The Retreat
Colonel
Barton claimed that his men had “not a single round of ammunition remaining.”[1]
The artillery was in desperate straits as well. Langdon was down to 7 unwounded
artillerists to draw his remaining guns off. Langdon ran for Seymour. All about
him the firing was so intense that men were “being struck every instant.”
Reaching his commander, he asked for men to help draw back the guns, as the
caissons were far in the rear. There were no men to spare.[2]
Seymour
tried to inspire his men to further defense. To instill caution in the enemy
and slow them down, he suggested that the men give out loud cheers to give the
impression that they were not so vulnerable. Captain Dana was about to order
the cheers when a limping soldier passed by. Overhearing what the commander
wanted, he issued a “hurrah for gen. Seymour and with the last word a stream of
blood spurted from his mouth and he fell on his face dead.”[3]
The 54th Massachusetts had refused the initial order to retreat as it came from the unpopular James Montgomery. Colonel Hallowell intervened and gave the order himself. This time they complied. They enacted Seymour’s cheering plan. The black troops gave nine shouts of victory, then in an act of audacious defiance about-faced and marched away from the Confederates at a regular pace. Every couple hundred yards they turned and delivered a volley. One staff officer of Seymour’s liked to believe that the cheering strategy gave the enemy doubts and produced the lack of a strong pursuit, but in reality darkness and exhaustion affected the enemy infantry.[4] Captain Robert Newell had a more chaotic take on the retreat. “There were a number of stragglers on my right and left, who had rushed forward & been fighting on their own account, several of these were hit, and I shall never forget the cry of agony of one poor fellow who was hurrying to catch up to the rest & fell forward on his hands & knees disabled, for the men expected no mercy if taken remembering Fort Wagner, & made desperate exertions to get away.”[5]
The
54th Massachusetts kept in good order and helped slow down the
enemy. While praising his regiment, George Stephens, a well-read and highly
literate black soldier, confessed that if the enemy simply surged forward the rear
guard would have done little good.[6]
Elsewhere a bullet had made a nasty gash in the head of Sergeant Stephen A.
Swails, one of the leading black soldiers of the 54th. Despite his
head wound, he tried to steer the rest of the men on the right escape route to
Baldwin. The exertion was too much for him and he fell on the roadside,
exhausted. Lieutenant Lewis Reed of the same regiment saw him and got him onto
a cart. He would receive “special praise” form Colonel Hallowell for his
determination and care for the men.[7]
There
was also a servant who was trying to rescue a mule. This mule held Colonel
Hallowell’s personal gear, such as cooking utensils. The guards would not allow
the mule and his handler to pass. The servant pleaded, “Gentlemen, for God’s
sake, let the mule go!” The mule, “taking matters into its own hands,” suddenly
broke through, cooking utensils falling off its back. The incident amused the
54th and “Let the mule go!” became an inside joke.[8]
Elements
of the 7th New Hampshire, organized by Captain James M. Chase, formed
another rear guard. This group was motivated by the plight of the wounded, who
would be captured if the Rebels advanced unimpeded. A bullet struck Chase’s
left foot, but he was still able to walk and lead. Unfortunately the weight of
the Confederate line was too strong. Instead of holding them off, the
Hampshireans had to retreat. Still, Chase’s impromptu unit loaded and fired
throughout, somewhat stemming the enemy tide.[9]
There
was a more singular act of bravery. Sergeant Henry Lang of the 48th
New York had gotten to the point where he was singlehandedly fighting from an
abandoned section of artillery with his 60 rounds of ammunition. His foes
darted from tree to tree as they closed in on him, firing away at this lone
individual. Lang recalled that “Everything about me was shot away – my canteen,
my haversack, the skirts of my blouse; on the other hand, my cartridges were
also ominously disappearing down to the fifty-sixth. I leveled to fire the
fifty-seventh round at a cluster of heads behind a pine trunk.” Finally the
Confederates hit Lang himself, a bullet striking his leg. Reclining against a
tree, he awaited the arrival of the enemy. They gathered about him and asked,
“Are you the man that was among the guns?” When he confirmed this they
exclaimed “Bully boy!”[10]
Hoping
to bag more of the Federals before they escaped, General Colquitt ordered Colonel
Harrison to flank the enemy’s right. The 6th and 32nd
Georgia moved forward, turned, and placed the retreating Federals in a crossfire.[11]
The 7th Connecticut had opened the battle. Now it closed it as a
rear guard. If the regimental history is to be believed, Seymour selected them
because he could not “trust any other regiment.” Their ammunition was
replenished by this point as well. They were supported by Elder’s Horse
Artillery and a section of the 3rd Rhode Island Artillery. One gun
was “unlimbered and loaded with double shot of canister.” Its gunners aimed it
at the Confederate pursuers and, when they were close, fired, “mowing them down
like grass.” One artillerist, Metcalf, claimed that this saved the rest of the
army by stopping the pursuit. In reality only part of the Confederate army
followed in the darkening environment. Most were recovering from their long,
exhausting fight.[12]
Amidst
all this chaos, Majer and his medical staff now faced a daunting task. From the
hospital they had to transport around 800 wounded men in the face of a rapidly
advancing enemy. They rose to the challenge. “Ambulances, caissons, army
wagons, litters, single horses, cars, in short, every conceivable mode of
carrying was made use of to secure the large number of our wounded…” Only about
40 unfortunates had to be left behind, under the care of Assistant Surgeon C.A.
Devendorf from the 48th New York. A note was sent ahead to the field
hospital at Barber’s Station: “A large number of wounded, Prepare coffee, tea,
and beef soup.” Majer also asked for “a train of cars with bales of hay, lint,
bandages, and stimulants” and requested the assistance of the Sanitary
Commission.[13]
Dr.
Heichold, the surgeon of the 1st North Carolina, favored the black
troops when loading the wounded onto the ambulances. He even gave orders that
white soldiers were not to be let on unless there was room. This was not merely
favoritism to his regiment. When somebody called him out on his discrimination,
he replied, “I know what will become of the white troops who fall into the
enemy’s possession, but I am not certain as to the fate of the colored troops.”
This proved to be a wise move, based on Confederate actions after the battle.[14]
Given
the reputation of Civil War prison camps, the white troops were also not eager
to fall into enemy hands. “We all concluded that it would be better to die
walking or even crawling towards freedom, than to starve to death in rebel
dungeons; so we moved off toward Barber’s.” Men from the 40th
Massachusetts dismounted their horses and gave them to the wounded. This saved
many from capture. The mount of New Yorker James Clark carried him a mile when
it gave out and “lay down in the mud to die.” An officer on horseback found him
and lent him his own steed.[15]
On
the Confederate side, General Finegan ordered cavalry commander Colonel Caraway
Smith to organize a pursuit. Smith did not do so, and cited many reasons of
varying legitimacy. He said it was too dark to discern the enemy lines (maybe),
that there were reports of a Federal cavalry force (not true), that the terrain
lent itself to enemy ambushes (not likely), and that telegraph wire had been
spread along the road to block any riders (true). Regardless, he became the
most heavily criticized major officer on the Confederate side of the battle.
Finegan pointed to the incredibly low casualties of the cavalry as evidence
that Smith did not utilize his men with proper vigor. General Gardner, who
would assume command days later, was also dissatisfied with Smith and looked
for somebody else to command the cavalry contingent.[16]
Though
Smith failed to carry out his orders, some of the cavalry moved forward on
their own initiative. Part of the 2nd Florida Cavalry rode through
the night and hit Baldwin on the morning of the 21st, availing
themselves of enemy stores of food. They also learned that Union wagons had
already evacuated the town. A sergeant of the 54th Massachusetts was
helping a wounded man along when enemy cavalry came upon them. The sergeant
dropped his injured comrade and raised his rifle while a Rebel officer raised
his revolver. They fired at the same time. The sergeant died, but not before
inflicting a wound on the officer.[17]
One officer of the 2nd Florida Cavalry claimed that his unit
captured about 200 wounded Federals, but did not mention any captures of
unwounded soldiers.[18]
Interestingly many of the white soldiers dropped most of their gear, including
weapons, to make it easier to get away. The black soldiers, fearful of what
would happen if the enemy cavalry did catch up to them, kept their gear so that
they could defend themselves.[19]
The
victorious Confederates took some time to enjoy their success One wrote a
poetic account of the battle. He ended with, “Ah, I fell the exultation. The
enemy is retreating – retreating before the brave fellows who wear the tattered
gray; and I smile to see the bullet scarred flags of my country floating
triumphantly in the pine scented air of my native land.”[20]
A Florida cavalryman wrote:
My Dear, Dear Wife - I am
now writing with a Yankee pen, Yankee ink and on Yankee Paper captured on the
battlefield. We had one of the hottest contested battles of the war on
yesterday, commencing about 2 o’clock pm and ending 1/2 past 5 pm and during
the whole time there was not a moment’s cessation in the fire. Men never fought
better than our men did and God seemed to shield them in great measure from
destruction as the loss on our side is comparatively light.
Lieutenant
Grant of the engineers surveyed the aftermath of the battle and included his
observations in his April report. “The infantry fire during the whole
engagement was continuous, and on our side very effective. The artillery fire
on both sides, judging from the marks upon the trees, was entirely too high,
and did comparatively little damage. Our men sheltered themselves behind the
trees, as was evident from the number who were wounded in the arms and hands,
thus gaining considerable advantage over the enemy, who used the trees to a
less extent.”[21]
Another Confederate dwelled on the human cost:
I went over the battleground
this morning on my way to camp and never in all my life have I seen such a
distressing sight, some men with their legs carried off others with their
brains out and mangled in every conceivable way and then our men commenced
stripping them of their clothing and left their bodies naked. I never want to
see another battle or go on the field after it is over. I could stand and count
20 or 30 dead Yankees at one sight [sic] and I counted 12 fine horses killed in
20 steps of each other.[22]
The Massacre
William
Penniman of the 4th Georgia Cavalry had just returned from chasing
down retreating Federals. His account of what he saw at the battlefield is one
of the more quoted sources of an atrocity:
In passing over the field, and the road ran centering through it,
my attention was first attracted to the bodies of the yankees, invariably
stripped, shoes first and clothing next. Their white bodies looked ghastly
enough, but I particularly noticed that firing seemed to be going on in every
direction, until the reports sounded almost frequent enough to resemble the
work of skirmishers. A young officer was standing in the road in front of me
and I asked him, "What is the meaning of all this firing I hear going
on." His reply to me was, "Shooting niggers Sir. I have tried to make
the boys desist but I can't control them." I made some answer in effect
that it seemed horrible to kill the wounded devils, and he again answered,
"That's so Sir, but one young fellow over yonder told me the niggers
killed his brother after being wounded, at Fort Pillow, and he was twenty three
years old, that he had already killed nineteen and needed only four more to
make the matter even, so I told him to go ahead and finish the job." I
rode on but the firing continued.
The next morning
Penniman found plenty of dead black soldiers. He recognized them as merely
wounded the evening before. There was more killing in store, though. One large
black soldier was interrogated. A Rebel asked “how it happened that he had come
back to fight his old master.” He was said to have given a “very insolent
reply. The man who asked him the question hit him in the head with the butt of
his musket, killing him. The most horrifying atrocity, if Penniman is to be
believed, is that wounded blacks were amputated by the surgeon. According to
Penniman many of them were only lightly wounded and the amputations were a form
of torture.[23]
Penniman’s
discovery is supported by several other sources. Earlier on when the battle
started in earnest, Lieutenant-Colonel McCormick of the 2nd Florida
Cavalry told his men that the Union “Army is made up largely of negroes from
Georgia and South Carolina, who have come to steal, pillage, run over the state
and murder, kill and rape our wives, daughters and sweethearts. Let’s teach
them a lesson. I shall not take any negro prisoners in this fight."[24]
According to one letter many of the boys took such advice to heart. One wrote
to his mother, “How our boys did walk into the niggers, they would beg and pray
but it did no good.”[25]
Private James Jordan of the 27th Georgia freely wrote that his
comrades “killed some of them after they had fell in our hands wounded.”[26]
Joab
Roach, a Georgian, wrote, “after the battle the boys went over the battlefield
and knoct [sic] the most of the wounded negros in the head with lightwood
knots.”[27]
One of the white soldiers left wounded on the field lay near another wounded
man form the 8th USCT. He saw a mounted Confederate officer came by
and say, “Ah, you black rascal, you will not remain here long!” The officer got
off his horse, drew his revolver, and blasted the wounded man in the head.[28]
One soldier who arrived after the battle had ended reflected that any follow-up
encounter would “be a desperate one for we know we will not meet with any mercy
if we fall into the hands of niggers & I tell you they do not meet with
mercy from us.”[29]
Far
from all were killed. Many of the missing black troops appeared in Confederate
reports as captured, mostly wounded. At this stage of the war captured black
soldiers were still fairly rare. General Finegan asked Beauregard, “What shall
I do with the large number of the enemy’s wounded in my hands? Many of these
are negroes.”[30] Perhaps
acting on a response from Beauregard, the victorious officers, for various
reasons ranging from compassion to a fear of Union reprisals, shipped them to
prisoner of war camps alongside their white allies instead of sanctioning further
massacre. Declared Confederate policies of re-enslavement and execution were
often ignored for practical reasons.[31]
However, the Confederates still gave them prejudicial
treatment. Wounded blacks were neglected while white prisoners were treated. Some
simply succumbed to untreated wounds and died in the streets of Lake City,
while Confederates picked off others by clubbing them in the head. A few
Confederate sources claimed that the blacks in their own camp, likely personal
servants, distanced themselves from the black Federal soldiers and participated
in the killings. Some were said to have scoured the field right after the
battle, killing wounded black soldiers for their valuable footwear. These
accounts are heavily ignored by historians who see them as self-serving tales
of faithful negroes. I’m inclined to agree with them, though evil takes root
even amongst commonly oppressed groups.[32]
Of course, Confederate prison camps at this late stage of the war were not the best places to be sent to. For many of the captured white and black Federals from Olustee, misery and often death awaited them. One black soldier, Corporal James Goodling was presumed dead. In fact he was wounded in the thigh. He was not executed, but instead sent to Andersonville. He died there on July 19 of that year. It could have been starvation, disease, or simply the refusal of his captors to treat his wounds. Even days to weeks after the battle, wounded black prisoners from Olustee remained untreated at Andersonville. One refused to work because he was still wounded. His captors punished him with a whipping.[33]
Colonel Charles Fribley
The
Confederates also targeted the white officers of the colored regiments. Among
those they derided was the killed Colonel Charles Fribley of the 8th USCT. General
Gardner allowed Fribley’s personal effects to be delivered to the Federals, but
more from sympathy for his widow rather than any respect for the man. The Savannah Daily Morning News was even
less kind, impugning him as a raider and race-mixer. It reported:
Such was the case with the redoubtable
Col. Frieble [sic[, of a negro regiment, in whose pocket was found a letter
from his wife (query black or white?) asking him to “confiscate” for her “a
nice saddle when he reached Tallahassee.” Yes! The black-hearted Frieble had a
dog’s burial. A leader of a horde of infuriated negroes, on a mission of
murder, robbery and rape, ought he not have been left to rot on the plain, to
the obscene birds to fatten on his vitals, and the great wolves to gnaw on his
bones?[34]
Major
Archibald Bogle of the 1st North Carolina also got flack for his position
as a white officer in a black regiment. His captors sent him to Andersonville
alongside the enlisted men. When they arrived he still could not walk so they
carried him in on a litter. His captors gave him no treatment for his wounds.
Somehow he got enough strength back to hobble about on crutches. He made his
way to the prison hospital where a fellow prisoner began to bandage his leg.
The Confederates interrupted his treatment. Still he would survive long enough
to be paroled in March, 1865, and lived years afterward.[35]
The
victory at Olustee had bagged the largest number of black prisoners yet. This
created a major issue involving prisoner exchanges. The Confederates were
actually quite willing to treat free blacks like any other prisoner of war.
Negotiations broke down, however, over those who had run away from their
masters to enlist in the Union Army. This helped lead to the end of prisoner
exchanges, condemning tens of thousands of men to wallow in horrid prison camps
both North and South.[36]
In discussing the post-battle massacre at Olustee in Black Flag over Dixie, historian David
Coles writes that the actual scale of it will never be known. It could have
been a wide-scale event such as what would occur later at Poison Spring and
Fort Pillow or it might have been a scattered series of actions by incensed
Confederates. My personal opinion is that it was the latter. There were at
least 200 captured black soldiers. Soldiers seemed to act on their own
initiative, some with encouragement from a couple officers such as McCormick of
the 2nd Florida Cavalry. Their emotions must have been running high
after such an intense, hours long battle.[37] There was one
unique casualty of the 8th US Colored Troops, but he made it off the
battlefield before he could be captured. It was the white dog Lion. He had been
lightly wounded in the leg. He would continue to see service with the men.[38]
 |
| Ironically, this informative historical marker labeled "A Bloody Massacre" covers the scale of combat deaths rather than the actual massacre. |
Some veterans criticized the black soldiers, claiming that they ran like cowards. For the most part, however, it was understood that they acted no differently than white troops thrust piecemeal against a full brigade of Confederates. Seymour reported, “The colored troops behaved creditably – the Fifty-fourth Massachusetts and First North Carolina like veterans. It was not in their conduct that can be found the chief cause of failure, but in the unanticipated yielding of a white regiment from which there was every reason to expect noble service, and at a moment when everything depended upon its firmness.”[39] A “gentleman who accompanied General Seymour” further talked up the 54th for readers back home. He claimed that they actually “broke the rebel ranks” and rescued the 8th USCT’s flag for them twice. Though this writer exaggerated the regiment’s accomplishments, such talk did help produce more positive feelings about black soldiers.[40]
Corporal
James Gooding of the same regiment boasted, “…Had it not been for the glorious
Fifty-fourth Massachusetts, the whole brigade would have been captured or
annihilated. This was the only regiment that rallied, broke the rebel ranks,
and saved us.”[41] Indeed,
the one positive result of the battle for the Union is that the 54th’s
notable performance in the battle’s last quarter, where they stemmed the
Confederate tide and were among the few units to retreat in good order,
received much attention in the press. Many white Northerners were convinced
that blacks could be great, courageous soldiers.[42]
Amidst
all this slaughter there was an act of humanity for a white soldier. Sergeant
Henry Lang, the New Yorker who had singlehandedly challenged a group of Rebels,
had won his enemy’s respect. Left at the tree where he reclined, he found
himself getting cold as night fell. Two Confederates aided him, starting a fire
to keep him warm. They also brought him a blanket and some water.[43]
The Pursuit
Despite
Smith’s failure to pursue with the cavalry, Finegan still hoped to catch up to
Seymour and deliver a killing blow. He advanced his force. Seymour reached
Sanderson, where Major Appleton of the 54th Massachusetts had formed
a battle line with his remaining men. He merged with Seymour and the army
continued out of Sanderson. The Federals tried to delay Finegan by wrecking
three quarter-miles of the railway. The first major stop for the retreating
Federals was Barber’s. Seymour ordered all army stores burned. He also ordered the
destruction of the property of a civilian named Derby. Derby had turned out to
be an informant for the Confederates. They moved on to Baldwin. The
Confederates, still low on available cavalry to catch up with the retreating
foe, ground to a halt at Barber’s Place.[44]
The Union army’s destruction and denial of supplies to the enemy continued at
Baldwin. Some of the black soldiers broke crates of cartridges open with bayonets
and axes, then emptied them into a watery ditch. The 7th New
Hampshire burned cotton and 500 barrels of resin. As the army left the inferno,
the flames grew so intense that they dried up the ditch, saving the ammunition
if not the powder.[45]
Once they had been transported to Baldwin and
out of immediate danger, the wounded crowded onto railroad cars. They were so
packed that when they started, the men had to cling to each other so as not to
fall off the sides.” Overburdened, the locomotive then broke down. Seymour gave
the 54th Massachusetts an incredibly difficult task. He wanted them
to backtrack to Ten Mile Station and bring the cars themselves. “It was a hard
trial for the footsore and hungry men to retrace their steps; but the thought
of the cars laden with wounded nerved them to the task, so they faced about
cheerfully.” The wounded on the train “suffered badly. They had nothing to eat
or drink, were so crowded that they could not sleep, and no chance to change
their cramped and painful positions.” Arriving at Ten Mile Station, they hooked
long ropes up to the engine and cars. The regiment manually pulled the cars
along the tracks. When they reached Camp Finegan they were relieved to have
help in the form of mules. Dr. Marsh, from the Sanitary Commission, saw the men
dragging their wounded comrades and wondered, “Does history record a nobler
deed?”[46]
General
William Gardner was on the way to assume command of Confederate forces in east
Florida. Thanks to the personal drama involved, it is hard to figure out
exactly how the changes in command and strategy came about. On the 22nd,
Gardner sent a message to Finegan informing him of the change in command. He attempted to be diplomatic,
expressing his regret that he should be coming in mid-campaign. He then recommended
that Finegan stop his pursuit
and take a defensive position on the west bank of the St. Mary’s River. If the
Union force was on the west side with him, he was to fall back to Ocean Pond.
Finegan claimed he never received this message, yet he wrote write to
Beauregard that Gardner halted his movement on the 22nd. (the
suspicion is that Finegan, not appreciative of how his superiors were seeking
to replace him after he had scored a victory, willingly ignored the order so he
could finish off Seymour). The next day Gardner sent another message saying
that the time for “reaping the full benefit of our success has passed” and that
Finegan should abandon his pursuit. He told Finegan to advance across the St.
Mary’s, but to leave a safe route of retreat just in case.
Finegan entered Baldwin on the 23rd.
They found 130,000 rounds of small-arm ammunition, which the Federals had
thrown into the ditch. They were able to recover the balls, but the powder of
course had been destroyed by the water. While the powder was lost, the ordnance
department was able to recover the percussion caps for the weapons they
captured. The victorious units that participated at Olustee were now among the
best-armed men in the Confederacy. On the 24th Finegan, with a hint of sarcasm, wrote Beauregard
that he would readily give over command to Gardner or Taliaferro since they
seemed to have a better idea of what to do than the general out in the field.
Gardner personally arrived on the 26th and halted all forward
movement at McGirt’s Creek.[47]
Finegan
was frustrated, feeling that his leadership was slighted and also that a great
opportunity had been lost to land a final blow against the Florida Expedition. He
wrote to Beauregard that “no officer residing at Tallahassee or Quincy can
intelligently control an army in this portion of the State with an active enemy
in the front.” Writing that he did the best he could under the circumstances,
he, in a roundabout fashion, said “It is not for me to question the reason that
induced the commanding genera to order General Gardner to control the movements
of the troops in East Florida from his headquarters…after the enemy had been
signally defeated and driven back to Jacksonville, and perhaps on board of his
transports.” As discussed earlier, Beauregard ordered Gardner to assume overall
command because he was the most senior officer bringing reinforcements to East
Florida. Finegan seemed to suspect that Beauregard had found fault in his
conduct.[48]
About
two weeks later Gardner responded to Finegan’s criticism and defended his
choice to halt the army. “Having been placed in command, I felt I would be held
responsible for any disaster that might befall the army.” He halted the army at
McGirt’s Creek because Finegan had failed in his initial pursuit following the
battle (Gardner did acknowledge that Caraway Smith had great responsibility for
this mistake). The Union army had gotten the time to strengthen its position
around Jacksonville, where gunboats could blast away at any Confederate
assault. Gardner also cited low ammunition as a reason for halting.[49]
Losses
Barton’s
brigade was hit the heaviest. The 115th New York lost 29 killed, 208 wounded, and 59 missing
for a total of 289; the 47th New York 30 killed, 197 wounded, and 86
missing for a total of 313; and the 48th New York 17 killed, 154
wounded, and 44 missing for a total of 215. Barton’s brigade lost 824 men, a
very heavy number considering Seymour had 5,500 men on hand. This was only one
brigade.
Hawley’s
brigade also incurred heavy losses. The 7th Connecticut saw 5 men
killed, 42 wounded, and 22 missing for a total of 69; the 7th New
Hampshire Volunteers 17 killed, 71 wounded, and 120 missing for a total of 208;
and the 8th US Colored Troops 49 killed, 188 wounded, and 73 wounded
for a total of 310. The number of missing was particularly high among the 7th
New Hampshire and 8th US Colored. This is not surprising since these
units quickly panicked under heavy fire and scattered. The brigade suffered 587
casualties in total.
The
official totals for Colonel Montgomery’s two regiments was 22 killed, 131
wounded, and 87 missing (230 total) for the 1st North Carolina
Colored and 13 killed, 65 wounded, and 11 missing (86 total) for the 54th
Massachusetts. The 54th Massachusetts suffered far less than they did
the previous summer on Morris Island, Charleston. The numbers of dead for both
regiments for both regiments, particularly the 1st North Carolina,
was obviously much higher when one takes the slaughter of the “missing” by the
victors. Montgomery lost 316 overall.
The
mounted units, as usual in these battles, saw lighter losses. The 40th
Massachusetts Mounted Infantry suffered 2 killed, 29 wounded, and 5 missing for
a total of 36; Battery B of the 1st US Horse Artillery 3 killed, 13
wounded, and 1 missing for a total of 16; and the Independent Battalion
Massachusetts Cavalry 5 wounded. This was 57 for Henry’s command. For the
artillery Battery E of the 3rd US Artillery incurred 11 killed, 22
wounded, and 6 missing for a total of 39; Battery M of the 1st US Artillery
4 killed, 22 wounded, and 6 missing for a total of 32; and Battery C of the 3rd
Rhode Island Artillery 1 killed and 5 wounded for a total of 6. The artillery
in total suffered 77 casualties.
Seymour’s
total losses (not factoring that many to most of the missing black troops were
actually killed) were 203 killed, 1,152 wounded, and 506 missing. This amounted
to an astonishing 1,861 (Seymour also counted 120 dead horses). In one battle
the Florida Expedition suffered a 33% casualty rate. It should also be noted
that a few larger battles saw equal or less casualties. At the Battle of Pea
Ridge, for example, General Samuel Curtis had almost twice as many men as
Seymour and lost less men at 1,381. By the end of the war, Olustee would be
ranked as the second most proportionately bloody battle for Union forces at 265
casualties per 1,000 men (June 14 of Port Hudson ranks first).[50]
Surgeon
Majer provided a glimpse of hope. He estimate that around 500 of the wounded
would “be able for duty in less than four weeks, and our loss therefore will be
merely temporary.”[51] In fact “a great proportion” of the
wounds were in the legs and feet. One source in the Boston Herald wrote, “The enemy fired very low, and there are a
great many lame shins, I assure you. Had the wounds been all of this character,
it would have been almost ludicrous to see men catching up with their feet, all
along the lines, when they were struck, as they were walking on coals.”[52]
Seymour put his artillery losses at six guns.[53]
Among
the wounded officers was Lieutenant McCrea of the 1st US Artillery.
From a hospital a week and a half later he wrote his wife: “I was shot through both legs—compound fracture of the left
leg and a flesh wound through the fleshy part of the right, both below the
knee. Neither wound is dangerous, but the one in the left leg has been very
painful. I was compelled to ride two nights and one day over the rough roads in
an ambulance and all the next day was at sea in a steamer bound for this place.
The torture was very great and I had never before suffered such physical pain.”
McCrea would be lame for the rest of his life and would see no further action
in the war. Instead he taught geography and other subjects at West Point.[54]
One of the more potentially tragic losses was Corporal Daniel Grant of the 115th
New York. He was on the cusp of a discharge because his two brothers had died
of disease. Wounded and captured, he spent 10 months in Andersonville, his
widowed mother not seeing him again until he was a “living skeleton.”[55]
Feelings
on the heavy casualties, especially in light of defeat, were understandably
grim and miserable. One lieutenant in the 115th New York wrote, “Another
unnecessary slaughter and nothing gained for our cause.”[56]
One soldier from the 40th Massachusetts opinionated, “Every one at
his post feels sadly enough. I have seen several of the wounded to-day, and I
feel that the whole of Florida is not worth half the suffering and anguish this
battle has caused.”[57]
Though
not faring as badly as the Federals, the Confederates incurred heavy losses n
proportion to their strength. Casualties between Finegan’s two brigades were
roughly equal. In Colquitt’s brigade the 6th Florida Battalion
suffered 9 killed, 73 wounded for a total of 82; the 6th Georgia 5
killed, 56 wounded for a total of 61, the 19th Georgia 8 killed, 88
wounded for a total of 96; the 23rd Georgia 2 killed, 66 wounded,
and 2 missing for a total of 70; the 27th Georgia 7 killed, 67
wounded for a total of 74; the 28th Georgia 10 killed, 85 wounded
for a total of 95; Chatham’s Artillery 3 wounded; and Gamble’s Battery 2 killed
and 3 wounded for 5. Overall Colquitt had 42 killed, 443 wounded, and 2 missing
for a total of 486.
Harrison’s
brigade lost saw the 1st Florida Battalion lose 3 killed, 47 wounded
for a total of 50; the 2nd Florida Battalion 12 killed, 95 wounded,
and 2 missing for a total of 109; the 1st Georgia Regulars 3 killed,
35 wounded for a total of 28; the 32nd Georgia 15 killed, 149
wounded for a total of 164; the 64th Georgia 17 killed, 88 wounded,
and 2 missing for a total of 107; and Guerard’s Battery 2 wounded. This
amounted to 50 killed, 406 wounded, and 4 missing for a total of 460.
Overall
Finegan listed his losses at 93 killed, 847 wounded, and 6 missing for a total
of 946. This was not as bad as Union losses, but still high at a near 20%
casualty rate.[58] If
losses were high, the Confederates could at least enjoy having scored a major
victory, and furthermore, restocking their supplies with capture ordnance.
Overall they acquired 3 Napoleon guns, 2 10-punder Parrot guns, 1,600 various
small-arms, 400 accouterments and sets, and 130,000 rounds of small-arm
ammunition.[59]
The
battle would claim casualties long after its occurrence. Many would remember
the horror and fury of it. One tragic case was Union Private Thomas Jackson.
His experience at the battle gave him Post Traumatic Stress Disorder (called
“nostalgia” at the time). His behavior changed and the others took notice. He
found himself in a mental asylum in Washington, D.C., where he would die an
early death.[60]
The Florida
Expedition Fizzles
Just
after the battle, Union reinforcements marched inland from the coast while
others arrived. If Seymour had halted his retreat at Baldwin he could have used
these extra men, filled Baldwin’s defensive works, and held off Finegan’s
force. This is hindsight, however. Seymour felt that his army was in danger of
being bagged and wanted to get to Jacksonville as quickly as possible. What is
really tragic for the Union cause is that if he had not marched out to battle
at all he would have maintained a strong numerical advantage over the
Confederates and perhaps have scored a victory rather than a catastrophic
defeat at Olustee.[61]
The Federals began to fortify the environs of Jacksonville:
Everything is quiet now, our
forces are now entrenching themselves about ten miles from here. No signs of
the enemy following. We are fortifying the town. We have a strong position;
intrenchments in front, gunboats in the river on our flanks and open
communications in our rear down the river, which the enemy can not blockade as
they did Little Washington in North Carolina, and men enough to man all the
defences thoroughly. It does not appear probable that we shall be attacked. If
the rebels come we are ready.[62]
On
the Confederate side Gardner, whose assumption of command had produced so much
drama, proved to himself be a temporary leader. General Patton Anderson was
coming to take his place.[63]
The Confederates considered the possibility of killing off the Florida
Expedition. Winston John Stephens wrote his wife:
I learn we are having large
reinforcements and siege guns sent on to us and I would not be surprised at any
time to be thrown in the midst of battle with all grandeur and at the same time
with all dangers. Oh how much I wish I could never see such a sight as I
witnessed after the battle near Olustee Station, and then to think of the loved
ones at home who have been left lonely in this life by the loss of a husband,
Son or Father, or some young lady who love had been centered upon some dear one
whose life is so suddenly cut off.[64]
Stephens
would not have to see another great battle. However, he did die at a skirmish
on March 1. He fell off his horse after being shot. His cousin Swepston
Stephens took him to his house, where he died without another word.[65]
By March 3 the Confederates very near to Jacksonville. Their force had swelled
to 8,000 men. Seymour was also reinforced, both by new units, Jacksonville’s
garrison, and veterans returning from furlough. Overall Seymour now had two
divisions’ worth (and a couple unassigned brigades) of men. The Confederates
had no intention of attacking them. The commanders thought a large assault
against a strong position supported by gunboats would be too risky. They
assumed a holding pattern.[66]
Confederate
forces in Florida rose to 17,000. This was temporary, however. Believing that a
smaller force would be adequate following the Federals’ hard defeat, Beauregard
took steps to send men back out of the state to reinforce more critical fronts,
foremost in Georgia where a Federal thrust at Atlanta was imminent. Seymour
worked on further strengthening the position around Jacksonville. This included
a 110 foot signal tower that would ensure cooperation between the garrison
troops and the gunboats. There were mostly small scale shootouts, usually with
the 2nd Florida Cavalry. Seeing that the enemy planned no big
assault, Gillmore felt it safe to withdraw most of the men for operations
elsewhere.[67] Those
that remained behind conducted little forays and raids. They caught Rebel
agents, intercepted enemy mail, got into small skirmishes, destroyed railroad
tracks, and gathered forage. The 8th USCT participated in many of
these raids, with their mascot Lion accompanying them. Lion was said to
distrust civilians, biting visitors to camp.[68]
As
the scale of fighting in Florida wound back down to its regular levels, Northern
politicians, military figures, and the press began to analyze what went wrong
with the Florida Expedition. As the commander in the field, Truman Seymour
received much of the blame. The unscrupulous tax commissioner Stickney, who had
much riding on the expedition’s success, wrote that Seymour’s generalship
showed “incaution if not rashness akin got his assault on Ft. Wagner.”
Furthermore he claimed, “Gen. Seymour too is not in accord with us politically
but if he will do the fighting in good style, his copperhead ablations might be
pardoned.”[69] Major
Furness did not bring politics or race into his criticism. He simply questioned
Seymour’s judgment. He castigated him for not developing a “plan until close to
the hostile lines and already under fire.” He should have had Hawley form into
line of battle sooner and waited until Barton and Montgomery’s brigades were in
close supporting distance.[70]
Seymour
also received criticism for his use of black soldiers. The 8th USCT
had been woefully underprepared for battle, especially for the role it had been
given. Like the forced trade of the 7th New Hampshire’s Spencer
rifles for Springfield muskets, it was a decision that had horrific repercussions.
The bad mauling the 8th USCT took at Olustee, exposed on the left
flank to superior enemy numbers and firepower, added to the charges that
Seymour viewed black troops as cannon fodder. [71]
Seymour
was candid about the scale of his defeat, though he claimed that the enemy had
15,000 men (three times then what he actually faced). He did argue that his
forward movement interrupted and halted the enemy’s own offensive intentions.
As to his seeming sudden change in strategy, Seymour argued that he intended no
further occupation on his part, but wanted only to destroy the railroad bridge
and hamper the Confederate’s efforts to send more men into West Florida. He
further argued that:
…A few of the details of the
instructions of February 19, relative to the construction of defensive works at
the South Fork of the Saint Mary’s, at Baldwin, and at Jacksonville, that I
think are incorrect, or rather should be modified, and I earnestly request that
some latitude may be allowed me in such matters, and that I be not so bound by
instructions concerning matters that can be perfectly originated and carried
out here, by the proper officers, that I must be placed in the unpleasant
position of disobeying them outright, or of doing what my experience and
judgment tell me clearly is not to be approved by the posture of affairs. And I
am sure that I desire no more than is naturally to be claimed by any officer of
my rank and experience.[72]
There
was also criticism of the Lincoln administration. Attacks and defense of the president
were of course based on partisan lines. Various Democrat papers presented the
Florida Expedition as a wasteful campaign that was supposed to give Lincoln
another voting base for the election. Some deliberately ignored other
objectives of the expedition with the New
York World declaring, “Of course no military purpose took an army into
Florida.” In an article titled “Beef or Politics,” the pro-Lincoln Boston Journal pointed out that none of
the soldiers’ letters mentioned this objective, and that the expedition was
mounted to cut off a valuable food supply for the Confederacy. The truth is
that both were real objectives, with the “Beef” objective” being much more
prioritized by the Army and the “Politics” side likely Lincoln’s primary
consideration.[73]
On
the Confederate side, praise from the press and politicians came upon Joseph
Finegan. Most of the men under him, however, pointed out that he was far to the
rear during the battle and that Colquitt and Harrison made most of the major
tactical decisions. One Florida officer claimed that Colquitt was the one who had
advocated the idea of leaving the entrenchments to force the Federals into
battle, and that Finegan had been too cautious and passed up an opportunity to
completely destroy the enemy. In truth Finegan had come up with the general
strategy for the battle and there was never a need for him to get involved. He
had also been the one to stress a cavalry pursuit, with Colonel Smith fumbling
on this point. The most criticism one can have is that he did not actively send
up ammunition, forcing Colquitt and Harrison to handle this crisis themselves.
This criticism of course involves a good deal of hindsight and it should be
noted that Finegan, a former politician with no true military experience,
wisely let his veteran subordinates do what they thought best during the fight.
William Nulty’s criticism in Confederate
Florida is that Finegan showed no planning and was ineffective at mounting
a pursuit. Nulty extends this criticism to his subordinates.[74]
By
contrast Nulty is highly complimentary of Beauregard, who though not present
had a large hand in setting the stage. He “showed a much better grasp of the
evolving character of modern war than his adversaries” with his expert use of
railroads and other interior lines. Utilizing these, he created a highly mobile
system that enabled the rapid reinforcement of threatened points.[75]
Finegan
still stewed over Beauregard’s shuffling of commands. To salve Finegan’s
feelings, as well as acknowledge him as the victor of Olustee, General James
Patton Anderson, now in charge of Florida, sought to salve his feelings. He
restored his command over East Florida, though Finegan’s true redemption came
when he and his men were sent north to join Robert E. Lee’s army in Virginia and
help repulse the Federals at the Battle of Cold Harbor.[76]
Olustee
Remembered
Olustee Monument guarded by a cannon
Though
Florida would now have no voting power in the federal elections, its Unionists
still sent a delegation to the Republican Convention.[77]
At the end of the war Florida would hold the longest continuous tract of land
still held by the Confederacy, and have the only original capitol firmly in
Secessionist hands. Florida’s Secessionists could also brag that the two
significant land battles in the state, Olustee and Natural Bridge, were both
Confederate victories. On the other hand, collapsing communications, largely
thanks to General William T. Sherman’s drive through Georgia in the summer and
fall of 1864, prevented the transportation of beef and pork to the major
armies. Instead much of it was trapped in store houses, rotting away.[78]
Right
after the battle, burial parties put Confederate bodies on the south side of
the railroad, Union on the north. The Federal bodies were handled with less
care and in weeks hogs had dug them up and feasted. In 1866 Lieutenant
Frederick E. Grossman and a detachment of the 7th US Infantry
visited the battlefield with bags. They stuffed these with bones and loaded
them on wagons. They then built a large mass grave where they dumped hundreds
of bones. They erected a fence and ditch around it and also established the
battlefield’s first monument. It was a wooden structure which, around its base
read: “To the memory of the officers and soldiers of the United States army who
fell in the Battle of Olustee, Feb. 20, 1864. Our Country. May the living
profit by the example of the dead. Unity and peace.”[79]
Months
after the war ended, Gillmore revisited the battle, likely hoping to restore
his reputation after several strategic failures throughout the war. In reality,
he simply uncovered the common ignorance and career-saving lies that officers
often made in their reports. He learned from Finnegan that Seymour actually had
more men then his opponents. He also discovered that the Confederates did not
use any notable entrenchments, as they had to march out of them to bring
Seymour to battle.[80]
In
1909 Floridians built a park at the site of the Battle of Olustee. They
centered the park around a memorial to the victorious Confederates. The United
Daughters of the Confederacy and other pro-South organizations monopolized
historical memory in the state, establishing all the Civil War memorials around
the state. Throughout the early 20th Century further Confederate
monuments cropped up in cemeteries, Olustee Park in Lake City, and on the
battlefield itself. In 1949 the Board of State Parks took control of historical
memorials, turning the site into a state park. State historian Mark Boyd
researched the battle and provided informative booklets on it. He further
attempted to uncover the Union side of the story and discovered that many
Federal bodies were lying in the ground, hurriedly buried there by the victors.
Even with the help of a US Army general, the Florida Parks Service was unable
to find the remains.[81]
For
the 100th anniversary of the battle Florida held a three-day
commemorative event. The main program booklet claimed to honor both Confederate
and Union participants. Memorial services, however, specifically honored
Finegan and Colquitt, both Confederate generals. The grand conclusion to the
ceremonies was an Olustee reenactment at the Gator Bowl in Jacksonville. A
narrator described what was happening. Even with bad weather 5,000 people came
to watch it.[82]
Following this event, Olustee reenactments became the largest of its kind in
the American southeast, with 2-3,000 reenactors attending every year.
Traditionally there have been two battles fought around the anniversary, one a
historically accurate recreation and the other a more “exciting” one in which
the Federals get to win. It’s also the one reenactment which prominently
features the famed 54th Massachusetts. In 1991 the wooden Union
monument marking the mass grave was replaced by a granite recreation.[83]
Surprisingly,
not until the sesquicentennial celebration of the Civil War was there were any
serious efforts to introduce Union monuments other than the update of the 19th
Century one. At the start of 2013 the Sons of Union Veterans called for such a
monument. The Florida Park Service was eager to agree, especially since this
would mean acknowledging black units such as the 54th Massachusetts
(black history has been very in over the last decade). A meeting on the matter
proved to be heavily contentious. Among the hundred plus Floridians to join in
were representatives of the Sons of Confederate Veterans. One claimed that
“Putting a Union monument at Olustee would be like placing a memorial to Jane
Fonda at the entrance to the Vietnam memorial.” Another negative voice was H.K.
Edgerton, the black president of a southern heritage organization. Actually
wielding the Confederate battle flag as he spoke, he said it was inappropriate
to honor “an army that came here raping, robbing, killing and murdering our
people.” Trying to argue his case, Mike Farrell of the Sons of Union Veterans
correctly noted out that every battlefield held monuments for both sides.[84]
The
Battle of Olustee, and the Florida Expedition, remains both overlooked yet a
source of controversy. Many dwell on the role of black regiments, especially
the 54th Massachusetts, and the racial murders in the aftermath.
While these are important aspects, the other aspects of the campaign should be
given attention as well. The campaign’s origins shed light on how politics can
dictate the course of military strategy. While Lincoln’s support for the
expedition was motivated by his desire to be re-elected, there were legitimate
military objectives. The question is would the war have shortened?
The
answer is a possible yes. Confederate sources expound on the need for Florida’s
cattle to feed the troops and continue the war. If this source was cut off the
armies in Georgia and the Carolinas might not have held out as long, enabling
General Sherman to more quickly complete his March to the Sea and then head
north to link up with Ulysses S. Grant at Petersburg, Virginia. It should be
noted, however, that much of the meat taken from the animals failed to actually
reach the troops thanks to ineffective administrators. A successful Florida
Expedition might have only hastened the end by a short amount of time.
As
for the fruits of Confederate victory, one should take into account how,
alongside the successful repulse of the Red River Expedition in the
Trans-Mississippi and Nathan Bedford Forrest’s successful raiding in Tennessee,
Secessionist spirits were raised in early 1864, solidifying the will to resist
the Union. Overall, the Florida Expedition ended in disaster for its
conductors. The Battle of Olustee was one of the most smashing defeats of
Federal forces in the war and signaled that, even after severe losses in 1863,
the Confederacy was far from defeated.
Sources
Primary
Andrews, William
H. Footprints of a Regiment: A
Recollection of the 1st Georgia Regulars, 1861-1865. Marietta:
Longstreet Press, 1992.
Clark, James. The Iron-Hearted Regiment: Being an Account
of the Battles, Marches and Gallant Deeds performed by the 115th
Regiment N.Y. Volunteers. Albany: J. Munsell, 1865.
Croom, Wendell
D. The War-History of Company “C”, Sixth
Georgia Regiment with a Graphic Account of Each Member. Fort Valley:
“Advertiser” Office, 1879.
Crowninshield,
Benjamin W. First Regiment of
Massachusetts Cavalry Volunteers. Boston and New York: Houghton Mifflin,
1891.
Emilio, Luis F. A Brave Black Regiment: History of the
Fifty-Fourth Regiment of Massachusetts Volunteer Infantry, 1863-1865. New
York: Bantam Books, 1992.
Gooding, James
Henry. On the Altar of Freedom: A Black
Soldier’s Civil War Letters from the Front. University of Massachusetts
Press, 1991.
Hawks, Esther
Hill. A Woman Doctor’s Civil War: Esther Hill
Hawks’ Diary. Columbia: University of South Carolina, 1984.
“Letters,
Newspaper Articles, Books and Reminiscences of Olustee.”
http://battleofolustee.org/letters/index.html
Little, Henry
F.W. The Seventh Regiment New Hampshire
Volunteers in the War of the Rebellion. Concord: I.C. Evans, 1896.
Palmer, Abraham
J. The History of the Forty-Eighth
Regiment New York State Volunteers, in the War for the Union, 1861-1865.
Brooklyn: Veteran Association of the Regiment, 1885.
Roman, Alfred. The Military Operations of General
Beauregard in the War between the States 1861 to 1865 Vol. II. New York:
Harper, 1883.
Stephens, George
E. A Voice of Thunder: A Black Soldier’s
Civil War. Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1998.
Trimmer, William
H. “Olustee and How I Was Captured,” Confederate
Veteran Vol. 20, No. 6.
United States. The War of
the Rebellion: A Compilation of the Official Records of the Union and
Confederate Armies Vol. XXXV part 1.
Washington D.C. 1891.
Walkley,
Stephen W., Jr. History of the Seventh
Connecticut Volunteer Infantry, Hawley’s Brigade, Terry’s Division, Tenth Army
Corps, 1861-1865. Hartford, 1905.
Secondary
Broadwater,
Robert P. The
Battle of Olustee 1864: The Final Union Attempt to Seize Florida.
Jefferson: McFarland & Company, Incorporated Publishers, 2006.
Combined Books
Editors. The Civil War Book of Lists.
Conshohocken, Pennsylvania, Combined Books, 1994.
Conner, Robert
C. James Montgomery: Abolitionist Warrior.
Casemate: April 13, 2022.
Davis, William
Watson. The Civil War and Reconstruction
in Florida. New York: Columbia University, 1913.
Egerton, Douglas
R. Thunder at the Gates: The Black Civil
War Regiments that Redeemed America. New York: Basic Books, 2016.
Lees,
William B., and Gaske, Frederick P. Recalling Deeds Immortal: Florida
Monuments to the Civil War. Gainesville: University Press of
Florida, 2014.
Marvel, William.
Andersonville: The Last Depot.
University of North Carolina Press, 1994.
Nulty, William
H. Confederate Florida: The Road to
Olustee. The University of Alabama Press, 1990.
Schafer, Daniel
L. Thunder on the River: the Civil War in
Northeast Florida. Gainesville: University Press of Florida, 2010.
Smith, Derek. Civil War Savannah. Savannah: Frederic C.
Beil, 1997.
Trudeau, Noah
Andre. Like Men of War: Black Troops in
the Civil War, 1862-1865. Boston: Little, Brown, & Company, 1998.
Various. A Forgotten Front: Florida During the Civil
War Era. University of Alabama Press, 201
Urwin,
Gregory J. W., ed. Black Flag over Dixie:
Racial Atrocities and Reprisals in the Civil War. Carbondale: Southern
Illinois University Press, 2005.
Williams,
George Washington. A History of the Negro Troops
in the War of the Rebellion. Harper & Brothers, 1887.
[1]
OR XXXV, part 1, 308.
[2]
OR XXXV, part 1, 317-318.
[3]
Broadwater, Battle of Olustee,
129-130.
[4]
Egerton, Thunder at the Gates,
223-224; Broadwater, Battle of Olustee,
130.
[5]
“Brother Robert to Dear Will,” March 9, 1864, http://battleofolustee.org/letters/index.html.
[6]
Stephens, A Voice of Thunder, 298.
[7]
Emilio, A Brave Black Regiment, 176.
[8]
Emilio, A Brave Black Regiment, 176.
[9]
Little, Seventh Regiment New Hampshire,
224-225; Broadwater, Battle of Olustee,
132-133.
[10]
Abraham J. Palmer, The History of the
Forty-Eighth Regiment New York State Volunteers, in the War for the Union,
1861-1865, (Brooklyn: Veteran Association of the Regiment, 1885), 135.
[11] Broadwater, Battle
of Olustee, 134.
[12]
Walkley, Seventh
Connecticut Volunteer Infantry, 122-123; Broadwater, Battle of Olustee, 137.
[13]
OR XXXV, part 1, 300.
[14] “Letter from Surgeon A.P. Heichold,” The Christian Recorder, March 12, 1864, http://battleof-olustee.org/letters/index.html; Broadwater, Battle
of Olustee, 129; “Letter from Rufus S. Johns, Sergeant-Major Eighth
U.S.C.T.,” The Christian Recorder,
April 16, 1864, http://battleofolustee.org/let-ters/index.html.
[15]
Clark, Iron-Hearted Regiment, 89.
[16]
Broadwater, Battle of Olustee, 138;
OR XXXV, part 1, 353-355; Lawrence Jackson, “As I saw and Remember the Battle
of Olustee, Which Was Fought February 20, 1863,” http://battleofolustee.org/letters/index.html.
[17]
Broadwater, Battle of Olustee,
138-140.
[18] “Winston Stephens to My Dear Wife,” February 21, 1864, http://battleofolustee.org/letters/index.html.
[19]
Broadwater, Battle of Olustee, 140.
[20]
Broadwater, Battle of Olustee, 136.
[21]
OR XXXV, part 1, 341.
[22] “Winston Stephens to My Dear Wife,” February 21, 1864, http://battleofolustee.org/letters/index.html
[23] “Excerpt from the Reminiscences of William Frederick
Penniman,” http://battleof-olustee.org/letters/index.html; The reference to Fort Pillow is problematic. The battle
and infamous massacre at this site occurred on April 12, a month and a half
after Olustee. Either the soldier’s brother had been killed by the black troops
at the garrison in a light skirmish or Penniman made up this story or got
confused with another battle involving black troops. The Penniman source was
written years after the war.
[24] Lawrence Jackson, “As I saw and Remember the Battle of
Olustee, Which Was Fought February 20, 1864,” http://battleofolustee.org/letters/index.html.
[25] “Cpl. Henry Shackelford to Dear Mother,” February 20,
1864, http://battleofolustee.org/letters/index.html
[26] “J.M. Jordan to My Dear Louisa,” February 21, 1864, http://battleofolustee.org/letters/index.html.
[27]
Trudeau, Like Men of War, 151.
[28]
Trudeau, Like Men of War, 151.
[29] David J. Coles, “‘Shooting Niggers Sir’: Confederate
Mistreatment of Union Black Soldiers at the Battle of Olustee” in Black Flag
over Dixie: Racial Atrocities and Reprisals in the Civil War, (Carbondale: Southern Illinois University Press,
2005), 75.
[30]
OR XXXV, part 1, 328.
[31]
Broadwater, Battle of Olustee, 147.
[32]
Coles, “Shooting Niggers Sir,” in Black Flag over Dixie, 75-76, 78-79.
[33]
Broadwater, Battle of Olustee, 123.
[34]
Broadwater, Battle of Olustee,
145-146.
[35]
Broadwater, Battle of Olustee, 150;
Marvel, The Last Depot, 42.
[36]
Marvel, The Last Depot, 43.
[37]
Coles, “Shooting Niggers Sir,” in Black Flag over Dixie, 84.
[38]
Broadwater, Battle of Olustee, 141,
179.
[39]
OR XXXV, part 1, 290.
[40] “Unidentified Civilian with the Union Army,” The Liberator, March 18, 1864, http://battleofolustee.org/let-ters/index.html.
[41]
Gooding, On the Altar of Freedom,
115.
[42]
Stephens, A Voice of Thunder, 69.
[43] Palmer, Forty-Eighth Regiment, 136.
[44]
OR XXXV, part 1, 327; Broadwater, Battle
of Olustee, 154.
[45]
Broadwater, Battle of Olustee, 155.
[46] Clark, Iron-Hearted
Regiment, 90; Emilio, A Brave Black
Regiment, 180-181.
[47] OR XXXV, part 1, 328-329, 333, 335, 342-343; Nulty, Confederate Florida, 186-187.
[48]
OR XXXV, part 1, 329.
[49] OR XXXV, part 1, 333.
[50] OR XXXV, part 1, 298; Combined
Books Editors, The Civil War Book of
Lists, (Conshohocken, Pennsylvania, Combined Books, 1994), 97.
[51] OR XXXV, part 1, 301.
[52] Boston Herald, March 1, 1864, http://battleofolustee.org/letters/index.html.
[53] OR XXXV, part 1, 289.
[54] “Letters and
History of 1st Lieutenant Tully McCrea: Battery M, First U.S.
Artillery,” http://battleof-olustee.org/letters/index.html.
[55] “Letter from
Lieutenant Nicholas De Graff, Company D, 115th New York Infantry,” http://battleof-olustee.org/letters/index.html.
[56] “Letter from
Lieutenant Nicholas De Graff, Company D, 115th New York Infantry,”
[57] Boston Journal, February 29, 1964, http://battleofolustee.org/letters/index.html.
[58] OR XXXV, part
1, 337.
[59] OR XXXV, part 1, 342-343.
[60] Broadwater, Battle of Olustee, 125.
[61] Broadwater, Battle of Olustee, 156-157.
[62] Boston Journal, March 1, 1864, http://battleofolustee.org/letters/index.html.
[63] Broadwater, Battle of Olustee, 161.
[64] “Winston
Stephens to My Dear Wife,” February 27, 1864, http://battleofolustee.org/letters/index.html.
[65] “Winston John
Thomas Stephens,” https://www.findagrave.com/memorial/21205690/winston-john_thomas-stephens; “Winston
Stephens to My Dear Wife,” February 27, 1864. http://battleofolustee.org/let-ters/index.html.
[66] Broadwater, Battle of Olustee, 164.
[67] Broadwater, Battle of Olustee, 167, 176.
[68] Broadwater, Battle of Olustee, 179-180.
[69] Broadwater, Battle of Olustee, 172.
[70] Broadwater, Battle of Olustee, 173.
[71] Broadwater, Battle of Olustee, 97.
[72] OR XXXV, part
1, 287-288.
[73] Davis, Civil War and Reconstruction in Florida,
293; Boston Journal, March 2, 1864, http://battleofolustee.org/letters/index.html.
[74] Broadwater, Battle of Olustee, 182-184; “Winston Stephens to My Dear Wife,”
February 27, 1864, http://battleofolustee.org/letters/index.html; Nulty, Confederate Florida, 187, 203.
[75] Nulty, Confederate Florida, 198-199.
[76] Nulty, Confederate Florida, 187.
[77] Davis, Civil War and Reconstruction in Florida, 295.
[78] Broadwater, Battle of Olustee, 4; Nulty, Confederate
Florida, 223; David Nelson, “Battles of Olustee: Civil War Memory in
Florida,” in A Forgotten Front: Florida
During the Civil War Era, (University of Alabama Press, 2018), 198.
[79] Broadwater, Battle of Olustee, 151-152.
[80] OR XXXV, part 1, 291.
[81] David Nelson, “Battles of
Olustee: Civil War Memory in Florida,” in
A Forgotten Front, 196, 199-200, 207-209; William
B. Lee and Frederick P. Gaske, Recalling Deeds Immortal: Florida
Monuments to the Civil War, (Gainesville:
University Press of Florida, 2014), 183-186.
[82] David Nelson, “Battles of
Olustee: Civil War Memory in Florida,” in
A Forgotten Front, 212.
[83] David Nelson,
“Battles of Olustee: Civil War Memory in Florida,” in A Forgotten Front, 216-218; Lee and
Gaske, Recalling Deeds Immortal, 154.
[84] David Nelson, “Battles of
Olustee: Civil War Memory in Florida,” in
A Forgotten Front, 196-197.
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