Valverde
Canby’s Forces
Canby was aware as early as June 1861 that the Texans were preparing a major invasion of New Mexico. For the first few months of the war, however, he was much more focused on ending an upsurge in Apache and Navajo raids. He sent small teams of soldiers around the territory to skirmish with Navajo warriors and seize their sheep herds. This strategy was starting to yield results when the Texan Confederate threat was confirmed. Though Sibley’s Brigade had many logistical obstacles to overcome, Canby, as was common with Civil War commanders, overestimated the size of the enemy’s and felt he needed more men.[1] Canby requested that Colorado and Utah Territories raise troops, to be sent to him if necessary. Colorado was quicker to respond Recruitment for Coloradan units proceeded at Denver. Hundreds of gold miners, many having not achieved the rich successes they had expected, answered the call. With winter coming in, there would be a halt of mining activity. Unable to make income and for the most part not having stockpiled enough gains, the miners saw a chance to receive guaranteed pay and food, and perhaps some excitement. The first ready unit, Company B of the 2nd Colorado, fell under the command of West Point graduate Theodore Dodd. Meant to be part of a full regiment, they were already equipped and trained ahead of the other companies in their unit. On January 1, the Coloradans learned that they would not be spending the winter in camp. Canby needed all the help he could get and Dodd was to lead his company to Santa Fe. The men were motivated. They would not only get some adventure, they would ensure that Colorado Territory was represented in the war. As they would go ahead without the rest of their regiment, they came to be known as “Dodd’s Independents.” The Coloradans marched through snow-covered trails in the mountains. The men took their first experience of military campaigning well. They had already led rough, physical lives in their search for gold and would not leave a trail of stragglers and discarded items as many early Civil War armies did.[2] Upon arrival, the Coloradans found New Mexico exotic. They appreciated the native and Mexican architecture and loved the fandangos where they could dance and drink to their heart’s content. On the other hand they did not think much of the inhabitants. They thought the Hispanics a collection of laborers and criminals and a few thought the Anglo-Americans there to be deeply immoral.[3]
They arrived at Fort Craig to find that Canby’s white and Hispanic troops were not getting along with each other very well. The Hispanics felt correctly that they were perceived as inferiors and reacted strongly to insults or perceived slights. They were also concerned that they had made a grievous mistake by agreeing to spend several years in the US Army while their homes were under assault by Indians. The whites were equally flustered thanks to the language barrier. Many Hispanics understood little to no English and it was hard to pass down orders. The New Mexican volunteer units were not a hundred percent Hispanic. Many whites lived in the territory and volunteered as well. Whites in primarily Hispanic volunteer units could understand orders passed down by high-ranking white officers, but their own Hispanic officers might not, resulting in confused disputes regarding orders.[4] Canby was not above prejudices and was determined not to come to battle with Sibley in a way that would require the Hispanics to maneuver under fire. His prejudice, however, was less concerned with any racial or cultural issues and more with the performance of inexperienced men under fire.[5]
 |
| Kit Carson started off as another trapper and fur trader. His guidance of Fremont on various expeditions as well as his performance in fighting Indians gained him a high reputation in the West. |
One misunderstanding, showing the low opinion of the New
Mexicans, occurred on February 13. Major Rafael Chacon,
who could not speak English himself despite his high status, and his company in
the 1st New Mexico had gone on a scouting expedition. Chacon split
his regiment in two to cover more ground. When he came back to Fort Craig,
Canby, through an interpreter, worriedly asked if Chacon had surrendered his
men and if they were now on parole. Chacon was confused and denied this. It
turned out that another Federal officer had seen the two scouting groups merge
and had assumed that Chacon was surrendering himself.[6]
Overall, Canby’s force was diverse and not as unified as it could be. The
regular soldiers, Hispanics, Coloradans, and Ute Indian scouts all came in with
their own prejudices.[7]
Among this colorful collection of men were two stand-outs. One was Kit Carson,
a well-regarded frontiersman who had helped explore the West and build
relations with the Indians. He also understood Spanish and could recruit and
lead Hispanics. He commanded the 1st New Mexico Volunteers.[8]
The other was the Irish James “Paddy” Graydon. Graydon was a chronic drunk, but
still a good soldier. He built up an “Independent Spy Company” who observed
Sibley’s movements. At one point a member of his unit even infiltrated a
Confederate camp disguised as an apple peddler. Thanks to the Spy Company,
Canby knew where Sibley was at any point and time.[9]
Sibley Enters the Territory
The Sibley Brigade’s first objective was Fort Craig, which they would approach on a northward route along the west bank of the Rio Grande. If they captured it they would have access to its stockpile of food, ammunition, and other supplies. The brigade set out for Federal New Mexico on January 1, with much less wagons and rations than planned. In addition to their supply woes, the Texans were assailed by “measles, small-ox, and body lice.”[10] They also had human obstacles to face on their first steps into New Mexico Territory, but not Federal ones. Every day Mescalero Apaches struck the Rebel column, taking off precious horses and cattle. One time they seized 80 horses and Sibley ordered a mounted pursuit. The pursuers could not catch up to the Apaches and returned “more dead than alive, more crazed than rational, for the want of both food and water.”[11] One of the Sibley Brigade’s first stops was the abandoned Fort Thorn. In pursuance with Canby’s consolidation strategy, the garrison had abandoned the fort and stripped it of supplies. They left only a few dead cattle, and the Texans feared that they had been poisoned as a trap.[12] The Texans halted here, waiting for more supplies and the reinforcing 7th Texas to arrive. The men found themselves bored, save for those who were sent out to scout or forage.[13]
The two sides sent scouts and small parties against each
other. No men were lost, but a few horses were killed. The Sibley Brigade made
the most of their killed animals. They used their hides to fashion shoes both
for themselves and the other horses.[14]
During this time Sibley fell ill. He suffered from abdominal pain and nausea,
sometimes vomiting. Sibley had always reacted to illness with the consumption
of alcohol and this time was no different. He left the saddle of his horse and
began to spend his time either in an ambulance wagon or a tent. He gave general
directions for the campaign, but delegated most of his responsibility over to
Colonel Green. The men began to perceive him as a lazy, cowardly drunk.[15]
Early in February the Sibley Brigade finally got back on the move, passing
through some of the sites of the previous year’s skirmishes. They saw remains
of breastworks, horse skeletons, and bullet-riddled adobe buildings.[16]
When he felt he was ready, Sibley moved north again, getting closer and closer
to Fort Craig. Following are the two forces that would soon clash.[17]
Union Forces
Commander: Colonel Edward Canby
Regular Infantry
2 Companies of the 5th
US Infantry: Captain Benjamin Wingate (Captain Henry Selden would command in
the battle itself)
Combined
Companies of 7th and 10th US Infantry: Captain Peter
Plympton
Regular Cavalry
1st
US Cavalry: Captain Richard Lord
3rd US
Cavalry: Major Thomas Duncan
Regular Artillery
Captain Alexander McRae
(3rd US Cavalry)
Lieutenant R. Hall (10th
US Infantry)
New Mexico Volunteers
1st
New Mexico: Colonel Kit Carson
2nd
New Mexico: Miguel E. Pino
3rd
New Mexico: Colonel Jose Gallegos*
5th
New Mexico: Lieutenant-Colonel Benjamin S. Roberts*
Independent
Spy Company: Captain James Graydon*
New Mexico Militia
1st
New Mexico Militia: Colonel Manuel Armijo*
2nd
New Mexico Militia: Colonel Nicolas Pino*
Colorado Volunteers
2nd Colorado
Infantry, B Company: Captain Theodore Dodd
*These units helped put up a front when the forces faced each
other at Fort Craig. Aside from some detachments, they stayed behind at the
fort during the actually battle itself.
Confederate Forces
Commander: Brigadier-General Henry Hopkins Sibley
2nd Texas Mounted Rifles: Major Charles L. Pyron
4th Texas Mounted Rifles: Lieutenant-Colonel
William Read Scurry
5th Texas Mounted Rifles: Colonel Thomas Green
7th Texas Mounted Rifles: Lieutenant-Colonel John
Sutton
Provisional Artillery Battalion: Trevanion Teel
Battle Plans Change
On February 16 the Sibley Brigade finally came in sight of the Federal outpost. Alerted, Canby exited the fort with most of his soldiers, staying close enough to it to encourage a frontal assault. Sibley was aware of how dangerous a direct attack against the fort would be and likewise hoped Canby would make the offensive maneuver. Both sides formed for battle. Expectantly, the two lines silently stared each other down. One soldier in the 7th Texas broke the tension by loudly saying “Gee whilikens captain, I ain’t half as mad at them fellows as I was before they showed up so many men. Let’s go home to mother.” After some laughter from his comrades, the two sides eyed each other again, unwilling to bring on battle until by making the assault themselves.[18]
Finally, Sibley called off any plans for battle, leaving skirmishers to face the Federals. It was obvious to Sibley that Canby was not only prepared for him, but also had a considerable army at his immediate command. He would have to bypass Fort Craig, the first serious deviation in his dreamed thread of conquest. This was serious. The capture of Fort Craig was supposed to provide the Sibley Brigade with a boost in resources. Sibley’s decision to leave it in his rear met with much criticism. Many veterans believed that by not taking Fort Craig he put his campaign in dire straits by letting Canby sit in his rear. Artillery officer Phil Fulcrod was more gracious in his assessment. He noted that Sibley had helped construct the defenses at Fort Craig and was aware that the officers among the Federals were well-trained and experienced West Pointers. Sibley “used economy of life and judgment as a commander for making this righteous and cautious move.”[19]
As Sibley withdrew, the Federals wondered if they were to let
them pass or go out to stop them. Canby was not one to share much of his
thoughts with his subordinates. One soldier noted in his diary, “Many rumors
afloat as the enemy is near but we know not of the course to be pursued whether
we will go out and meet the enemy or wait for them to attack the fort. Canby
counsels none.” Canby ordered some of his units to occupy the heights on the
other side of the Rio Grande River while Graydon’s scouts shadowed Sibley’s
column. For the time being the Federals stayed put while the Texans marched.[20]
Sibley’s roundabout route would carry his army to the eastern side of the Rio
Grande and around the Mesa del Contadero, obscuring its movements. Then, using
a ford at Valverde, he would get back to marching on the western side of the
river. The march was plagued by snow, then a two-day sandstorm. On February 19
they crossed the still icy Rio Grande and then climbed a rocky and
ravine-ridden volcanic shelf.[21]
 |
Suicide Mules and the God of War
On February 20 Canby finally moved out to confront Sibley, joined by further last minute reinforcements from the New Mexico Militia. Chacon’s company climbed up to a ridgeline and got a clear view of the Confederate Army. One Texan battery, Fulcrod’s, opened fire, but the shells fell just short of the New Mexicans. Pino’s regiment fared worse. The Texan guns did not hit any of the men, but it did smash the hillsides and send rocks raining on them. The men panicked and ran. Fulcrod attributed his success to the heavy presence of unhardened volunteers among the Federals. To prevent the Confederates from following up on this rout, Canby ordered Colonel Benjamin Roberts to cover the New Mexicans’ retreat with a cavalry demonstration. The Texans made no attempt to follow up their successful bombardment.[22] That night the Texans’ horses and mules grew uneasy with thirst. Some wandered off in search of drink and ended up in Federal hands. Men were just as thirsty. Some of the Texans sneaked to the Rio Grande, braving picket fire to fill their canteens.[23]
Paddy Graydon and his Spy Company devised a plan to disrupt
Sibley’s invasion. They selected two mules and strapped artillery shells to
them. The mules were to be detonated via fuses attached to the shells. The
unfortunate animals would be set off by the Confederates’ beef herd, scattering
and depriving the enemy of their main food supply. The Spy Company lit the
fuses and cheered the mules forward. However, the mules decided to follow their
familiar masters and ran back. The surprised Federals rushed to their mounts
and fled, narrowly escaping the exploding mules. The effect on the beef herd
was minimal at best, but nearby Confederate horses and mules panicked and were
scattered about. Many were recovered the next morning, but around 200 fled
towards Union lines and were brought into Fort Craig. Sibley claimed this was a
disastrous turning point in his campaign as it removed literal horsepower from
his army. “Rather than the plan should be defeated a number of wagons were
abandoned, containing the entire kits, blankets, books, and papers of this
regiment…”[24] The tension-filled night
finally ended. The morning of February 21 was heralded by a distant reddish
star. It was the planet Mars, an omen of the coming violence.[25]
The Battle of Valverde Begins
The Confederates needed to cross a ford at Valverde to get back to the west bank of the Rio Grande. Canby knew this and had already sent Major Thomas Duncan and the 3rd U.S. Cavalry to hold the ford. About 8:00 AM, first contact was made when Duncan’s cavalrymen spotted Major Pyron’s 2nd Texas Mounted Volunteers (detachment). Duncan had his men dismount and take cover behind a sandbank. From here it would be possible to hold off the enemy until the rest of Canby’s force arrived.[26] Reinforcements did not take too long to arrive. McRae’s battery and Benjamin S. Roberts’ cavalry were on the other side of the Rio Grande and part of the 3rd New Mexican Infantry reinforced Duncan directly. Until Canby could arrive, Roberts took command of all present Federal forces. Pyron sent for reinforcements as now he was in danger of being outnumbered.[27]
By now both commanders were aware that a major battle had started and were trying to get their men to Valverde before their side was overwhelmed. The other Texas regiments were impatient to get in on the action. One soldier in the 7th Texas exclaimed “By God! Are you going to let Pyron whip them before we get there?” The 7th was the first to come to Pyron’s relief, with Scurry’s 4th and Pyron’s 2nd were the first to arrive, and Green’s 5th and Sutton’s 7th still behind. A large detachment of the 5th Texas was left with the wagon train. It was feared that the battle was a ruse to drag the Rebels away from their essential supply train and Sibley and Green wanted to be prepared for such a possibility. Scurry’s arrival came in the nick of time for Pyron. Pyron’s 700 Texans had been able fend off a much larger Federal force, but would have soon been overwhelmed.[28] Scurry also brought howitzers to counter the enemy artillery. However, the howitzers among the batteries proved unable to contest the Union guns and were pulled behind the lines to sit out the battle.[29]
For almost two hours, the Texans weathered small arms fire with few casualties. It took cover in a grove of cottonwood trees and in a sand bank. The sand bank did not have much height, so they had to lie down and hug the ground. For a while they endured unopposed artillery fire. Finally, at 10:45 AM, Teel’s battery “came thundering down” and deployed in the center of the Confederate line. Lieutenant Charles Raguet’s men from the 4th Texas also arrived to bolster the line. Soon all the Union fire concentrated on Teel, also making it a “hot place” for the men laying behind the battery. “Shell and round shot and minie bullets came whistling in showers over our heads, bombs burst just behind and before, and trees were shattered and limbs began to fall.” Teel’s battery took some casualties, one man wounded and two horses hit. Teel and Pyron’s units soon had to change their positions as Dodd’s Independents advanced in force and occupied the cottonwoods to their right.
The Coloradans fired their rifles as they advanced, taking out many of the enemy sharpshooters. Some mounted Texans rode closer to the to Dodd’s men and tethered their horses behind the sandbank. Only those Rebels with long-range rifles were allowed to fire. Their horses, tethered behind them, made easier targets and many were hit by bullets. Among the few human casualties was a William H. Onderdonk. A bullet penetrated his mouth and tore his tongue. He cut off the hanging flesh of tongue and handed it to a comrade with the instructions it be sent to his brother. The Texans, raised to not waste their bullets, fired at a slower pace than the Federals, but inflicted enough damage to drive them away from the cottonwood trees.[30]
The battle was now in full swing. The Texans had a disadvantage in firepower, but were careful to maximize what they had. Private Davidson noted “…Those who had long-range guns were ordered to lie down in this ravine, and whenever one of those who had a long-range gun was wounded or killed, his gun was given to one of the shotgun men, who was put in his place.” Phil Fulcrod brought up his battery. The men cheered him, glad to have more artillery support. However the Federals on a nearby mesa, including many sharpshooters and two 24-pound howitzers, killed or wounded all his horses and most of his men. Fulcrod himself had to pitch in with loading and firing the guns. The same fate befell Teel’s battery. More Federal artillery arrived and hurled a wave of grape and canister at the Texans. Teel redeployed his battery to face them. One gun crew was almost wiped out by the superior Federal firepower and Teel called for volunteers to help work the guns. Men with shotguns, who were unable to join in the long-range musket firing, gladly volunteered to replace the dead and disabled artillerists. Some even recovered unexploded round shot fired from Federal lines and brought them over to be returned. Federal Robert Hall’s battery still held the upper hand against Teel. It was effective enough to drive back the Confederate left “in a few minutes.” Teel had to split his batteries up. The enemy line was so long that he could not focus his artillery on one or two key positions. [31]
Charge of the Lancers
On the Federal side, Canby had finally arrived in person, relieving Roberts of overall command. Canby’s general plan for the battle was to advance his center and right flank. They would turn the Rebel left and gain a position from which they could enfilade the sand bank.[32] Sibley’s leadership was comparatively lacking. In the early stages of the battle he had tried to take an active role in spite of his colic. He mounted a horse and positioned himself in the rear, using mounted aides to receive and send out orders. The riders were not pleased with their assignment, which required them to ride back and forth long distances, and were also not pleased to see the general consuming copious amounts of alcohol as he made tactical decisions. Sibley’s excessive drinking became legendary across New Mexico, with even Union soldiers referring to him as a “walking whiskey keg.” Despite his efforts, he could not keep in the saddle and around 1:00 PM he retired to his ambulance wagon and gave full control over to Colonel Green.[33]
The center of the battle was now between the Confederate left, under Raguet, and the Federal right under Duncan and Hall. Raguet was hit by a shell shard. He almost fell down, saved by several of his men, and went back to walking up and down his line.[34] Kit Carson led the 1st New Mexico Volunteers on a foray to hit Sibley’s wagon train. Green had seen the famed frontiersman gathering his men on the mesa and left a strong detachment to protect the supplies. Two companies of the 5th Texas beat off Carson’s move. Unable to seize the train, Carson led his regiment to the main battlefield where Canby placed him in support of the left flank.[35] By 2 PM all the participants had arrived on the field. The Federals held the ford. On the east side, directly confronting the Confederates, Duncan’s regular cavalrymen continued to hold the right flank with the assistance of Hall’s battery, Plympton’s regular infantry held the center with McCrae’s battery, and Selden’s infantry formed the left flank, with Dodd’s Independents on the far left. Unsure of his volunteers, Canby positioned them behind the Rio Grande. He had Pino’s 2nd New Mexican stay directly behind the ford with the ammunition train while Carson’s 1st new Mexico stayed behind the left flanks. The remaining volunteers and detachment of regular soldiers were back holding Fort Craig. On the Confederate side Scurry held the far right flank. The rest of his 4th Texas, however, was on the far left flank under Raguet. Pyron and Sutton held the center and rest of the left flank. With Green taking overall command, Major Samuel Lockridge took over the 5th Texas and the rest of the right flank.[36]
McRae’s
guns pummeled the Confederate right and the Union infantry was advancing. If
something was not done soon, the Texans’ right flank could be turned and the
battle lost. Colonel Green decided to halt the Federal advance with a charge of
his own. The charge would be made both on foot and horseback. The horseback
contingent was made up of none other than the lancer companies. Led by Captain
Willis Lang, the lancers lined up in three columns, lowered their nine-foot
long lances, and spurred their horses forward in what many would recall as a
“gallant” rush. They assumed that they would smash through the blue-clad ranks,
sending the infantry running, and then overrun McRae’s Battery, skewering the
artillerymen or trampling them to death. They knew that much of the enemy force
consisted of raw New Mexico volunteers who they imagined would, in the face of
such a fierce charge, panic and abandon McRae’s men to their fate.[37]
 |
| Alonzo Ickis, one of the Coloradans who stood in Lang's way. |
Dodd stood in Lang’s way. He instinctively recalled
Napoleonic tactics and ordered his men into a square. Dodd could see that his
men were excited, whether out of anticipation or fear, at being charged like
this. “Steady there my brave mountaineers! Waste not a single shot. Do not let
your passions run off with your judgment.” The Coloradans became quiet and
tense, to the point that one of them claimed to have heard his own heartbeat.
When the lancers were forty yards off Dodd gave the order and his Independents
unleashed a devastating volley. Lancers with slain and wounded mounts got to
their feet, only to be bayoneted and clubbed down by the Federal volunteers.[38]
Another wave of lancers under Jerome McCown readied for a second charge, but
Green wisely called off what would have been a repeat disaster.[39]
One veteran grandly recalled: “The famed 600, who rode into the jaws of death
at Balaclava were this day eclipsed.” Perhaps they did equal the performance of
the British cavalry in undertaking an ineffectual and costly assault.[40]
The charge did net one positive for the Texans. It had brought the opposing
lines closer together, enabling them to use their shorter-range shotguns.
Dodd’s Independents got out of range and withdrew.[41]
 |
| A dramatic rendition of the Lancers' charge |
The failure of the lancer charge was followed by a comparative lull in the battle. The Federal soldiers that could took lunch. Canby continued to prepare for his assault on the Texan left.[42] In the meantime, 40 to 50 Texans advanced to a grouping of rocks and trees on the crest of a hill. From there they worked as sharpshooters, targeting officers and artillerists. The sharpshooting was effective and one of the veterans of this foray, W.P. Laughter, admitted that he “thought it was the finest fun in the world” until the Federals “turned every gun on us and how they did hustle us out of there.” One Union shell smashed into a boulder, shattering a good chunk of it and sending rock flying into the face of Laughter. Laughter quickly ordered a retreat.[43]
The Decisive Moment
Canby shifted his forces, moving Plympton, Wingate, and Carson’s men on his right. His reinforced right would flank the Confederates out of their natural sand bank entrenchments. This weakened his left and left a gap in the infantry. This gap exposed McRae’s battery and it became a source of future debate. The majority of participants blamed Pino’s 2nd New Mexican volunteers, saying they had been ordered to move across the Rio Grande and plug the hole in the line. Instead they fearfully stayed huddled by the river bank. A few insisted that Canby had unwittingly or foolishly neglected his left and center to reinforce his right. One officer claimed that Canby had moved McRae’s battery a hundred yards to the left without adequate support.[44] At the same time the Confederate guns slackened their fire as Green planned an assault on McRae, who battery had been the dominant performer all day. Teel moved the bulk of the artillery to the right flank to support the final great charge and also to save the day if the charge should fail and the enemy counterattack. The Texas artillery opened up to signal its commencement. Many of them focused their fire on McRae’s battery, which was the key to the Federal center. Thanks to the bosque and sandbank the Texans were able to conceal their mounting strength for this assault.[45] On the left flank Green ordered Raguet to stall the Federal advance against him with a charge. Raguet successfully blunted the enemy’s, but the charge was fairly costly as he attacked a far larger force,[46]
The attack on the Federal left and center began. Many of the
men in the assault had barely participated in the battle, spending hours lying
behind a sandbank, and were eager to get at the enemy. One unit had an unusual
obstacle to charge through. Part of the field was covered by tall dry grass and
the sparks from the battle had set it on fire.[47]
The casualties from artillery fire were low because the Federal artillerists
could not angle their guns right. At first they overshot the Confederate
infantry. When they tried to compensate, they instead blasted the ground
between them and the enemy. Some veterans claimed that they were able to evade
the artillery fire through good timing. “Watching the flash from the guns, each
man threw himself on the ground and as the discharge passed over, rose and
pushed forward again.”[48]
Enemy musket fire hit the attacker’s flank and rear from the other side of the
river, but this came from too far away to cause any real damage. Lieutenant-Colonel
Sutton urged them on, crying “Forward boys, forward! Glory lies in front!” The
men finally got close enough to let loose with their shotguns, “and the fire of
the enemy’s lines seemed to melt away. The boys did not stop to re-load but
they drew their pistols and pressed right on over the cannon, where a terrific
hand-to-hand struggle took place.” Major Lockridge of the 5th Texas
put his hand on the barrel of one of McRae’s guns and declared “This is mine.”
Immediately he was mortally wounded. His last words were, “Go on my boys, don’t
stop here.” The Texans had reached the guns just in the nick of time. They had
both been loaded and one artillerist was just about to set one off with a fuse.
A Rebel who had mounted the caisson behind the gun attempted to stop him with
his revolver. Noticing this, the artillerist defiantly stuck the fuse into the
caisson instead. The result was a “dreadful explosion that took out several men
on both sides.” In the midst of this furious melee McRae was killed.[49]
 |
| A somewhat exaggerated illustration of the fight for McRae's artillery. |
Now in possession of the guns, the Confederates turned them on the Federals. Most of the Federals on the left flank at this point were green volunteers and the fury of the charge had discombobulated them. With so many men running, those who had not panicked joined in the rout. The Texans had to use improvisation to man the guns. With so many artillery tools destroyed or missing, one man used a flagstaff to ram ammunition into the barrel. The rest used their shotguns and revolvers to pick off men as they fled across the Rio Grande.[50] Canby tried to stem the retreat. He ordered the guns to be retaken. 80 cavalrymen, supported by constant fire from infantry, moved for the guns. For a moment it looked like the Texans would have to mount a desperate defense. The incessant Federal musketry put a lot of pressure on them. One recalled, “The smoke was so thick that you could scarcely tell one man from another, and our faces so black with powder and dirt that we looked more like negroes than white men.” Artillerist Private Starr added, “The balls were whistling around us thick as hail.” The Union counterattack died out, however, as too many of their soldiers were in a state of rout to allow any success. The cavalrymen were hit by friendly and enemy fire at the same time, while the infantry was blasted by a now dominant Texan artillery presence.[51]
The battle had ended with a Confederate victory, the Federals having rushed back to Fort Craig. It could have gone either way. The timing of Green’s attacks, even Raguet’s near-sacrificial effort, had hit the Federals at a critical moment. Now it was time for the two sides to assess their performances. Some were quite chivalrous in distributing praise. One man who was commended by friends and foes alike was Alexander McRae, who was both a solid faithful Federal officer and a North Carolinian. As an artillerist himself, Fulrod was particularly effusive in his praise and also condemnatory of McRae’s allies. “The gallant McRae and his men stood at their posts of duty and performed acts of heroism worthy of Sparta’s best days, while the right and left wings, who should have come to the rescue, fled and many of them fell dead with our bullets in their backs.” Canby shared this assessment in his battle report. “Pure in character, upright in conduct, devoted to his profession, and of a loyalty that was deaf to the seductions of family and friends, Captain McRae died, as he had lived, an example of the best and highest qualities that man can possess.” McRae’s personal possessions were delivered to Federal lines so they could in turn be delivered to his family.[52]
Their was plenty of scathing criticism to go around as well. The Confederates were disenchanted with Sibley’s lack of presence at the battle. On the Union side, many of the Federal soldiers blamed the New Mexico militia and volunteers for the defeat. They claimed they had run off, “leaving us white men only to hold” McRae’s battery. A military inspector wrote “No dependence whatever can be placed on the natives; they are worse than worthless; they are really aids to the enemy, who catch them, take their arms, and tell them to go home.” Canby was also condemnatory in his initial report. He claimed that the regulars bore the brunt of the fighting and that the militia and volunteers repeatedly disobeyed orders. These criticisms, which were generalizations, ignored the fact that the Hispanics on the right flank had held their ground and only retreated when the rest of the force was withdrawing. Still, at least 100 volunteers and militiamen deserted straight from the battlefield. Canby’s casualty report also showed that the regular units and Dodd’s Coloradans had taken the lion’s share of losses, giving some credence to his assessment.[53]
Under a truce, men from both sides searched for their wounded. The Federals generously donated lanterns to the bands of Texans so they could find their comrades. Private Davidson remembered finding one of his friends, Suff Clapp, with both thighs shot through. Apparently he had passed within feet of Clapp several times while looking for the wounded. Clapp had stayed silent in hopes that Davidson would grab the more seriously injured instead of prioritizing his personal friend.[54] While the soldiers dealt with the aftermath, Sibley sent Scurry and another officer to Fort Craig to negotiate Canby’s surrender, a final effort to get at Fort Craig’s much needed supplies. Though he had lost a battle, Canby had no reason to give up his force while it still held such a formidable position. He “peremptorily refused.”[55] It is unclear if Sibley genuinely though that his men’s victory was decisive enough to demand surrender and thus would be disappointed in Canby’s refusal, but he had another reason to be angry with the Federals. He felt that the truce he had brokered for recovering the dead and wounded had been violated.
“This flag had for its object the burying of the dead and removal of their wounded; and I regret to state here, for the sake of old associations, that, under this flag and another sent next day, the enemy, availing himself our generosity and confidence in his honor, not only loaded his wagons with arms picked up on the battle-field, but sent a force up and actually succeeded in recovering from the river one 24-pounder which had been left in our hands. Even a guidon and a flag, taken in the same way, under the cover of night, and a white flag were boastingly pointed to, in an interview under a flag of truce between one of my aides and the Federal commander at the fort, as trophies of the fight.”[56]
Pyrrhic Victory?
Though the battle was lengthy, losses were not as high as they could have been. This was probably due to ample cover on the battlefield, from the sandbank to heavy brush to the cottonwood trees. The Confederates suffered 71 killed and 157 wounded (228 in total), nearly 10 percent. Losses in horses and mules were so high that the 4th Texas was for the time forced to give up its mounts and become a foot unit. Their horses were distributed among the other mounted units.[57] The Federals suffered much higher thanks to their disorganized rout. They incurred 111 killed, 160 wounded, and 204 missing (475 total). Of the missing, many were captured but more simply deserted in the panic. Of the forces engaged, the Union lost 17 percent, though not all in hard casualties of killed and wounded. Accounting for the men left at Fort Craig, the casualty rate was at the significantly lower 12 percent.[58]
The Battle of Valverde, which began with brief artillery fire
on February 20th and ended with the Union rout on February 21st,
was the first of two major battles in New Mexico. It was a tactical Confederate
victory. In a strategic sense the merits of the victory have been debated. The
battle was hailed by Confederate veterans as a great victory, the fruits of
which were squandered by Sibley’s leadership. It is worth noting that Sibley
disappears from the narrative of the battle. It was Colonel Thomas Green who
led the Texans to victory and who made all the key decisions. This, combined
with reports of Sibley’s drinking, led to great dislike, even hatred, of the
commanding officer. Many historians believe that even though Sibley did not
capture Fort Craig, his force still presented a credible threat to New Mexico
Territory and could still pull off its strategic objectives. A dissenting voice
is John Taylor. In his study of the battle, Bloody
Valverde, Taylor argues that the Confederate victory was a hollow one.
Valuable men, horses, and supplies had been lost while the Federals still held
Fort Craig with a considerable force. By the time the Sibley Brigade went for
its final thrust into Colorado, it lacked the logistical support needed to
complete its mission.[59]
The failure to take Fort Craig was definitely a major setback and aggravated the
Sibley Brigade’s logistical problems. The Texans hoped that northern New Mexico
would yield enough goods to sustain the rest of their campaign.
Next: The Texans take Santa Fe and Albuquerque and find both
friends and potential foes among the citizenry. Further south, Baylor causes
more controversy in his management of Arizona. And to the north, more
Coloradans come to defend the last obstacle to a Confederate invasion of their
home territory.
Primary Sources
Anderson,
Latham. “Canby’s Services in the New Mexican Campaign.” in Battles and Leaders of the Civil War Vol. II. Century Company, 1887
Evans,
A.W. “Canby at Valverde” in Battles and
Leaders of the Civil War Vol. II. Century Company, 1887
Peticolas,
A.B. Rebels on the Rio Grande: The Civil
War Journals of A.B. Peticolas. Albuquerque: University of New Mexico
Press, 1984.
Pettis,
George H. “The Confederate Invasion of New Mexico and Arizona” in Battles and Leaders of the Civil War Vol. II.
Century Company, 1887.
Tate,
Michael L. (1987) “A Johnny Reb in Sibley’s New Mexico Campaign: Reminiscences
of Pvt. Henry C. Wright, 1861-1862, Part I.” East Texas Historical Journal: Vol. 25: Iss. 2, Article 7.
-
(1988)
“A Johnny Reb in Sibley’s New Mexico Campaign: Reminiscences of Pvt. Henry C.
Wright, 1861-1862, Part II.” East Texas
Historical Journal: Vol. 26: Iss. 1, Article 7. Thompson, Jerry (ed.). Civil War in the Southwest: Recollections of
the Sibley Brigade. Texas A & M University Press, 2001.
United
States. The
War of the Rebellion: A Compilation of the Official Records of the Union and
Confederate Armies Vol. IX.
Washington D.C. 1894.
Secondary Sources
Alberts,
Don E. The Battle of Glorieta: Union
Victory in the West. Texas A & M University Press, 1998.
Austerman, Wayne. “The South’s Legion of Lancers.” Civil War Times Illustrated (March
1985), pp. 20-25.
Frazier,
Donald S. Blood & Treasure:
Confederate Empire in the Southwest. Texas A & M University Press,
1995.
Josephy,
Alvin M. The Civil War in the American
West. New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1991.
Nelson,
Megan Kate. The Three-Cornered War: The
Union, the Confederacy, and Native Peoples in the Fight for the West. New
York: Scribner, 2020.
Pittman,
Walter E. New Mexico and the Civil War,
The History Press, 2011.
Taylor,
John. Bloody Valverde: A Civil War Battle
on the Rio Grande. University of New Mexico Press, 1995.
Thompson,
Jerry. Henry Hopkins Sibley: Confederate
General of the West. Natchitoches: Northwestern State University Press,
1987.
-
A Civil War
History of the New Mexico Volunteers & Militia. Albuquerque:
University of New Mexico Press, 2015.
[1] Nelson, 30-32; OR IV, 47;
Thompson, 2015, 17.
[2] Nelson, 51-53.
[3] Nelson, 54-55.
[4] Josephy, 63.
[5] OR IX, 488.
[6] Taylor, 21-22; Thompson, 2015,
29.
[7] Nelson, 58.
[8] Josephy, 41.
[9] Taylor, 27.
[10] Thompson, 2001, 16-19.
[11] Thompson, 1996, 247.
[12] Wright, 25.
[13] Frazier, 143-145.
[14] Thompson, 2001, 23.
[15] Thompson, 1996, 251-252.
[16] Frazier, 149-150.
[17] Taylor, 124, 128.
[18] Thompson, 2001, 23-24; Taylor,
28.
[19] Thompson, 2001, 6, 53; Taylor,
29.
[20] Taylor, 32-33.
[21] Josephy, 66.
[22] Taylor, 34-38; Thompson, 2001,
46.
[23] Thompson, 2001, 52.
[24] Taylor, 39-40; OR IX, 489, 507.
[25] Taylor, 41.
[26] OR IX, 497.
[27] Frazier, 160.
[28] Thompson, 2001, 25; OR IX, 513.
[29] OR IX, 514,
[30] OR
IX 512-513, 524; Peticolas, 42-44; Taylor, 53; Nelson, 66.
[31] Thompson,
2001, 29, 31, 49, 54, 67; Peticolas, 46; OR IX, 500, 524.
[32] OR IX, 490.
[33] Thompson,
1996, 260-261, 269; OR IX, 506.
[34] Thompson,
2001, 32-33.
[35] Thompson,
2001, 43; OR IX, 502-503, 519.
[36] Taylor, 71.
[37] Austerman, 23.
[38] Nelson, 66-67.
[39] Frazier, 168.
[40] Thompson, 2001, 47.
[41] Nelson, 67.
[42] OR IX, 496, 498-499.
[43] Thompson, 2001, 62-63.
[44] Taylor, 81; A.W. Evans, “Canby
at Valverde” in Battles and Leaders of
the Civil War Vol. II, (Century Company, 1887), 699; Latham Anderson, “Canby’s
Services in the New Mexican Campaign.” in Battles
and Leaders of the Civil War Vol. II, (Century Company, 1887), 600, George H. Pettis, “The Confederate Invasion of
New Mexico and Arizona” in Battles and
Leaders of the Civil War Vol. II, (Century Company, 1887), 108.
[45] Thompson,
2001, 56; OR IX, 496, 524.
[46] Frazier, 173-174.
[47] Thompson, 2001, 42.
[48] Thompson, 2001, 42; Wright, 27.
[49] Thompson, 2001, 34-35, 39;
Peticolas, 48.
[50] OR IX, 515, 520.
[51] Frazier, 177.
[52] Thompson,
2001, 57, 72, OR IX, 492.
[53] OR IX, 487, 491, 193, 634;
Nelson, 70-71.
[54] Thompson, 2001, 72-73.
[55] OR IX, 632, 638.
[56] OR IX, 508.
[57] Taylor, 136; Pittman, 26.
[58] Taylor, 142.
[59] Taylor, 2-4.
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