East African Campaign (1914-1918) Part IV: War Along the Railway

The Lesson of Jassini

Lettow-Vorbeck prepared for his offensive against Jassini. Early in January, Lettow-Vorbeck scouted ahead with one of his captains. He created as accurate sketch as possible of the terrain and enemy dispositions. The most notable feature of Jassini was its large coconut plantation. The fort at Jassini itself was only manned by a small advance force, with the bulk of the British force miles to the north (now under the command of General Richard Wapshare). In Jassini’s rear was a small river, the Sigi. The commander of Jassini’s garrison was an Indian Colonel, Raghbir Singh. Under him were Indians and elements of the KAR. If Lettow-Vorbeck hit it swiftly enough, he could overwhelm the small garrison and remove the northern threat to Tanga. He hastened back to his army and brought it up. He was careful and secretive in organizing his men, hoping for the element of surprise. Contingents went ahead, going north around the town to straddle the roads north. They hoped to block and delay any relief efforts for the garrison.

The battle began on January 18. The surprise attack was looking to be a success, but internal dissensions prevented it. Among the Askaris were Arabs, and they were very angry with their commander. Lettow-Vorbeck wanted few impediments to his force’s mobility, and had ordered the Arabs to leave their boys behind. These young males helped the Askaris carry their gear, and performed certain other services for the Arabs. Stripped of their youthful companions, the Arabs waited until they were close to enemy lines and then fired their guns into the air, alerting Singh’s Indians. They ran to the rear, satisfied that they had gained their revenge. However, the African Askaris were furious and turned their guns on the Arabs, mowing them down. Having dealt with this treachery, the Schutztruppe now found itself embroiled in a furious battle.

East African Campaign (1914-1918) Part III: The Sting of Defeat

The Invasion Force

As the first skirmishes broke out on land and at sea, the British Empire prepared a death blow to German East Africa. Given the rapid successes mounting against Germany’s other colonies, it expected much to be accomplished with one hastily assembled force. This force was Indian Expeditionary Force B. Assembled in India, it soon was stripped of many of its best men and top-notch gear. These resources were diverted to deal with the oncoming entrance of the Ottoman Empire on Germany’s side. Indian Expeditionary Force B was led by General Arthur Edward Aitken of the Indian Army. He had not done much of note in his career, but had good familial and political connections. This gave him a command position, albeit one in a sideshow. Originally IEF B was built around Aitken’s own 16^th Poona Brigade, and his mission was to seize Dar-es-Salaam and its radio station. However, the 16^th Poona Brigade was taken away, while his superiors gave him a far more ambitious plan. He was to land his force at the port town of Tanga. After seizing it, he was to move north towards Stewart’s IEF C, which was currently squaring off against Lettow-Vorbeck, and secure the colonial border. After this he was to conquer all of German East Africa. Like many of the famed British military disasters of history, the upcoming campaign was to be undone by an incredible stream of horrible decisions and terrible luck.

Replacing the Poona Brigade was the 27^th Bangalore Brigade under General Richard Wapshare (but sans its cavalry, artillery, and pioneers which were redirected elsewhere). This was the only brigade in the force to hold an all-British battalion, the Loyal North Lancashires. One Regular Army brigade was added, with the 63^rd Palamcottah Light Infantry and the 98^th Infantry. The infantry was further filled out with Imperial Service troopers. These were not part of the British army, but soldiers assigned to various Indian princes. They had practically been private security forces and inexperienced in true warfare. Those that were borrowed were placed in a brigade under Brigadier General Tighe. The Indian Service units had originally been equipped with outdated Lee-Enfield long rifles and had barely any time to adjust to the newer shorter models handed out before the East Africa invasion. They did not have machine guns at all. A few finally got the weapons, but at the last minute and with no time to properly train. Finally Aitken was given the 61^st King George’s Own Pioneers, the 28^th Indian Mountain Battery, and various small detachments of support personnel such as railway specialists and signalmen. All of these units would not consolidate until they arrived at Tanga, making it impossible for Aitken to study his force as whole and reorganize it accordingly.

East African Campaign (1914-918) Part II: War Comes to East Africa

Neutral Hopes

War among the whites was not supposed to happen in Sub-Saharan Africa. The Scramble for Africa and other colonial ventures had been morally justified on the idea of transmitting European civilization to the unenlightened (“White Man’s Burden”). The whites had to set an example by showing they had moved beyond fighting each other. There were another dimension to this ideological reasoning. One was that Europe itself was hoping never to repeat the widespread conflagration of earlier coalition wars, the Napoleonic Wars serving as the most recent example. Europeans had managed to avoid any such conflicts for about a century. What wars there were between the nations included ones that were quick (Franco-Prussian War) or limited in its scope (Crimean War). Thus Europe hoped to prevent any escalation of competing imperial interests into a repeat of earlier disasters.

By not allowing blacks to see white kill white, the Europeans in the colonies were primarily serving their own self-interests. After all, they were perfectly willing to send blacks to kill other blacks. What they realized was that if the supposedly superior whites began to kill each other, it would undermine the image they had cultivated for themselves. Even worse, such a war in the colonies might require the use of black troops against whites, further undermining the hierarchy of race. Thus far the only inter-white conflicts in Africa had occurred between the British Empire and the Boers in Southern Africa, and these were not between the imperial powers, but between just one of them and a defiant group of colonists. It was furthermore restricted to only one part of Africa. World War I would be the true violation of colonial neutrality.