The New Mexico Campaign, 1861-1862 Part VII: Remembrance and Assessment

 

Remembrance & Historiography

At the end of the campaign Albert Peticolas, having just endured the horrid retreat from New Mexico, noted in his journal that “our operations out here will all be lost in history, when such great struggles are going on nearer home…”[1] The Civil War in the Southwest would indeed be considered a sideshow, though it would receive a few articles in Battles and Leaders of the Civil War. One of the writers, Brigadier-General Latham Anderson, attempted to argue the importance of the campaign. He wrote that if Sibley’s men had reached California, they would have doubtlessly created a strong presence in the state and created large implications for the Union war effort. With California’s coastline added to Confederate territory, the already strained Union blockade would have lost any effectiveness. However, such grand ramifications, even when expressed by a Civil War veteran and late 19^th Century general, remain speculative as Sibley’s campaign was done in before it could ever get out of New Mexico.[2] Only one Confederate, Teel, provided an article in which he castigated Sibley. “He did not husband his resources, and was too prone to let the morrow take care of itself,” he wrote. Teel believed that if Baylor had been given command, “the result might have been different.”[3] There was some argument among the Union contributors over Canby’s leadership, but this failed to spark any great historical inquiry into the campaign.

Some veterans kept memories of the campaign more alive through unit histories or published speeches. Once these survivors had died off, the war for the Far West became a piece of trivia, unknown by many. It often did not garner a mention in general Civil War histories, including Bruce Catton’s centennial trilogy. This is not to say that historians totally forgot about it. Several books were published in the 50s and 60s. Sibley’s campaign was presented in Robert Lee Kerby’s The Confederate Invasion of New Mexico and Arizona (1958), Martin Hardwick Hall’s Sibley’s New Mexico Campaign (1960), and several other works. Hall’s account of the campaign was the expansion of a doctoral dissertation, fleshed out with a wealth of newly discovered sources. Arthur Wright’s The Civil War in the Southwest (1964), is actually oriented around the adventures of James Carleton’s California Column rather than Sibley’s battles with Canby and the Coloradans.

The New Mexico Campaign, 1861-1862 Part VI: The Retreat

Canby Strikes Back

Canby, still unaware of the decisive victory at Glorieta Pass, had decided to finally leave the safety of Fort Craig and go after Sibley. He had an army of 1,210 men. Though this was smaller than the Sibley Brigade, he likely expected to link up with the force at Fort Union. The rest of the men at Fort Craig stayed behind under the command of Kit Carson. Canby planned to strike at Albuquerque, but was delayed by the same weather and supply conditions that dogged the Sibley Brigade. Of course he soon learned of what had happened up north and could only have had his confidence in victory raised.[1] For his part Sibley initially planned to continue his strivings for a Confederate empire in the west, only now he would have to assume a defensive posture while waiting for more support from Texas. He took up a position on the Manzano Mountains from which he could launch a future strike. This position was oriented towards the northeast. To him Slough’s Coloradans were the biggest threat. Slough himself was not planning to move further into New Mexico. He had been shaken by his experience at Pigeon’s Ranch. Despite the destruction of the Texan supply train, Slough had been hard-pressed and almost entrapped several times in the battle. Sibley’s movement left Albuquerque and his supply depot exposed from the south. When he learned that Canby was driving north at him, he realized this new danger and rushed south to save his supplies from the Federals.[2]

Louisa Canby

One such base of supply was in Santa Fe. Louisa Canby, wife of Edward Canby, had been left there when the Texans took over. In the aftermath of Glorieta Pass she took pity on the ragged, wounded Texans and took action. She grabbed several wagons, had cots created in them, and sent them towards Glorieta Pass to recover the wounded still stuck there. One Confederate fondly remembered, “Mrs. Canby won the hearts of all our boys through her kindness to our sick and wounded.” She spent hours every day visiting the wounded, “bringing them delicacies and cheering their drooping spirits with kind words.” She even revealed hidden caches of blankets belonging to the US government, an action which aroused some disgust from Santa Fe’s Unionists. Overall, however, she came out of the campaign with a sterling reputation for kindness and charity.[3] Less fortunate were the Texan wounded down south in Socorro. These recovering survivors of Valverde had not received any fresh supplies and were starving to death. With Canby heading north, Kit Carson found himself in charge of the situation. Carson agreed to rescue the Texans at Socorro with food and other supplies if they in turn surrendered themselves on terms of parole. The agreement was finalized and 10 days’ rations were delivered. However, over 30 Texans refused to surrender even for this bountiful gift and struggled north to unite with Sibley.[4]

The New Mexico Campaign, 1861-1862 Part IV: Into Northern New Mexico

 On to Albuquerque

The Confederate victory at Valverde temporarily halted Union opposition. The Federals prepared for the further Confederate incursions. Canby instructed Major James Donaldson and part the 3^rd U.S. Cavalry to head north and remove or destroy all supplies along Sibley’s route. He further wanted all Union forces in northern New Mexico to consolidate at Fort Union. Fort Union sat at the other end of Apache Canyon, the entryway into Colorado Territory. Donaldson followed his orders, destroying or taking all that was in Santa Fe. Santa Fe itself, despite its importance as the territorial capital, was deemed indefensible because it was surrounded by hills. It would be abandoned for the time being. Once finished, Donaldson joined Colonel Gabriel R. Paul and his 4^th New Mexico Volunteers at Fort Union. The colonel as a veteran of the Mexican War and frontier fighting and noted for his competency. Paul now had under him a company of regular soldiers, two cavalry units, two howitzers, Coloradans (more on them later), and additional New Mexican volunteers under Manuel Chaves, the descendant of a conquistador and a prominent New Mexican himself.[1]

The Sibley Brigade’s first major stop was at Socorro. The march there was very unpleasant. The ground was “deep sand. Our progress was slow as our mules were about worked down and could hardly pull the empty wagons.” The men had to physically help out and push the wheels to keep the wagons moving. The shortage of litters for Valverde’s wounded exacted a further logistical price. Texans had to cut up some of their tents to fashion new litters. The destination was worth it. Socorro was held by Captain Nicolas Pino and 200 Hispanic militiamen. The rebel guns opened fire and most of the militia abandoned Pino. The captain surrendered and the Texans moved in. Socorro provided the first real housing in over a month. The Sibley Brigade stayed there for four days, turning it into a hospital where the wounded could be left. With the wounded there, the Sibley Brigade would be able to move on without their weight slowing them down. One of the wounded, Captain Lang of the lancers, was in such agony that he begged his slave for his revolver. He promptly committed suicide with it. The brigade, aside from the wounded and some doctors and guards, marched out on February 26. These would be brought up later, but were practically at the mercy of Canby’s men should they decide to leave Fort Craig. As Sibley’s Brigade moved, small parties of Federals followed them, but at a “respectful distance.” The Confederates were actually glad to have the enemy nearby, as they were one of the only reliable sources of supplies, meaning they could steal from them through small raids and forays. They also looted the various villages they came across, to ravenous extents. They not only deprived hundreds to thousands of New Mexicans of food, livestock, and tools, but sometimes tore up their roofs and house frames for much-needed wood. Up to this time they lost about 1,000 horses to hard marching effects and Apache raids. In spite of their victory a week earlier, the rank-and-file were in tough straits. They marched with thirst and “gnawing hunger,” with little transportation to haul their baggage. Stragglers lined the route. Even the hard-fighting Lieutenant-Colonel Scurry began to lose heart and made a failed bid to resign. The officers and men of the Sibley Brigade hoped that the capture of Albuquerque would relieve their suffering.[2]

The New Mexico Campaign, 1861-1862 Part III: The Battle of Valverde

Valverde

Canby’s Forces

Canby was aware as early as June 1861 that the Texans were preparing a major invasion of New Mexico. For the first few months of the war, however, he was much more focused on ending an upsurge in Apache and Navajo raids. He sent small teams of soldiers around the territory to skirmish with Navajo warriors and seize their sheep herds. This strategy was starting to yield results when the Texan Confederate threat was confirmed. Though Sibley’s Brigade had many logistical obstacles to overcome, Canby, as was common with Civil War commanders, overestimated the size of the enemy’s and felt he needed more men.[1] Canby requested that Colorado and Utah Territories raise troops, to be sent to him if necessary. Colorado was quicker to respond Recruitment for Coloradan units proceeded at Denver. Hundreds of gold miners, many having not achieved the rich successes they had expected, answered the call. With winter coming in, there would be a halt of mining activity. Unable to make income and for the most part not having stockpiled enough gains, the miners saw a chance to receive guaranteed pay and food, and perhaps some excitement. The first ready unit, Company B of the 2^nd Colorado, fell under the command of West Point graduate Theodore Dodd. Meant to be part of a full regiment, they were already equipped and trained ahead of the other companies in their unit. On January 1, the Coloradans learned that they would not be spending the winter in camp. Canby needed all the help he could get and Dodd was to lead his company to Santa Fe. The men were motivated. They would not only get some adventure, they would ensure that Colorado Territory was represented in the war. As they would go ahead without the rest of their regiment, they came to be known as “Dodd’s Independents.” The Coloradans marched through snow-covered trails in the mountains. The men took their first experience of military campaigning well. They had already led rough, physical lives in their search for gold and would not leave a trail of stragglers and discarded items as many early Civil War armies did.[2] Upon arrival, the Coloradans found New Mexico exotic. They appreciated the native and Mexican architecture and loved the fandangos where they could dance and drink to their heart’s content. On the other hand they did not think much of the inhabitants. They thought the Hispanics a collection of laborers and criminals and a few thought the Anglo-Americans there to be deeply immoral.[3]

They arrived at Fort Craig to find that Canby’s white and Hispanic troops were not getting along with each other very well. The Hispanics felt correctly that they were perceived as inferiors and reacted strongly to insults or perceived slights. They were also concerned that they had made a grievous mistake by agreeing to spend several years in the US Army while their homes were under assault by Indians. The whites were equally flustered thanks to the language barrier. Many Hispanics understood little to no English and it was hard to pass down orders. The New Mexican volunteer units were not a hundred percent Hispanic. Many whites lived in the territory and volunteered as well. Whites in primarily Hispanic volunteer units could understand orders passed down by high-ranking white officers, but their own Hispanic officers might not, resulting in confused disputes regarding orders.[4] Canby was not above prejudices and was determined not to come to battle with Sibley in a way that would require the Hispanics to maneuver under fire. His prejudice, however, was less concerned with any racial or cultural issues and more with the performance of inexperienced men under fire.[5]