The Fortified City
The
Federals reached the lines in and around Knoxville on the 17th, but
they could not be considered safe yet. The Confederates approached on the 18th.
Captain Orlando Poe, the engineer in charge of the defenses, had already set to
work building upon the unfinished Rebel entrenchments. The exhausted soldiers
found themselves having to hurriedly work on their own entrenchments before the
Confederates arrived and hit them. Poe believed that he needed only a few hours
before the army could have effective defenses. He and Burnside decided that General
William Sanders and his cavalry would have to hold off the Confederates for the
duration of that time. It was a large thing to ask of Sanders and his men.
Dismounted cavalry could buy time for the infantry to come up, as General John
Buford did at Gettysburg, but did not fare as well when expected to play
defense on their own. Sanders took up the challenge with determination.
 |
| General William Sanders, the martyr of the Knoxville Campaign |
McLaws’ division was the first to reach Sanders’ line. Sanders’ men used piles of rails, intended for an unfinished railroad, as their breastworks. For hours they managed to hold off the Confederates. Poe wrote years later that their stand “excited the wonder of the rest of our army.” Whenever the line began to falter, “Sanders would walk up to the rail piles and stand there erect, with fully half his height exposed to a terrific fire at short range, until every retreating man, as if ashamed of himself, would return to his proper place.” Sanders also worked with the artillery. He directed its fire to a house full of sharpshooters, and Federal shells struck the building and drove them out. Sanders’ bravery cost him. One bullet found him and mortally wounded him. However, he had bought the necessary time for the rest of Burnside’s army. The grateful commanding general sat by his bedside as he passed away. In honor of the cavalry general Fort Loudon, one of the most prominent fortifications at Knoxville, was renamed Fort Sanders.[1] The armies now settled into a siege.
Poe’s
efforts to improve Knoxville’s defenses rank among the greatest technical
achievements of the war. Learning that the Army of the Ohio would be taking
position in the city, he set about turning it into a fortress. With the lack of
time and resources, his task would not be easy. “There was absolutely nothing
prepared in the way of materials; the lumber was standing in the woods, and the
nails were lying around the railroad shops in the shape of scraps of old iron.
Blacksmiths were at once set to work transforming these scraps into nails, and
the saw-mills to sawing the lumber.” Poe also drew up plans for Knoxville’s
defenses. He thoroughly studied the terrain and the organization of the Army of
Ohio. Two dams were destroyed, flooding much of the open ground. The defenses
arced so that the flanks touched the river, making it impossible for the
Confederates to turn either flank. As the army arrived at its defenses, the
soldiers were set to work digging their own entrenchments. Civilians were put
to work also. Burnside’s report gives the impression that they were all
volunteers. Poe, on the other hand, honestly noted that many were in fact
“rebels” who “worked with a very poor grace, which blistered hands did not tend
to improve.” More willing was the local black population, which Burnside
singled out as “particularly efficient.”
 |
| Orlando Poe |
The
first defenses were “nothing but mere rifle-pits” 4 feet wide and 2 and a half
feet deep, with 2 feet of earth serving as a parapet. The second defenses were
the main earthworks and forts. Poe saw to it that they were improved “all day
and all night.” Poe further destroyed two dams to flood some of the open
ground, narrowing the attack lanes for the besiegers. A pontoon bridge was
constructed over the Holston River. All throughout the siege this bridge served
as a lifeline. Though the nearest base of supply was over a hundred miles away,
Unionist civilians donated food to come in. Food and supplies were also brought
in on flatboats, often protected from Confederate sight by the daily morning
fog.[2]
Despite
several successful repulses by his entrenchments over the course of the siege,
Poe was not satisfied. The soldiers continually strengthened their earthworks,
made taller in some places. For the forts and rifle pits he had men string
spare telegraph wire around the tree stumps and other ground protrusions,
covering the various approaches. Much of this wire was used to fasten together
cheval-de-frise, wooden spikes that would further obstruct any enemy assaults.
On Fort Sanders, the suspected point of attack, he placed cotton bales “covered
with green rawhides of animals slaughtered.” Fort Sanders itself was a
“bastioned earth-work, built upon an irregular quadrilateral,” with sloped
sides that deflected the impact of enemy shells. It was not fully completed,
but still formidable. Around it was a ditch 12 feet in length and from 6 to 8
feet in depth. Poe got wind of an enemy scheme to send rafts down the Holston
into the pontoon bridge. To avoid such a calamity, he constructed two booms,
one an iron cable and the other a long beam of timberwood, stretched parallel
to the bridge to catch any rafts.[3]
 |
| Poe's Topographical map of the defenses at Knoxville. With the aid of several photographers, he created a detailed illustrated report of his work. This map can be explored in closer detail at https://www.loc.gov/resource/g3964k.cw0427000/ |
The
Confederates were aware that every passing moment strengthened the Union
defenses. Logic would seem to have dictated an immediate attack before they
grew too strong. Longstreet, Alexander, and others identified Fort Sanders as
the most vulnerable point of attack. A wooded area lay close enough to cover
the formation of an assault group. Any other point of attack would have to be
conducted over long open spaces of ground. However, Longstreet postponed the
assault with constancy, sometimes by choice and sometimes due to uncontrollable
circumstances. The first delay occurred when one of Longstreet’s staff officers
drew attention to the Cherokee Heights, on the south side of the Holston. It
was thought that Knoxville could be shelled from this point. Much time and
effort was spent ferrying artillery to this hill. As it turned out it had a
commanding view of the Federal positions, but was out of range for the most
part. The second delay occurred on the 22nd. Longstreet learned that
Bragg had detached a division under General Bushrod Johnson to aid him. He chose
to wait for the reinforcements to add more punch to his assault. Johnson,
however, took some time to arrive. Like Longstreet he had to deal with the
half-functional rail system. Arriving with Johnson was Danville Leadbetter,
Bragg’s chief engineer and the one who had begin the work on Knoxville’s
defenses. Leadbetter convinced Longstreet to instead target Mabry’s Hill
further to his left. The 26th was lost scouting out the area, which
was deemed impregnable. The attack plan reverted to Fort Sanders on the 28th,
but the plan was again put on hold when it rained.[4]
While
Longstreet dithered, the two sides engaged in frequent sparring. There was the
usual sharpshooting and artillery dueling common in every siege. One
Confederate gun targeted none other than General Burnside. Its officer had
spotted Burnside scanning their lines with a telescope. He rushed forward a
gun. Three shots struck near the commander. A Union gun rushed to the commanding
general’s defense and damaged the Rebel cannon piece with one well-aimed shot.[5]
Federal artillery also targeted buildings that lay within Confederate lines,
not merely to silence sharpshooters, but to destroy them for any future use by
the enemy.
Groups
of infantry also made forays. These “burning parties” were tasked with setting
fire to the buildings, tearing down the wooden ones and hollowing out those
made of stone. On the night of the 20th 200 men from the 17th
Michigan crept out of their entrenchments. They were protection for five
burners, armed with “axes, port fire, cotton, turpentine and matches.” The 200
men rushed forward, putting up such a noise that the inhabitants of the
targeted buildings thought they were under full-fledged attack. They beat a
hasty retreat, leaving much of their weapons and gear behind in the targeted
buildings. The five burners smashed up wooden furniture and converted them into
pyres. Setting them aflame, they rushed back to the rest of their unit. The
light from the burning buildings revealed the small Union force. Realizing this
was no massive attack, the Confederates sent their men back while their
artillery opened fire. The Federals escaped to their defenses with only two men
killed.[6]
Both
sides undertook forays on the 23rd. The Union one, conducted by the
6th Michigan, was not successful. The Confederates, taking advantage
of the “dark and hazy dawn,” were able to seize a line of rifle-pits. The
retreating Federals set fire to all the buildings around them as they retreated
and further skirmishing was conducted against the backdrop of flames.
The
most known of these little encounters was the charge of the 2nd
Michigan on November 24th. Their target was a line of rifle-pits
manned by the 3rd Georgia Sharpshooters Battalion, from Wofford’s
Georgia Brigade. The 2nd
Michigan charged quickly, giving the Rebels no time to prepare for them. The
Georgians fled the rifle-pits and the Michiganders occupied them. Once there,
they found themselves “subject to heavy musketry from their front and left, and
from rebel sharpshooters on their right flank.” This “destructive flank fire”
hit many men, including the major who had led the attack. Seeing the desperate
situation, the wounded major ordered his men to fall back to the safety of
their original lines. He himself could not be carried away in the retreat. “Men
commenced falling from the time we left our own picket line until we got back
to the railroad.” The Georgia sharpshooters, who contributed much to the
slaughter, reoccupied their former positions. A report estimated that the 2nd
Michigan lost about 50 men, but other sources put the casualties even higher.
Captain Poe criticized the affair, unsupported by other Federal units, as
“simply murderous” and a waste of good men. It was the only considerable defeat
for the Union during the siege.[7]
The Battle of Fort Sanders
As
mentioned earlier, Longstreet kept postponing his assault plan. Every time he
did so the Federal lines grew stronger. By the 28th news came in
that Bragg was embattled at Chattanooga. Longstreet felt he had to do something
to help out Bragg (he did not realize that Bragg’s army had already been
routed) but believed he still needed to eliminate Burnside as a factor.
Desperate, he resolved to launch an assault on Fort Sanders as soon as
possible. He knew the odds were against him, but convinced himself to be
optimistic. Desperate, illogically optimistic, Longstreet was unwittingly
emulating Lee’s behavior on the third day at Gettysburg. He had roundly
criticized Lee for assaulting the well-defended center of the Union line in
that battle. Now he was making a similar and equally grievous miscalculation.
Part
of Longstreet’s ill-founded optimism can be chalked to poor intelligence
regarding Fort Sanders’ ditch. During a reconnaissance mission on the 27th,
a Union soldier was seen traversing the ditch while visible the whole time.
This indicated the ditch was not too deep. It later turned out that the Union
soldiers crossing the ditch with ease were actually traversing planks invisible
from the Confederates’ view.[8]
McLaws’ men would spearhead the assault. One regiment each from Humphreys’ and
Wofford’s brigades were to lead the charge. The rest of their brigades would
follow in columns. The men were to fix bayonets and not fire a shot until he
reached the fort. One observer claims that this order was followed so closely
at the time of the assault that “not a gun was loaded in three brigades.” The
sharpshooters and some of the artillery were to provide covering fire.
Anderson’s brigade from Jenkins’ division would support McLaws by attacking Federal
entrenchments to the left. McLaws, more wary of the ditch than his superior, suggested
bringing along thick bundles of straw. Throwing these into the ditch would make
it easier to cross (McLaws later claimed that he was going to construct such
bundles anyways with out without Longstreet’s approval, as well as scaling
ladders, but did not have the time to do so). Longstreet said they would be
unnecessary. Longstreet dismissed any warnings of failure. “If we go in with
the idea that we shall fail, we will be sure to do so. But no men who are
determined to succeed can fail.” He suggested the men simply dig out footholds
if the ditch proved deep.[9]
A
heavy pre-assault bombardment was planned. E. Porter Alexander had the
Howitzers mounted on skids to provide angular fire which could reach the
insides of the fort. Once the big guns stopped, the sharpshooters and a
storming party would hit the enemy’s rifle pits. From there the advance party
would provide supporting fire for the rest of the assault. Since the fort’s
garrison was miniscule, it was reasoned that they “could be overpowered as
quickly as they could be reached.” The bombardment was scrapped, however, in
the interest of sustaining the element of surprise. The artillery would instead
fire after the assault was underway. The element of surprise was lost anyway.
The night before the attack, skirmishers seized forward rifle-pits from which
they could snipe at the fort’s defenders. Those in the fort knew that an attack
was coming and prepared accordingly.[10]
At
dawn on the 29th, a very foggy morning, the attack formation moved
forward. Signal guns gave them the go-ahead for the charge. The fog helped
create an eerie sight for the fort’s defenders. One wrote that the Confederates
“seemed to rise up out of the fog, and came on – a dirty gray mass of brute
courage.” They quickly ran into trouble when they hit the stumps of felled
trees. Telegraph wire had been strung around the stumps. The men in front found
themselves tripping and falling. Officers tried to halt their units so they
could carefully navigate the wire, but the momentum of the charge was too much
and the lines fell into disorganization. All the while canister fire swept the
attackers. Infantry in Fort Sanders found the mass of Rebels an easy target. “The
weight of the [Confederate] column carried them promptly” through the wire
entanglement. In under two minutes they were in the ditch. They learned how
deep it really was. Worse, the cold, rainy weather had turned its walls into
solid sheets of ice. Men who tried to climb up slid down. They could not dig
out footholds as Longstreet had suggested.[11]
About
4,000 Confederates had been massed for the assault. Fort Sanders held only 222
men, most of them from the Scottish-born 79th New York Highlanders.
The force was so small that a lieutenant, Samuel N. Benjamin of the 2nd
US Artillery, found himself in command. However miniscule Sanders’ garrison
was, it was well compensated by Poe’s engineering efforts. Neighboring
fortifications provided supporting fire, much of it enfilading the massed Confederates.
The slopes and traverses of the fort provided security against the Rebel
artillery. Enemy sharpshooters provided the only considerable threat to the defenders.
They made it dangerous for anyone to expose himself above the parapet. Benjamin
had the men attach fuses to cannon shells, creating hand grenades. Lighting the
fuses, they would hurl them over the parapet and towards the ditch, where they
exploded to great effect. Every now and then a Rebel, climbing up his comrades,
would manage to scale the fort and reach the parapet. The sharpshooters made
this possible, preventing any Federal from popping too far out. But many a
Confederate who reached the top was sent flying backwards by a Federal bullet. Those
who were shot off the top “dragged all below them back into the ditch.”[12]
Despite the furious defense, many
Confederates were able to get onto the parapet. One officer leapt into Fort
Sanders and called for its surrender. The Union soldiers cheered his boldness,
but did not comply with his demand and made the officer their prisoner. Another
officer called on the defenders to surrender while he blocked the barrel of a
cannon. He was not as well-received and was “blown to atoms” by the gun he
obstructed. Three flagbearers, from the 13th and 17th Mississippi
and the 16th Georgia, managed to plant their colors on the parapet.
This only made them easy targets and the fort’s defenders won three trophies.
Union officers also braved the parapet to declare victory. Captain C.H. Hodskin
of the 2nd Michigan mounted it and demanded the surrender of the
trapped Rebels. “They answered him with yells and with a volley,” but failed to
even wound him. The Confederates in the ditch were trapped. If they managed to
get out towards the fort, they would either be shot or taken prisoner. If they
attempted to retreat, they would have to brave a field of rifle and canister
fire. But staying in the ditch was also dangerous, with explosives raining down
on their packed numbers. Their support was not faring well either. Anderson’s
brigade was supposed to relieve pressure by striking the entrenchments further
north. Instead he moved “too far to the right” and got his brigade entangled in
the chaos enveloping McLaws’ men. Behind Rebel lines, a staff officer rode up
to General Longstreet and reported that the men could not get through the
tangle of wire without enough axes. This was not entirely true. While the wire
had been disruptive, the Confederates had already managed to break through it.
Longstreet assented. He later regretted the recall order, feeling that he and
his subordinates had over-estimated the Federal defenses. He should have
regretted making the charge at all. The only way he could have hoped to
penetrate the formidable Federal lines was to have wrecked them with a heavy
and accurate bombardment, and he had ditched this part of the plan the night
before.[13]
With orders coming from the back,
the Confederates “fell back, at first sullenly and slowly, but flesh and blood
could not stand the storm of shot and shell that was poured upon them, and they
soon broke in confused retreat.” About 250 of them remained in the ditch.
Lieutenant Benjamin mounted the parapet and in his New England twang yelled,
“You surrender, do you? Then come in here.” The Confederates, who had resisted
surrender, finally did so. Despite the hell they had been through, some still
found themselves able to muster up humor. One of the prisoners exclaimed
“General Longstreet said we would be in Knoxville for breakfast this morning;
and so some of us are!”
In
under half an hour the Confederates suffered 800 killed, wounded and captured,
their dead and wounded “piled three deep” in the ditch. The Federals got off
much better, with 5 killed and 12 wounded. It was one of the most lopsided
battles of the war. The main cause of the failure to take the fort was
Longstreet’s vacillation. He repeatedly postponed the attack over the course of
a week, giving the Federals time to make their lines impregnable. Historian
Alexander Mendoza’s assessment of Longstreet’s generalship at Fort Sanders was
that it “bordered more on desperation than on sound strategic judgment.” He
felt he had to at least try to decisively defeat Burnside and salvage his
campaign. In other words, he repeated Lee’s desperate and poorly thought out
gamble at Gettysburg.[14]
 |
| Dead Confederates fill the ditch at Fort Sanders. |
The Death of a Campaign
More
bad news reached the besieging First Corps. Bragg’s army had been terribly
beaten and routed outside of Chattanooga. A Union courier was also intercepted,
with news that three Federal columns were coming to rescue Burnside from the
siege. It was later revealed that the courier had been intentionally captured.
General Grant had sent him with exaggerated reports of a massive Federal force
in hopes of making Longstreet give up the siege. The ruse worked and on December
4 the Confederates broke off the siege. Longstreet retreated through Loudon,
destroying anything his men could not bring with him.[15]
Grant
did send relief, however, in the form of General William Tecumseh Sherman and a
small army made up of men from various corps. Gordon Granger’s XIV corps had
already set out for Knoxville and Sherman ordered a junction with his force.
Sherman had been ordered to move with all haste. The Lincoln administration, worried
that Burnside would be forced to surrender, was applying a lot of pressure for action.
The relief column came upon the
Tennessee River, where the bridge had been destroyed. A new bridge had to be
hastily erected to cross the frigid Little Tennessee River. Halfway through
getting the men over, the bridge broke and had to be reconstructed. On December
4 Sherman found evidence that Longstreet had already lifted the siege himself and
was in full retreat. He entered Loudon to find “the bridge destroyed, 3
locomotives and 48 cars run into the river, and all the public stores burned.”[16]
Sherman’s
army, ragged and exhausted, finally reached Knoxville. He was astonished with
what he discovered. “I found General Burnside and staff domiciled in a large,
fine mansion, looking very comfortable…We all sat down to a good dinner,
embracing roast-turkey. There was a regular dining-table, with clean
table-cloth, dishes, knives, forks, spoons, etc. I had seen nothing of this
kind in my field experience, and could not help exclaiming that I thought ‘they
were starving.’” Had Sherman known that Burnside had been able to keep a supply
line open and receive food from loyal citizens, “I should not have hurried my
men so fast.”[17] While
Burnside did in fact keep a supply line open with the help of Unionist
Tennesseans, some of the rank-and-file did have incredible stories of
near-starvation to tell. At the start of the siege the men were put on quarter
rations. Food appropriated from Knoxville’s citizens helped stretch out their
food supply. Running out of bread, they began to subsist on corn, often eating
it raw. Whether they took their rations in one meal or tried to spread them
over three, their hunger remained “undiminished.” Some soldiers stooped to
fishing kernels of corn out of the dirt, left over from the horses’ meals.[18]
Burnside
graciously credited Sherman’s aid, writing “the siege would not have been
raised” without his army. He sent out 12,000 men under Major-General John G.
Parke to pursue Longstreet. Sherman marched his men back to Grant, leaving
behind Gordon Granger’s corps to hold Knoxville. As the chase progressed, Parke
sent a third of his men ahead under General James Shackelford to find
Longstreet’s force.[19]
The Confederates themselves were having an expectedly rough time of it. The
great issue was the lack of footwear, for both men and horses. Alexander and
Sorrel both recalled that the men, wearing their bare feet out, left “bloody
stains…on frozen ground.” For the horses, nails and horse-shoes were stripped
from dead horses. Many of these deceased horses were provided by the river,
which streamed four-legged casualties down from Knoxville. As for the men, General
Johnson provided some relief by seizing a tan yard shop and having new shoes
made. Wagon drivers mercifully donated their own footwear to those unfortunate
to be marching on foot.[20]
Longstreet
was instructed to rejoin Bragg. However, Bragg was on the other side of the
mountains in north Georgia. A junction of the two forces was impractical, so
Longstreet decided to retreat further into East Tennessee, staying close to
Virginia should he be recalled back to Lee’s army. As their retreat progressed,
the men’s spirits began to return. This was based on a hopeful and
unfortunately false notion that they were returning to Virginia and the
assuring comfort of once again being under Lee. They could be heard cheerfully
singing “Carry Me Back to Ole Virginny” all along the column.[21]
Longstreet’s hopes were up for another reason. He learned that a few thousand
Federals, under Shackelford, were closing in on him. With the number now in his
favor, he set about creating a trap. While his infantry held Shackelford in
place, cavalry under Generals William T. Martin and “Grumble” Jones were to
speed around from the south and north and catch him from behind at Bean’s
Station Gap.
On
December 14 Shackelford clashed with the infantry as scheduled, but the cavalry
failed their part. Jones to the north reached Bean’s Station Gap on time, but
his men, capturing Federal stores, fell apart as they took to enjoying their
spoils. Martin did not get there at all. He wasted valuable time setting up
artillery. This gave Shackelford time to realize the planned trap. He withdrew
to the other side of a stream and fortified a multi-storied hotel. Federals
converted the hotel into a fortress. Sharpshooters cut out portholes for their
rifles, allowing them to fire without presenting targets themselves. Archibald Gracie’s brigade of Johnson’s
division faced the hotel. One sharpshooter hit Gracie in the arm. The 16th
Alabama regiment advanced towards the building, but went to ground thanks to
accurate fire. They got up and advanced further, using undulations in the
ground to afford some protection. The men on their right poured a fire against
the hotel to cover their advance. They finally reached a stable, from where
they could fire back without serious exposure. Artillery fire finally drove the
Federals out of the hotel. The Alabamans took possession, capturing 3 Union
soldiers who had been left behind in the cellar. The Federal force in its
entirety retreated. While this gave the Confederates a tactical victory, the
Battle of Bean’s Station was really the latest failure.[22]
For
the rest of December and well into 1864, Longstreet’s army remained in East
Tennessee. There was little action during this period, but much drama. The
tensions and petty rivalries among Longstreet and his generals finally exploded
in a series of accusations and attempted court-martials. Longstreet in
particular targeted McLaws, Law, and Robertson and wrote to authorities in
Richmond to take action against them. Longstreet’s behavior was unseemly and
petty. He shifted the blame for his own failures to others, and he targeted
officers for events out of their control or honest mistakes. His targeting of
McLaws in particular was unwarranted. Longstreet’s charge was that he had not
shown the proper confidence and energy in the assault on Fort Sanders. Longstreet
charged him with not effectively covering the assault with sharpshooters,
failing to give proper instructions to his subordinates, and charging a point
“where the ditch was impassable.” Longstreet likely knew how ridiculous his
charges were, as he did not want to put McLaws through a court-martial. He
instead sent McLaws to Georgia, explaining that he might be “important to the
Government in some other position.” He did not want his services “impaired in
any way by a trial.”[23]
McLaws
was furious and demanded a court-martial to clear himself of these charges.
Corresponding with Samuel Cooper, the Adjutant-General of the Confederate Army,
he wrote “It is an easy matter after the assault is over to see where errors
have been committed.” McLaws felt he was being targeted to “draw attention away
from the main issue, which is the conduct of the campaign in East Tennessee
under General Longstreet.” He said Longstreet should have attacked or cut off
the enemy before he reached Knoxville, or at least attacked as soon as he
arrived at the city before the Federals bolstered their defenses. McLaws was
put on trial. Though found guilty, Cooper rescued him, overturning the verdict.
With his friendship with Longstreet destroyed, McLaws left the Army of Northern
Virginia and served on the defenses along the lower Atlantic coast.[24]
The
charges against Law produced the most drama. Fed up with Jenkins’ command and
Longstreet’s obvious favoritism, he briefly resigned. He then returned asking
for his former command. Longstreet accused him of resigning his command under
false pretenses. By coming back and asking for his former command, he was
setting a bad example for the troops “by encouraging them to hope for more
pleasant service in some field other than that to which they properly belong.”
Thus he refused to give him back his brigade. Adjutant-General Cooper did not
support the charges and ordered that Law be given back his command without any
court-martial. General Robert E. Lee himself intervened on Longstreet’s side.
Longstreet had written him and explained his point of view. Lee reviewed the
charges against Law and said that they were of “a very grave character.”
Considering Lee’s prestige, President Davis now had to step in and write to the
South’s favorite general. He reaffirmed Cooper’s stance that Law would not
undergo a court-martial. Despite support from the central government, Law would
not be able to command troops until June of 1864.[25]
The
charge against Robertson was his vocal defeatism at the Battle of Bean’s
Station. When ordered to attack the enemy, he instead gathered his regimental
commanders and said “That there are but three days’ rations on hand, and God
knows where more are to come from.” He complained that even if the battle was
won, the campaign was doomed to failure. This charge had more merit. Robertson
was likely stewing over Longstreet’s previous attempt to get rid of him.
Robertson would lose command of the Texas Brigade and spend the rest of the war
commanding reserve forces.[26]
Longstreet’s blame-shifting and squabbles with his subordinates came at a bad
time for the Army of Northern Virginia. In the words of the historian
Glatthaar, he “unnecessarily offended and alienated Law and drove McLaws, a
slow but skillful division commander, away from the army” right after the tide
of war in the east had started to swing in favor of the Union.[27]
 |
| While working on his illustrated report on his work at Knoxville, Poe poses for a picture with a fellow officer. |
Legacy
Longstreet
would temporarily redeem his reputation in the 1864 Overland Campaign. He
almost struck a major blow against the Union Army at the Battle of the
Wilderness, but was then shot by his own men. He did not return to service for
months. After the war he joined the Republican Party and converted to
Catholicism, both big no-no’s among white Southerners. His disastrous Knoxville
Campaign provided ammunition for his critics. They saw it as further evidence
that he was a terrible general and responsible for the defeat at Gettysburg.
While Longstreet’s reputation has been restored in the past half-century,
historians still agree that his conduct in Tennessee was less than exemplary
and downright unprofessional.
Burnside
was relieved of duties in East Tennessee. He was sent back to Virginia, where
he joined the Army of the Potomac with an enlarged IX Corps (it was bolstered
with an all black division under General Ferrero). The return of Burnside and
his corps created an issue, as he held seniority over General George Meade,
commander of the Army of the Potomac. As a result his one corps reported
directly to Grant, who personally oversaw the 1864 Overland Campaign.
Burnside’s reputation, which he had redeemed with excellent service in
Tennessee, once again plummeted when his corps botched and suffered in the
Battle of the Crater. Though yet another attempt at resignation was refused, he
sat out the rest of the war with no command.
The
Knoxville Campaign did have an effect on the war. By following Grant’s advice
and choosing to withdraw to Knoxville, Burnside served, in the words of his
biographer, as “live bait,” drawing Longstreet away from the already thinned
out Confederate lines ringing Chattanooga.[28]
However, control over East Tennessee proved to be fleeting. As most of the
Federals pulled out for campaigns in Georgia or Virginia, the Union hold on
this section of the state weakened. The cycle of irregular violence among
guerillas and vengeful civilians resumed. It was so terrible that after the war
the East Tennesseans, in the interest of post-war healing, chose to forget the
history of what happened between 1861 and 1865. Thus the Knoxville Campaign,
despite the participation of several of the most well-known generals of the war,
was shunted to the background of historical memory.[29]
There
is one lesson for historians that can be derived from the Knoxville Campaign.
It is to not elevate or demean the reputation of a historical figure based on a
handful of events. Longstreet has often been hailed as a forward-thinking
modern general, a genius poorly served by his subordination to Lee. Yet it was
clear that Longstreet could flounder, and flounder disastrously, when in
independent command. He should still be considered a great general, but prone
to poor judgment when entangled in military politics. This lesson holds true for
the other commanding general. Thanks to the disasters at Fredericksburg and the
Crater, Burnside has been dismissed my many Civil War buffs and even some historians
as an incompetent buffoon. But he not only served ably before the
Fredericksburg debacle, his performance in Kentucky and East Tennessee was
praiseworthy. With long and unreliable lines of communication and supply, he
was able to seize and hold East Tennessee while scoring a major victory over
Longstreet. Overlooked campaigns can often lead to new insights.
Sources
Memoirs
Alexander,
Edward Porter. Military Memoirs of a
Confederate: A Critical Narrative. New York: Scribner’s Sons, 1907.
Brearley, Will
H. Recollections of the East Tennessee
Campaign. Detroit: Tribune Book and Job Office, 1871.
Cutcheon,
Byron M. Recollections of Burnside’s East
Tennessee Campaign of 1863. 1902.
Longstreet,
James. From Manassas to Appomattox:
Memoirs of the Civil War in America. J.B. Lippincott and Co., 1896.
Sherman,
William Tecumseh. Memoirs. Penguin
Books edition, 2000.
Sorrel, G.
Moxley. Recollections of a Confederate
Staff Officer. New York: The Neale Publishing Company, 1917.
Wilshire, Joseph
W. A Reminiscence of Burnside’s Knoxville
Campaign: paper read before the Ohio Commandery of the Loyal Legion, April 3rd,
1912. Cincinnati: 1912.
Other Primary Sources
The War of the Rebellion: a Compilation of the
Official Records of the Union and Confederate Armies Vol. XXXI: Operations in Kentucky, Southwest
Virginia, Tennessee, Mississippi, North Alabama, and North Georgia. October
20-December 31, 1863. Washington D.C.
1894.
Poe, Orlando M.
“The Defense of Knoxville” in Battles and
Leaders of the Civil War Vol. III. New York: The Century Co., 1888
Secondary Sources
Cozzens, Peter The Shipwreck of their Hopes: The Battles
for Chattanooga. University of Illinois Press, 1996.
Glatthaar,
Joseph T. General Lee’s Army: From
Victory to Collapse. New York Simon & Schuster, 2008.
Hess, Earl J. The Civil War in the West: Victory and
Defeat from the Appalachians to the Mississippi. University of North
Carolina Press, 2012.
Korn, Jerry. The Fight for Chattanooga: Chickamauga to
Missionary Ridge. Time-Life Books, 1985.
Markel,
Joan L. Knoxville in the Civil War.
Arcadia Publishing Inc., 2013. Hoopla Edition.
-
“Knoxville: a Near-Death Experience,” https://www.battlefields.org/learn/articles/knoxville-near-death-experience, accessed December 3, 2020
Marvel,
William. Burnside. University of
North Carolina Press, 1991.
McPherson,
James. Battle Cry of Freedom: The Civil
War Era. Oxford University Press, 1988.
Mendoza,
Alexander. Confederate Struggle for
Command: General James Longstreet and the First Corps in the West. Texas
A&M University Press, 2008.
Wert, Jeffry D. General James Longstreet: The Confederacy’s
Most Controversial Soldier – A Biography. New York: Simon & Schuster,
1993.
Wilkinson,
Warren and Steven E Woodworth. A Scythe
of Fire: A Civil War Story of the Eighth Georgia Infantry Regiment. New
York: HarperCollins, 2002.
[1] Orlando M. Poe,
“The Defense of Knoxville” in Battles and
Leaders of the Civil War Vol. III, 737; Markel, 69; All of the forts and
redoubts were named after officers who had died in the last couple months.
[2] OR XXXI, 275-276, 295-296.
[3] OR XXXI, 297-299; Brearley 13.
[4] OR XXXI, 479, 531-532;
Alexander, 485-486; Mendoza, 129.
[5] Marvel, 318.
[6] Brearley, 30-31.
[7] OR 349, 366-367, 519; Poe, 740.
[8] Alexander, 485-486; Markel, 18.
[9] OR XXXI, 484, 486-487, 489; Korn
114.
[10] Alexander, 486-487; OR XXXI,
343; Wert, 350-351.
[11] OR XXXI 344; Cutcheon, 17;
Alexander, 488.
[12] OR XXXI, 344-345, 521; Korn,
114-115, 119.
[13] OR XXXI, 528; Sorrel, 210;
Cutcheon, 18; Poe, 743; Brearley 38; Longstreet 507.
[14] Poe, 743; Cutcheon 19; Korn,
115; Mendoza 137.
[15] Wert, 354.
[16] Sherman, 350-352; OR XXXI, 242.
[17] Sherman, 338-339.
[18] Brearley, 35, 42.
[19] OR XXXI, 271; Marvel 333.
[20] Alexander, 491; Sorrel 215; OR
XXXI, 533; Mendoza 138.
[21] OR XXXI, 500; Mendoza, 140.
[22] OR XXXI, 534-536; 546-547;
Mendoza 144-145; Wert, 355-356.
[23] OR XXXI, 469, 503-504.
[24] OR XXXI, 502; Wert, 363-364.
[25] OR XXXI, 471-474.
[26] OR XXXI, 470.
[27] Joseph T. Glatthaar, General Lee’s Army: From Victory to Collapse,
(New York Simon & Schuster, 2008), 351.
[28] Marvel, 324.
[29] Markel, 89; Markel, https://www.battlefields.org/learn/articles/knoxville-near-death-experience.
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