman John J. Crittenden, who had no strong dislike for slavery yet firmly opposed secession. George’s brother Thomas joined the military as a general, but for the Union side. George Crittenden so far had a serviceable military career, but was prone to drunkenness. As a Kentuckian, it was hoped that he would convince thousands of men from his home state to choose the Confederacy. In terms of manpower he would have Zollicoffer and William H. Carroll’s brigades, as well as an incoming regiment of Georgians and all volunteers still being mustered into service within his jurisdiction. Thus, despite being asked to hold an extensive border line, Crittenden had what amounted to a single division.[6]

 

The Camp Wildcat Affair

Though Crittenden was in command, Zollicoffer still practically operated on his own and made more aggressive movements in southeastern Kentucky. He led his men to the Rock Castle Hills. Thomas responded by sending the 7^th Kentucky Infantry and 1^st Kentucky Cavalry to the mountainous region. These Kentuckians established Camp Wildcat, on a mountain in the Rock Castle Hills overlooking the Cumberland Gap Road. Zollicoffer aimed to strike this camp and clear the way for an ambitious invasion of central Kentucky. He had 3,5000 soldiers for the task. He grabbed the important passes around the Cumberland Gap and then marched northward. It was getting to winter, and the roads were not the best. One soldier remembered, “The route through the mountains was rough and heavily timbered, the greater part of the way was between precipitous ridges which rendered our march hazardous.”[7]

Brigadier General Albin Schoepf, a Hungarian-born officer, held Camp Wildcat. Aware of the enemy’s approach, he kept the bulk of his force there while sending out four companies of the 33^rd Indiana and 1^st Kentucky Cavalry to a ridge a half mile away. These were to keep a watch out for Zollicoffer. On October 21 these men ran into the 20^th Tennessee at Rock Castle River. The Federals withdrew, leaving one dead body behind. This body turned out to be Captain Merriman, a Tennessean who had pitched in with the Union by joining an Ohio cavalry regiment. The 20^th Tennessee split their line and let McNairy’s cavalry cross over the river.[8]

McNairy’s cavalry skirmished with the Federals for a bit. At night the 20^th “plunged into the river nearly waist deep, it was cold and swift.” They tore down a fence and formed a battle line, only be ordered back, then made to cross over again. Despite their constant crossings, most of the 20^th missed out on the actual fighting the next day. Company B was mostly asleep when one of its pickets fired at a creeping figure. The surprised company jumped to their feat “and began a hasty retreat” before Lieutenant Thomas B. Smith rallied it. The picket’s target turned out to be “a tall mountaineer dressed in blue jeans, with a squirrel rifle, and with a bullet hole in the back of his neck.”[9]

The 19^th Tennessee, exhausted from marching as well as having to removed the obstructions of purposefully felled trees, was more active. Zollicoffer ordered an assault on the Federal camp, which at this point was heavily fortified and bolstered by Thomas’ reinforcements. Unfortunately for the exhausted men they had to take a steep bluff and the Federals were well fortified. “We opened fire, which was briskly returned. My company filled all the available space, so we could not be reinforced and we were recalled.”[10]

Sherman, who was not in the best state of mind at the time, overreacted and ordered Camp Wildcat abandoned. The soldiers, especially the Kentuckians and East Tennesseans, were devastated by what they rightly saw as an unnecessary withdrawal and one band played the “Dead March.” Those from East Tennessee threw down their arms and practically mutinied until Andrew Johnston convinced them to stay on. Still, they visibly wept as they moved further away from their home state’s border. Thomas came to the rescue, convincing Sherman that the Confederates were staying put for the moment. Schoepf reoccupied Somerset and Camp Wildcat.[11]

Sherman seemed to be losing it. He made inflated estimates of enemy strength and turned reporters, and thus newspaper readers, hostile with his aggressive responses. Like other Union generals in the area he struggled to balance the various challenges posed by a state full of loyalists, secessionists, and runaway slaves. Though he insisted in his memoirs that reports about him were exaggerated, he indeed felt himself thrust into a hopeless situation. His apparent breakdown led to his dismissal from Kentucky, with Buell taking his place.[12]

 

Zollicoffer’s Foothold

Though unable to penetrate as far as planned, Zollicoffer did not give up. With Crittenden and more men expected to arrive, he acted on his own initiative to gain a foothold in Kentucky. He made a series of demonstrations. On December 2 his cavalry went to height overlooking Schoepf’s camp along the Cumberland River, the barrier between Kentucky and Tennessee. Zollicoffer sent his howitzers forward. The guns opened fire and Schoepf withdrew from the bank towards Somerset. The Union colonel reported larger enemy numbers, but assured Thomas that he could hold his new position for a while.[13]

Now on the northern bank Zollicoffer’s cavalry made frequent reconnaissance forays and often got into light actions. On December 5 they managed to capture three officers, including engineer Captain Prime (wounded in the leg), Major F. W. Helveti of the 1^st Kentucky Cavalry (wounded in the arm), and Corporal W.F. Hudson. Prime was an engineer on Buell’s staff and the most flaunted fruit of this victory.[14] Three days later, early on the afternoon of December 8, Rebel cavalry reconnoitered Somerset. They found and drove in Schoepf’s cavalry pickets. After “a lively chase” they encountered 30 infantrymen from Colonel Ferdinand Van Derveer’s 35^th Ohio. The Ohioans withdrew into the woods, getting off only three volleys. Van Derveer estimated that the Ohioans killed one enemy officer (he was in fact only wounded), killed one horse, and captured one horse. 16 of his own men fell into enemy hands.[15]

A log cabin camp at Mill Springs, Zollicoffer's supply depot south of the Cumberland River

While his cavalry kept Schoepf on his toes, Zollicoffer employed quickly constructed flatboats to ferry his infantry and artillery to the north side. He left two regiments of infantry and as many pieces of artillery on the south bank, guarding his supply base at Mill Springs.[16] Schoepf was aware of the crossings and watched as a lone steamer, the Noble Ellis, helped ferry Confederates across the river. He and Brigadier-General J.T. Boyle asked Thomas for reinforcements, stating that if they just had more men or better yet actual artillery they could smash the ferry to pieces and keep the Rebels out of Kentucky.[17]

Not a proper military man, Zollicoffer had acted rashly in placing his men on the north shore. He only had a handful of boats to ferry men and supplies in cases of emergency His choice of camp was also somewhat unwise. He centered his position at Beech Grove, constructing a cabin town. Beech Grove was positioned in a horseshoe bend of the Cumberland River. White Oak Creek further ran along his eastern flank. These waterways ran through deep ravines 200 to 300 feet deep, making them difficult to cross. While this setup could theoretically stagger a Federal assault, it also ensured that, if defeated, Zollicoffer and his men would have no escape route save a few flatboats and a civilian steamer that could not take any horses. In fact Zollicoffer’s ranking superiors were distressed to learn that he had crossed the Cumberland without approval. General Johnston had wanted him to simply watch the river and not provoke any Federal response. For the time Zollicoffer had practically cut himself off. For his part Crittenden was in Richmond, discussing East Tennessee with President Davis. Unaware of what was happening, he could not simply order Zollicoffer back.[18]

 

Mutual Offensive Plans

Zollicoffer also distressed the Federals. They were currently dealing with Kentucky secessionist guerillas in the eastern part of the state and now a major threat had landed to the south. Zollicoffer’s positions at Mill Springs and the Cumberland Gap also blocked the Federals’ own planned offensive into Tennessee. The Union Army would doubtless strike soon to open the way to the south. As they readied, their contingent at Somerset continued to suffer from raids and other demonstrations. They found themselves vulnerable to these attacks because they did not have enough cavalry of their own to block and counter them. One urgent letter reached Buell around midnight on January 7. “Please name as early a day as you safely can on or before which you can be ready to move southward in concert with Major-General Halleck. Delay is ruining us, and it is indispensable for me to have something definite.”[19]

Washington also fired off a series of messages to Buell, insisting that he move south. Lincoln not only wanted him to secure Kentucky’s loyalty, but also to relieve the Unionists in East Tennessee. Buell was characteristically cautious, wanting Thomas to stay put in case another Rebel force led by General Thomas Hindman made a move into Central Kentucky. However, it eventually became evident that Hindman would make no serious move. Buell now directed Thomas to move forward and expel Zollicoffer from the state, capture his whole army if possible.[20]

Further instructions from Buell called for Thomas to advance on Zollicoffer from the left while Schoepf struck him in front. Buell stressed speed and secrecy in order to achieve the desired, decisive effect. Thomas would have neither thanks to the weather. He set out from Lebanon on January 1 reached Logan’s Crossroads on the 17^th. Much of his force had not caught up due to terrible winter roads, averaging only 5 miles a day, so he halted and gave them time to catch up. These included two brigades under Colonel Mahlon Manson and Colonel Robert McCook. Manson’s brigade included the 4^th and 10^th Kentucky, the 10^th Indiana, and the 14^th Ohio. The 2^nd Minnesota and the Ohio from McCook’s brigade supplemented the infantry. Colonel Frank Wolford’s 1^st Kentucky Cavalry provided the mounted contingent and the artillery came from Battery C of the 1^st Ohio Light Artillery. The 18^th U.S. Regulars were also on the way. As he waited he met with Schoepf and ironed out the details of the assault.[21]

During this time George Crittenden arrived and assumed command at Beech Grove. He was not satisfied with his position. He reported that he was outnumbered (not exactly true) and that he could not moves his forces back over the river. He felt compelled to fight on the north side. Crittenden and Zollicoffer also learned, not surprisingly, that Thomas was marching to link up with Schoepf at Somerset. The best course, therefore, was to strike before the various Federal units could affect their junction. With the constant rains, they also believed Fishing Creek would swell and block any advance from Somerset.[22]

Zollicoffer would lead the way. The 15^th Mississippi would go in advance with Rutledge’s battery the 19^th, 20^th, and 25^th Tennessee would follow. The 15^th Mississippi, hailing from the vicinity of Corinth, was chosen to lead because it was one of the only units armed with rifled muskets, and also had battle experience from the Camp Wildcat affair. General Carroll would come next in the order of march with the 17^th, 28^th, and then 29^th Tennessee with two guns from Captain McClung’s battery. Colonel W.B. Wood’s 16^th Alabama and two cavalry battalions would stay in reserve.[23]

Like Thomas’ men, the Confederates struggled with mid-winter conditions. “The night was dark and gloomy; a cold rain was constantly descending, rendering the march extremely difficult and unpleasant. This, together with the almost impassable condition of the roads, rendered so by recent heavy rains, so much retarded our progress, that at daylight we had not advanced more than 10 miles from Camp Beech Grove, thus consuming nearly six hours in marching this short distance.”[24] On the foggy morning of January 19, the forward elements of Thomas' army and Zollicoffer's advance were set for a collision.

Next: The Battle of Mill Springs begins with a furious and confusing confrontation between Zollicoffer and Manson's brigades.

Bibliography 

Primary Sources

 

Berry, Mary Clay. Voices from the Century Before: The Odyssey of a Nineteenth-Century Kentucky Family. New York: Arcade Publishing, 1997.

Gibson, F.T. “Reminiscences of the Seventeenth Tennessee Regiment.” Confederate Veteran 2 (January, 1894): 21.

Hancock, Richard R. Hancock’s Diary: or, A History of the Second Tennessee Confederate Cavalry. Nashville: Brandon Printing Co., 1887.

Kelly, R.M. “Holding Kentucky for the Union” in Battles and Leaders of the Civil War Vol. I. Century Company, 1887.

McMurray, William Josiah. History of the Twentieth Tennessee Regiment Volunteer Infantry, C.S.A. Nashville: The Publication Committee, 1904.

Shaw, James Birney. History of the Tenth Regiment Indiana Volunteer Infantry: Three Months and Three Years Organizations. Lafayette: Burt-Haywood Co., 1912.

Sherman, William Tecumseh. Memoirs. Penguin Books. 2000.

Tarrant, Sergeant E. The Wild Riders of the First Kentucky Cavalry: A History of the Regiment, in the Great War of the Rebellion, 1861-1865. Committee of the Regiment, 1894.

United States. The War of the Rebellion: A Compilation of the Official Records of the Union and Confederate Armies Vol. VII. Washington D.C. 1882.

Worsham, Dr. W.J. The Old Nineteenth Tennessee Regiment C.S.A. Knoxville: Press of Paragon Printing Company, 1902.

 

Secondary Sources

 

Cist, Henry Martyn. The Army of the Cumberland. New York: C. Scribner’s Sons, 1882.

Harrison, Lowell Hayes. The Civil War in Kentucky. Lexington: University Press of Kentucky, 1975.

Hess, Earl J. The Civil War in the West: Victory and Defeat from the Appalachians to the Mississippi. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2012.

McPherson, James. Battle Cry of Freedom: The Civil War Era. Oxford University Press, 1988.

Sanders, Stuart W. The Battle of Mill Springs, Kentucky. Charleston: The History Press, 2013, hoopla edition.

Townsend, William H. Lincoln and the Bluegrass: Slavery and Civil War in Kentucky. Lexington: University Press of Kentucky, 1989.

Warner, Ezra. Generals in Gray: Lives of the Confederate Commanders. Baton Rouge: LSU Press, 1959.

Wills, Brian Steel. George Henry Thomas: As True as Steel. University of Kansas Press, 2012.

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[1] Stuart W. Sanders, The Battle of Mill Springs, Kentucky, (Charleston: The History Press, 2013, hoopla edition), 8.

[2] R.M. Kelly, “Holding Kentucky for the Union” in Battles and Leaders of the Civil War Vol. I, (Century Company, 1887), 373-375, 378-379; Lowell Hayes Harrison, The Civil War in Kentucky, (Lexington: University Press of Kentucky, 1975), 9-11; James McPherson, Battle Cry of Freedom, (Oxford University Press, 1988), 294, 296; William H. Townsend, Lincoln and the Bluegrass: Slavery and Civil War in Kentucky, (Lexington: University Press of Kentucky, 1989), 284.

[3] Kelly, “Holding Kentucky for the Union” in Battles and Leaders of the Civil War Vol. I, 382.

[4] Willis, 94-95, 114, 120-121; Sanders, 11.

[5] Sanders, 13, 29; Ezra Warner, Generals in Gray: Lives of the Confederate Commanders, (Baton Rouge: LSU Press, 1959), 349-350.

[6] OR VII, 706; Sanders, 16-17.

[7] Sanders, 13; Worsham, 16.

[8] Sanders, 13; McMurray, 193; “Camp Wildcat,” https://www.battlefields.org/learn/civil-war/battles/camp-wildcat, accessed November 19, 2021.

[9] McMurray, 194.

[10] Worsham, 16-17; “Camp Wildcat,” https://www.battlefields.org/learn/civil-war/battles/camp-wildcat, accessed November 19, 2021.

[11] Sanders, 15; Kelly, “Holding Kentucky for the Union” in Battles and Leaders of the Civil War Vol. I, 383.

[12] McPherson, 305; Sherman, 189, 197; Hess, 32.

[13] OR VII, 7-8, 11.

[14] OR VII, 9, 11; Hancock, 90.

[15] OR VII, 9-11; Hancock, 91-92.

[16] OR VII, 12.

[17] OR VII, 535-536.

[18] OR VII, 10-12; 105; Sanders, 19-20.

[19] Hess, 33; Berry, 275; OR VII, 103.

[20] OR VII, 78-79, 535; Cist 13.

[21] Sanders, 19, 14, 22; OR VII, 78-79; Harrison, 25.

[22] Sanders, 17; OR VII, 104-105.

[23] OR VII, 82, 106; Sanders, 28-29.

[24] OR VII, 111.