Hawley vs.
Colquitt
Early
in the afternoon, 4 miles east of Olustee, the 40th Massachusetts Mounted
Infantry met Confederate horsemen from the 2nd Florida and 4th
Georgia Cavalry. The Confederate riders fell back, the Federals in pursuit.[1]
Corporal William Penniman of the 4th Georgia took credit for drawing
the first shots of the battle. He was
with Colonel Caraway Smith on top of a railroad embankment. Smith was looking
one way with his field glasses, Penniman another. Penniman saw Seymour’s force
and directed Smith’s attention to it. Smith, noticing the presence of black
regiments, said, “It’s the Yankees sure enough and they seem to be niggers.”
Federal skirmishers came within 300 yards and discharged “quite a volley.” The
two Confederates mounted their horses and escaped.[2]
According to the history of the 1st Massachusetts Cavalry (a battalion, as readers might recall, that was assigned to the Mounted Infantry to serve as an experienced core), they reported back to the rest of the army that there were at least three Confederate regiments. Captain Elder of the Horse Artillery came up and said but could only see “just one man.” The Confederates, per Finegan’s plan, had withdrawn, the Federals unaware of how large the opposing force was.[3] Elder’s Horse Artillery advanced and with the 7th Connecticut established a firing line of skirmishers. Confederate cavalry would show themselves and then draw back, “as though inviting us to charge after them.”[4]
Captain
Benjamin Skinner, at the moment the commander of the 7th
Connecticut, sent two companies under Captain Mills and Lieutenant Townsend to
deploy to the left (south) of the railroad. Another company of skirmishers went
on the right (north) side with the rest of the regiment in reserve. The
skirmishers encountered the forward elements of the Confederates and pushed them
back.[5]
The Federals were not fully aware of the enemy’s plans, but were finally
adopting a careful stance. “Apprehending that the enemy was too cautious to
approach our works,” Confederate commander Finegan now attempted a battle out
in the open. He advanced Colquitt’s brigade (the 6th, 8th,
19th, and 64th Georgia) with a section of Gamble’s
Artillery. Within an hour he ordered the rest of his force forward, but
Colquitt would be on his own for a while.[6]
This
brigade was of course Colquitt’s. Throwing forward skirmishers to provide
cover, Colquitt placed the 19th Georgia on the right and the 8th
Georgia on the left, with the 6th and 64th in the center.
Gamble’s guns drew up in the center. Colquitt’s men were mostly positioned on
or south of the railroad.[8]
A corporal in the 19th Georgia noted how easy it was to see across
this battlefield. “We could see them a half mile, as the country is quite
level, and no undergrowth…One could plainly see the blue coats army in fine
order.”[9]
Thanks
to their Spencer Rifles, the Connecticut men were able to push forward while
delivering a rapid fire. They did this against a larger force, and reportedly
took down all the officers of the 64th Georgia. The 64th
Georgia was the one green regiment in Colquitt’s otherwise veteran brigade, and
without leadership the new recruits began to panic and break. The 28th
Georgia on their flank was able to stop and keep them in line. The Confederate
line in general withdrew, but now did so in an orderly fashion with return fire.
The 7th Connecticut was still outnumbered so its advance against the
enemy brigade bent it into a semicircle. The left flank came upon a swamp and was
exposed to a “galling fire.” Skinner claims that he came into view of the enemy
entrenchments, and received fire from three angles. The intensity of the 7th
Connecticut’s mostly unsupported stand showed. One private wrote days later,
Most of the boys clothes bear marks of bullets. I had one bullet strike my
rubber blanket that was hung over my shoulder but it did not hurt me.” The
emerging crossfire, along with depleting ammunition and no visible support units
at the ready, convinced Skinner to order a retreat.[10]
Rumor
held it that a moment of personal revenge occurred within the ranks of the
Connecticut skirmishers. Days earlier two substitute recruits, Jerome Dupoy and
John Rowley, had a violent altercation. It ended with Dupoy cutting Rowley with
a knife. During the early part of the battle Dupoy fell with a shot to the head.
The men were sure that Rowley had done it during the heated firing. After the
battle Skinner conducted an investigation that found no evidence. Still, Rowley
was placed in the guardhouse because of the men’s suspicions. There he broke
down and confessed that he had committed murder.[11]
The
7th Connecticut fell back, splitting in two so that Hawley’s next
regiment could take its place. As they drew back, Hawley sent the 7th
New Hampshire in their place. “I had the regiment brought into column by
company, and closed en masse on the tenth company. The enemy’s fire began to be
felt, not very severely, but it was increasing as we approached.”[12]
To their left the 8th USCT went into line with their mascot, an “old
white dog” named Lion. The dog ran along the line of men, who were happy to see
that the white animal did not care that he served alongside black soldiers.[13]
Seymour planned to hold the Confederates in place with Elder, Hamilton, and
Langdon’s batteries, with the 7th New Hampshire on the right and 8th
U.S. Colored on the left. The 7th Connecticut withdrew.[14]
Captain
Langdon of the 1st US Artillery hurried up with six guns. He found
himself being ordered this way and that. An aide told him to go to the left
flank because, “We are threatened there and unsupported.” While Langdon was
going that way another aide came saying they needed a section on the right.
Langdon detached a two-gun section under Lieutenant Tully McCrea to do just
that. A messenger informed him that Hawley’s regiments were on his left and he saw
“a crowd of men firing wildly in my front, but without order or judgment.”
Langdon positioned his guns over 100 yards behind the 7th Connecticut
and 8th USCT.[15]
Langdon’s
gunners on the left could see no Confederates, but every now and then their
shots zipped amongst the artillery. For aiming the gunners only had “a line of
smoke.” Unable to line up any good shots, Langdon limbered up his four guns and
moved them a hundred yards to the left. Still he could not get any clear shots
thanks to the thick trees. All the while enemy bullets downed horses as well as
2 or 3 artillerists.[16]
 |
| George Harrison |
With more Federals forming up, Colquitt’s Georgians felt the heat. Fortunately Harrison, with most of his brigade, arrived. Seeing the situation, he moved his men to the left (north) of Colquitt. Harrison did an excellent job of deploying his troops, with a messenger from Colquitt informing him “that I was in proper position.” The 64th Georgia and two companies of the 32nd Georgia formed to the left of the 28th and when the Federals attempted to flank him he placed the 6th Georgia on the far left. Colquitt sent a messenger to ask for reinforcements and was pleased to learn that Finegan had already ordered everyone up.[17]
The
Federals obviously did not have enough men to face Colquitt’s Georgians.
Altogether, the Confederates would be able to flank both ends of Hawley’s line.
From left to right it was the 23rd Georgia, 32nd Georgia,
1st Georgia Regulars, 64th Georgia, 6th
Georgia, 28th Georgia, Gamble’s Artillery, 19th Georgia,
and 6th Florida Battalion. The 19th Georgia outflanked
the 8th USCT, with the Floridians completely in their flank.
Colquitt also outflanked the Federal right with the 6th and 32nd
Georgia.[18] Gamble’s
gunners in Colquitt’s center had lost many of their men and horses and were
having difficulty keeping up their fire. At some point the tail of a 12-pounder
howitzer was crushed into the earth while recoiling from a discharge. The
gunner continued to operate it until finally it was unserviceable. The Chatham
Artillery, which had been deployed on the right, moved to take their place
while they retired towards the rear.[19]
Seymour
ordered his own guns to lob shells into the pine barren and feel out the enemy.
Surgeon Adolph Majer wrote, “Hardly had the second shell departed when a
compliment in the form of solid shot fell directly in front of the staff, a
second one following closely on the first, and a third one passing in close
proximity over our heads.” The real threat came from the Confederate
sharpshooters. They inflicted a good number of casualties among the
artillerists, firing low so that the wounds disproportionately came to the legs
and feet. Though not fatally wounded, the Federals “were brought down and
disabled as effectually as though shot in the head, and they toppled over with
the most disheartening frequency.”[20]
The
infantry, two regiments, had it far worse. The 7th New Hampshire and
8th USCT not only faced off against overwhelming firepower, they
were undone before they even took the field. A quick summary of the 7th
New Hampshire’s participation was that they soon “broke in confusion, and the
most strenuous efforts of Colonel Hawley and its own colonel, assisted by
Lieutenant-Colonel Hall, of my staff, could not reform and rally it, and this
regiment counted as nothing during the remainder of the engagement.” These men
were not cowards, but the victims of mistakes made before and early in the battle.[21]
The left of the New Hampshire line included men who had been made to trade their Spencer Rifles to Henry’s mounted force. Seymour had ordered this done to increase his mounted arm’s firepower. The problem was that the New Hampshireans received old and unreliable Springfield muskets, 42 of them “pronounced unserviceable by the brigade inspector.” These muskets were too cumbersome for mounted fighters, hence the necessity of the exchange. In the heat of battle most of them shortly proved worthless. One company counted 20 weapons that failed to fire. They did not even have bayonets. Unable to counter-fire effectively, Hawley’s left flank was dangerously exposed.[22]
 |
| Joseph Hawley |
“A semblance of organization was lost in a few moments, save with about one company, which faced the enemy and opened fire.” Hawley’s explanation was that the “somebody must have misunderstood the order” to form on the 10th company. However several sources state that he commanded Colonel Joseph Abbot to deploy on the 5th company. Abbot states in his report that after executing this move Hawley rode up and told him he was not deployed properly. Abbot barked, “Halt; front!” and tried to get his men back into column. Several officers and men, however, recall that they clearly heard the order to line up on the 5th, not 10th, company. Sergeant Otis A. Merrill states that Hawley was with the men the whole time and his orders were clearly heard. The sad truth is that Hawley simply mixed up his words, a small but fatal mistake (Henry Little, a veteran who wrote the regimental history, says that Hawley actually compounded his error by ordering Abbot to form on the 8th company before finally giving the correct company on the third try). Whoever was to blame, it was too late. The incorrect, and then contradicting, orders resulted in the companies’ entanglement. Under heavy enemy fire, sorting out the regiment became a deadly task. In the midst of this confusion sergeant and color-bearer Thomas H. Simington of Company B bravely obeyed every order while his comrades panicked. Hawley commended him for sometimes facing “the enemy alone. Though, wounded, he carried the colors to the end of the battle.”[23]
Colonel
Abbott was able to find a company of cavalry to halt some of the New
Hampshireans. About 200 rallied and stayed there for the rest of the battle as
the right flank guard.[24]
There was of course some criticism of the regiment for breaking down, but the
circumstances show that they were thrust into an impossible situation. One
correspondent for the Boston Journal
summed up the general feeling of the men thrust into the open with defective
weapons, language barriers, and barely any support. “I am of no use, and why
should I stand here for the sole purpose of being shot?”[25]
Events
did not unfold much better to the south. The 8th US Colored deployed
in a line nearly parallel to the railroad. Rushed into battle at the
double-quick (one soldier wrote in this diary that they had just gone through
“a very rapid as well as fatiguing march”), they had no time to drop their
heavy knapsacks and worse none to load their muskets. No sooner had they gone
into line then the Confederates unleashed “a terrific shower of musketry and
shell” at short range into their front and their unsupported left flank. The
soldiers never had proper training, having been “drilled too much for dress
parade and too little for the field.” They did not know “how to shoot with
effect” in the heat of battle. They “commenced dropping like leaves in autumn.”
Despite all of their disadvantages and the murderous fire, they somehow
withstood it and did not dissipate like the 7th New Hampshire. It is
likely that they feared what would happen if, in a rout, they were overtaken by
the enemy. As black soldiers they could be returned to slavery, possibly
slaughtered, if taken prisoner. Colonel Charles Fribley ordered the black
troops to “to fall back slowly,” firing as they did so.[26]
Rebel
bullets quickly downed Fribley. Shot in the chest, he told his men to carry him
to the rear. He died within minutes. Major Burritt took over, only to quickly
receive two wounds and come off the field. The men, “losing the stimulus of his
command, gave way in disorder.” Lieutenant Oliver Norton said that many
“gathered in groups like frightened sheep, and it was almost impossible to keep
them from doing so. Into these groups the rebels poured the deadliest fire,
almost every bullet hitting some one.”[27]
They
did not fall back the way they came, but at an angle towards the right.
Lieutenant Elijah Lewis found the national flag on the ground and picked it up.
A rider from Hamilton’s battery rode up to him and said, “Don’t leave that
battery; bring your flag and rally the men around it.” Lieutenant Norton saw
Lewis carrying the flag and told him to “give it to one of the men, and help form
some kind of a line.” Doing this, Lewis found a limbered gun getting pulled
right through his men by an unmanned team of horses. He swatted one of the
leading horses with his sword. Catching it by the bridle, he and his men
managed to halt them.[28]
The
8th US Colored rallied near the Federal battery and attempted to
save it from capture. The regiment, in trying to protect one gun, lost 3
color-sergeants and 5 additional members of the color guard. The black troops
fled again, leaving their national flag along with the gun to be captured.
Captain R.C. Bailey, who commanded the color guard and the other soldiers in
this part of the battle, sought to alleviate the shame of losing the flag. He
pointed out that the color guard was “nearly annihilated” and, with only about
20 men remaining, he fell back with the regimental flag. He insisted that,
understandably given the desperate situation, he had not noticed that the
national colors were missing. In his report on the matter Lieutenant Lewis
pointed out that the regiment had two stands of colors and that, seeing one
complete pair being taken to the rear, he mistakenly thought that the national
flag he had found earlier was one of those. The regimental flag, however, was
kept safe. Sergeant Taylor of Company D was tasked with carrying it. When his
right hand was “nearly shot off,” he “grasped the colors with the left hand,
and brought them out.”[29]
Langdon’s
gunners on the left suddenly found themselves in a hot position. Langdon
ordered his artillerists switch to double canister in an attempt to stem the
onslaught of Rebels. “A caisson of my battery, through the stupidity of the
drivers or fright of the horses, passed the guns and wheeled to the left,
directly between me and the enemy. Out of the 18 men who should have been with
the guns I had about 8 left. The drivers of the caisson, becoming an immediate
target for the enemy, soon left the horses. They were sent back, and 2
retreated. One remained and succeeded in starting the caisson, but it got
fastened by a tree, and the man came back, stating it was impossible to get it
out alone. There was no one to help him, and the caisson was left…” The stuck
and abandoned caisson blocked their line of fire and forced Langdon to limber
up his pieces. Now a limbered gun got trapped in a tree. While trying to free
it, the artillerists saw Confederate cavalry bearing down on them and had to
abandon it. Overall, the Federal batteries on the left flank were hard hit,
with the 3rd Rhode Island Battery getting the worst of it.[30]
The
losses of the 3rd Rhode Island Battery were appalling. In 20 minutes
49 men had been killed or wounded and 40 horses shared the same fate. Without
horsepower, or even manpower, the guns had to be abandoned. The artillerists
resented the 8th USCT for the rest of their lives, holding them
responsible for the debacle. A letter by Lieutenant George E. Eddy reached the
papers and held this complaint: “It was our misfortune to have for support a
negro regiment, who, by running, caused us to lose our pieces.”[31]
Lieutenant
Norton of the 8th USCT had the opinion that the artillerists had
themselves to blame for their losses. With the thrashing the black troops
received, they should have anticipated the need to withdraw and made their
preparations sooner. Norton also did not appreciate how instead of withdrawing,
Captain John Hamilton made the infantry stay as a human barrier, even though
the fight was obviously lost.[32]
It was now up to Barton’s brigade to take the place of Hawley’s. With the
previous brigade shattered, they would arrive at a disadvantage.
The Main Phase
 |
| A more accurate portrayal of the battle by Phillips Capps from fineartamerica.com. The pine trees are tall with no undergrowth and the Confederates are past a pair of abandoned guns. Note the railroad gun to the back right. |
The 115th New York, at the front of Colonel Barton’s line, came upon a stream of retreating men, many of them bloodied and some literally dragging their bodies along the ground. The men became “frenzied at the sight, and begged to be hurried to the front that they might avenge the death of those already fallen.”[33] The regimental history reads: “Up to the opening of the fight, the regiment together with the other troops, had marched nineteen miles without partaking of a morsel of food, and although tired, hungry, thirsty and foot-sore, cheerfully rushed into the very thickest of the conflict, nerved by the terrible battle cry of ‘Harper’s Ferry!’” (see citation note)[34] One of the 115th New York’s officers, Lieutenant Nicholas De Graff, was afflicted “with fever and ague.” Unwilling to miss the battle, he was lent a horse by the regimental surgeon so that he could advance into battle.[35]
Barton
put the 115th New York on his right. The 48th New York
and then the 47th New York came next. The remainder of the 7th
Connecticut and 8th USCT filled up the left flank, the latter
anchoring itself on the railroad. Most of the 7th New Hampshire was
in a disorganized mess in the rear.[36]
Montgomery’s two regiments, in the rear of Seymour’s column, were also coming,
but still had miles to go. Montgomery sent his adjutant ahead to get orders,
but none came. Determined to fight, he marched his men towards the sound of
shooting.[37]
With
his other regiments shattered, Hawley deployed the 7th Connecticut
“a little to the left and in rear” of Barton. Still low on ammunition from the
opening fight, they lay down, only firing if absolutely necessary. They were
within 25 yards of the abandoned Federal guns and were tempted to reclaim them, “but under the fire to which we were opposed, could not advance to seize them.”
In the meantime Hawley worked to bring up reserve ammunition.[38]
The Confederates also had most of their men up. From left to right (north to
south) to the railroad, their line was now the 6th, 32nd,
1st, 23rd, 64th, 28th, and 19th
Georgia. The 6th Florida stayed on the south side of the railroad,
threatening the Federals’ left flank.[39]
The
fighting was centered around the pine trees, the only source of cover on flat
terrain. 2nd Lieutenant Hugh W. Barclay of the 23rd
Georgia wrote, “The fight was now conducted in Indian style, both sides
availing themselves of the protection of pine trees of which kind there was
plenty.” The Confederates made “the woods ring with the terrible rebel yell,
and as a negro or a Yankee run from tree to tree muskets enough were generally
leveled at them to stop their career.”[40]
The
Confederate artillery throughout the battle underperformed. They were
inaccurate and their shells exploded in the treetops. As the battle progressed,
the limbs did start to fall down, hitting the Federals below. There was one
notable gun, a “sixty-four pound swivel, fixed on a truck-car on the railroad.”
It was a 30-pounder Parrott gun, commanded by Captain Joseph Dunham (a brief
regimental history of the 6th Georgia claims there were two of
these). One gunner and 13 privates manned the car. The Parrott for the most
part stayed silent, with pine trees and friendly forces obstructing its’ view.
For the brief time it was in action, later in the battle, it fired grape and
canister shot up the Union line and took out many men.[41]
The
Union artillery also had issues with its performance. The batteries faced a
lose-lose situation. The open fields seemed to promise wide, visible ranges of
fire. However there were enough trees that if the guns were too far back they
would be as likely to hit trees as the enemy. The artillery officers opted to
move in closer so they could aim better. This resulted in heavier casualties as
Confederate infantry, particularly the sharpshooters hidden in grass and other
vegetation, had easier shots. As artillerists were downed, it became harder to
keep the cannons booming and thus support the infantry.[42]
The
Union cavalry under Colonel Guy Henry remained on the battlefield. Their main
actions were to respond whenever Rebel cavalry appeared on the flanks. Their
southern counterparts would not give battle and withdrew every time Henry’s
riders appeared. For the most part the cavalry stood in support of Elder’s
Horse Artillery.[43]
While
the battle escalated, Surgeon Majer looked for a suitable place to tend to the
wounded. He rode for a pair of log houses, the only structures he could find,
but upon inspecting them found they “were so much exposed that while inspecting
them I was in imminent danger in the midst of heavy and light missiles.” With
no rise or descent in the terrain to cover a hospital, he had to settle for a
cluster of pine trees 200 yards to the rear of the battle line. “In a half hour
from the commencement, stray shots passing through the tall pines, and,
breaking them off at the trunk like canes, admonished us to remove the depot
farther to the rear” about one mile behind a stream and “miry ground.” This
provided more water for the wounded, but artillery shells still landed
dangerously close.[44]
The
115th New York faced the 6th and 32nd Georgia. Their
leftmost flank and the right flank of the 48th New York faced the 1st
Georgia Regulars. To meet all these units, the New Yorkers had to thin out
their lines.[45] The
history of the 115th New York described the fighting as “a
continuous roar on both sides, and for three long hours the swift tide of
battle surged with cruel fury…The leaden messengers of death hailed down in
unceasing torrents. Grape and canister swept by with hideous music, and shell
after shell tore through our ranks and burst amid heaps of our wounded heroes.”[46]
Lieutenant Nicholas DeGroff of the 115th New York was not terrified.
Instead, “the excitement of the battle so engaged my attention that I did not
realize my peril and now it seems like a hideous dream.”[47]
This phase of the battle lasted about 20 minutes. The Confederates pushed back the
thin Federal ranks, but not very far.[48]
The
Confederates had the advantage in numbers, but they were having a hard fight,
too. One Union prisoner saw a mounted officer. He asked J.W. McCook of the 6th
Georgia, “Who is that man on the gray horse?” McCook replied “That is General
Alfred H. Colquitt, who commands this brigade. The prisoner then told him, “God
Almighty must be taking care of him, for I shot at him twelve or thirteen times
as he was riding up and down your lines when we were fighting in those woods
yonder, and I could not hit him.” Bullets had actually claimed two buttons from
Colquitt’s overcoat and wounded his horse in the neck.[49]
Colquitt’s
men were about out of ammunition. This was the only significant moment of
crisis for the Confederate ranks. The 27th Georgia and Bonaud’s
Battalion took up a skirmishing position (utilizing ammo from dead Federals) to
“hold the enemy in check” while ammunition was brought up and distributed.[50]
Colonel Harrison helped out. He dismounted his horse and gave it to a staff
officer, Lieutenant George M. Blount. He instructed him to ride back to the
train cars and personally grab as much ammunition as he could. Harrison soon
gave the same orders to all his staff officers and couriers, anybody who had a
horse. They did this under fire, with Blount being shot off his horse (but only
lightly wounded).[51]
The
1st Florida Battalion arrived and bolstered the 64th
Georgia. This was just in time, because this unit of Georgians had just run out
of ammunition. The 27th Georgia also arrived. As his brigade went
through this critical phase of the battle, Colquitt rode up and down the line
wielding a Confederate battle flag, right in full view of the Federals, and urged
his men to hold. The refusal of the Georgians to quit while low on ammunition
and reinforcements hid their vulnerable moment to the enemy, a moment which
they could have capitalized on to turn the tide of battle.[52]
The
New Yorkers finally attempted a charge. The Georgians were about to attempt a
counter-charge with their bayonets “when to our joy, new supplies of cartridges
came to us, we grabbed them more eagerly than hungry men ever grabbed loaves of
bread.” Their ammunition refreshed, they unleashed a heavy fire and drove the
Federals back.[53] Guerard’s
Battery from the Chatham Artillery moved over to the north of another battery,
These guns, also from the Chatham Artillery, were almost out of ammunition. All
they had left was canister, which did not work as well in the pine trees (the
trunks would absorb most of the fragments). Guerard allowed them to take from
his ammunition chests.[54]
Now
it was the 115th New York that was running out of ammunition. They
refused to run and fixed bayonets. General Seymour saw the blue-coated line
standing firm and asked an officer, “What stone wall is that standing there?”
Ultimately they were ordered to fall back “with face to the enemy.” Colonel
Simeon Sammon encouraged them, staying on his horse despite two wounds. Barton
grew concerned when he saw the slow pace of their withdrawal. He sent three
messengers before Sammon erupted, Give my compliments to General Barton and
tell him to go to Hell. I will fall back with my Regiment when I am ready to do
so!”[55]
The
47th New York faced three of Colquitt’s regiments. The 6th
Florida had also arrived on the field far to the left, and had turned so that
they could hit the New Yorkers with enfilade fire. Colonel Henry Moore was severely
wounded. The men themselves would suffer over 300 casualties, the worst in
Barton’s brigade. Like the rest of the brigade they were running very low on
ammunition, even after stripping the dead and wounded.[56]
By this point Seymour was aware that victory was impossible and that a defeat
could be a complete catastrophe. He was now fighting the battle to reach a
point where he could safely withdraw his men. His final reserves, Montgomery’s
two black regiments, were to stabilize the line until he thought a retreat
possible.[57]
Montgomery was almost there. Private Joseph Wilson of the 54th Massachusetts remembered, “The road was sandy and the men often found their feet beneath the sand, but with their wonted alacrity they sped on up the road, the 54th leading in almost a locked running step, followed closely by the 1st North Carolina. The men threw off their knapsacks and anything else that slowed them down.[58] They met a stream of wounded and straggling men. The defeated soldiers offered such statements as “We’re badly whipped!” and “You’ll all get killed!” The sight of hundreds of wounded men as well as a retreating, badly beat up artillery battery were not encouraging. Seymour rode up to Hallowell and told him, “The day is lost. You must go in and save the corps.”[59]
To
get to the battlefield, the 54th Massachusetts went through a swamp
and came out near Hamilton’s guns. Montgomery’s two regiments arrived at a
“critical juncture.” The Confederates were about to make an assault all along
the line and the Federals were almost out of ammunition.[60]
As the 54th Massachusetts came up, an artillery officer told Colonel
Hallowell, “Colonel, you will have to do your best to keep your men from
running to-day. Your men all ran to-day.” By “your men” he meant black troops.
This ignorant officer, basing his conclusions on the 8th USCT’s rout
(which was no worse than the 7th New Hampshire’s), was to be proven
wrong.[61]
Since
the New Yorkers were about out of ammunition, Montgomery moved his men into
their front, the 54th Massachusetts on the left and the 1st
North Carolina on the right. Though this covered Barton’s brigade, they did not
have enough men to face the entire Confederate battle line. The enemy line was
also two lines deep. If not for the two swamps on the flanks, they might have
completely enveloped Seymour’s force. In the first line were Bonaud’s
Battalion, the 1st Florida Battalion, and the 29th
Georgia. The second line had the 6th Florida, 19th
Georgia, 28th Georgia, 64th Georgia, and 23rd
Georgia. The 1st Georgia Regulars, and the 6th and 32nd
Georgia extended beyond Montgomery’s right flank.[62]
The
arrival of the 54th Massachusetts and 1st North Carolina
heartened the New Yorkers and saved the 47th New York from being
flanked. The 47th in particular cheered on the 1st North
Carolina. The 54th’s regimental band, determined to take part, stood
on the side of the road and blasted out patriotic tunes. The Union soldiers
could hear them above the intense fighting. When the “Star-Spangled Banner”
played, a group of retreating New Hampshireans stopped and turned back to
rejoin the fight. “It’s thrilling notes, soaring above the battle’s gales,
aroused to new life and renewed energy into the panting, routed troops.”[63]
 |
| This Kurz & Allison lithograph is the only widely known depiction of the battle. It inaccurately shows the Confederates fighting from their entrenchments |
Though
he had made several critical errors, none could deny Seymour’s bravery at this
point. He rode all about the battlefield, moving troops and giving orders.
Hawley pleaded with him not to endanger himself, but only got a “sharp reply.”
As the situation grew more desperate, Seymour had Captain Gustavus Dana, his
chief signal officer, grab any officers he found behind the trees and throw
them into the nearest units to fight with the enlisted men.[64]
Montgomery’s
regiments and the 115th New York, the latter out of ammunition,
charged forward “with a soul-stirring cheer” to stem the Rebel tide. Several
well-directed volleys from the 54th forced the Confederates back
about 200 yards. Since the 7th Connecticut’s fight at the start of
the battle, this was the only time that the Federals had seriously pushed back
their opponents.[65] The
54th Massachusetts settled on the left of the wagon road, the
strongest unit on the left flank. Colonel Hallowell took position on a tree
stump 50 feet behind the line. This enabled him to keep track of his various
companies.[66]
As
the sides settled into their new firing lines, the 54th
Massachusetts was wracked by accidental friendly and self-firing. Captain
Robert Newell “heard a musket go off behind me and a cry of pain…I found out
after the fight that this was one of our men, one of the worst in the company,
who had wounded himself & killed a man near him by the careless discharge
of his piece. One of our sergeants wounded himself in the same way, and has
since been reduced to the ranks in consequence.” This caused considerable
confusion. Some of the newer recruits had evidently not mastered firearms
discipline and many of the veterans were afraid to advance for fear they would
be shot in the back by one of their own.[67]
The
next crisis for the Federals came on their left. The 19th Georgia, 6th
Florida, and Bonaud’s Battalion were advancing from the railroad, right into
the left of the 54th Massachusetts. Montgomery, seeing the flanking
attempt, shouted at the 54th to “fire to the left! Fire to the
left!” The following hail of bullets stemmed the enemy tide.[68]
In the desperate fury of the fight, many of the men had fired off their ramrods
by accident. Somebody suggested the favored alternative form of getting their
ammunition down the barrels, which was to hit the butt of their rifles against
the ground.[69]
On
the right flank Lieutenant Homans, seeing the exposed position of the Chatham
Artillery, shouted, “Now is a good opportunity; we’ll try and take those guns!”
Colonel Hallowell saw what was happening and quickly stifled what would have
been a heroic, but suicidal undertaking. Hallowell also had to stop a portion
of the regiment following the lead of national flag-bearer Sergeant Wilkins.[70]
A few, frustrated at not being allowed to charge, rushed out ahead of the line,
using the cover of pine trees to operate as sharpshooters. One “little black
fellow…would run forward beyond the line in his excitement, discharging his
piece, fall back and load, and then rush out again…Shortly, this man I speak of
fell, shot through the head.”[71]
Over
in the 1st North Carolina, the situation was even deadlier. One
private wrote of his men’s casualties, “Men fell like snowflakes.” its
commander Lieutenant Colonel Reed (actually a part-black officer, the highest
ranked “colored” person in the army) urged a wounded officer, Adjutant William
Manning, to leave the field. As he embraced Manning, two bullets wounded both
him and the man he was trying to save. He and Manning lay together. Reed would
die days later, while Manning was instantly dead.[72]
Archibald
Bogle, second in command, was also wounded and lay on the ground. One of his
soldiers rushed forward to rescue him, only to be wounded in the shoulder.
Though hit, the soldier made it to Bogle and took him in his arms. His attempt
failed when a bullet slapped into his head. The brave soldier fell dead, his
body across Bogle’s. Bogle was presumed dead, with an obituary appearing in the
Boston press, but he in fact lived on as a prisoner, albeit one with a bullet
wound and broken leg, and survived the war.[73]
James
Clark of the 115th New York was among those who went to the field
hospital. This was near the end of the battle. Clark wrote that he had been
fighting for about three hours. “…When I saw my comrades shot down around me
and myself uninjured, I began to conclude that I was bullet proof.” Shortly
after having this thought, he felt a “stinging sensation” as a bullet pierced
his right side. He tried to keep fighting, “but beginning to grow faint I
informed my captain and started for the rear.” He found a surgeon amputating a
limb, with “about twenty wounded lying around him.” An enemy shell then “burst
in their midst, and sent the mangled remains of several of them flying in all
directions.” Turning “with horror,” Clark found another surgeon with
blood-soaked arms, taking bullets out of wounded men.[74]
It
was past 6 PM. Ammunition finally came up for the Federals. To the men’s anger
it turned out to be the wrong caliber. A Lieutenant-Colonel Henry Hooper
responded by stating, “Men, we are whipped!” The Confederates might have sensed
that their foes were at the final breaking point. The 27th Georgia
charged the 1st North Carolina. This signaled an advance all along
the Rebel line. The Federals had made a brave stand, but the inevitable was
occurring. Orders to retreat emerged from the throats of the colonels.[75]
Next: Seymour's army attempts to extricate itself and escape east. The battle passes into memory, with some controversy.
[1]
OR XXXV, part 1, 288, 352.
[2]
“Excerpt from the Reminiscences of William Frederick Penniman,” http://battleofolustee.org/letters/index.html.
[3]
Crowninshield, First Regiment of
Massachusetts Cavalry Volunteers, 262-263.
[4] OR XXXV, part 1, 288; Crowninshield, First Regiment of Massachusetts Cavalry
Volunteers, 263.
[5]
OR XXXV, part 1, 307.
[6]
OR XXXV, part 1, 332, 340.
[7]
OR XXXV, part 1, 307-308. 352-353.
[8]
OR XXXV, part 1, 343; Nulty, Confederate
Florida, 132.
[9] “Cpl. Henry Shackelford to Dear Mother,” February 20,
1864, http://battleofolustee.org/letters/index.html.
[10] OR XXXV, part 1, 308, 310; “Carroll E. Kingsley to Dear
Mother,” February 24, 1864, http://battleof-olustee.org/letters/index.html; Broadwater, Battle
of Olustee, 84.
[11]
Walkley, Seventh
Connecticut Volunteer Infantry, 123-124.
[12]
OR XXXV, part 1, 303-304, 308.
[13]
Broadwater, Battle of Olustee, 81.
[14]
OR XXXV, part 1, 288.
[15]
OR XXXV, part 1, 316.
[16]
OR XXXV, part 1, 316.
[17]
OR XXXV, part 1, 332, 343, 349.
[18]
Broadwater, Battle of Olustee, 104;
Nulty, Confederate Florida, 138.
[19]
OR XXXV, part 1, 344-346.
[20]
OR XXXV, part 1, 299; Broadwater, Battle
of Olustee, 81.
[21]
OR XXXV, part 1, 288-289.
[22]
Boston Journal, March 4, 1864, http://battleofolustee.org/letters/index.html;
Broadwater, Battle of Olustee, 88-90;
Little, Seventh Regiment New Hampshire,
216-218.
[23]
OR XXXV, part 1, 304, 311; Broadwater, Battle
of Olustee, 88; Little, Seventh
Regiment New Hampshire, 221-223.
[24]
OR XXXV, part 1, 304, 311.
[25]
Boston Journal, March 4, 1864, http://battleofolustee.org/letters/index.html.
[26]
OR XXXV, part 1, 312; “Lt. Oliver Norton to Dear Sister L, February 29, 1864, http://battleof-olustee.org/letters/index.html;
“Letter from Surgeon A.P. Heichold,” The
Christian Recorder, March 12, 1864, http://battleofolustee.org/letters/index.html;
Broadwater, Battle of Olustee, 90-92;
“History and Diary Extracts of Private William P. Woodlin,” http://battleofolustee.org/letters/index.html;
“Lt. Oliver Norton to Dear Father,” March 1, 1864, http://battleofolustee.org/letters/index.html.
[27]
OR XXXV, part 1, 289, 312; “Letter from Surgeon A.P. Heichold,” The Christian Recorder, March 12, 1864, http://battleofolustee.org/letters/index.html;
“Lt. Oliver Norton to Dear Sister L, February 29, 1864, http://battleofolustee.org/letters/index.html.
[28]
OR XXXV, part 1, 313-314.
[29]
OR XXXV, part 1, 312-314.
[30]
OR XXXV, part 1, 316-317.
[31]
Boston Herald, March 1, 1864, http://battleofolustee.org/letters/index.html.
[32] “Lt. Oliver Norton to Dear Sister L, February 29, 1864, http://battleofolustee.org/letters/index.html.
[33]
Clark, Iron-Hearted Regiment, 83.
[34]
Clark, Iron-Hearted Regiment, 83; The
115th New York among the regiments that surrendered to surrounding Confederates
at Harper’s Ferry during the Antietam Campaign. It was considered to be a humiliating
event and they continually sought to avenge it.
[35] “Letter from Lieutenant Nicholas De Graff, Company D,
115th New York Infantry,” http://battleof-olustee.org/letters/index.html.
[36]
Broadwater, Battle of Olustee, 106;
Nulty, Confederate Florida, 149.
[37]
Broadwater, Battle of Olustee, 117.
[38] OR XXXV, part 1, 304, 308; Walkley,
Seventh Connecticut Volunteer Infantry,
121.
[39]
Nulty, Confederate Florida, 149.
[40]
“H.W.B. to Mr. Editor,” February 25, 1864, http://battleofolustee.org/letters/index.html.
[41]
Broadwater, Battle of Olustee, 106;
“Letter from Surgeon A.P. Heichold,” The
Christian Recorder, March 12, 1864, http://battleofolustee.org/letters/index.html;
OR XXXV, part 1, 348; Wendell D. Croom, The
War-History of Company “C”, Sixth Georgia Regiment with a Graphic Account of
Each Member, (Fort Valley: “Advertiser” Office, 1879), 23.
[42]
Broadwater, Battle of Olustee,
113-114.
[43]
Crowninshield, First Regiment of
Massachusetts Cavalry Volunteers, 263-264.
[44] OR XXXV, part 1, 299.
[45] Broadwater, Battle
of Olustee, 107.
[46] Clark, Iron-Hearted
Regiment, 84.
[47]
Broadwater, Battle of Olustee, 107.
[48] OR XXXV, part 1, 349.
[49]
Broadwater, Battle of Olustee, 109.
[50]
OR XXXV, part 1, 340.
[51]
OR XXXV, part 1, 349-360; Broadwater, Battle
of Olustee, 109.
[52]
Broadwater, Battle of Olustee, 109-110.
[53]
Broadwater, Battle of Olustee, 110.
[54] Broadwater, Battle
of Olustee, 109; Nulty, Confederate
Florida, 156; OR XXXV, part 1, 351-352.
[55]
Clark, Iron-Hearted Regiment, 87;
Broadwater, Battle of Olustee, 111.
[56]
Broadwater, Battle of Olustee,
115-116.
[57]
Trudeau, Like Men of War, 145.
[58] Broadwater, Battle
of Olustee, 118.
[59]
Luis F. Emilio, A Brave Black Regiment:
History of the Fifty-Fourth Regiment of Massachusetts Volunteer Infantry,
1863-1865, (New York: Bantam Books, 1992), 169; Egerton, Thunder at the Gates, 221.
[60]
OR XXXV, part 1, 315; Stephens, A Voice
of Thunder, 296.
[61]
Stephens, A Voice of Thunder, 297.
[62]
Broadwater, Battle of Olustee,
116-117.
[63]
Broadwater, Battle of Olustee, 121;
Trudeau, Like Men of War, 149.
[64]
Broadwater, Battle of Olustee, 120-121.
[65]
Broadwater, Battle of Olustee, 122;
Clark, Iron-Hearted Regiment, 85; The Christian Recorder, April 2, 1864, http://battleof-olustee.org/letters/index.html.
[66]
Emilio, A Brave Black Regiment,
171-172; Egerton, Thunder at the Gates,
222.
[67]
“Brother Robert to Dear Will,” March 9, 1864, http://battleofolustee.org/letters/index.html.
[68]
Broadwater, Battle of Olustee, 124;
Conner, James Montgomery, 56-59.
[69]
Emilio, A Brave Black Regiment, 173.
[70]
Broadwater, Battle of Olustee,
124-125.
[71]
Emilio, A Brave Black Regiment, 173.
[72]
Broadwater, Battle of Olustee,
126-127; Conner, James Montgomery,
87.
[73]Broadwater,
Battle of Olustee, 126-128; Boston Journal, March 2, 1864, http://battleofolustee.org/let-ters/index.html;
Marvel, The Last Depot, 33.
[74]
Clark, Iron-Hearted Regiment, 88.
[75]
Broadwater, Battle of Olustee, 125,
128.
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