Longstreet's Great Failure: The East Tennessee Campaign of 1863 (part 1 of 2)

General James Longstreet is popularly portrayed as a voice of modern warfare in the Civil War. He has also become the voice of reason at the Battle of Gettysburg. If his superior General Robert E. Lee had listened to him and avoided frontal assaults than the Confederacy would have had a much better summer of 1863. One would think that, given independent command, Longstreet would excel. He did in fact have a good shot at independent command at the end of 1863. But rather than excelling, he performed poorly. Casual and even some avid Civil War buffs might be surprised to learn that he was defeated by Union General Ambrose Burnside, a man often regarded as just another incompetent general to lose to Lee in Virginia. So why did one of the most highly regarded Confederate generals do so poorly and to what extent should credit be given to Burnside? Here is a short look at the Knoxville Campaign, which was waged in November and December of 1863.

Longstreet Goes West

Georgia-born James Longstreet was working as an army paymaster in New Mexico Territory when the war broke out. Resigning from the army, he soon led a brigade at the First Battle of Bull Run. In 1862 he rose to become one of the South’s greatest generals and Lee’s most reliable subordinate. Commanding the First Corps, he did exemplary service up to the Battle of Gettysburg. While his criticisms of Lee’s risky offensive tactics were valid, his execution of these tactics were themselves mishandled. After the disaster at Gettysburg he looked west for both practical and personal reasons.

Many in the Confederate government and army had been calling for a defensive posture in Virginia so that forces could be concentrated for offensive operations in the West. Originally they had wanted to relieve pressure on Vicksburg, the last major rebel stronghold on the Mississippi. With Vicksburg fallen, they now wanted to reverse the Confederacy’s poor fortunes in Tennessee. If enough men were concentrated with General Braxton Bragg’s Army of Tennessee, than the Federals could be pushed away from Georgia and out of the vital railroad junction of Chattanooga, Tennessee. Longstreet lent his support to this strategy, seeing it as the best chance for the South to regain momentum and perhaps win this war.

General James Longstreet

Longstreet also had personal reasons for going west. He still had bitter feelings towards Lee’s generalship and was considering a break from the Gray Fox. He also hoped to reunite with Joseph E. Johnston, another major Confederate commander in the West who he was particularly chummy with. Of course, he could also prove himself in another field and perhaps exercise more independence, furthering his military career. In fact, if the unpopular Bragg was finally removed from his army, Longstreet would be a strong candidate to replace him.[1]

With the support of western Confederate senators and representatives, Longstreet’s wish was fulfilled. He and the First Corps rode trains south and then west to join up with Bragg in northern Georgia. The presence of veterans from many victories in Virginia was valuable at the Battle of Chickamauga. Longstreet quickly seized upon a gap that was accidentally opened on the Federal right. Concentrating his forces for one great blow, he shattered half of the Union force, earning the Army of Tennessee its one large-scale victory of the war. However, that victory was greatly tainted. First, Longstreet’s valued division commander General John Bell Hood was seriously wounded and would sit out the rest of the year. Worse for the Confederacy, Bragg failed to follow up on his victory, allowing the Federals to fortify themselves inside Chattanooga. A siege commenced, which the besiegers found just as hard to bear as the besieged.

For about a year morale had been plummeting in the Army of Tennessee. Bragg, a personal friend of President Jefferson Davis, had a talent for coming up with sound strategies, but freezing up and failing to press his advantages once the fighting started. He would then blame his subordinates for his various defeats and disappointments. These same subordinate generals fumed at this poor leadership and by late 1863 were on the verge of mutiny, scheming to have Bragg removed. Bragg only remained in his valuable position because of his strong friendship with Davis. Davis in fact personally visited the lines facing Chattanooga. Unwilling to directly attack Bragg while both he and Davis were in the same room, the generals failed to affect a change in leadership.

Caught in the middle of this was Longstreet. The Army of Northern Virginia under General Lee usually operated like a well-oiled machine, and when it did not the army was still an effective unit. Instead of bringing stability to the Army of Tennessee, Longstreet and his First Corps instead were themselves transformed by the chaotic state of affairs in the west. Longstreet himself harmed his reputation with Davis by joining the other generals against Bragg, while displaying obvious hopes that he would take Bragg’s place. When Davis asked Longstreet for his opinion of Bragg, Longstreet could only bear to give “an evasive answer.”[2] Longstreet’s battlefield performance plummeted. He halfheartedly challenged a Union move towards his lines, enabling the Federals to gain a strong foothold against Bragg’s lines.

Bragg was almost out of options. He had three possible mobile operations on his list. An assault on Chattanooga was out of the question. General Ulysses S. Grant and his Army of the Tennessee were bolstering the besieged Army of the Cumberland. The Federals had good defenses and now superior numbers. Another option, to withdraw to a more defensible line among Chickamauga Creek, was considered. In fact Longstreet proposed such a move. However a withdrawal would destroy what was left of the army’s low morale. The other option was to drive out or destroy the Union force in East Tennessee before it could come to Grant’s aid. Then the victorious Confederates could turn about and strike the Federals in the rear, disrupting their supply lines. This would make it hard on the Union force growing in Chattanooga. Even this strategy was risky. A Confederate force would have no strong advantage against the Federals there and the country was low on subsistence to forage. Also, Bragg’s over-extended lines around Chattanooga would be spread even thinner if he detached any of his men. Yet he did so.

Bragg wanted to send Longstreet, along with Joseph Wheeler’s experienced cavalry force, to secure East Tennessee. Davis and Lee both approved of this plan, partly because it would put Longstreet closer to Virginia. If Lee was put in a difficult situation, then Longstreet could come to his aid. Many contemporary sources as well as historians have accused Bragg of simply trying to get rid of a troublesome subordinate, at the expense of the strained Confederate lines south of Chattanooga. He even wrote to Davis that Longstreet’s departure was “a great relief for me.”[3] Longstreet thus had a chance to prove himself in independent command, though under less than stellar circumstances. His enemy was the Army of the Ohio, under General Ambrose E. Burnside.

 

A Chance at Redemption

Burnside had once been a rising star of the Union Army. Early in the war he had provided one of the first significant victories with his capture of Roanoke Island in North Carolina. He had performed ably with the Army of the Potomac in Virginia and won over the Lincoln administration with his lack of interference in politics. An affable and modest man, Burnside almost refused to take command of the Army of the Potomac when it was offered to him in October of 1862. He reluctantly caved in and made an offensive early winter thrust into Virginia. He planned to quickly cross the Rappahannock River at the town of Fredericksburg, maneuvering between Lee and the Confederate capital of Richmond. His campaign was derailed when pontoon bridges did not arrive on time. This gave Lee’s army time to fortify itself on heights south of Fredericksburg. Instead of altering his strategy, Burnside bulled ahead. He sent his army on fruitless and blood-soaked assaults on the heights. After this disaster he went for another maneuver, only to lead his army on a cold and muddy march that demoralized it further.

Ambrose Burnside

Disgraced, Burnside found himself shunted off to an ancillary theater of war. He was given the Department of the Ohio, which included Ohio, Indiana, Illinois, and Kentucky. Kentucky had been a border state, furnishing men to both sides of the war. The Union had conquered it in early 1862, but in 1863 it was again becoming a source of trouble. There were bands of pro-Confederate guerillas, and Confederate raiders often mounted operations into the state. Burnside also found himself dealing with anti-war Copperheads in the northern states. In Ohio, Governor Clement Vallandigham railed against the Lincoln administration and the war, while the Chicago Times in Illinois voiced similar opinions. Burnside had to deal with irregulars and raiders on one hand and serious anti-war dissent on the other.

Though his arrests and censorship against Copperheads created some controversy, Burnside did start to rebuild his reputation in battling the guerillas. In mid-1863 he was finally given another major military operation. He was to advance into East Tennessee. East Tennessee had long been in the hearts and minds of President Abraham Lincoln and administration. Slavery was not as prevalent in this part of the state, and a considerable number of civilians wished to stay in the Union. Andrew Johnson, Lincoln’s future vice-president, came from this region and was the only senator from a seceded state to remain loyal to the Union. Lincoln long wished for the liberation of the Unionists from Confederate rule, but a campaign for this task had failed to materialize. Generals saw it as a low priority. Its difficult mountainous terrain and lack of transportation routes rendered it unfeasible as an invasion route or military target. While Union forces focused elsewhere, pro-Unionist guerillas and activists were suppressed by the Confederate government, many of them hanged.[4]

Burnside had his hands full operating in Kentucky, fighting off Rebel raids and ensuring Kentucky’s 1863 elections went off smoothly (in other words, that the pro-Unionist vote had its way). Burnside still viewed Kentucky as under threat and only reluctantly complied with Army Chief of Staff Halleck’s order for a move into east Tennessee. His own force had been much reduced. Thousands had been diverted to Grant’s operations in Mississippi and Rosecrans’ in middle Tennessee. Of those who returned from the former state, most had contracted malaria and other river country afflictions and could not be of much help.[5] As he waited for the return of some of his men, Burnside sent a raiding force under Colonel William Sanders to soften the enemy forces. Sanders struck Confederate garrisons and tore up railroads. Like Burnside, Confederate general Simon B. Buckner, in command of the region, was low on men and could do little to slow Sanders down. Sanders marched his cavalry to the gates of Knoxville, the main city of East Tennessee. Pro-Confederate civilians volunteered to strengthen the city’s defenses and man the big guns. Sanders found it unwise to proceed further and graciously praised the civilians for their stubborn courage.[6]

Sanders returned to Burnside, as did portions of the IX and XXXII Corps from operations against Vicksburg. Under pressure from the government, Burnside moved his army south in August. To alleviate the stress of traveling on the rough mountainous roads, Burnside split his force into five columns. They would converge into three once past the Cumberland River and then unify past the Tennessee River in Morgan County. The start of the campaign was rough going. The mountainous roads would be hard on the wheels of the wagon train. They were also lengthy. Burnside would be far away from his base of logistics. Normally this meant an extensive wagon train, but the only viable route for wagons was through the Cumberland Gap. Not wanting to assail this protected position head-on, Burnside used thousands of pack mules to haul artillery and supplies through smaller alternate gaps.[7] Burnside’s cavalry screened his movements against Buckner’s force, which was about equal in size to Burnside’s. Buckner enjoyed good rail communications, but could not hope to hold the nearly fifty mountain passes in the north. He also expected Burnside to reinforce Rosecrans in middle Tennessee, not appear suddenly outside Knoxville, so he had sent most of his men there instead.[8] Burnside forced the surrender of the town on September 9 and his forces fanned out to defeat and drive out other Rebel outposts. Knoxville was filled with Unionist refugees, and most Secessionist men had departed to serve in the Confederate army. As a result Burnside and his army were enthusiastically greeted as liberators. Burnside had captured or driven out almost all Rebel forces, and having accomplished the long-desired goal of freeing Unionist East Tennessee, attempted to resign while he had regained some of his lost glory. Lincoln denied his request.[9]

Burnside had some reason to be fearful of displeasing his superiors again. The War Department sent him two orders which, with the number of men he had available, were impossible to reconcile. He was told to send a sizeable portion of his force to reinforce Rosecrans and also to hold East Tennessee and protect Unionist civilians. He could not adequately protect East Tennessee if he sent reinforcements to Rosecrans, so he decided to only obey the second order.[10] Burnside had considerable resources, but they were stretched thin. He was separated from other Federal forces. His only line of communication was a 160 mile route north to Kentucky. In his fairly exposed position he presented a potential military target. When Grant learned of Longstreet’s move towards East Tennessee, he could do little for Burnside. He had his hands full breaking the siege at Chattanooga. Burnside would have to go it alone against one of the Confederacy’s best Corps.

Burnside had the following force to contest Longstreet at the river and back north in Knoxville. As can be seen the full corps were not available, with the First Division of XXIII Corps noticeably absent.

IX Corps: Robert B. Potter

First Division: Brigadier-General Edward Ferrero

            David Morrison’s 1^st Brigade

Benjamin C. Christ’s 2^nd Brigade

            William Humphrey’s 3^rd Brigade

Second Division: Colonel John F. Hartranft

            Joshua K. Sigfried’s 1^st Brigade

            Edwin Schall’s 2^nd Brigade

XXIII Corps: Brigadier-General Mahlon D. Manson

            Second Division: Brigadier-General Julius White

                        Samuel R. Mott’s 1^st Brigade

                        Marshall W. Chapin’s 2^nd Brigade

            Third Division: Brigadier-General Milo S.  Hascall

                        James W. Reilly’s 1^st Brigade

                        Daniel Cameron’s 2^nd Brigade

                        William A. Haskins’ Provisional Brigade

Cavalry Corps: Brigadier-General James M. Shackelford

            First Division: Brigadier-General William P. Sanders

Frank Wolford’s 1^st Brigade

                        Emory S. Bond’s 2^nd Brigade

                        Charles D. Pennebaker’s 3^rd Brigade

            Second Division: Colonel John W. Foster

Israel Garrard’s 1^st Brigade

                        Felix Graham’s 2^nd Brigade

 

Derailed Campaign

On November 1 the Confederate First Corps withdrew from the siege around Chattanooga. Its first destination was Sweetwater with its railroad station. Longstreet’s campaign did not get off to a good start. There were two factors would plague his efforts for the next couple months. First was the growing dissent within the ranks of the First Corps’ generals. Longstreet started off with two infantry divisions and Edward Porter Alexander’s artillery. He was also given another battery under Leyden and Wheeler’s cavalry corps. This gave him about 15,000 men. The first infantry division was under Lafayette McLaws, a long-running friend and subordinate of Longstreet’s.  Leadership of the second division was a source of division. It had been John Bell Hood’s, but Hood was out with an injury. Rules of seniority held that Evander Law would take up command. In fact he had assumed control of the division at Chickamauga after Hood was wounded. However Micah Jenkins, another brigade commander in the division, had caught the praise and favor of Longstreet.

Longstreet sought President Davis’ view on the matter. Davis suggested Law should take command since he was senior, but made no firm directions. Longstreet decided to promote Jenkins to divisional command. This move caused strife between Jenkins and Law that would plague the division’s coordination throughout the campaign.[11] Another issue concerned General Jerome Robertson, commander of the famed Texas Brigade. Robertson had performed miserably at Chattanooga, failing to seriously contest a Federal crossing that took pressure off the besieged city. Longstreet, with Bragg’s assent, had him removed and arrested. But with a new campaign immediately opening up, Bragg decided to reinstall Robertson for the time being. Longstreet now had another bitter subordinate to contend with.[12] Longstreet was responsible for creating and aggravating tensions within his Corps. He was starting to emulate Bragg rather than Lee in how he managed his subordinates.

Micah Jenkins

Evander Law

Following is the Confederate order of battle at the start of the campaign. Another brigade under Robert Ransom was ordered to join Longstreet from Western Virginia, but he would not link up with him until after the main battle. 

First Division: Major-General Lafayette McLaws

            Joseph B. Kershaw’s South Carolina Brigade

William T. Wofford’s Georgia Brigade

Benjamin Humphreys’ Mississippi Brigade

Goode Bryan’s Georgia Brigade

Second Division: Brigadier-General Micah Jenkins

            Micah Jenkins’ South Carolina Brigade commanded by Colonel John Bratton

            Evander Law’s Alabama Brigade

            Jerome B. Robertson’s Texas Brigade

            George Anderson’s Georgia Brigade

            Henry Benning’s Georgia Brigade

Artillery: Colonel Edward P. Alexander

Cavalry Corps: Major-General Joseph Wheeler

            First Division: John T. Morgan

            Second Division: Frank Armstrong

 

The second issue plaguing the campaign was the inefficiency of the Confederate military and government in Tennessee. Longstreet had envisioned a lightning-fast campaign utilizing the East Tennessee & Georgia Railroad. He would strike and destroy Burnside’s army while it was divided. Indeed, Burnside’s men were scattered all over the region. One brigade had to protect and keep the Cumberland Gap open. The Cumberland Gap was the long, but only decent route for reinforcement and supply between East Tennessee and Kentucky. Some men had to garrison Knoxville, the most important town, and others were scattered about protecting other important points. If Burnside could consolidate the bulk of these units, he would have parity or even superiority in numbers. Longstreet had to strike hard and fast.

Unfortunately the railroad system was a mess. There were not enough cars available and the engines carrying them were of degraded quality. Thus some of the men and equipment got to go by rail while the rest had to get to Sweetwater on foot. Edward Porter Alexander’s artillery was given priority and the guns were mounted on trains but, “owing to the inefficiency of the railroad transportation” the artillery did not all reach Sweet Water Station until November 13. To quicken the pace as much as possible, the artillerists were “required to pump water for the engine and to cut up fence rails for fuel.” Longstreet was also blocked by the Tennessee River, and had to wait days for the pontoon bridges to arrive. Once finally constructed, the pontoon bridge was so weak against the Loudon’s currents that it broke away. When finally reconstructed, it was said to look like an “S.” A Federal cavalryman who observed this wrote later that if not for their engineering woes, the Confederates would have crossed quicker and caught the Federals by surprise. The bridge did hold well enough for the army to get over. Bragg contributed to First Corps’ delays. He promised to send wagons and supplies to expedite the campaign, but failed to do so. This broken promise “beset the entire campaign.”[13]

 

The Fighting Retreat

Despite the issues befalling Longstreet’s force, the Federals were still in danger of being cut off and destroyed before they reached Knoxville. As his men crossed the Tennessee, Longstreet learned that the Federal IX Corps was only a few miles off to the east. If he moved quickly, he could cut it off at Lenoir Station and then destroy it. Burnside initially also was eager to give battle, planning to contest the Confederates after they crossed. However he quickly changed his mind. Grant suggested that he try to draw away Longstreet and make his job at Chattanooga easier. Also, while Burnside technically had more men than Longstreet, they were scattered around East Tennessee. He would actually be outnumbered if he faced Longstreet at the Tennessee River. His new strategy incorporated Grant’s strong advice. It was to draw the Confederates after him, taking them further away from Chattanooga to soften Bragg’s Army there. While the First Corps slogged their way to Sweetwater, Burnside took advantage of their delays. He would get as much of the IX and XXXII Corps as he could to Knoxville. Knoxville had earthworks, a supply depot, and a favorable Unionist population surrounding it. Burnside believed he could hold for a while there until the situation at Chattanooga was resolved. Then Grant could send aid.[14]

Longstreet’s army was across the river by the night of the 13^th, challenged only by a brief foray from General White’s brigade. The skirmishing is reported to have inflicted no casualties on the Confederates and did little to slow them down.[15] Now Burnside’s army was in a desperate retreat. Rain dropped from the sky, turning the already poor roads into mud. One veteran of the retreat recalled that a “liberal mixture of water with the red clay soil had produced a substance not so slippery as soap, nor so sticky as wax, yet… qualified to receive the appellation of Tennessee mud…” In order to make time, Burnside’s men had to abandon many of their wagons. Their mules were needed to pull the artillery pieces and their caissons through the deep mud. The mud deprived men of their boots, forcing them to spend time rescuing their footwear. Heavy horses and mules often sank and teams of men had to drag them out.[16]

Men were left in the rear to destroy abandoned wagons and their supplies, but could not do it fast enough. Confederate soldiers, always suffering from shortages in almost everything, enthusiastically came upon these gifts laden with food, blankets, and other essentials. The sacrifice of supplies worked out well for the Federals, who beat the Rebels to Lenoir Station. There they gathered straw to make beds, eager to finally get some sleep. Their hopes were dashed when in just an hour they were put on the march again. Burnside was not ready to contest Longstreet yet. Furthermore, Longstreet was already attempting to cut off his army again, this time by beating the Federals to Campbell Station. Once again the Federals trudged through the mud, losing wagons and worn-out mules. Artillerists in one Rhode Island battery could not haul all of their ammunition and had to destroy two caissons. Exhausted stragglers sat down by the road, only motivated to move when Rebel skirmishers appeared. During their pursuit the Rebels came “upon a park of eighty wagons, well loaded with food, camp equipage, and ammunition, with the ground well strewn with spades, picks, and axes.” This time Confederate cavalry intercepted Hartranft’s division. However, this light force was incapable of stopping a full division and had to stand aside while the Federals marched past to Campbell Station. Longstreet had sent the bulk of Wheeler’s cavalry ahead, on the other side of the Holston River, to strike Knoxville from the South. While this helped besiege the city later on, Wheeler’s thousands-strong force could have been better used to dash ahead and get in front of the Federals, trapping them between two Rebel forces (this judgment, of course, involves a little hindsight. Longstreet did not learn how close the separated IX Corps until after he dispatched the cavalry).[17]

Around noon on the 16^th, The Federals once again won the race, but this time only by a quarter of an hour. A cavalryman scouting out the army’s rear spotted the 8^th Georgia regiment and, after gunning down one soldier, rushed back to warn the rest of the army. General Edward Ferrero, a dance school instructor and commander of one of the Federal divisions, rose from his meal and announced “Gentlemen, the ball has opened.” The IX Corps quickly deployed to meet the oncoming Confederates. Longstreet’s plan for the battle was to have McLaws’ division confront the IX Corps and hold it in place. Jenkins’ division on the right would attack the Federal left. Law would command two of Jenkins’ brigades and flank the enemy, rolling them up and cutting off the road to Knoxville.[18]

The Union’s hasty defense soon gave way. The Federals made the “nearly fatal mistake” of trying to regroup in a ravine, exposed to fire from the higher ground above them. One officer of the 17^th Michigan, Major F.W. Swift, seized the colors and barked at his men to run no further. General William Humphreys also stepped in to stop the rout. Finally rallying, the men were able to beat off the initial attack and return to a retreat, this time in more orderly fashion.[19] The confrontations between the infantry were brief and usually amounted to mere skirmishes. Several generals described the Battle of Campbell’s Station as an artillery battle. Confederate artillery fire sent the Federals withdrawing, though the actual effectiveness of their shells proved lacking. Too many of them exploded prematurely, leaving the Union ranks almost unscathed. One of the faulty shells went off in the barrel of a gun, destroying it. Federal counter-fire was more effective. In addition to dueling with the Confederate guns, they slowed down the Rebel pursuit. If the enemy infantry got too close they switched over to canister fire.[20]

This depiction of Battle of Campbell's Station currently hangs at the Campbell Station Inn

The real problem for Longstreet’s men was coordination. McLaws’ division engaged the enemy as planned, but the Federals withdrew rather than hold their ground. This meant that quicker action was required from Jenkins. However, his brigades moved out of step with each other. Law’s two brigades had moved too far to the left. They not only bumped into Anderson’s brigade on their left, but came in front instead of behind the Federals. Attempts to rectify the situation failed and the IX Corps always stayed a step ahead of Jenkins’ division. Jenkins was so furious with Law’s failure that he ascribed petty ulterior motives to it. He believed that Law, out of jealously over the divisional command, had purposefully mismanaged his movements to make him look bad.  The biased Longstreet was inclined to agree with his favorite, worsening the strife at the command level. Moxley Sorrel, Longstreet’s Chief of Staff, lamented years later on the state of the second division’s leadership, “Ah! Would that we could have had Hood again at the head of his division.”[21] Sensing that all was not right with their leadership, the rank-and-file began to lose their enthusiasm. They even grew critical of Longstreet after his two failures to envelop the enemy. Instead of using the affectionate “Old Pete,” they gave him the nickname “Peter the Slow.”[22]

Longstreet’s only hope now for a quick and successful campaign was to hit the Federals before they could solidify their positions at Knoxville.

Sources

Memoirs

Alexander, Edward Porter. Military Memoirs of a Confederate: A Critical Narrative. New York: Scribner’s Sons, 1907.

Brearley, Will H. Recollections of the East Tennessee Campaign. Detroit: Tribune Book and Job Office, 1871.

Cutcheon, Byron M. Recollections of Burnside’s East Tennessee Campaign of 1863. 1902.

Longstreet, James. From Manassas to Appomattox: Memoirs of the Civil War in America. J.B. Lippincott and Co., 1896.

Sherman, William Tecumseh. Memoirs. Penguin Books edition, 2000.

Sorrel, G. Moxley. Recollections of a Confederate Staff Officer. New York: The Neale Publishing Company, 1917.

Wilshire, Joseph W. A Reminiscence of Burnside’s Knoxville Campaign: paper read before the Ohio Commandery of the Loyal Legion, April 3^rd, 1912. Cincinnati: 1912.

Other Primary Sources

The War of the Rebellion: a Compilation of the Official Records of the Union and Confederate Armies Vol. XXXI: Operations in Kentucky, Southwest Virginia, Tennessee, Mississippi, North Alabama, and North Georgia. October 20-December 31, 1863. Washington D.C. 1894.

Poe, Orlando M. “The Defense of Knoxville” in Battles and Leaders of the Civil War Vol. III. New York: The Century Co., 1888

 

Secondary Sources

Cozzens, Peter The Shipwreck of their Hopes: The Battles for Chattanooga. University of Illinois Press, 1996.

Glatthaar, Joseph T. General Lee’s Army: From Victory to Collapse. New York Simon & Schuster, 2008.

Hess, Earl J. The Civil War in the West: Victory and Defeat from the Appalachians to the Mississippi. University of North Carolina Press, 2012.

Korn, Jerry. The Fight for Chattanooga: Chickamauga to Missionary Ridge. Time-Life Books, 1985.

Markel, Joan L. Knoxville in the Civil War. Arcadia Publishing Inc., 2013. Hoopla Edition.

-           “Knoxville: a Near-Death Experience,” https://www.battlefields.org/learn/articles/knoxville-near-death-experience, accessed December 3, 2020

Marvel, William. Burnside. University of North Carolina Press, 1991.

McPherson, James. Battle Cry of Freedom: The Civil War Era. Oxford University Press, 1988.

Mendoza, Alexander. Confederate Struggle for Command: General James Longstreet and the First Corps in the West. Texas A&M University Press, 2008.

Wert, Jeffry D. General James Longstreet: The Confederacy’s Most Controversial Soldier – A Biography. New York: Simon & Schuster, 1993.

Wilkinson, Warren and Steven E Woodworth. A Scythe of Fire: A Civil War Story of the Eighth Georgia Infantry Regiment. New York: HarperCollins, 2002. 

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[1] Alexander Mendoza, Confederate Struggle for Command: General James Longstreet and the First Corps in the West (Texas A&M University Press, 2008), 24-26; Peter Cozzens, The Shipwreck of their Hopes: The Battles for Chattanooga, (University of Illinois Press, 1996), 28-29.

[2] Longstreet, James, From Manassas to Appomattox: Memoirs of the Civil War in America, (J.B. Lippincott and Co., 1896), 465; Chapter III of Cozzens’ Shipwreck of their Hopes gives a summary of the plot against Bragg and Davis’ visit.

[3] Mendoza, 107-109; Jeffrey Wert, General James Longstreet: The Confederacy’s Most Controversial Soldier – A Biography, (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1993), 338-339; Jerry Korn, The Fight for Chattanooga: Chickamauga to Missionary Ridge, (Time-Life Books, 1985), 100.

[4] James McPherson, Battle Cry of Freedom: The Civil War Era, (Oxford University Press, 1988), 304-305.

[5] William Marvel, Burnside, (University of North Carolina Press, 1991), 264-267.

[6] Joan L. Markel, Knoxville in the Civil War, (Arcadia Publishing Inc., 2013, Hoopla Edition), 87.

[7] Marvel, 270; Earl J. Hess, The Civil War in the West: Victory and Defeat from the Appalachians to the Mississippi, (University of North Carolina Press, 2012) 187; Korn 101.

[8] Marvel, 271-273; Hess, 188.

[9] Marvel, 276-280; Markel, 89.

[10] Marvel, 285-289.

[11] Longstreet, 467-468; Wert, 336-338.

[12] Mendoza, 110-112.

[13] OR XXXI, 478; E. Porter Alexander, Military Memoirs of a Confederate: A Critical Narrative, (New York: Scribner’s Sons, 1907), 481; G. Moxley Sorrel, Recollections of a Confederate Staff Officer, (New York: The Neale Publishing Company, 1917), 205-206; Joseph W. Wilshire, A Reminiscence of Burnside’s Knoxville Campaign paper read before the Ohio Commander of the Loyal Legion, April 3^rd, 1912, (Cincinnati: 1912), 19-21.

[14] Marvel, 300-307.

[15] OR XXXI, 377-378, 383, 386.

[16] OR XXXI, 345; Will H. Brearley, Recollections of the East Tennessee Campaign, (Detroit: Tribune Book and Job Office, 1871), 14-15.

[17] OR XXXI, 346-347; Brearley, 18; Longstreet, 491; Mendoza, 119; Korn, 108-109; Joan L. Markel, “Knoxville: a Near-Death Experience,” https://www.battlefields.org/learn/articles/knoxville-near-death-experience, accessed December 3, 2020.

[18] Warren Wilkinson and Steven E Woodworth, A Scythe of Fire: A Civil War Story of the Eighth Georgia Infantry Regiment, (New York: HarperCollins, 2002), 274; Byron M. Cutcheon, Recollections of Burnside’s East Tennessee Campaign of 1863. 1902, 12-13; Mendoza, 120.

[19] Brearley, 20-21.

[20] OR XXXI, 478.

[21] OR XXXI, 526-527; Sorrel, 207; Mendoza, 125.

[22]Mendoza, 125.