Florida Before
1864
The American Civil War almost began months earlier in Florida. In late 1860 exuberant Secessionists planned an assault on a weakened Fort Pickens on Santa Rosa Island, in Pensacola Harbor (the westernmost point of the state). However politicians intervened, believing this would paint the Confederates as the instigator of hostilities and drum up war support in the North. This fear was still fulfilled when South Carolinians fired on Fort Sumter in Charleston Harbor.[1] Almost immediately the war hit Florida hard. Its inhabitants were heavily dependent on ships to export its produced goods and import what they did not make themselves. The absence of Northern trade vessels as well as the blockade led to the shutdown of businesses and shops alongside rising prices.[2]
 |
| Governor John Milton |
Florida held few cities or other sites of strategic value. Also, defending its extensive coastline would be costly. Recognizing that the Federals would confine operations in this area to small raids and a couple important ports, the Confederacy was not interested in spending much men and material in this theater of war. Governor John Milton was aware of his light defenses. In 1861 the state troops received little in the way of ammunition. Unarmed men, as well as unused cavalry horses, were consuming the populace’s food without offering much in return. Milton complained that Florida felt overlooked by the central Confederate government and did not appreciate how its military resources were commanded from out of state. For the time being only small, scattered units of state troops would defend Florida.[3]
In
early 1862 the Union Navy under Admiral Du Pont assailed Fernandina in
Northeast Florida. The defenders were not prepared to face such a fleet and the
town was evacuated, with all available Confederate forces congregating further
south at Jacksonville, the expected next target. The Federal ships deposited
eight companies of infantry under General Horatio G. Wright. This was only a
“reconnaissance in force,” with the Federals not yet planning any permanent
occupation beyond Fernandina. Still, Floridians did not know this and
pro-Confederate citizens carried out an orgy of destruction on Unionist homes
and businesses before fleeing Jacksonville. The Federals advancing up the St.
Johns River arrived on March 12 to find a burned out town. The Union force met
with a positive reception, to the point that a Lieutenant Stevens expressed the
mistaken belief that northeast Florida was firmly Unionist in sentiment and
could be brought back from the Confederacy. Indeed, the area around
Jacksonville became a Unionist haven, and also a place where planters, having
suffered economic losses during the blockade, could now trade with Northern
cotton-starved businesses.
Unfortunately
for the Unionists, General David Hunter, having recently assumed command of the
Department of the South, decided his forces were overextended and ordered the
military evacuation of the town. This was a deep shock to Jacksonville’s Unionists.
Many evacuated to Northern cities rather than risk the wrath of Secessionists,
though the Union Navy did maintain a gunboat presence on the St. Johns River.
Violent groups of pro-Secessionists (called the Regulators) found an
opportunity to hunt or persecute deserters, Unionist refugees, and escaped
slaves. Actual Confederate soldiers occupied Jacksonville throughout the
remainder of spring, establishing order and protecting citizens and their
property from Regulator bands. Jacksonville, St. Augustine, and other major
towns became the only refuge for Unionists, who risked Regulator violence if
they departed them.[4]
 |
| General Joseph Finegan |
General Joseph Finegan was the main commander of Confederate forces. In pre-war Florida Finegan had been a businessman and politician. Though without military experience, his prominence got him a sizeable, if backwater, command. In response to the Federal incursions throughout 1862, he installed artillery positions on the St. Johns River. These were to contest the Federal gunboats. Finegan had an economic stake in contesting the ships, as he was one of many Floridian slaveholders who had lost wealth as their slaves ran to the safety of the ships. Finegan hoped that he could stem the tide of fugitives and prevent any further economic damage by the loss of labor. Aware of Finegan’s activities, naval commanders scrambled to bring Unionist families to safety. In the meantime Finegan began to assemble a force. It was not a large army and its ten big guns were assembled by a thorough search of the state.[5]
As
the Confederacy lost vital centers and waterways of transportation and
supplies, Florida rose in importance. It supplied food, usually in the form of
cattle, to the armies and was credited with keeping eastern Confederate forces
in the field. One Rebel in Charleston wrote, “We are almost entirely dependent
on Florida…We now have 40,000 troops and laborers to subsist. The supply of
bacon on hand in this city is 20,000 pounds and the cattle furnished by this
state is not one-tenth of what is required.” Another soldier in Savannah wrote
grimly, “Starvation stares the army in the face.” Northern Florida holds
several prairies, ideal for cattle herds. As happened further west, the
livestock was taken on cattle drives, the cowboys using old military trails or
cutting out new ones. By the dawn of 1864 Florida had sent 25,000 cattle
alongside 10,000 hogs in a year. One general gave a higher estimate that “Two
thousand head of cattle are reported to be driven out of Florida every week for
the Rebel armies.” The main recipients were the Army of Tennessee, currently
under General Braxton Bragg, and the coastal forces centered at Charleston,
South Carolina under General Pierre G.T. Beauregard. Florida was also providing
sugar to Georgia. While sugar crops might seem unimportant compared to the
herds of cattle and hogs, it should be remembered that as a valuable resource
of the Confederacy it could be used for trade via blockade runners.[6]
Union
generals recognized these developments and believed that if they seized the
interior of northern Florida, the southeastern Confederacy’s military forces
would crumble. Cutting off the state’s cattle became the primary military
objective of the Florida Expedition. If this food supply was cut off, Bragg and
Beauregard’s forces would face a logistical crisis. Bragg in particular would
need more food as General William T. Sherman’s Federal force in Tennessee was
bound to march on Atlanta. In addition to this objective, political and
economic considerations would strengthen the case for a Florida Expedition.[7]
The Florida
Scheme
By 1864 President Lincoln was facing a tough campaign for re-election. The length and cost of the war, his administration’s controversial violations of the Constitution, and typical partisan loyalty, was aiding the Democrats. Furthermore many within the Republican Party, displeased with the course of the war or following separate factions within the party, wanted new leadership. The President searched about for victories that would better his chances. Among these were Floridian voices. Unionists from Florida, such as Judge Philip Fraser, assured him that thousands in their state would flock to the cause and form a loyal government if a stronger military presence was established. Seeking any opportunity to strengthen his hand in November, Lincoln grew interested in backing an expedition. Hoping to take advantage of other Unionist factions in the secession states, he devised the Ten Percent Plan (announced in the Amnesty Proclamation on December 8, 1863), in which if ten percent of a state’s 1860 voting population swore allegiance to the Union then it would be officially readmitted. Of course these voters, as firm and now grateful Unionists, would be inclined to vote for Lincoln. The majority of Secessionists would not have a voice in the election as they would be considered rebels against the Union. In short, the Ten Percent Plan would cheat the electoral system in Lincoln’s favor.[8]
Other
opportunistic Northerners also had schemes for the state, some plotted well
before the Ten Percent Plan. In early 1863 Eli Thayer, a politician known for
supporting free-soilers in Kansas during the 1850s, proposed to colonize
Florida with free blacks and Union soldiers, with himself as military governor
of the state (of course) and Brigadier General James A. Garfield (yes, the
future president) as commander of the army itself. To make room for free labor,
they would have to forcibly remove thousands of white Southerners. Vice-President
Hamlin and 134 congressmen supported the scheme and called for a 20,000 man
army. To his credit Lincoln did not support this plan, finding that the mass seizure
of southern property and displacement of thousands would undermine attempts to
restore trust in the Union. Other voices, especially the press, lent their own criticisms,
seeing a Florida invasion as a waste of resources that could not deliver any
truly great blow to the Confederacy.[9]
Still,
plans for Florida continued to crop up. A circle of Northern businessmen, led
by Marshall O. Roberts, called for the government to seize the Florida
Railroad. Roberts and the others had actually owned the majority of stock in
the railroad, and of course lost it when the state went over to the
Confederacy. With the aid of Federal tax commissioner L.D. Stickney, they hoped
to regain control of the railroad for themselves. This would come to naught. In
possession of iron meant for the railroad, Stickney preferred to sell it and
make money for himself. He then failed, or purposefully neglected, to pay the
railroad taxes. Roberts and the other
investors had to sell while Stickney pursued new schemes related to the state.[10]
Less
self-serving were the Floridian exiles. Unionists who had escaped from
Jacksonville told anyone they could of their experiences in Florida. They
avidly consumed any incoming information on military operations on Florida,
learning how Union gunboats had thwarted Confederate attempts to block off the St
Johns River. Lincoln played to them, claiming that the abandonment of
Jacksonville was “a great blunder.”[11]
This encouraged the Floridian Unionists. On December 19 they gathered in
Federal-controlled Port Royal, South Carolina. The convention ended with a vote
for the state to be reorganized into the Union with the abolition of slavery and
exile of Confederate authorities. They followed up with a petition to Lincoln
requesting “armed occupation” of the state.[12]
Stickney joined the chorus, imploring Lincoln to liberate Florida from
“Confederate rule” and install a loyal governor. Though an unscrupulous man with
few connections, he had clout with Lincoln thanks to his professional
friendship with Secretary of the Treasury Salmon P. Chase. His voice thus held
weight out of proportion to his standing amongst other politicians.[13]
One
policy that attracted profiteers and Floridian Unionists alike was the Direct
Tax Law. The Direct Tax Law was to be implemented against occupied, Secessionist
areas. If the Secessionists did not pay the special tax, then their property
was subject to seizure by the Federal government. If more of Florida was
occupied, there could be more taxes to fund the Union war effort. Opportunists
saw a chance to get their hands on Floridian property while exiles realized
that this could result in a larger armed Federal force in their home state.[14]
In
December 1863 Stickney arrived at St. Augustine to call for the reconstruction
of Florida as a Union state. Around this time the Direct Tax Law was starting
to go into effect. The Florida Direct Tax Commission confiscated private
property, selling real estate at low prices. Stickney and Lincoln’s secretary
John Hay got in on the action, amassing property for themselves at low cost.
There was also talk of powerful political positions for Hay, and Stickney was
eager to ingratiate himself to the secretary and gain something for himself.[15]
One
final reason for a large movement in Florida was the absence of a port which
Floridians could use to export products. Between the blockade and Department of
Treasury regulations, the closest port that Floridians under Union occupation
could use was Port Royal, South Carolina. Unable to trade, Floridians suffered
from a strangled economy. General Quincy Adams Gillmore, head of the Department
of the South, hoped that further occupation of the state would result in
another approved port. Gillmore would get his chance, as Lincoln finally went
ahead in ordering the Florida Expedition.[16]
The Florida
Expedition Emerges
 |
| General John Gillmore |
On January 13 Lincoln sent his own message to Gillmore. This stressed the importance of the campaign to him:
I understand an effort is being made by some worthy gentlemen to reconstruct a loyal State government in Florida. Florida is in your department, and it is not unlikely that you may be there in person. I have given Mr. Hay a commission of major and sent him to you with some blank books and other blanks to aid in the reconstruction. He will explain as tot eh manner of using the blanks, and also my general views on the subject. It is desirable for all to co-operate; but if irreconcilable differences of opinion shall arise, you are master. I wish the thing done in the most speedy way possible, so that when done it will be within the range of the late proclamation on the subject. The detail labor, of course, will have to be done by others, but I shall be greatly obliged if you will give it such general supervision as you can find convenient with your strictly military duties.[17]
There
were four objectives, outlined by Gillmore in one of his general overviews.
1. Create
an outlet through which Floridian goods of lumber, timber, and cotton could be
exported to the North.
Gillmore
proposed to occupy the west bank of the St. Johns River and set up supply
depots. From there he would march his force further inland. On January 22
Secretary of War Edwin M. Stanton assured him that he could conduct operations
in any way he saw fit.[19]
Gillmore felt that he lacked the manpower to effectively carry out the
President’s wishes. He requested that recently formed colored regiments in the
North be sent to his department. With the extra manpower he could establish
permanent garrisons once he conquered northeastern Florida. He also lacked
cavalry, which he listed at “less than 300 effective men.” To temporarily solve
this issue he mounted “some of my very best infantry.”[20]
General-in-Chief
Henry W. Halleck stepped in. He was notorious for obstructing the wishes of field
and departmental commanders (when he felt that he knew better), and in saying
no with the most diplomatic wording or vague reasoning. He pointed out that
Stanton’s letter allowed him to conduct the campaign “entirely to your judgment
and discretion” but only “with the means at your command.” He then provided an
excuse for not sending the additional troops. “As the object of the expedition
has not been explained, it is impossible to judge here of its advantages or practicability.
If it is expected to give an outlet for cotton, or open a favorable field for
the enlistment of colored troops, the advantages may be sufficient to justify
the expense in money and troops. But simply as military operations I attach
very little importance to such expeditions. If successful they merely absorb
our troops in garrisons to occupy the places, but have little or no influences
upon the progress of the war.” Halleck surely must have been aware of the
campaign’s objective, as Lincoln himself had a vested interest in laying it
out. He was likely voicing his concern that these politically-motivated
campaigns in side theatres were a waste of manpower and resources.[21]
Gillmore responded with the aforementioned list of objectives. He made sure to mention to Halleck that Lincoln, through his private secretary Major John Hay, had also lent him these objectives. He restated his wish for horses and related gear so that he could mount a large portion of his infantry. He diplomatically added, “If the filling of these requisitions will occasion any embarrassment to the departments of supply they can be reduced 30 per cent.” He would get the resources for mounting part of his infantry, but Halleck would be slow in providing more men.[22]
Shortly, observers in Confederate Savannah, Georgia, reported about 35 ships disappearing into the fog. It was thought there might be an attack or invasion headed their way. On January 16 General Beauregard personally arrived and, until February 3, inspected the troops and defenses of the city. He returned to Charleston, but ordered Savannah’s commander, Major-General Gilmer, to hold his position with the 64th Georgia, 1st Florida Battalion, and a battery. Considering the possibility that the Union might be moving on Florida, he gave instructions for Gilmer to send these units southward should such a development occur.[23]
The Expedition
Starts
 |
| General Truman Seymour |
Gillmore would eventually make his way to Florida, but General Truman Seymour would lead the actual invasion force. Seymour had been among the officers at Fort Sumter when the war began. His presence at this historical moment garnered him some attention and a promotion to brigadier-general. It also saw him return to Charleston Harbor after a stint as a brigade commander in the Army of the Potomac. He commanded the assaults on Morris Island in July of 1863. The heavy losses among the black 54th Massachusetts against Battery Wagner caused outrage among abolitionists. They claimed that he was a coward who used black troops as cannon fodder. Robert Broadwater, author of a book on Olustee, thinks Seymour unfairly accused. Rather Seymour wanted to give the black soldiers a chance to prove themselves. The 54th had certainly been game for the opportunity. Seymour also proved his bravery at the same battle when a shell fragment struck him.[24] Seymour was not the most popular general in the Army, though some such as Lieutenant Tully McCrea of the 1st US Artillery called him “my favorite general here.” Still, his conduct throughout the Florida Expedition would see him ranked among the most disastrous generals of the war.[25]
A
look at the list of Seymour’s regiments suggests that, aside from a couple
untested black regiments, he had an experienced veteran force. In fact the
timing of the expedition was horrendous. The terms of enlistment for the
veterans had been set to expire at the end of 1863. The government assailed
them with various incentives to re-enlist. Among these were 30-day furloughs,
breaks for the men to spend a month at home. This occurred just as the Florida
Expedition was to start. Thus these white regiments were under strength and
holding fresh recruits, most of them conscripts or paid substitutes. Fears
concerning the new recruits would be partly justified. Many of the foreign-born
draft substitutes would straggle on the marches or desert, satisfied with
having gotten their enlistment bounty as well as whatever pay they had acquired
up to this point.[26]
The
7th New Hampshire had almost no veterans and about 300 of the new
recruits were German immigrants or French Canadians, creating an internal
language barrier. The history of the 7th Connecticut explains that
their 112 new recruits “were a bad lot, mostly young foreigners, many of them
ignorant of the names under which they had sold themselves for the bounty.” The
3rd Rhode Island Battery had so few men present that infantry were
assigned to help man the guns and limbers. The black 54th
Massachusetts had no expiring enlistments to deal with, but disease had
likewise rendered it under strength. The 8th USCT (United States
Colored Troops) was very green, and it was said that most of the men had never
actually mastered how to fire and reload their weapons. Most of them were
former slaves who of course would have not been allowed even a civilian’s
acquaintance with firearms.[27]
The
black regiments that would participate in the campaign were a mix of veterans
and new recruits. The 54th Massachusetts was well tested in
operations around Charleston Harbor. Its sister regiment, the 55th
Massachusetts, and the 8th USCT were very green. The 1st
North Carolina, officially renamed the 35th USCT, had not
participated in any major fights, but had experience on various raids. The
commander of two of the black regiments was former Kansas free-soil warrior
Colonel James Montgomery. Up to this point he had led liberated Carolina
slaves, including the 1st North Carolina. These new soldiers fought
an abolitionist war, marching about the swamps and plantations of the
countryside and liberating more slaves. While only engaged in light actions,
the black soldiers performed well enough that President Lincoln actually took
note of these underreported operations.[28]
 |
| Colonel James Montgomery |
Montgomery was to lead the 1st North Carolina, 54th Massachusetts and two white regiments, but the latter couple was held back so he only had two units under his command. Upon assuming his new position, Montgomery delivered an hour long speech regarding an ongoing pay issue. The 54th Massachusetts and other black regiments received less pay than white soldiers and many were refusing the dollars until they got equal treatment. Montgomery argued that the 54th Massachusetts was one of the more well-equipped units in the army and this was why they received less pay. The cost of the equipment had been deducted from the regular soldier’s pay. He also attempted to convince them that the Abolitionists had been riling them up. If these arguments were already shaky to begin with, Montgomery made matters worse with racially charged rhetoric. For example, he thought that race-mixing was a source of the men’s perceived attitude problem and encouraged the lighter-skinned in the ranks to marry the darkest women they could find.[29]
To
compensate for the lack of cavalry, the 40th Massachusetts was
redubbed the 40th Massachusetts Mounted Infantry. It was no small
feat for the infantry to quickly become a mounted force. A battalion of veteran
cavalry was incorporated into the regiment and served as a model for the rest
of the men. By all accounts the 40th Massachusetts performed
incredibly well in Florida.[30]
As for artillery, Seymour’s army had four batteries consisting of about 20
guns. There were some experienced gunners in these batteries. One of the
artillerists in the 1st US Artillery, Lieutenant Tully McCrea, was
actually a veteran of the Army of the Potomac and had helped repulse Pickett’s
Charge.[31]
Jacksonville
Landing
 |
| Old Map of Jacksonville |
On February 4 Gillmore ordered Seymour to “embark without delay.” His men were to carry six days’ rations, knapsacks, haversacks, blankets and at least “60 rounds of ammunition per man,” with more ammo in reserve. To ensure speed, camp equipment was to be packed up and also put in reserve. One wagon was to follow mounted regiments and two foot regiments. Gillmore seemed to have women on his mind, perhaps as another factor that would slow down Seymour. Seymour was to “give strict orders that none shall follow except regularly appointed laundresses.” Ambulance wagons and the hospital steamer Cosmopolitan would shortly follow.[32]
On
February 5 Gillmore commanded Seymour’s force to ride their steamboats to
Jacksonville. The launch of the expedition began under a pall, with wet, windy
weather. An officer of the 54th Massachusetts commented that it was
“not a nice day for an excursion.” Once Seymour landed, he was to hurry forward
his cavalry and seize control of the railroad junction at Baldwin, 20 miles
west of Jacksonville. Baldwin, according to Northern soldiers, did not warrant
the distinction of a town as it was so small. However it had railways leading
to three locations. The one that concerned Seymour was the route to Lake City.
It also linked to Fernandina and Tampa.[33]
Colonel
Guss’ 97th Pennsylvania, stationed at Fernandina to the north, was
to also get to Baldwin with instructions to tear up portions of the railroad
tracks and keep them obstructed “throughout Saturday night.” They were to keep
the tracks between Baldwin and Jacksonville intact so that Seymour could supply
his men, hopefully with a captured locomotive. Guss’ raid was to be executed
quick enough to trap and seize a Confederate train, as well as divert attention
from the landings at Jacksonville.[34]
The boats departed Hilton Head and the men learned that “we were destined for Jacksonville.” It took roughly 24 hours to get to the mouth of the St. Johns River. One boat, “in trying to cross the bar at the entrance to the river stuck fast in the bar. We were compelled to remain there all day waiting for the tide to rise and succeeded in crossing that night.” In hopes of speeding things up, the 7th New Hampshire, stuck on a boat, sent part of its regiment onto the hospital boat Cosmopolitan, which was already on the other side of the bar.[35] The boats which made it through experienced some wonderful scenery, a nice sight before the days of marching and battle ahead. As described in the history of the 7th New Hampshire:
The journey up the St. John’s River on these clear, sunny, February days was really beautiful; the green, marshy lowlands on one side reaching far inland and skirted by woodland of still darker green, while on the other hand, the low, broad landscape was frequently broken by precipitous bluffs and ranges of heavy timber on rolling upland. The channel was so narrow in places that the sides of our steamer would rub the marshy banks, and was, withal, so serpentine in its course that our boat was steered at almost all points of the compass in rotation, in its course up the river to Jacksonville.”[36]
On
February 7 the first boats reached Jacksonville. Corporal James Henry Gooding
of the 54th Massachusetts did not see any evidence of the promised, strong
Unionist sentiment. He wrote that as the steamboats entered the harbor, “the
women and children flocked to the wharves, or looked out of the windows, with a
seemingly sullen silence – no waving of handkerchiefs greeted the old flag as
it proudly floated from the peak of each vessel.”[37]
Jacksonville
only held a light guard. The defenders fired on the General Hunter, wounding one soldier of the 54th
Massachusetts, and also hit a sailor and a mate on the Maple Leaf. A detachment of the 54th Massachusetts under
Major John D. Appleton landed and gave chase, followed by Company C of the 40th
Massachusetts Mounted Infantry. They went on the nearby railroad and into the
woods “in pursuit of the mounted rebels.” They captured five of them and also
set fire to the buildings they used for sharpshooting.[38]
As
the Federals swarmed into the town, Finnegan’s outnumbered Confederates
withdrew, sinking the steamer St. Mary’s
and burning 270 bales of cotton. The Federals seized about 100 men, plenty of
ammunition, and best of all 8 artillery pieces. The army and navy began to
fight over the sunken St. Mary’s and
the prize for its capture. Gillmore claimed that the army deserved it because
its arrival had scared the defenders into abandoning and sinking it. Acting
Master Frank B. Meriam of the Norwich
said that it was his picket boat that blocked off escape and induced the
abandonment. It is not known who won the claim. What was known was that the
Federals now had a strong foothold on the state. It was just one victory, and
Seymour had a whole list of small, but significant towns and stations to
capture.[39]
The Confederate Response
 |
| General Pierre G.T. Beauregard. He was not present in Florida, but played a major role in assembling a proper army there via his use of interior lines and quick orders |
General Finegan wired Beauregard with the news of the invasion. The Creole responded quickly, telling Gilmer in Savannah to send his reserve force to reinforce Finegan. Beauregard likewise fired off a message to General William Gardner in West Florida to do the same. Brigadier-General Alfred Colquitt’s Georgia Brigade, station on James Island at Charleston, was to go to Savannah with a battery and from there get to Finegan as quickly as possible.[40]
Colquitt’s
brigade did not get far. The Federals, hoping to prevent any reinforcements
towards the south, struck at John’s Island, just south of James Island. The
majority of Colquitt’s men were recalled to help General Wise and the batteries
on Morris Island repel the Federals. By the 12th Colquitt was able
to get back to his original mission. Having stripped his garrisons at Savannah
and Charleston, Beauregard requested reinforcements from other quarters to man
these positions.[41]
The
main impediment to these various reinforcements was the railroad system. There
was a gap of 26 miles between the Georgia and Florida railways and not many
available cars for carrying the troops. Beauregard initially ordered
Brigadier-General Taliaferro, a veteran of the 1863 Charleston campaign, to
assume command in Florida, but chose Gardner instead as he had more seniority
and had just gotten off sick leave. Finegan had been a planter, lumber mill
operator, and politician, but he had no military experience prior to the war
and little chance to gain any during it. Beauregard understandably was wary of
entrusting him to repel a thousands-strong invasion. He ordered Finegan to
avoid any battles until more forces arrived.[42]
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[1] Daniel L. Schafer, Thunder on the River: the Civil War in
Northeast Florida, (Gainesville: University Press of Florida, 2010), 32-33.
[2] Schafer, Thunder on the River, 37.
[3] Robert P. Broadwater, The Battle of Olustee1864: The Final Union Attempt to Seize Florida, (Jefferson: McFarland & Company, Incorporated
Publishers, 2006), 1; William H. Nulty, Confederate Florida: The Road to Olustee, (The University of Alabama
Press, 1990), 11-13.
[4] Schafer, Thunder on the River, 48-49, 52-53, 58-65, 72-73, 78-79.
[5] Schafer, Thunder on the River, 91-93.
[6] Broadwater, Battle of Olustee, 1-2, 9-10; William Watson
Davis, Civil War and Reconstruction in
Florida, (New York: Columbia University, 1913), 268-270; Nulty, Confederate Florida, 66.
[7] Broadwater, Battle of Olustee, 10.
[8] Broadwater, Battle of Olustee, 13-14.
[9] Broadwater, Battle of Olustee, 16; Schafer, Thunder
on the River, 127-128.
[10] Broadwater, Battle of Olustee, 16; Nulty, Confederate
Florida, 60.
[11] Schafer, Thunder on the River, 124.
[12] Broadwater, Battle of Olustee, 16-17.
[13] Davis, Civil War and Reconstruction in Florida, 272-273.
[14] Schafer, Thunder on the River, 124-125.
[15] Schafer, Thunder on the River, 176.
[16] Nulty, Confederate Florida, 74.
[17] United States, The War of
the Rebellion: A Compilation of the Official Records of the Union and
Confederate Armies Vol. XXXV part 1, (Washington
D.C. 1891), 278.
[18] OR XXXV, part
1, 276.
[19] OR XXXV, part 1, 276, 278.
[20] OR XXXV, part 1, 278.
[21] OR XXXV, part 1, 279.
[22] OR XXXV, part
1, 279.
[23] OR XXXV, part 1, 321.
[24] Broadwater, Battle of Olustee, 21-22.
[25] “Letters and
History of 1st Lieutenant Tully McCrea: Battery M, First U.S.
Artillery,” http://battleof-olustee.org/letters/index.html
[26] Broadwater, Battle of Olustee, 23-24, 90-91; Stephen W. Walkley, History of the Seventh
Connecticut Volunteer Infantry, Hawley’s Brigade, Terry’s Division, Tent Army Corps,
161-1865, (Hartford, 1905), 116; William Marvel, Andersonville: The Last Depot,
(University of North Carolina Press, 1994), 31-32.
[27] Broadwater, Battle of Olustee, 23-24, 90-91; Walkley, Seventh
Connecticut Volunteer Infantry, 116; Boston Journal, March 4, 1864, http://battleofolustee.org/letters/index.html.
[28] Robert C. Conner, James Montgomery: Abolitionist Warrior,
(Casemate: April 13, 2022, hoopla edition), 56-59.
[29] George E. Stephens, A Voice of Thunder: A Black Soldier’s Civil War,
(Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1998), 278-279.
[30] “Praising the 40th
Massachusetts Mounted Infantry,” Chelsea
Telegraph and Pioneer, March 12, 1864. http://battleofolustee.org/letters/index.html.
[31] “Letters and
History of 1st Lieutenant Tully McCrea: Battery M, First U.S.
Artillery,” http://battleofolustee.org/letters/index.html
[32] OR XXXV, part 1, 280.
[33] OR XXXV, part 1, 276; The Christian Recorder, April 16, 1864, http://battleofolustee.org/letters/index.html.
[34] OR XXXV, part 1, 281.
[35] Letters and History of 1st
Lieutenant Tully McCrea: Battery M, First U.S. Artillery,” http://battleofolustee.org/letters/index.html,
Henry F.W. Little, The Seventh Regiment
New Hampshire Volunteers in the War of the Rebellion, (Concord: I.C. Evans,
1896), 209-210.
[36] Little, Seventh Regiment New Hampshire, 210.
[37] James Henry Gooding, On the Altar of Freedom: A Black Soldier’s Civil
War Letters from the Front, University of Massachusetts Press, 1991), 112.
[38] OR XXXV, part
1, 295; Boston Herald, February 22,
1864, http://battleofolustee.org/letters/index.html.
Broadwater, Battle of Olustee, 27-28.
[39] OR XXXV, part 1, 281;
Broadwater, Battle of Olustee, 27.
[40] OR XXXV, part 1, 321-322.
[41] OR XXXV, part 1, 321-322.
[42] OR XXXV, part
1, 323; Alfred Roman, The Military
Operations of General Beauregard in the War between the States 1861 to 1865
Vol. II, (New York: Harper, 1883), 185; Broadwater, Battle of Olustee, 32-33.
[43] Broadwater, Battle of Olustee, 58.
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