The Battle of Dove Creek (January 8, 1865)

On January 8, 1865, several hundred militiamen and Confederate soldiers, all Texans, attacked an Indian camp. In their minds they were attacking Comanches or Kiowas, the allied Indian peoples who had been ravaging a frontier long exposed by the withdrawal of Union forces in the early days of secession. In time they would learn that they had made a grievous error. They had assaulted the Kickapoos, a people largely neutral in the War Between the States. The Battle of Dove Creek would become one the largest and most controversial Indian battles in Texan history.

 

An Undermanned Frontier

Throughout the 1850s Texas Rangers, in conjunction with the Federal Army, struggled to keep the western Texas frontier safe for settlers. They frequently battled Comanches and Kiowas, and it seemed like this war would never have a final end. Matters only worsened at the end of 1860 and the start of 1861, as Federal garrisons abandoned most of the far western forts. This was the result firstly of a collusion between General David Twiggs and Texan Secessionists and secondly of a need for experienced soldiers further east. Texans now struggled to keep their western borders safe, using special frontier and border militia units as well as whatever Confederate troops could be spared.

A family faces the horror of an Indian raid.
Such horrors were feared by many families
exposed by the removal of Federal fort garri-
sons and the draining of men into military units.

By late 1864, Morale on the Texas frontier was low. Hundreds of deserters and draft dodgers not only sought refuge in western, sparsely settled counties, but often resorted to theft of Texan citizens. In fact, for many law-abiding Texans, these desperate men were becoming a greater problem than Comanche and Kiowa raiders. And those Indians had not ceased their raids, though they seemingly never realized or cared that they had a golden opportunity to smash through a weakened Confederate frontier.[1]

First it might be good to look at the actions in the Second District of the frontier defense network, where the Battle of Dove Creek would occur. On August 26, 1864, Captain James Moore led Company H of the Border Regiment out of Gainesville. This force of 90 men marched in the direction of a spot on Hubbard Creek from which they could roundup deserters and outlaws. Portending the sloppy reconnaissance and waste of life that was to half a year later, Company H surrounded a house where a deserter was hiding. They opened fire and killed not only the deserter, but the house’s owners, an elderly couple.

After reaching their destination, Company H quickly scattered around 50 more deserters, but their tired mounts were unable to keep up and they got away. Around the same time Major Erath sent a force of 100 men under Captain Silas Totten to a location nearby to also hunt for outlaws as well as look out for Indians. Totten’s men found none of their targets, but settled in for the winter.[2]

It was not to be a season of rest. On December 9, a small scouting party found a trail that suggested at least 500 Indians nearby. They headed east to report to Erath, but Erath was currently out of town so Totten took charge. The captain got together 300 men. On the last day of the year, December 31, Captain John Fossett of the Frontier Regiment headed for Fort Chadbourne with a further 50 men, and several other detachments would join him there. Fossett would lead the official Confederate contingent of 161 men, while Totten would have 300-325 militia men.[3]

 

A People Seeking Peace

Kickapoos in Mexico circa 1865

The Indians in question were in fact the Kickapoo. Though not allied with the Confederacy, the Kickapoo people were far from enemies. When the war began the Kickapoo’s leaders were very wary about getting entangled in an internecine American conflict. In 1862 Chief Machemanet had led his families south for Mexico to escape the war. They had come upon a ranch belonging to a friend, William Tankersley, and spent some time there.

Then violence struck. Confederates arrived demanding to know what these Indians were up to. Tankersley assured them that they were friendly Kickapoos. Despite hearing this, the Confederates did not decide to let the refugees pass, but instead attack them and seize their fine horses. Perhaps they disbelieved Tankersley, or perhaps they thought the Kickapoos sounded like easy, docile targets.

Seeing Confederate cavalry approach, Machemanet sent an old man with a white flag. Two women, who among most Indian peoples came along with men to signify peaceful rather than bellicose intentions, accompanied the man. The Confederates shot down the peace feelers and charged on, only to be repelled by quick-thinking resistance from the Kickapoo warriors. Having driven off the white cavalry, Machemanet feared that a war with Texas had just begun and urged his people on. Thankfully they had made it to Mexico. Now over two years later the Kickapoos and Confederates were heading for another violent clash.[4]

Machemanet’s band found their subsequent stay in Mexico pleasing and sent messages back to Kickapoos in the US territories. One reservation group under Chief No-ko-aht, was finding life increasingly intolerable at the Potawatomie Agency near Fort Leavenworth, Kansas and decided to join Machemanet. Along the way they met more Kickapoos under chiefs Papequah and Pecan. The three groups, numbering over 600, decided to head south, with Mexicans authorities across the border having already invited them. No-ko-aht’s group separated and it was his own band alone was the one that drew Confederate attention.[5]

 

The Battle

Fossett arrived at Fort Chadbourne on January 1. Totten was supposed to meet Fossett, but he had rushed ahead with his militia, immediately destroying coordination between the two forces. The Confederates at Chadbourne waited two days before heading out themselves. On January 7 both columns camped on the North Concho River, but at different points. Fossett had no idea where Totten was, but did pick up the Indian trail, finding two abandoned villages of temporary shelters. Now having a good grasp of where the supposed enemies were, he made the rash decision to move forward and attack, despite not knowing which Indians he was encountering and where the militia was.[6]

Totten, meanwhile, had also picked up the trail at another point thanks to his Tonkawa scouts. They realized the Indians were splitting into two groups every time they moved on, but this was likely due to hunting parties separating from the main column rather than any special strategy.[7] The Kickapoos were likewise aware that whites were nearby. “We saw some tracks of soldiers,” remembered No-ko-aht. “We failed to find the soldiers and leaving a white flag went on. In either a fortunate or unfortunate occurrence, the Confederate soldiers came upon their allies. Totten should have urged Fossett to restrain himself, but instead gladly led 220 of his men to assist the 161 Confederates.[8]

Totten and Fossett planned a pincer attack. The bulk of Totten’s militia would cross Dove Creek to the east and attack southward. Their horses were so exhausted that they would advance dismounted. Fossett would circle his Confederates and two companies of the militia to a point where he could attack from the west, first scattering or capturing the herd and then striking the Indians themselves, who would already be responding to the militia assault. 75 men under a Lieutenant Brooks would detach to strike from the Southwest, further hemming in the supposed enemy.[9]

The columns  moved out. One veteran recalled that the Kickapoo camp “was quiet as Sunday. Save for a few bucks who kept a lazy half an eye on the horses, the entire population seemed to be sleeping…We thought we were getting on like a house afire.”[10] Indeed the battle had a good start for the Confederates. Fossett struck the horse herd and captured it with ease, not surprising since the Kickapoo had no reason to expect trouble with the whites. At the time “All our young men were scattered that morning hunting horses, and one or two were killed or out.” Fossett also captured, Aski, who insisted that he was attacking the wrong Indians. This led to the most singularly controversial moment of the affair.[11]

Aski “explained that the Indians had killed no white people and had not stolen or destroyed any property, but that they had against their will been armed and equipped by the Federal government to fight against the South, and that they had taken advantage of a permit to leave the reservation to hunt buffaloes in the Panhandle, to make their way into Mexico, and thus keep out of a war that did not concern them. And added that if our commander would grant a parley, the chief would explain to his entire satisfaction.”[12]

One participant claimed that a solider with a knack for ventriloquism asked Fossett, “Captain you are not taking any prisoners, are you?” Fossett raised a musket and shot the old man in the chest. A woman was also said to have been killed killed. An account of a Confederate participant claimed that the old man and woman were a chief and his daughter, but No-ko-aht clearly states that they were simply the first two people the soldiers came upon. Fossett also seized two youths who were accompanying Aski.[13]

This one incident is the most documented part of the battle. Information on the rest of the fight is much lighters. After crossing the stream into a thicket of briars and brush, the attack of Totten and his militia immediately fumbled. Forewarned Kickapoo warriors fired arrows and Enfield rifles into the whites. It should be mentioned that the militia was largely armed with shotguns and hunting rifles, meaning those Kickapoos with rifles greatly outranged them. I.D. Ferguson, one of the Texans, claimed that three officers were fatally wounded within minutes, and over a dozen enlisted men became casualties as well. The militia ran and would sit out the rest of the battle, many of them hiding three miles from the battlefield at Spring Creek.[14]

For his part, Fossett, seeing Totten’s retreat, ordered his own attack. His Confederate troops fanned out, the right flank anchoring on a tributary of Dove Creek. Using the timber and ravines for cover, the Kickapoos effectively held them down for six hours. At one point they even tried a counterattack that almost routed the Confederates. One veteran later recalled, “At that moment men began to fall off their horses all around me, among them an Indian fighter and crack shot named Brown, my cousin, Louis Wylie, and two other privates, Bailey and Tarver.” Fossett tried to restore order among his Texans, “pleading and threatening, and telling them what a disgrace it was to run from Indians. In the midst of his wild harangue, the captain’s horse was shot from under him.” The Confederates stabilized, but with no sign of progress or aid from Totten, Fossett ordered a retreat north.[15]

To do this, the Confederates had to go back across Dove Creek. As they did so, a detachment of warriors suddenly appeared and fired into them. Unable to fight while wading through the water, the Texans suffered considerable losses and the retreat turned into a rout. The Kickapoos pursued, trying to recapture their herd animals as well as the two youths taken captive, but had to give up.[16] The Kickapoos had no intention or even a thought of having a battle, but they had fought one and they had won handily.

 

A Tragic Mistake

Casualty estimates for Dove Creek vary wildly. The Confederates suffered 22-26 killed and 19-60 wounded for a total of up to 86. Among the casualties were Captains Barnes and Culvers of the militia and Gillentine, one of Fossett’s favored scouts. Even a low estimate of 41 killed and wounded was a massive number of casualties for a force of 381 men, and the bloodiest engagement for a Texan force in an Indian battle. The defeated men went to a camp on Spring Creek, with Fossett later claiming that they intended to have another go at the Kickapoos. Instead, they suffered cold weather and low food, killing many of the captured horses for food. They retreated for good on January 11, having to endure chilly rain that turned to snow. Kickapoo losses are less certain. Fossett claimed at least 23 dead Indians, but such reports were often exaggerated. Some of the Indians themselves bragged a light casualty list of just 11 killed and 7 wounded.

However, their trip was likely now much more difficult since “All our stock was taken away nearly; some families had none. We were obliged to leave most of our things.”[17] There was a bright moment. The two young Kickapoos the Texans had captured took advantage of the disorganized and defeated state of their captors to sneak away and, according to once account, take back some of the horses that had been seized.[18]

The retreating Texans continued to suffer intense cold and snow, as well as food rations so thin that the men started to eat one slice of bread a day (one group was lucky enough to come across a fresh buffalo corpse). In one incident there was a report that the Kickapoos were coming at them. This created a panic and Totten could only get a fraction of the militia to stand for a fight. As it turned out it was a small group of fellow Confederates who had acquired a small herd of cattle, and the soldiers and militia got to eat beef. Eventually they reached the ranch of cattleman John Chisum (yes, the character John Wayne plays in Chisum) and stayed there to recuperate.[19]

The heat for the blunder was largely directed against Major Erath and Lieutenant-Colonel Barry, even though they had not been present for the foray. General John McAdoo investigated the matter and rightly concluded that Totten and Fossett were at fault. Worse was the revelation that the Indians were from the friendly Kickapoo People and stories of Texans shooting at peace-offering Indians began to spread. One officer wondered, “They ought to have known whether they were friendly or not.”[20]

Many of the soldiers were disgusted by the affair as well. One, noting that the Kickapoos had no hostile intentions and only harmed the white who attacked them, bitterly claimed that after the battle “the Indians could easily have given chase and secured the scalp of the last one of us.” The same soldier, whose name is not known, also expressed his disgust at Fossett’s unwarranted execution of Aski.[21] The Battle of Dove Creek caused long-term damage to the frontier forces of the Second District. Whether from shame or in reaction to the criticism, many of the same men who had signed up to hunt deserters now deserted themselves. The flood of discontents only increased as news of final Confederate defeat in the East reached western Texas.[22]

As for the bands of No-ko-aht, Papequah, and Pecan, they found a new home in Hacienda El Nacimineto in northern Mexico. In what be labeled tragedy, many of the Kickapoos actually did not find life in Mexico all too appealing, unable to practice many of their favored ways of life and facing possible conscription into the Mexican Army. Many returned north to Kansas.[23]

Those Kickapoos who stayed in northern Mexico had gained a large distrust, even hatred, of Texans. They undertook border raiding, attacking white settlers on the American side of the Rio Grande. By attacking an innocent camp of Indians, the Texans had added the Kickapoos to their long list of enemies. It took a cross-border expedition by Colonel Ranald S. Mackenzie, the man who would later ultimately defeat the Comanches, to end these raids.[24]

Sources

“Henry Fossett’s Account of the Battle of Dove Creek,” Galveston Daily News, March 14, 1865. https://www.newspapers.com/article/the-galveston-daily-news-1865-3-14-henry/33068505/

Kelton, Elmer. “Battle of Dove Creek.” https://www.tshaonline.org/handbook/entries/dove-creek-battle-of.

Latorre, Felipe A. The Mexican Kickapoo Indians. New York: Dover, 1991.

Michino, Gregory. Encyclopedia of Indian Wars: Western Battles and Skirmishes, 1850-1890. Missoula: Mountain Press, 2003.

Smith, David Paul. Frontier Defense in the Civil War: Texas’ Rangers and Rebels. Texas A&M University, 1994.

Unknown. “Texas Pioneer Recalls Battle with Indians – Dove Creek Fight.” https://www.frontiertimesmagazine.com/blog/texas-pioneer-recalls-battle-with-indians-dove-creek-fight

---

[1] David Paul Smith, Frontier Defense in the Civil War: Texas’ Rangers and Rebels, (Texas A&M University, 1994), 147-148.

[2] Smith, Frontier Defense, 149, 151.

[3] Smith, Frontier Defense, 152.

[4] Felipe A. Latorre, The Mexican Kickapoo Indians, (New York: Dover, 1991) 17-18.

[5] Latorre, Mexican Kickapoo, 18; Gregory Michino, Encyclopedia of Indian Wars: Western Battles and Skirmishes, 1850-1890, (Missoula: Mountain Press, 2003), 162.

[6] Smith, Frontier Defense, 152; “Henry Fossett’s Account of the Battle of Dove Creek,” Galveston Daily News, March 14, 1865, https://www.newspapers.com/article/the-galveston-daily-news-1865-3-14-henry/33068505/.

[7] Unknown, “Texas Pioneer Recalls Battle with Indians – Dove Creek Fight,” https://www.frontiertimesmagazine.com/blog/texas-pioneer-recalls-battle-with-indians-dove-creek-fight.

[8] Smith, Frontier Defense, 153.

[9] Smith, Frontier Defense, 153; Michino, Encyclopedia of Indian Wars, 162; “Account of Dove Creek,” https://www.newspapers.com/article/the-galveston-daily-news-1865-3-14-henry/33068505/.

[10] Unknown, “Texas Pioneer,” https://www.frontiertimesmagazine.com/blog/texas-pioneer-recalls-battle-with-indians-dove-creek-fight.

[11] Smith, Frontier Defense, 155.

[12] Unknown, “Texas Pioneer,” https://www.frontiertimesmagazine.com/blog/texas-pioneer-recalls-battle-with-indians-dove-creek-fight.

[13] Latorre, Mexican Kickapoo, 19; Unknown, “Texas Pioneer,” https://www.frontiertimesmagazine.com/blog/texas-pioneer-recalls-battle-with-indians-dove-creek-fight.

[14] Smith, Frontier Defense, 153; “Battle of Dove Creek,” https://www.tshaonline.org/handbook/entries/dove-creek-battle-of; “Account of Dove Creek,” https://www.newspapers.com/article/the-galveston-daily-news-1865-3-14-henry/33068505/.

[15] Unknown, “Texas Pioneer,” https://www.frontiertimesmagazine.com/blog/texas-pioneer-recalls-battle-with-indians-dove-creek-fight; Smith, Frontier Defense, 153-154; “Battle of Dove Creek,” https://www.tshaonline.org/handbook/entries/dove-creek-battle-of.

[16] Smith, Frontier Defense, 154; Latorre, Mexican Kickapoo, 19.

[17] Smith, Frontier Defense, 154; Latorre, Mexican Kickapoo, 19; “Battle of Dove Creek,” https://www.tshaonline.org/handbook/entries/dove-creek-battle-of; “Account of Dove Creek,” https://www.newspapers.com/article/the-galveston-daily-news-1865-3-14-henry/33068505/; Michino, Encyclopedia of Indian Wars, 163.

[18] Unknown, “Texas Pioneer,” https://www.frontiertimesmagazine.com/blog/texas-pioneer-recalls-battle-with-indians-dove-creek-fight.

[19] Unknown, “Texas Pioneer,” https://www.frontiertimesmagazine.com/blog/texas-pioneer-recalls-battle-with-indians-dove-creek-fight; Smith, Frontier Defense, 154.

[20] Smith, Frontier Defense, 154-155.

[21] Unknown, “Texas Pioneer,” https://www.frontiertimesmagazine.com/blog/texas-pioneer-recalls-battle-with-indians-dove-creek-fight.

[22] Smith, Frontier Defense, 155.

[23] Latorre, Mexican Kickapoo, 19-20; Latorre, Mexican Kickapoo, 19-20.

[24] “Battle of Dove Creek,” https://www.tshaonline.org/handbook/entries/dove-creek-battle-of.

A Short Biography of Shoshenq I, the Pharaoh from Raiders of the Lost Ark

 

The Captor of the Ark?

Shoshenq I, also known as Sheshonq or in the Hebrew Bible Shishak, is a familiar name among those interested in what exactly happened to the Ark of the Covenant. It helps that he was name dropped in Raiders of the Lost Ark. In the scene where Indiana Jones and Marcus Brody talk to army intelligence in a university lecture hall, the word “Tanis” comes up in an intercepted Nazi message. This instantly raises the interest of Indiana Jones, who says it’s one of the possible final resting places of the Ark. The scene has a couple inaccuracies. For one thing, the characters talk like the Nazis just unearthed Tanis, when in fact its ruins, situated in northeastern Egypt, were obvious for centuries. In 1798 Napoleon’s Army had already begun serious archaeological studies of the city. More obvious is Brody’s incorrect dating, where he has the Shoshenq hitting Jerusalem  in 980 instead of 925 BC.

It’s a masterclass in delivering tons of exposition, with bits of humor and an ominous image of the Ark shooting out rays making for an intriguing five minutes scene where four guys just talk. For Ark and archaeology enthusiasts the scene resonates, as Shoshenq is a main suspect. The questions is, what was the context for Shoshenq’s attack on Judah, and was the pharaoh known for anything else?

 

A Dynasty Made Through Marriage and Family

Shoshenq I was the first pharaoh of the 22^nd Dynasty, in the latter half of the 10^th Century BC. Often the creation of a new dynasty meant a revolt, a coup, or a disaster that necessitated a new family to take the pharaonic throne. The 21^st Dynasty, however, did not end because of any power struggle or disaster. Rather the last pharaoh, Psussennes II, had no male heir. Despite the Egyptian allowances for harems among royalty, along with many fertile wives, it could be hard for children in those days to grow to adulthood. Or perhaps Psussennes II simply had difficulty performing. Whatever the case, he needed to find a solution before he died. Shoshenq was the commander of his army and often had glory alongside the pharaoh on monuments, and had the power and obviously political connections to marry Psussennes’ daughter Maatkare. In 945 he naturally became the next pharaoh and kick started his own dynasty.

Trail of Blood on Ice Part III: Descent into Tragedy

 

Chustenahlah (December 26)

James McIntosh

Colonel Cooper received word that Colonel James McIntosh had forwarded part of his men to him so that he would have more numbers and ammunition to get back on the trail of Opothleyahola. The plan was that Cooper would travel up the Arkansas River and get in front of the rebellious Indians. McIntosh would go up the Verdigris River and head west, trapped the target between two forces. But it would be some time before Cooper was ready. McIntosh, a highly aggressive officer who often put himself at risk, knew that to wait would give Opothleyahola respite from pursuit and worse more distance. He thus resolved to move at once.[1] McIntosh had at his disposal 4 companies of his own 2^nd Arkansas Mounted Riflemen, 5 companies of the South Kansas-Texas Regiment, the 3^rd Texas Cavalry, 6^th Texas Cavalry, and a single company of Texans under Captain Bennett. Like Cooper, he led a mounted force ideal for moving quickly across large stretches of uninhabited territory. He had 1,380 men in total. These soldiers were surprised to be in action. With the first phase of winter having come, the men were busy constructing comfortable wood cabins near Van Buren. But winter rest would not come quite yet.[2]

Back on Fort Gibson, on December 24, Cooper received the ammunition he had ordered. He moved out, but sent Stand Watie and the 2^nd Cherokee ahead to link up with McIntosh. Watie was of the pro-Confederate Cherokee faction and so were the men in his regiment. Unlike Drew’s 1^st Cherokee, this regiment was in no danger of defecting.[3] Despite his quickness to move upon gaining ammunition, Cooper would miss out on the climactic battle of the Trail of Blood on Ice.

Trail of Blood on Ice Part II: Cooper Gives Chase

 

Round Mountain (November 19)

Though Opothleyahola talked of neutrality and letting the whites slaughter each other, his grand scheme was seen in a different light by the Confederacy and its allies. The McIntosh Creeks, aside from their usual political and cultural antipathy towards the traditionalists, thought this exodus would encourage their human property to run away. Slaveholders in other Indian nations felt the same. Of more strategic concerns was that instead of staying out of the “white man’s war” as stated, at least many of the males in the exodus would form Union units and improve the probability of a major Federal invasion from Missouri.[1]

The commander of the Confederate forces was Colonel Douglas Cooper (left). He long had relations with the Nations of Indian Territory, with Opothleyahola’s faction accusing him or stealing. In fact, there was a rumor that he wanted to catch up with Opothleyahola not to fight him, but to bribe him to reveal the location of a supposed great treasure that the chief’s slaves had buried. Such beliefs seem to be more the creation of spiteful Indians. While such planned thievery is not confirmed, Cooper did have a true reputation for drunkenness that would dog his Civil War career.[2]

Trail of Blood on Ice Part I: A Creek Nation Divided

 

In the American Civil War the Union Army did not hit Indian Territory until well into 1862, and only in full force in mid-1863. However, there was one major campaign, perhaps the most tragic one of all. In a period 35-45 years earlier the members of the Five Civilized Tribes and been driven off their land in the East by the executive and unconstitutional power of US President Andrew Jackson. For the Cherokees, the forced relocation to what is now Oklahoma became known as the Trail of Tears. The events at the end of 1861 would be known as the Trail of Blood on Ice.

 

Primary sources for the campaign are somewhat scarce for somebody running a blog out of Illinois. I was limited to letters contained in The Prairie Was on Fire, a wonderful source for anybody who wants firsthand accounts of the Civil War in Indian Territory, and the official battle and campaign reports. Aside from a letter in which Indian agent Carruth communicates with Creek chief Opothleyahola, they are all from the Confederate perspective. As for the secondary sources, the best was Now the Wolf Has Come, a book that seeks to reframe the campaign entirely from the Creek’s perspective. The two authors of the book, Christine and Benton White, do alert the reader that the Creeks’ biases come to the fore, so keep that in mind when some heavy accusations are made against white figures such as General Douglas Cooper. I also tried to flesh out the sources with web sources, chiefly from the Oklahoma Historical Society, but I decided not to include them because the information was so brief and already covered in the books.

The Creek chief named in the image and below (https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/3/34/Opothle_Yaholo.jpg)

Opothleyahola

When the Civil War began to take shape, the Confederacy was keen to make the Cherokee, Chickasaw, Choctaw, Creek, and Seminole nations allies. They hoped they would serve as a buffer force between Kansas and Texas. The task for many of these nations was actually not too hard, thanks to shared cultural traditions and the Federal Government’s abandonment of protection and services. The latter factor was caused by the Union’s prioritization of beating Confederates further east.

However, many Indians also opposed an alliance with the Confederacy because they preferred the Union, or, in the case of the following individual, did not want to get wrapped up in a “white man’s war.” His name was Opothleyahola. He was of the Creek Nation (their official names is Muscogee, but for the sake of lining up with my sources I will refer to them as Creek). His name stood out in stark contrast to the other major Creek chiefs, who had taken up western names. This was very symbolic. Opothleyahola was a deeply conservative traditionalist who despised much of white culture. To him whites were demons responsible for all that had befallen the Creeks. He was more not likely to be seen in the suit and shirt of the whites, and he rejected Christianity.

Opothleyahola was old enough to have been present when the great Pan-Indian Shawnee Tecumseh visited the Creeks. Tecumseh had preached that the Indians must return to their old ways of living and makes themselves pure of both the physical and cultural encroachments of the white men. Opothleyahola was struck by Tecumseh’s words and had been on the side of the Red Sticks in the Creek Civil War. It was during this event that he gained a dislike for the opposing Creeks’ white American allies. Now he saw himself as the protector of the Creeks’ old ways.[1]

His arch-enemies were the McIntosh family. Back during the days of Indian removal, the McIntosh faction had voluntarily decided to head west. Their journey west was not the mournful procession that the rest of the Creeks would face. They even entered their new lands on steamboats, and brought their slaves with them. Having first dibs at their new home, they quickly grabbed much of the best farmland and set up farms and plantations.[2]

By contrast the rest of the Creeks, the majority of them, had a miserable time of it when they were forced out of what is now Alabama. As they trekked west they fell into destitution, constantly cheated by more unsavory whites, exposed to the elements, forced to endure long marches in rough conditions. When they finally arrived the McIntosh faction was wary. They agreed to let this second wave of migration stay as long as they accepted the laws they had already set up.[3]

It took time to adjust to the new country. The majority of Creeks built settlements along the rivers, but, being unfamiliar with the weather and natural cycles of Indian Territory, found themselves hit by flooding that wrecked their homes, drowned valuable livestock, and propagated the spread of diseases. Through it all Opothleyahola sought to do what he could to revive his peoples’ prosperity.[4]

Helping the Creeks rebuild were Baptist, Methodist, and Presbyterian missionaries. Most were white, though at least one was black. They set up schools at which the Creek children could receive education and learn how to read and write. For this case Opothleyahola made an exception, as he understood that such talents would help his people deal with further intrusions from the United States. Despite his efforts, the mixed-bloods were more willing or likely to attend the new schools. Not only did this tie them more to American culture, it guaranteed that they would have educational advantages over the other Creeks.[5] Opothleyahola also held black slaves, just like most wealthier Creeks. It should be noted, however, that slavery by the Creeks had existed before the arrival of the whites. The only adjustment made to it was that only blacks could be held in bondage.

When these mixed-bloods began to respond positively to an alliance with the Confederacy, it was only natural that Opothleyahola would stand in opposition.

Planning the Exodus

During the pre-war Secession crisis, militant Texans surged into Indian Territory, keen to seize Federal property. Colonel William Emory of the Federal forces entered the territory to determine if the Union should maintain their handful of scattered posts: Forts Arbuckle, Cobb, Gibson, and Washita. As it turned out, soldiers had already evacuated Fort Cobb. For his part Emory, fearing an attack on Fort Washita, evacuated that site as well, and the garrison of Fort Arbuckle joined him without orders. The Union was abandoning Indian Territory and with it protection from the Comanches and Kiowa. The new Confederate forces assumed command of the forts.[6]

It did not help that the government agent assigned to the Creeks was an Alabamian secessionist named William Garrett. He ensured that none of the Creeks could easily and directly communicate with the Federal government. At the same time the federal government was aware of Garrett’s duplicity and withheld the promised annuities for fear that the agent would divert them to the Confederacy. They may as well have sent them, for by withholding them the Creeks felt further abandoned by the government and more open to Confederate overtures.[7] As bonds between the Creeks and white southerners tightened, the Creek General Council passed a law requiring all free blacks to go into servitude. They were allowed to choose their master, but that could not have been much of a relief.[8]

Opothleyahola looked on these developments in dismay. Already hostile to the whites, he did not want to see his people risk their lives and their nation in an alliance with the same people who had dispossessed them a generation earlier. He and others held the mixed-bloods back from making such an alliance. One Creek, James Scott, was ten when he saw aged chief. He recounted that his “heart was sad at all the war talk. He visited the homes of his followers or any of the Indians and gave them encouragement to face all these things, but above all things to stay out of the war. It was no affair of the Indians.”[9] In June he and many of the full-blooded chiefs left to attend a council of Great Plains Indians. This was a major political mistake. With most of their opposition out of the way, pro-Southern mixed-blood chiefs were able to meet with Confederate officials and other Indian leaders. Naturally they allied with the Confederacy, and the new deals they struck were actually more favorable than those made with the Federal government.[10]

John Ross letter to Opothleyahola

Feeling betrayed, neutral and Unionist Creeks joined with like-minded people from the other Indian groups to seek aid from the Union. William Garrett noted these developments with alarm. Technically the Creek Nation was allied with the Confederacy, but according to his estimates there was a severe division. The Lower Creeks were mostly pro-Confederate, but the Upper Creeks largely went against. Overall he counted 1,675 “Southern” Creek warriors and 1,575 “Northern” Creek warriors, a nearly-50-50 division though the Confederate faction was now better armed. John Ross, President of the Cherokee Nation, was sympathetic to Opothleyahola and had previously backed his efforts to keep Indian Territory neutral. But Ross had to cave in to pressure when a rival faction of pro-Confederate Cherokees threatened to supersede his authority. Now he begged the aged Creek not to give the Confederates and their Indian allies any pretext to attack him. But his pleas went ignored. Indian vs. Indian violence looked more likely every day. In her history of the creeks, the historian Angie Debo noted that this was a tragic repeat of history, as earlier in the century Creeks had divided in a larger conflict between a still young United States and the older European powers in the War of 1812.[11]

Opothleyahola was encouraged by a response to his messages north. It was from E.H. Carruth, another US Indian agent. “I am authorized to inform you that the President will not forget you. Our Army will soon go South, and those of your people who are true and loyal to the Government will be treated as friends…The commissioners from the Confederates States have deceived you. They have got two tongues. They wanted to get the Indians to fight, and they would rob and plunder you if they can get you into trouble…His soldiers will soon drive these men who have violated your homes from the land they have treacherously entered.” Carruth sent further letters to various loyal leaders among the Indian peoples. Each letter requested that some of their best men be sent to Kansas to meet with Federal authorities and then to Washington to meet President Lincoln. Each letter also promised protection for whoever refused to ally with the Confederacy and the short arrival of Federal troops.[12]

The anti-Confederate Creeks had a plan on how to gather without attracting premature attention. Some Creek families with herds of pigs and cattle would round up their animals and slaughter a large portion of them. The dead animals’ meat was dried preserved. Families and small groups would leave their homes and take planned out routes to a great gathering place. Each had a bundle of sticks. Each morning they would dispose of a stick until there was none left. As the sticks were thrown away, these small groupings began to converge.[13]

Opothleyahola went with a rearguard of armed, mounted men. One night while they camped in a grove of oak, a white man named John Taylor rode to them. The Confederates were aware that something was happening and had sent Taylor, a merchant and trader, to talk the Creek chieftain into surrender. He warned that if he and the others continued on their course, there would be war and suffering in Indian Territory. Opothleyahola, who had been sitting on a log, met Taylor’s words with silence. At this moment the White learned that he was surrounded by Creeks, their rifles leveled at him. Opothleyahola declared him their prisoner. He hoped that by taking Taylor with him, he would cause confusion among the Confederates as to what had happened.[14]

The size of Opothleyahola’s exodus has been estimated as high as 8,000 people, with 1,500 of those men armed for battle. It was not entirely a Creek affair. Inspired by Tecumseh, Opothleyahola had reached out to others unwilling to ally with the Confederacy. To quote Now the Wolf Has Come, “Let the white men slay one another until the earth was soaked in their venomous blood…Let the many peoples join as brothers of the same fire; Let them all shun the white man’s war, and the gods would protect them.” Many had already been looking for a way out of the war. Among those who heeded the Creek chief’s call were Delawares, Kickapoos, Seminoles, and Shawnees. There were also hundreds of enslaved and free blacks. Although Opothleyahola had no abolitionists aspirations, there were runaway slaves in his group, riding ponies they had stolen from their masters. Seeing an anti-Confederate exodus, this was an opportunity to escape enslavement for free-soil Kansas. The massive body of people moved north as one unified body on November 15.[15]

Actually, Opothleyahola had another option on his mind, one that might remove any need to interact with US government. To the west of Indian Territory were the Comanche. The Comanche are rightly among the most well-known Indian peoples. After mastering the horse, they dominated the western plains for centuries. Maps in 1861 showed the western borders of Texas and Indian Territory, but in reality these regions often fell into Comancheria. The fierce Comanche warriors, often alongside their Kiowa allies, constantly warred on their neighbors, including the displaced nations in Indian Territory. Now Opothleyahola called for a great alliance. As Indians, they should all stand together, staying free of the emerging Civil War. A few Comanches were moved by his entreaties and some would even join his exodus. The rest, however, were dismissive. The Comanche had reigned supreme and could not imagine their destruction by the Americans, much less if they were busy slaughtering each other.[16]

https://buchananej.wixsite.com/7-
cherokee-clans/the-wild-potato

So Kansas it was. As it moved the north, the great exodus absorbed several smaller groups, such as the Yuchis and Alabamas. Naturally with all these culture mingling together, tensions rose. Some of the Indian peoples would refuse to interact with traditional enemies. The Delawares killed a fox, a sacred animal of the Cherokee Potato Clan (emblematic mask pictured left). Fortunately Opothleyahola had the natural presence and ability to defuse these situations before they broke his movement apart. [17] So far the great chief had quelled fighting among those in his charge, but soon he would need to manage fighting against the true enemies. The Confederates and their Indian allies would not allow these differing Creeks and their friends to reach Kansas unmolested.

Next: Two battles erupt on the Trail of Blood on Ice.

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[1] Christine Schultz White and Benton R. White, Now the Wolf Has Come: The Creek Nation in the Civil War, (Texas A&M University Press, 1996), 19-20.

[2] Angie Debo, Road to Disappearance: A History of the Creek Indians, (Oklahoma Press, 1941), 95.

[3] Debo, Road to Disappearance, 100-102.

[4] Debo, Road to Disappearance, 108.

[5] Debo, Road to Disappearance, 120; Mary Jane Warde, George Washington Grayson and the Creek Nation, 1843-1920, (University of Oklahoma Press, 1999), 41-42.

[6] Thom Hatch, The Blue, the Gray, & the Red: Indian Campaigns of the Civil War, (Mechanicsburg, Pennsylvania: Stackpole, 2003), 2.

[7] Debo, Road to Disappearance, 142.

[8] Debo, Road to Disappearance, 143.

[9] Debo, Road to Disappearance, 151.

[10] Debo, Road to Disappearance, 144-146.

[11] Debo, Road to Disappearance, 149-150; Hatch, Indian Campaigns, 7.

[12] United States, The War of the Rebellion: A Compilation of the Official Records of the Union and Confederate Armies Vol. VIII. (Washington D.C. 1883), 25-26.

[13] White, Wolf Has Come, 15; Debo, Road to Disappearance, 151.

[14] White, Wolf Has Come, 20-22.

[15] Hatch, Indian Campaigns, 8; White, Wolf Has Come, 23; Warde, George Washington Grayson, 60; Edwards, Prairie was on Fire, 13.

[16] White, Wolf Has Come, 24-25.

[17] White, Wolf Has Come, 36-38.