In popular media the Civil War has often been linked to the Old West. Sergio Leone’s spaghetti western The Good, the Bad, and the Ugly has played a large role in this. In this classic, three ruthless gunslingers search for gold that was hidden by a ring of Confederate soldiers. Complicating their quest, as well as their competition with each other, is the war unfolding around them. While the Civil War serves as more of a backdrop and obstacle, the fact that the war was fought in the deserts and adobe towns of the southwest was little known by the general public. But in reality the area was a major battlefield in the first year of the war. The secession and creation of the Confederate States of America was motivated by a desire to preserve slavery for the future. For slavery to continue to flourish, the would-be nation needed new land and territory, and it was to be found to the west and south, in locations such as southern California, New Mexico, and even northern Mexico. Even while a war was raging to the east, a few thousand Texans decided that the time was ripe in 1861 for their imperial ambitions to be realized. One general who had served in Mexico as a Federal officer, Henry Hopkins Sibley, would spearhead the main thrust of this military operation. What followed was a long war, lasting almost a year, in which ambitious Texans, Federal troops, and also the Apache battled for the future of the American West. At the end of this series I hope to provide an answer to the questions of whether this campaign was important to the Civil War and if it was possible for the Confederacy to accomplish their goals.
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| Map of the United States in 1860. By the time of the Civil War parts of Kansas, Nebraska, and Utah Territory would be reorganized into Colorado Territory. |
Before I go further I need to go into my descriptive terms for the various ethnic and national groups. The sources I’ve read have variously referred to those of Spanish descent as Mexicans, Hispanics, and Hispanos. I have chosen the common term Hispanic, mainly to distinguish those of Mexican descent in New Mexico and Arizona from the inhabitants of Mexico itself. Since anybody born in America is a Native American, I will refer to the first peoples of the Southwest as Indians. They were also referred to as such by contemporary sources, so this will prevent a disconnect in terminology. I will often refer to the Confederates as Texans, as aside from General Sibley nearly everyone who fought for the Confederacy in the Southwest were Texans, and the campaign was very much a plan to fulfill long-time Texan aspirations. The Union soldiers will usually be called Federals and sympathetic civilians will be called Unionists. The term New Mexicans refers to any inhabitants of New Mexico Territory not aligned with one of the independent American Indian groups.
Imperial Texas
Texans, ever since winning their independence (a shaky
independence) in 1836, had a long-running fascination with linking their state
to California. These aspirations continued into their state’s entry into the
United States. Their politicians in the Senate and House of Representatives
clamored for roads, as well as a railroad, that would connect Texas with the
California coast and hasten settlement of the Southwest. While mail and
transport routes were established, these were highly susceptible to American Indian
attacks and did not provide much in the way of economic benefits. The
Californians themselves noted that their own wealthier regions were further
north, and thus these Texas-favored routes went “from no place through nothing
to nowhere.”[1]
Texas had already tried to seize parts of New Mexico Territory. This occurred with the conclusion of the Mexican War. In the Treaty of Guadalupe-Hidalgo, the United States acquired California and a large chunk of the Southwest renamed New Mexico Territory. Most of the natives protested their intrusions and the U.S. Government likewise was not keen on the Texans’ over-assertion of territory. In this dispute Southerners notably supported Texas. After all, Texans mostly came from southern states and upheld slavery. Despite southern support, the national government successfully checked the ambitions of Texas. Texans felt betrayed. When they had aided the United States in the war and joined it as a state, it had expected territorial benefits, not opposition. They were so incensed that they threatened war. The Compromise of 1850 was able to soothe tensions, but the Texans maintained their desire to expand their southern slaveholding culture to the west and south. This incident had a major effect on future events. Many in Texas had an independent streak that might have led to a stay in the Union when Civil War came. Founding father and war hero Sam Houston was notably adamant that his state should stick by the Union. However, frustrated ambitions in New Mexico ensured that they would align with the Confederacy, which shared their vision of an expanding slave empire.[2]
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| Texas Rangers (referred to as Texan devils by the Hispanics) ride through a town in the Mexican War. Texans expected more territory from this war, but their expansionist plans were stifled by the Federal government. |
Donald Frazier, a historian of the Civil War in and around Texas, argues that the oncoming Southwest campaign of 1861-1862 was more than just a sideshow: “The Confederate invasion of New Mexico was the heir of Manifest Destiny, filibustering, and the American drive for expansion. Expansion from coast to coast was required, for the same reasons that the United States had built its empire in the 1840s and 1850s, if the new Confederate nation was to succeed as a dynamic, progressive country. Building a Confederate Empire from the rubble of the Union was a basic goal of Southern independence, not an afterthought.” The Confederacy was not merely fighting to defend itself, as so loftily expressed by President Jefferson Davis and other Confederate politicians. It always had an expansionist agenda. The promises of this agenda grew with time, thanks to the efforts of the Knights of the Golden Circle. The Knights of the Golden Circle, formed in the mid-1850s, was made up of influential southerners who dreamed of a slaveholding empire that would extend as far afield as the Amazon River in South America. With northerners, abolitionists, and moderate southerner checking such ambitions through the national government, they used their influence to push the southern states towards secession.[3]
The Knights planted agents all throughout the west in hopes
they would support post-secession land grabs. One of the Knights, Trevanion
Teel, would command a battery in the Sibley Brigade. He noted that an attempt
to conquer the Far West was feasible thanks to a widespread scattering of
“Southern men who were anxiously awaiting an opportunity to join the
Confederate army.” These men could be found not only in adjacent New Mexico
Territory, but in California and Colorado. In fact considerable numbers of
pro-Confederate elements did indeed in the coastal states of California and
Oregon, as well as Colorado, so a supported invasion of these states was
considered viable, if still daunting.[4]
New Mexico Territory was targeted as the first step in this imagined expansion
of slavery. Any conquest of this territory would have to be conducted along the
sparse lines of travel. These included the Rio Grande River which bordered
Mexico then went north into New Mexico and three roads designed for stagecoach
travel. When Sibley undertook his campaign, the Federals knew he could only
take so many options. Otherwise he would have to march his army through
inhospitable wilderness.[5]
Servitude in New Mexico Territory
While antebellum slavery was denied in the western territories, involuntary servitude actually existed there, and had for a long time. New Mexico at the time was mostly Hispanic and Indian. Most of the Hispanics cared little for the affairs of their new American brethren, aside from a long-running mutual antagonism with the Texans. The exceptions were many of the prominent wealthy New Mexicans, who chose to adopt and align with similarly aristocratic Southern culture. They themselves employed Indian slave labor and also practiced a system of debt peonage that indentured lower-class Hispanics. This debt peonage was a long-running Latin American tradition, in which a creditor could have a debtor perform compulsory labor if he was unable to make his payments. This system was instituted by wealthy Spanish colonists following the ban on Amerindian slavery and the rising costs of African slavery. The system could be easily rigged against the unfortunate peons, as their lords would loan them money for food, clothing, and other goods. This kept them in perpetual indebtedness and thus perpetual servitude.
Another long-running tradition was the inter-ethnic conflicts. The Hispanics took on the Apache and Navajo in an endless series of raids and counter-raids. Hispanics not only stole flocks of sheep and herds of horses, but also grabbed women and children. Until the Americans conquered the area, Hispanics would sell the women and children at auction in Santa Fe. The Indians for their part tried to cling onto less savory aspects of their traditional lifestyles, gaining wealth from raids on both Hispanics and whites, and sometimes each other. They tended to enslave their captives, though they often adopted captured women and children as wives, sons, and daughters. The US government sought to end this mutual slave raiding, with limited success. There were too many long-running resentments and entrenched traditions of raiding to end slavery, and the Anglo-Americans did not help out much. Many white migrants hoped to bring in southern slaveholding culture. Henry Conelley, the Republican territorial governor, himself had a massive estate outside the town of Peralta which was worked by Indian slaves.
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| An artistic rendering of Mexican peons at work. |
If the Hispanics were resistant to change, the Indians were even less willing to acknowledge American domination. The most formidable Indian force was the Apache, who until 1860 considered Mexico to be their arch-enemy. Other Indians in the region included Navajo, Kiowa, Ute, and Commanche. Attempts at peace were failures. When the US government was able to make peace with any group through a treaty, it was often violated by settlers. Up until the Civil War, New Mexicans continued to raid the Indians for slave labor, prompting counter raids and ensuring the continued cycle of violence.[6]
The southern part of the territory, called Arizona by many,
was more inhospitable to whites than the north. Despite an abundance of rich
minerals, no big businessman would dare invest time and money into their
cultivation thanks to the Apache presence. Only a white minority of hardened
men dared live there, and only in the environs of Mesilla and Tucson. Mesilla
was almost entirely Hispanic, the white minority of about a hundred taking
advantage of its farmlands to make a living. Tucson by contrast was “a paradise
of devils.” Criminals from California, Mexico, and other regions came there to
escape the law. At one point 45 of the 47 whites buried in the cemetery were
listed to have died of non-natural causes. In other words they had died from
violence amongst themselves and with the various native groups. Whites in
Arizona were made up of secessionists, some members of the Knights of the
Golden Circle. They, and others like them in the rest of New Mexican territory,
sought to gain powerful positions to better ensure successful annexation in the
event of war. They also convinced many Hispanics to support their cause. When
war broke out several self-named Arizonans went east to arrange entry into the
Confederacy.[7]
The Secession Threat Emerges
Texas joined the Confederacy in February of 1861. This isolated the various Federal forts and outposts in the state. The Federal commander in Texas, David Twiggs, was sure to resign and join his native state of Georgia. The Texan government feared that Twiggs’ resignation would come too early and a Northern successor would block their attempts to seize Federal property in the state. Texas Ranger Ben McCulloch gathered a small army, with which he rode to San Antonio. There he demanded Twiggs’ surrender and told him “to deliver up all military posts and public property held by or under your control.” Twiggs at first refused, but gave up ground by withdrawing his men from the San Antonio Arsenal and allowing armed state troops to gather outside his fort. One of his subordinate officers reported that he had given the men “orders not to load their muskets and not to resist in the case an armed force attempted to seize the public property.” After negotiations with delegates from the Texas government, Twiggs complied, on the provision that all soldiers be allowed to leave with their weapons and enough equipment to survive their exit from the state. His reasoning for caving in was that he wished “to avoid any unnecessary collision between the Federal and State troops.” In reality, Twiggs had acted out his part and ensured that Federal property would pass into secessionist hands.
Twiggs’ obvious favoritism towards the South incensed many of his men, who refused to be taken prisoner and were allowed to walk to the coast and depart. On March 1 the Federal government relieved Twiggs of command and replaced him, but the damage had been done. The remaining Federal garrisons were now in an even more vulnerable position. Throughout March Federal soldiers surrendered their forts. Some units were able to leave the state, but many were held prisoner as insurance against any mistreatment of secessionist prisoners by the U.S. government.[8] The situation was little better to the west. Garrisons in New Mexico suffered greatly as most Southern officers, a third of all officers in western commands, resigned to go east and side with their states over the Federal government. More loyal officers as well as enlisted men were sent east to deal with more pressing crises. Some of the enlisted men, affected by the growing pessimism and feeling of isolation, contributed to it by choosing to desert. This exposed much of the Hispanic and white settlers to Indian raids. Groups such as the Apache were quick to take advantage (I will get more into them in the next part). People who had not expressed any interest in the emerging civil war were desperate for any military presence to come in and protect them.[9]
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| Edward Canby |
Unionists in New Mexico feared that North Carolinian Colonel Loring, recently posted to command of New Mexico Territory, would emulate Twiggs and hand the forts and their military stores over to secessionists. However, despite his obvious pro-Confederate leanings and his contact with Confederates at Fort Bliss in Texas, Loring instead followed the traditional honorable route of resigning before he took any actions for the Confederacy. His successor, arriving in July of 1861, was Colonel Edward Canby. Canby was a decorated veteran of the Mexican War. He was a quiet and no-nonsense man, who often gave out orders without telling his men what the end goal was. Canby had a weak force to command, but he knew exactly how to frustrate any Confederate invasion. New Mexico’s countryside was not conducive to foraging. As he noted when he took command: “The past two years have been season of great scarcity, almost famine, throughout the whole of New Mexico. The scarcity of water, grass, and forage, and constant hard service have destroyed a large proportion of the animals in the service of the Government.” He simply had to move or consolidate all stockpiles of food and other supplies so that they were kept out of rebel reach. He also consolidated most of his troops into two forts, Fort Union to the north and Fort Craig further to the south. All other forts were abandoned or destroyed, or manned by reduced garrisons. The side effect was that this practically abandoned citizens in much of New Mexico. Secessionist regions, such as Tucson, were also able to declare themselves Confederate without any repercussions. Canby did not consider such defections an issue, as small scattered outposts of secessionism could do little against him without proper Confederate support.[10] Such support, unfortunately, was coming from a small but dangerous force of Texans led by the fierce John R. Baylor.
Baylor’s Campaign
Baylor and his family had come over from Kentucky while he
was a teenager. Baylor grew into a busy, hard-working man who always started
new ventures and careers, from plantation management to politics to law
practice. He also may have murdered a merchant in Indian Territory, where he
was serving as a teacher for Indian children. In fact he used to be very
friendly with Indians. This changed after a rough dismissal from a position as
Commissioner of Indian Affairs. He felt that his firing could be partly blamed
on the refusal of many Indians to behave or treat him with respect, so he
developed a strong hatred for all of them that would factor into his future
management of Confederate Arizona.[11]
Baylor was eager to realize Texans’ dreams of westward expansion and, without
proper authorization from the Confederate government, organized an invasion of
New Mexico Territory. Early in July he started off with a small army of
undisciplined Texans. Drunkenness was endemic and one inebriated soldier
angrily gunned down a comrade. Baylor and his officers had to take a tough
stance to instill some discipline into the men. As they got deeper into New
Mexico they collected fresh local recruits. Most were miners and other
frontiersmen. Over 20 of the new recruits were deserters from the Union army.
The presence of these defectors emboldened hopes that large portions of the
Federal garrisons would, when in close proximity to Confederate forces, switch
sides and enable the conquest of the West. Also, the citizens were grateful to
have some military presence re-enter the area. The Federal withdrawals had
exposed them to Apache raids and now there was a new source of protection.[12]
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| Baylor in Confederate uniform. Baylor expected that he would lead the grand invasion of the American west. Instead he would be stuck managing his initial conquests while others marched for glory. |
Baylor’s first target was Mesilla’s nearest Federal outpost, Fort Fillmore. Major Isaac Lynde commanded the fort. He believed Baylor had 700 men when he in fact had far less. In light of this overestimate he acted with undue caution and made several critical mistakes.[13] Lynde had just taken command of Fort Fillmore the previous month. In addition to the soldiers were over a hundred women and children.[14] Knowing he was outnumbered, Baylor trusted in a surprise attack to get into and seize the fort. A deserter from his small army entered the fort and ruined the surprise, but Baylor simply moved on to Mesilla. Mesilla’s white population was made up of migrants from southern states. It was practically already a Confederate town, and though unable to vote in the 1860 election, it held a mock one that overwhelmingly supported the pro-southern Breckinridge. When Baylor’s force occupied the town and replaced the American flag with their own, the citizens cheered.[15]
Lynde felt he could not just let the Texans run around the countryside. On July 25 he grabbed 380 troops, along with his howitzers, and marched on Mesilla. Though they were poorly armed in comparison to the Federals, the Texans benefitted from Mesilla’s adobe structures. Adobe can actually absorb military projectiles, so every house and building in the town made for an excellent fortress. Lynde demanded Baylor’s unconditional surrender, to which the Texan replied, “We would fight first, and surrender afterward.” Lynde ordered the howitzers to open fire. Their shells fell short of the town. Lynde next ordered his infantry and cavalry to advance. Under this cover, the howitzers could get in for a better shot. The infantry found themselves entangled in cornfields and fell behind. The howitzer crews also lagged. It was very hard to wheel their guns through the heavy sand. It was up to the mounted men to score a victory. Baylor ordered his few riflemen to target the Union officers. One shot away the saber of Captain C.H. McNally, who was leading the charge. They then hit McNally two more times and he fainted from blood loss. When the Federals got closer the shotguns and revolvers opened up. In addition to ravaging the cavalry, the Texans also killed and wounded several howitzer crewmen. This fierce resistance convinced Lynde to withdraw.[16] The Texans lost few men, but about 20 horses. Horses were necessary for covering the long uninhabited stretches of New Mexico. Without them soldiers had to trudge long miles, often without fresh sources of food and water. Baylor targeted Lynde’s horse herd at Fort Bliss. His raids seized over a hundred of the animals. Making matters worse for Lynde, emboldened Indians took even more away.[17]
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| Mesilla, a pro-Confederate town and site of the first major confrontation between Federals and Confederates. |
Believing himself outnumbered and in danger of capture, and short of horses thanks to the raids, Lynde ordered his men to destroy all they could not bring with them and march to a safer location, along with the women and children. Their first march would be 20 miles toward San Augustine Springs, the closest water source. This was a daunting prospect. After setting fire to the fort, they set out at night. At first the march went well, but with the arrival of day the July sun wreaked havoc. The marchers learned that the distance to the springs was greater than anticipated, as they also had to traverse an ascending mountain passage. TO make matters worse, many of the soldiers had foolishly taken advantage of the chaotic evacuation of Fort Fillmore to fill their canteens with whiskey instead of water. This selfish act of pleasure ensured rampant dehydration on the march. In the meantime Baylor learned of the enemy’s retreat. He sent a small detachment to see what could be saved at Fort Fillmore while he rode with the rest to intercept and bag Lynde’s force.[18]
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| An aged Isaac Lynde. In a tragic irony, Lynde was on the cusp of retirement. He stayed in the Army just long enough to lose his pension as punishment for his failure. |
Lynde rode ahead of his thirsty column with his mounted men. They would get the water at San Augustine Springs and bring them back in canteens for the infantry. Even this plan fell short of expectations. At the springs Lynde “found the supply of water so small as to be insufficient for my command.” Even on horseback the major and the mounted men gave in to heat and exhaustion. Lynde learned that the wagon horses also “had given out and could not be brought up, and that large numbers of the infantry had become totally overpowered with the intense heat.”[19]
The entire column was a wreck of thirsty men, horses, and cattle. The pursuing Baylor recorded that “the road for 5 miles was lined with the fainting, famished soldiers, who threw down their arms as we passed and begged for water.” Baylor’s force finally appeared from behind a hill, coming upon the beef herd. Captain Alfred Gibbs tried to hold him off with his mounted men so Lynde could establish a line. However, only a hundred or so men could answer the call to arms. The rest were too over-exhausted to even offer token resistance. Lynde gave up. “Under the circumstances I considered our case hopeless; that it was worse than useless to resist; that honor did not demand the sacrifice of blood after the terrible suffering that our troops had already undergone, and when that sacrifice would be totally useless. A body of mounted Texans followed Captain Gibbs to the vicinity of the camp, when a parley was held, and I surrendered my command to Lieutenant-Colonel Baylor, of the C. S. Army.” Reportedly his subordinate officers vehemently attempted to talk him out of surrendering. One report by Gibbs accused Lynde of cowardly surrendering without a fight. This was an odd accusation to focus on, as Lynde should really have been blasted for attempting a difficult march under adverse conditions, and for having no proper intelligence as to how long it would take to reach the springs and how its water could be accessed and distributed among all the men. These mistakes ensured that no good fight was possible.[20]
One surgeon angrily wondered, “Was there ever such a
suicidal, cowardly, pusillanimous surrender as that in all history?” The War
Department agreed. That November, through adjutant-general Lorenzo Thomas, it
dropped Lynde from the army rolls.[21]
Baylor offered any regular soldier who switched sides “$26 per month, a horse,
saddle, and bridle, and all each can make besides.” Only 26 took him up on his
offer. As for the others, Baylor was so inadequately prepared to keep so many
near-dead prisoners that he had to parole them. The effects of his victory sent
waves across the territory. To the north Union Lieutenant Colonel Benjamin
Roberts abandoned Fort Stanton. Hispanics and Indians seized the opportunity to
ransack whatever was left behind. To Baylor’s pleasant surprise, friendly
visitors arrived from the west. These were former army officers and Californian
secessionists led by Brigadier General Albert Sidney Johnston, a fellow Texan.
Baylor graciously handed his command over to Johnston, who accepted it until he
moved on to become one of the leading generals of the early Confederacy.[22]
The Start of Something Larger
Baylor declared the conquered territory, south of the 34 parallel and north latitude, Confederate Arizona. He named himself governor. For the time being all the laws from the Federal Territory of New Mexico would carry over. Baylor’s disobedience in mounting the invasion was rewarded because he had accomplished a great victory and struck the first blow in the Confederate dreams of empire. He claimed that the “vast mineral resources of Arizona, in addition to its affording an outlet to the Pacific,” made it a valuable asset to the Confederacy. However he found his position precarious. In addition to Federal forces within striking distance, there were emboldened bands of Apaches as well as Mexicans to the south who seriously considered retaking territory handed over to the US in the 1854 Gadsden Purchase.[23]
On the Union side, Canby now realized the danger posed to the
Southwest. He sought to bolster his forces by raising regiments of Hispanics,
in fact militia called out and raised by orders of the governor. This process
was slow. Many Hispanics had not developed any loyalty to their new national
government. Others were put off by discriminatory attitudes. The largely Anglo-Saxon
and Protestant white Americans saw them as racially and/or culturally inferior
due to their mixed ancestry and Catholicism. Canby himself had serious doubts
as to their ability to fight off a larger Confederate incursion from Texas.[24]
New Mexican recruitment was helped by enlistment bounties, other promises of
pay, and the hope that once the Confederate threat was dealt with Hispanic
farms and ranches could be protected from the wave of Indian raids. The
available rifles were given to the mounted units. The infantry would get
muskets. Canby also called on California and Colorado to contribute to the territory’s
defense, while Baylor made similar requests of Texas.[25]
Baylor’s campaign was the start of a war for the destiny of the Far West.
Next:
The Confederates try to make Arizona work, the Apaches turn the war into a
three-sided affair, and a Louisianan hatches an ambitious scheme to take the
rest of the West.
Primary
Sources
Teel, T.T. “Sibley’s New Mexican Campaign – Its Objects and the Causes of Its Failure” in Battles and Leaders of the Civil War Vol. II. Century Company, 1887.
United States. The War of the Rebellion: A Compilation of the Official Records of the Union and Confederate Armies Vol. I, IV. Washington D.C. 1894.
Secondary
Sources
Alberts,
Don E. The Battle of Glorieta: Union
Victory in the West. Texas A & M University Press, 1998.
Frazier,
Donald S. Blood & Treasure:
Confederate Empire in the Southwest. Texas A & M University Press,
1995.
Josephy,
Alvin M. The Civil War in the American
West. New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1991.
Kiser,
William S. “A ‘Charming Name for a Species of Slavery’: Political Debate on
Debt Peonage in the Southwest, 1840s-1860s.” Western Historical Quarterly Vol. 45, No. 2 (Summer 2014), pp.
169-189.
Nelson,
Megan Kate. The Three-Cornered War: The
Union, the Confederacy, and Native Peoples in the Fight for the West. New
York: Scribner, 2020.
Pittman,
Walter E. New Mexico and the Civil War,
The History Press, 2011.
[1] Alvin M. Josephy, The Civil War in the American West, (New
York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1991), 12-13.
[2] Donald S. Frazier, Blood & Treasure: Confederate
Empire in the Southwest,
(Texas A & M University Press, 1995), 8-10, 16.
[3] Frazier, 5-6, 13-14.
[4] T.T. Teel, “Sibley’s New Mexican
Campaign – Its Objects and the Causes of Its Failure” in Battles and Leaders of the Civil War Vol. II, (Century Company,
1887), 700; Josephy, 17-19.
[5] Don E. Alberts, The Battle of Glorieta: Union Victory in the
West, (Texas A & M University Press, 1998), 5.
[6] Walter Earl Pittman,
New Mexico and the Civil War, (The History
Press, 2011), 6, 43; William S. Kiser, “A ‘Charming Name for a Species of
Slavery’: Political Debate on Debt Peonage in the Southwest, 1840s-1860,” Western Historical Quarterly Vol. 45,
No. 2 (Summer 2014), 170-171; Megan Kate Nelson, The Three-Cornered War: The Union, the Confederacy, and Native Peoples
in the Fight for the West, (New York: Scribner, 2020), 43-44; Josephy, 51.
[7] Frazier, 11-12, 18-19.
[8] United States, The War of
the Rebellion: A Compilation of the Official Records of the Union and
Confederate Armies Vol. I, (Washington
D.C. 1894), 504, 525, 527-518, 520, 571; Josephy, 24-25.
[9] Josephy, 34; Pittman, 6;
Frazier, 44.
[10] OR I, 606; United States, The War of
the Rebellion: A Compilation of the Official Records of the Union and
Confederate Armies Vol. IV, (Washington
D.C. 1894), 57; Alberts, 13; Josephy, 37-40; Pittman, 8.
[11] Nelson, 5; Frazier, 25-27.
[12] Frazier, 52-53, 56-57.
[13] OR IV, 4.
[14] OR IV, 13.
[15] Nelson, 7; Pittman, 9; OR IV,
17.
[16] OR IV, 4, 14, 17; Pittman, 9;
Josephy, 45-46.
[17] Frazier, 59.
[18] OR IV, 5-6, 18.
[19] OR IV, 5-6.
[20] OR IV, 6, 8, 11, 18.
[21] Josephy, 48; OR IV, 16.
[22] Nelson, 11; Pittman, 10; OR IV,
15, 19.
[23] OR IV, 20-21, 23; Pettis,
103-104; Josephy, 50; Nelson, 12-14.
[24] OR IV, 2; Josephy, 41.
[25] Josephy, 41, 51; OR IV, 47.
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