Confederate Arizona
Further
Fights with the Federals
By late summer of 1861, the Confederacy had a firm foothold in New Mexico Territory. Confederate Arizona was the first conquest of the emerging nation and it was hoped that it would just be the first of many. Recognizing that Canby’s Union force would soon largely outnumber the Confederates, Baylor appointed native Hispanics to prominent posts in an effort to win over the majority of the population and keep his position secure until more aid could arrive from the east.[1] Even with the establishment of a new government, the violence still raged between Texan and Federal forces. Small groups of Baylor’s men and Federals got into several skirmishes. In these the Texans usually claimed victory. The first such victory came when they beat off a Union raid on a Confederate horse herd. On the night of September 24 a small force of Federal Hispanic volunteers under Captain John H. Minks were investigating the town of Alamosa when they heard what sounded like an Indian war whoop. Instead of Indians they found Texan pickets. After a short firefight the Texans withdrew. The following day Minks found himself and his volunteers in a poor position. The Texan commander, Captain Bethel Coopwood, had been sent to scout the area around Fort Craig and now stood between Minks and safety at his home base. The New Mexican Volunteers made a dash for it, but a good chunk was force into a fight. An hour long firefight ensued, with the Texans enjoying the benefits of two high ridges. The Federals attempted to fight their way out towards Fort Craig. With a spyglass Minks saw that 60 horsemen were about to charge his line. He surrendered along with a few wagons, but most of his men had already got away, the skirmish giving them time to put some distance towards Fort Craig. The Texans escaped with 2 killed and 10 wounded. In addition to those captured on the 25th, the Federals lost about a dozen killed and wounded in these engagements.[2]
The Confederate-Apache Wars
The Texans had much more difficulty with the Apaches. Baylor’s initial invasion and early defense had
 |
| Mangas Coloradas. |
Baylor did attempt to establish treaties with the natives. He thought he had one with the Mescalero Apache, but they quickly violated it by attacking a Confederate beef herd. On August 5, 100 Mescalero Apaches struck a ranch, killing some of the herders and seizing many of the horses and cattle. A mounted force of Texans gave pursuit and recklessly rode into a deadly ambush. The sole survivor, a Hispanic who served as a guide, lived to tell the tale by hiding in a cave. Later that month o August 29, four Texan scouts found their breakfast interrupted by a hail of arrows. The Apache assailants killed all but one Texan who was able to escape on his horse. In the midst of these attacks, refugees tried to escape to the handful of Confederate forts and towns. One column of men, women, and children (including some of the territory’s few slaves) embarked for Mesilla. 200 Indian warriors form various Apache groups banded together to assault the wagon train. What followed was a classic western scenario. The settlers organized their wagons into a circle and traded shots with the Apaches. After both sides suffered many casualties, the Apache, satisfied with some captured wagons and livestock, withdrew and the remaining settlers reached Texan soldiers at Pinos Altos. The soldiers helped recover many of their animals, which had dispersed in the attack, and came upon the grisly sight of scalped white corpses. The Confederate government in Texas tried to establish more protection with available soldiers and Texas rangers, as well as armed mail carriers, but Apaches and other Indian raiders ensured that communication and transportation in Confederate Arizona remained haphazard.[4]
The worst attack came in late September, when Mangas Coloradas and Cochise led their respective Apache groups on a major raid against the mining town of Palo Altos. Along with a few Arizona Guards (recently established state troops), the surprised miners managed to put up a spirited defense. The hour-long battle saw both sides fight mainly from behind cover, darting from spot to spot as the momentum shifted back and forth. The Apache set many buildings on fire and killed over 10 miners and Arizona guards, but withdrew with 10 to 30 casualties themselves. While the raiding party had been repelled, Pinos Alto, one of the few established sources of wealth in the state, was falling into ruin. The Apache raiders split into smaller groups, continuing to deprive the Arizonans of livestock and other wealth and evading any attempt to bring them to heel.[5]
Under stress from Indian raids, remaining Federal soldiers to
the north, and Unionist spies, Baylor’s reputation began to flounder as his
temper affected his judgment. One incident concerned the editor of the Mesilla Times, Robert Kelly. Kelly
castigated Baylor after an embarrassing scare in October and November. Baylor’s
informants had warned of an impending massive movement of 2,500 men under
Canby. The Confederate military and civilians fled south, choosing to destroy
large stores valuable property rather than let it fall into enemy hands. It
turned out their energetic flight and destruction of essential supplies was all
for nothing, as Canby had not moved at all. Kelly put all the blame on Baylor,
attacking his judgment and courage. On December 12 Baylor confronted Kelly with
a rifle and demanded an apology. Kelly refused and the two got into a serious
fight. Kelly reached for his knife and Baylor shot him through the jaw and neck.
Kelly lingered for two weeks before dying (managing to churn out one final
editorial attack). Thanks to his influence as governor, Baylor won his case in
court and walked free. However his murder of Kelly, combined with his mounting
failures, began to destroy his popularity with the people.[6]
Baylor longed for the Confederacy to finally send its promised aid. It was
indeed on its way, if much slower than hope for. Leading the aid was Henry
Hopkins Sibley, a man who had served the Federals in New Mexico and was now
coming to drive them out.
Sibley’s Scheme
Henry Hopkins Sibley
Sibley’s family line could be traced to the days of the Norman Conquest of England. The first Americans in his family were Puritan migrants who arrived in Salem, Massachusetts, in 1629. In the latter 18th Century the Sibleys moved to North Carolina, and then moved again to Louisiana right before President Thomas Jefferson purchased it. Here Henry Sibley was born in 1816. He proved to be an intelligent child. In his childhood he developed a fascination with the U.S. Army. At the time Louisiana was on the frontier and the army’s presence was required there. It was seen as a key element in achieving America’s Manifest Destiny.[7] Sibley’s family came upon hard financial times and had to sell off most of their property. They moved to Missouri, where Sibley excelled in school. Upon graduation set his sights on the US Military Academy at West Point. He returned to Louisiana, where he reestablished ties with his grandfather and acquired recommendation papers. He was accepted to West Point. Though intelligent, he struggled with natural sciences and also committed his fair share of infractions. He ultimately graduated 31st in a class of 55.[8]
The US Army assigned Sibley to the Second Dragoons. He first served in the Seminole War, where he spent much more time trudging through swamps and filing paperwork than actually fighting the Seminole Indians. In the Mexican-American War he and the Second Dragoons were part of General Winfield Scott‘s invasion force. They finally saw considerable action from Vera Cruz to the outskirts of Mexico City.[9] Sibley had bouts of “erratic behavior” between the Mexican and Civil Wars that were attributed to drunkenness. Sibley’s dragoons even got involved in Bleeding Kansas, where on several occasions they almost got into a violent scrap with the free soil and pro-slavery factions. The dragoons soon left Kansas to participate in the Mormon Expedition, which amounted to days of hard marching through harsh weather. Sibley never fought the Mormons but got into heated disputes with fellow officers.[10] While serving on the Texas Frontier, Sibley noted the spacious warmth and comfort of a Comanche chief’s tent and created an altered variation known as the Sibley Tent. The tent provided extra protection against prairie winds, extra warmth against the cold nights and winters, and the ability to light a fire while obscuring it to hostile eyes. Sibley also developed a stove that could be placed at the center of the tent. This proved to be his most positive contribution to history.[11]
Sibley had just served in New Mexico himself. He had even paired up with Canby in a failed
attempt to bring the Navajo to heel. When the secession crisis hit, Sibley not
only found his sympathies with Louisiana and the South, but also personally suffered
from neglect. Attempts to carry out military duties operations in New Mexico
were hamstrung by a distracted government which would not give him and his command
the proper supplies and manpower. Longing for something greater, Sibley began
to study the dispositions of the army in the Southwest. He rationalized that
the Federal force there was organized in a way to fight small bands of Indians,
not a full invasion. He sensed opportunity He gave a presentation to none other
than President Jefferson Davis, pitching the campaign as a lightning-fast
mounted operation that would accrue Confederate sympathizers. Once they had
gone through New Mexico, they would secure gold fields in Colorado with the aid
of southern sympathizers (Colorado was mostly Unionist, but enough pro-Confederate
miners were there to cause heated arguments and acts of violence). It would be
easy to get through Utah as the Mormons there had a troubled history with the
Federal government. Finally, California could be won thanks to the presence of
thousands of Secessionists. The gold and other riches acquired in these
successes could be used to purchase Northern Mexican land. Davis and the Confederate
government approved Sibley’s plan and gave him a free hand in raising up the
army for this mission.[12]
Sibley’s presence in Texas attracted some attention. Initial news coverage of
Sibley’s scheme did not reveal his true intentions. The Texas papers instead
believed that he was going to operate in the northeastern corner of Texas.[13]
Formation of the Sibley Brigade
Was Sibley’s plan feasible? Could he conquer the West with a few thousand Texans? There was indeed a considerable number of Secessionists in the various western territories and states, even in the West Coast’s free states. However many of the groups out west were also largely indifferent or even hostile to the Confederacy. Sibley’s assessment of the western populations was partly steeped in unrealistic optimism. One of his largest misjudgments was on New Mexico’s population, surprising given that he had served amongst them. While the New Mexican Hispanics were largely apathetic to the United States government, they had a decades-long hatred for Texans. Of the white citizenry, many were Unionist and these were concentrated in the northern part of the state. In the town of Taos the few Secessionists there hoisted a Confederate flag. Kit Carson tore it down and replaced it with a Union flag that still waves there today. Actually getting to Confederate Arizona and then Federal New Mexico was a challenge. Sibley’s efforts to raise his army were frustrated by the rampant confusion of the early war days. He was listed as having the right number of formed companies when in fact many of these companies were woefully understrength or had already disbanded. The interim commander of Texas, Colonel Henry McCulloch, had little interest in the affairs of interior Texas and diverted all logistics towards strengthening the Texan coastal defenses. Sibley had to send his quartermaster to Galveston to meet McCulloch’s permanent successor, Paul Herbert. Herbert himself had been very bad at communicating with Sibley, often letting his messages go unanswered. After strenuous effort, he was finally able to fill out his regiments, but was far behind his planned schedule.[14]
The men in Sibley’s emerging army at San Antonio were not quite sure what his plan was, only the initial direction of the campaign. Even after the war, many veterans of the Sibley Brigade believed they were merely going to seize and collect the arms and equipment of the Federal garrisons and then turn east to help Sterling Price’s pro-Confederate militia army in Missouri, and then go all the way to Virginia. Some thought they would go directly to Virginia as part of the Texas Brigade.[15] Despite the expedition’s need for secrecy, the Texan “papers were full of flaming posters for months before we started, derailing particularly what our object was and out destination.” One Texan officer, William Davidson, believed the army should have assembled at Franklin (shortly known as El Paso), a much better launching point for a quick and successful invasion. He believed the hardened Texans were underestimated by their own government and expected to start at the easier to reach assembling point of San Antonio.[16]
Sibley was not loved by the brigade that bore his name. He was criticized as “old, lazy, and indolent,” lacking the energy needed to prod the Texan government and quickly assemble the transportation and other resources needed to mount the campaign. One veteran derisively complained that he was too fixed in military protocol and wasted time waiting for hundreds of wagons and other supplies. While he squandered valuable time he continually boasted of his plans for the West. “…He was the very last man on earth who ought to have been placed in command of that expedition.” Many of these accusations were unwarranted and borne out by post-failure frustrations. The idea that Sibley was too concerned with logistics is an odd argument since a lack of supplies would have rendered any western campaign disastrous. The veterans seem to have believed they were merely seizing the rest of New Mexico prior to an eastward thrust. Ironically, despite the claim that Sibley was exposing his plans through boasts, many veterans seem unaware that his true scheme was to go into Colorado and then California, an expedition that required hundreds of wagons full of supplies. The veterans were correct that the timing of the invasion, caused by issues with recruitment and equipage, was less than ideal. Even in New Mexico the winter left little sustenance for large bodies of armed men.[17]
By contrast the men came to love the other high-ranking officers. Most, if not all of these officers had fought in all of Texas’ wars against Mexicans and Indians. One who would stand out in the coming campaign was Colonel Thomas Green, the commander of the 5th Texas Mounted Rifles. He was not a professional soldier, yet had fought in every Texan war. One soldier wrote “Green knew nothing about military science, but he knew how to fight and win battles.”[18] Another stand-out was William Scurry. Scurry was a natural orator and poet who had inspired many Texans to support secession. On Scurry one man wrote, “His men had implicit confidence in him and he had confidence in them.”[19] One popular figure was Lieutenant William P. Hardeman. The men knew him as “Old Gotch,” to the point that his real name did not register to them. Whenever one heard of Hardeman they thought of another officer, Captain Pete Hardeman, and there was much confusion when orders were officially handed down by Lieutenant Hardeman.[20] Of special interest was Colonel James Reily, Reily had some military experience from the Texas Revolution, but had primarily been a diplomat. His most notable pre-war assignment was as the American consul in St. Petersburg, Russia. Such experience was desired in the effort to conquer the West.[21]
The rank-and-file was mostly young and unmarried. Many held no stable jobs, being wanderers or in some cases frontiersmen. Their motivations were mixed. Of course many were all for the Confederate cause. Others supported it insofar as it benefitted Texas. A few men of northern birth, afraid of the possibility of fighting their Union brethren, joined in the hopes that they would get to fight Indians or Mexicans instead. Some were not ideologically motivated at all, joining out of peer pressure, a sense of adventure, or the prospect of a repeat of Baylor’s easy conquest, with all the rewards it would entail. The soldiers were primarily armed with double-barrel shotguns. “They were not considered as army guns, but the truth is, just place plenty of courage behind a double-barrel shotgun and it will whip any one on earth,” explained one veteran.[22] Among the 4th and 5th Texas Mounted Rifles were several companies of lancers. In the very same century, the Europeans had been gradually abandoning the lance as a weapon. Using long spears to charge massed infantry armed with muskets and rifles was no longer feasible in modern warfare. However many Americans, moreso in the South, had a romantic notion of charging the enemy like chivalric knights. It is notably surprising that lancers would be found among the Texans, known for their practical reliance on revolver pistols, hunting rifles, shotguns, and bowie knives. With some already, and perhaps prematurely, labeling the lancers the “pride and joy” of the Sibley Brigade, time would tell if the lancers would prove of any use in battle.[23] The Sibley Brigade had difficulty getting all the equipment it needed. There was a notable shortage of saddles. It was so bad that Sibley had to complain to Colonel Ben McCulloch, the departmental commander, for his own saddle.[24]
No Confederate army was complete without black servants. The
number of slaves in the Sibley Brigade is uncertain. There might have been
about 50, mostly serving the officers. If one account is to be believed, one,
Bob, “did some real fighting” at the Battle of Glorieta Pass. However, the same
figure was said to have a comical fear of artillery fire. Bob was one of two
blacks not to run off with the Union soldiers when they hit the supply base in
that same battle. Colonel Green’s slave escaped much earlier, seizing a mare
and crossing the Rio Grande into Mexico.[25]
The teamsters who managed the long wagon train were primarily of Mexican
descent (these only helped get the Sibley Brigade to Confederate Arizona and then went their separate way). Thus
the Texans called the wagon train “Mexico.”[26]
This is the Sibley Brigade at the time of its formation with its notable officers listed.
Commanding General Henry Hopkins Sibley
4th Texas
Mounted Rifles
Colonel James Riley
Lieutenant-Colonel William R. Scurry
5th Texas
Mounted Rifles
Colonel Thomas Green
Lieutenant Colonel Henry McNeill
Major Samuel Lockridge
6th
Texas Mounted Rifles
Colonel
William Steele
Lieutenant
Colonel John Sutton
2nd
Texas Mounted Rifles (only a battalion served in the campaign)
Major
Charles L. Pyron
Artillery
(made up of men from various regiments)
Major
Trevanion Teel
The First Leg of the Journey
Late in the fall, with winter approaching, the Sibley Brigade was finally ready to move out. “The Order was read directing them to take up the line of march, and such a cheer as rent the air was never heard before along the Salado.” On their second day the brigade “camped halfway between Castroville and the Hondo, where we had an abundant supply of wood by not water and but little grass.” The Hondo was crossed the next day under a blizzard from the north. Chilly winter winds beset the first stage of the march, whipping men without any proper protection.[27] The Sibley Brigade first had to brave western Texas. The soldiers were both amazed and disappointed by the hilly terrain and lack of foraging. The men marched with their guns loaded, as many hostile Indians inhabited this region. Indians, many Apaches and Commanches, stole a good number of the horses in raids. After one such raid, a group of Texans got on their horses to give chase, but the ensuing three day chase only wore their mounts down. Those who had lost their horses to raids and terrible marching conditions were forced to go on foot for a while.[28]
The Sibley Brigade reached Ojo del Muerto, the Spring of the Dead, known better to whites as “Dead Man’s Hole.” Here they learned they could either travel along a long trail with two likely insufficient watering holes or another one that provided two full streams of water, but required a lengthy 65 mile stretch through mountains without water. Colonel Green chose the latter course. While the men gladly came upon a stream, they had to dig out roots in order to light their fires. They quickly ran out of bread and relied solely on their beef herd, a source of food which at the same time slowed their march.[29] The brigade finally reached the town of Franklin, situated on the Rio Grande, on December 24. There they had a rest, enjoying corn and linking up with veterans of Baylor’s expedition. For some of the men Christmas proved more exciting than hoped for. A group crossed the Rio Grande to visit the Mexican town of El Paso. There one of them, Platner, was gunned down and seriously wounded by the local police for allegedly having attacked a woman in her home (Davidson claims he was mistaken for the true culprit). Davidson, the only one who spoke Spanish, was able to get Platner and he and his comrades spent Christmas night feasting on tamales. Platner died the following day.[30]
Relations with the Hispanics at El Paso and other towns were
not the best. The Hispanics were cordial to the Texans at first, but soured
when their fields were invaded by horses. The hunger-ridden beasts were drawn
to the “green and lovely” wheat fields and their riders let them run loose.
When pressed about disturbing the locals’ food source, they claimed, “My horse
got loose and I could not find him.”[31]
The further the Sibley Brigade got into the frontier, the more they had to deal
with the Apaches. Apache raiders covered themselves with dirt, oil, and grass
and stealthily crept up to the animal herds and waited. Once the pickets moved
and provided an opening, they quietly went amongst the herds and cut the ropes
keeping them in place. They made off with hundreds of animals. Most of the
Texans in Sibley’s army were not experienced with battling highly mobile
Indians. They went on fruitless chases and only occasionally managed to gun
down a raider (in one morbid case some of the surgeons dissected a dead
Indian).[32] This was all in Texas. The Sibley Brigade was just finally nearing Confederate Arizona.
The Sibley Brigade Arrives
Sibley already had claimed his position in the coming conquest. On December 14 he assumed command of all forces in Arizona and dubbed his force the Army of New Mexico, but it would be better known as the Sibley Brigade because it was in fact brigade-sized. On December 20 he released a proclamation. In it he tried to assure the “peaceful people of New Mexico” that the Confederates meant no harm towards them and were only fighting an unjust and wicked foe in the Union. He claimed their property would not be disturbed (an unrealistic promise). Furthermore he appealed to Union soldiers, particularly those in the regular army. He urged them to join the Confederacy instead. Sibley believed that much of the army in New Mexico was of pro-Southern sentiment and only had to be prodded further into switching allegiances.[33] Robert Baylor, the man who had started all of this, could not get along with Sibley. He felt that his rightful glory was being stolen from him. At the same time he had his hands full with the Apaches. Baylor had devised a division of Arizona in which Sibley would operate in the east against Canby and he, with 1,000 men, would fortify the west and prepare the way for California. The issue was that Sibley was taking too long and the Apaches were making control of Arizona difficult. In fact his correspondence in the latter half of 1861 involved constant calls for reinforcements not to mount an invasion, but to secure the rest of Confederate Arizona. His small force could not do much against overwhelming numbers of Indians. While the Confederacy had taken possession of Arizona’s valuable mines, the workers could not effectively utilize them when so many were needed to look out for raiders. To make matters worse, Baylor would now lose a large chunk of his command while he was still recruiting local militia to defend the mines and settlements. Many of his former soldiers were put under Major Charles Pyron in the 2nd Texas Mounted Rifles.[34]
On the way west, Sibley sent James Reily, the experienced diplomat, to Mexico to negotiate. Reily’s mission was to at least procure supplies from the northern Mexican states of Sonora and Chihuahua. He also had the added objective of convincing the Mexican governors, Luis Terraza of Chihuahua and Ignacio Pesqueira of Sonora, to sell their territories into the Confederacy. This seemed audacious, but was considered likely at the time given that Mexico was entering another period of turbulence and division with the French invasion. Along the way Reily traveled with Sherod Hunter’s 150 Arizona Rangers, who took up base in pro-Confederate Tucson. Reily claimed that he had procured the rights for the Confederates to purchase supplies from Chihuahua and Sonora. However Reily’s attempts to purchase Mexican land, though restrained in comparison to invasive filibustering expeditions, rubbed the Mexicans the wrong way. In fact the Mexican governors would consider any entry of Confederate troops, even for the purpose of marching through to California, an invasion. Furthermore, if relations with the Confederacy were too strong this would be considered a violation of Mexico’s policy of neutrality. Worse, they refused to allow any Confederates to pursue Apaches onto Mexican land, a policy that had enabled hostile Indians to raid Arizona Territory with much success. Terrazas of Chihuahua did provide one concession. Texans could purchase goods from his territory. Of course this was the one concession with tangible benefits for Mexico, that being money. Sonora’s Pesqueira, was much more cautious. Sonora held extensive borders with both the Union and Confederacy, and any sign of favoritism for one could draw the ire of the other. In truth, Reilly was only able to establish the ability to buy supplies from Chihuahuans.[35]
 |
| Luis Terrazas, Governor of Chihuahua and an owner of hundreds of ranches, had a storied career. His territory held Benito Juarez's government-in-exile during the Franco-Mexican War and he also had a rivalry with Pancho Villa in his later years. |
With
Reilly departed, Lieutenant-Colonel Scurry took command of the 4th
Texas Mounted Rifles. Colonel William Steele stayed on to help Baylor and
Lieutenant-Colonel John Sutton took his place. Sibley also took on men from
Baylor’s command. The campaign proper could not begin.
Next: Sibley's plans go off the rails early and the Federals and Confederates have the first great battle in New Mexico Territory.
Primary
Sources
Peticolas,
A.B. Rebels on the Rio Grande: The Civil
War Journals of A.B. Peticolas. Albuquerque: University of New Mexico
Press, 1984.
Tate,
Michael L. (1987) “A Johnny Reb in Sibley’s New Mexico Campaign: Reminiscences
of Pvt. Henry C. Wright, 1861-1862, Part I.” East Texas Historical Journal: Vol. 25: Iss. 2, Article 7.
-
(1988)
“A Johnny Reb in Sibley’s New Mexico Campaign: Reminiscences of Pvt. Henry C. Wright,
1861-1862, Part II.” East Texas
Historical Journal: Vol. 26: Iss. 1, Article 7.
Thompson,
Jerry (ed.). Civil War in the Southwest:
Recollections of the Sibley Brigade. Texas A & M University Press,
2001.
United
States. The
War of the Rebellion: A Compilation of the Official Records of the Union and
Confederate Armies Vol. IV.
Washington D.C. 1894.
Secondary
Sources
Alberts,
Don E. The Battle of Glorieta: Union
Victory in the West. Texas A & M University Press, 1998.
Austerman, Wayne. “The South’s Legion of Lancers.” Civil War Times Illustrated (March
1985), pp. 20-25.
Frazier,
Donald S. Blood & Treasure:
Confederate Empire in the Southwest. Texas A & M University Press,
1995.
Josephy,
Alvin M. The Civil War in the American
West. New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1991.
Kiser,
William S. “’We Must Have Chihuahua
and Sonora’: Civil War Diplomacy in the U.S.-Mexico Borderlands. Journal of
the Civil War Era Vol. 9, No. 2 (JUNE 2019), pp. 196-222
Nelson,
Megan Kate. The Three-Cornered War: The
Union, the Confederacy, and Native Peoples in the Fight for the West. New
York: Scribner, 2020.
Pittman,
Walter E. New Mexico and the Civil War,
The History Press, 2011.
Taylor,
John. Bloody Valverde: A Civil War Battle
on the Rio Grande. University of New Mexico Press, 1995.
Thompson,
Jerry. Henry Hopkins Sibley: Confederate General
of the West. Natchitoches: Northwestern State University Press, 1987.
-
A Civil War
History of the New Mexico Volunteers & Militia. Albuquerque:
University of New Mexico Press, 2015.
[1] Pittman, 13.
[2] OR IV, 27-31; Jerry D. Thompson,
A Civil War History of the New Mexico
Volunteers & Militia, (Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press, 2015),
104-105; Pittman, 14.
[3] Nelson, 17-22
[4] Frazier, 64-67.
[5] Frazier, 108-110.
[6] OR IV, 129, 132-133; Pittman,
13; Frazier, 114-116
[7] Thompson, 1996, 4-10.
[8] Thompson, 1996, 21-23, 32.
[9] Thompson, 1996, 33-37, 40-44,
56-66.
[10] Thompson, 1996, 82-83, 114-115,
140-167.
[11] Thompson, 1996, 102-107, 174.
[12] Taylor, 11-12; Thompson, 1996, 198, 209; OR IV, 93; Frazier, 33,75.
[13] Thompson, 1996, 219-220.
[14] OR IV, 141-143; Josephy, 53-54;
Alberts, 8.
[15] Thompson,
2001, 3-4; Wright, 22.
[16] Thompson, 2001, 4-5.
[17] Thompson, 2001, 5-6.
[18] Thompson, 2001, 33; Frazier,
79-80.
[19] Thompson, 2001, 89; Frazier, 78.
[20] Thompson, 2001, 100-101.
[21] Thompson, 1996, 222-223.
[22] Thompson, 2001, 7; Frazier,
85-86, 89-90.
[23] Austerman, 21, 23.
[24] Thompson, 1996, 225.
[25] Thompson, 2001, 40-41; Frazier,
92, 125.
[26] Thompson, 1996, 232.
[27] Thompson, 2001, 10-12.
[28] Thompson, 2001, 12-13; Wright,
24; Thompson, 1996, 231-232; Frazier, 125-126.
[29] Thompson, 2001, 13, Wright, 24.
[30] Thompson, 2001, 14-16.
[31] Wright, 24-25.
[32] Frazier, 134.
[33] OR IV, 89-90.
[34] OR IV, 120-121, 165; Taylor,
41;Peticolas, 31; Frazier, 102.
[35] OR
IV, 167-168, 172; Kiser, 2019, 199-203, 205; Thompson, 1996, 239-242
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