East African Campaign (1914-1918) Part IV: War Along the Railway

The Lesson of Jassini

Lettow-Vorbeck prepared for his offensive against Jassini. Early in January, Lettow-Vorbeck scouted ahead with one of his captains. He created as accurate sketch as possible of the terrain and enemy dispositions. The most notable feature of Jassini was its large coconut plantation. The fort at Jassini itself was only manned by a small advance force, with the bulk of the British force miles to the north (now under the command of General Richard Wapshare). In Jassini’s rear was a small river, the Sigi. The commander of Jassini’s garrison was an Indian Colonel, Raghbir Singh. Under him were Indians and elements of the KAR. If Lettow-Vorbeck hit it swiftly enough, he could overwhelm the small garrison and remove the northern threat to Tanga. He hastened back to his army and brought it up. He was careful and secretive in organizing his men, hoping for the element of surprise. Contingents went ahead, going north around the town to straddle the roads north. They hoped to block and delay any relief efforts for the garrison.

The battle began on January 18. The surprise attack was looking to be a success, but internal dissensions prevented it. Among the Askaris were Arabs, and they were very angry with their commander. Lettow-Vorbeck wanted few impediments to his force’s mobility, and had ordered the Arabs to leave their boys behind. These young males helped the Askaris carry their gear, and performed certain other services for the Arabs. Stripped of their youthful companions, the Arabs waited until they were close to enemy lines and then fired their guns into the air, alerting Singh’s Indians. They ran to the rear, satisfied that they had gained their revenge. However, the African Askaris were furious and turned their guns on the Arabs, mowing them down. Having dealt with this treachery, the Schutztruppe now found itself embroiled in a furious battle.

East African Campaign (1914-918) Part II: War Comes to East Africa

Neutral Hopes

War among the whites was not supposed to happen in Sub-Saharan Africa. The Scramble for Africa and other colonial ventures had been morally justified on the idea of transmitting European civilization to the unenlightened (“White Man’s Burden”). The whites had to set an example by showing they had moved beyond fighting each other. There were another dimension to this ideological reasoning. One was that Europe itself was hoping never to repeat the widespread conflagration of earlier coalition wars, the Napoleonic Wars serving as the most recent example. Europeans had managed to avoid any such conflicts for about a century. What wars there were between the nations included ones that were quick (Franco-Prussian War) or limited in its scope (Crimean War). Thus Europe hoped to prevent any escalation of competing imperial interests into a repeat of earlier disasters.

By not allowing blacks to see white kill white, the Europeans in the colonies were primarily serving their own self-interests. After all, they were perfectly willing to send blacks to kill other blacks. What they realized was that if the supposedly superior whites began to kill each other, it would undermine the image they had cultivated for themselves. Even worse, such a war in the colonies might require the use of black troops against whites, further undermining the hierarchy of race. Thus far the only inter-white conflicts in Africa had occurred between the British Empire and the Boers in Southern Africa, and these were not between the imperial powers, but between just one of them and a defiant group of colonists. It was furthermore restricted to only one part of Africa. World War I would be the true violation of colonial neutrality.