Longstreet's Great Failure: The East Tennessee Campaign of 1863 (part 2 of 2)

 The Fortified City

The Federals reached the lines in and around Knoxville on the 17^th, but they could not be considered safe yet. The Confederates approached on the 18^th. Captain Orlando Poe, the engineer in charge of the defenses, had already set to work building upon the unfinished Rebel entrenchments. The exhausted soldiers found themselves having to hurriedly work on their own entrenchments before the Confederates arrived and hit them. Poe believed that he needed only a few hours before the army could have effective defenses. He and Burnside decided that General William Sanders and his cavalry would have to hold off the Confederates for the duration of that time. It was a large thing to ask of Sanders and his men. Dismounted cavalry could buy time for the infantry to come up, as General John Buford did at Gettysburg, but did not fare as well when expected to play defense on their own. Sanders took up the challenge with determination.

General William Sanders, the
martyr of the Knoxville Campaign

McLaws’ division was the first to reach Sanders’ line. Sanders’ men used piles of rails, intended for an unfinished railroad, as their breastworks. For hours they managed to hold off the Confederates. Poe wrote years later that their stand “excited the wonder of the rest of our army.” Whenever the line began to falter, “Sanders would walk up to the rail piles and stand there erect, with fully half his height exposed to a terrific fire at short range, until every retreating man, as if ashamed of himself, would return to his proper place.” Sanders also worked with the artillery. He directed its fire to a house full of sharpshooters, and Federal shells struck the building and drove them out. Sanders’ bravery cost him. One bullet found him and mortally wounded him. However, he had bought the necessary time for the rest of Burnside’s army. The grateful commanding general sat by his bedside as he passed away. In honor of the cavalry general Fort Loudon, one of the most prominent fortifications at Knoxville, was renamed Fort Sanders.[1] The armies now settled into a siege.

Longstreet's Great Failure: The East Tennessee Campaign of 1863 (part 1 of 2)

General James Longstreet is popularly portrayed as a voice of modern warfare in the Civil War. He has also become the voice of reason at the Battle of Gettysburg. If his superior General Robert E. Lee had listened to him and avoided frontal assaults than the Confederacy would have had a much better summer of 1863. One would think that, given independent command, Longstreet would excel. He did in fact have a good shot at independent command at the end of 1863. But rather than excelling, he performed poorly. Casual and even some avid Civil War buffs might be surprised to learn that he was defeated by Union General Ambrose Burnside, a man often regarded as just another incompetent general to lose to Lee in Virginia. So why did one of the most highly regarded Confederate generals do so poorly and to what extent should credit be given to Burnside? Here is a short look at the Knoxville Campaign, which was waged in November and December of 1863.

Longstreet Goes West

Georgia-born James Longstreet was working as an army paymaster in New Mexico Territory when the war broke out. Resigning from the army, he soon led a brigade at the First Battle of Bull Run. In 1862 he rose to become one of the South’s greatest generals and Lee’s most reliable subordinate. Commanding the First Corps, he did exemplary service up to the Battle of Gettysburg. While his criticisms of Lee’s risky offensive tactics were valid, his execution of these tactics were themselves mishandled. After the disaster at Gettysburg he looked west for both practical and personal reasons.

Ten Battles from the Second Sino-Japanese War (1937-1945)

 

The Second Sino-Japanese War was one of the largest yet overlooked fronts of World War II. In this theatre of war Chiang Kai-Shek’s Nationalist government forces and Mao Tse-Tung’s Communists forged an uneasy alliance to stave off Japanese conquest. After victory was achieved, they quickly turned on each other. Though it was the first theatre of war to open up, predating Nazi Germany’s attack on Poland by two years, little has been written about it beyond the opening phases. Many sources and documents were destroyed by the upheaval of the continuing Chinese Civil War and then Mao’s Cultural Revolution. Information from Chinese or Taiwanese scholars are often heavily slanted in favor of the Communist or Nationalist causes or simply difficult to translate, while Japan’s presentation of its role in World War II is often purposefully hazy. Here are ten battles from an often ignored front of World War II, a couple fairly well-known and the others not so much.

 

#1: Shanghai (August 13 – November 26, 1937)

 

Shanghai was a major world economic center with thousands of foreign residents. It was therefore a natural target for Japanese military planners, who hoped to end the war with one swift blow. Chiang Kai-Shek also hoped to end the war soon. Thus both sides continuously funneled reinforcements into a desperate bid for quick victory. The battle itself largely took place within the city itself, resulting in furious and confusing building-to-building fighting. Ironically many Chinese units were led into battle by their German advisers (Germany was already under Nazi control and was turning towards an alliance with Japan).[1] The battle was a grueling stalemate, the Chinese using their numerical advantage to counter Japan’s advantage in aircraft and tanks. This changed in mid-November when the Japanese 10^th Army arrived and made a major breakthrough with an amphibious operation.[2] The Chinese army was sent retreating towards Nanking. China had lost much of its industrial base as well as many of its best units. However, it displayed a newfound determination to resist decades of Japanese aggression. The Chinese lost over 250,000 out of 750,000 men while the Japanese lost about 40-60,000 out of 300,000.[3] The latter army would soon seize Nanking and commit one of the greatest atrocities of the 20^th Century.

The Second Battle of Winchester: The Confederate Victory that Opened the Door to Gettysburg (book review)

Wittenberg, Eric J. and Scott L Mingus, Sr. The Second Battle of Winchester: The Confederate Victory that Opened the Door to Gettysburg. Savas Beatie, 2016.

Wittenberg and Mingus team up to reveal a battle that has been overlooked even by Civil War enthusiasts. The Second Battle of Winchester occurred on June 13-15, in Virginia’s bountiful Shenandoah Valley. In this event General Richard Ewell’s I Corps of the Confederate Army of Northern Virginia successfully entrapped over half of General Robert Milroy’s Union force at Winchester. The battle removed all potential opposition to General Robert E. Lee’s invasion route into the North. The battle has usually received scarce attention, a pit stop on the way to the much larger Battle of Gettysburg.

            Wittenberg and Mingus seek to argue that this battle had significant impact, though are careful not to over exaggerate. After his disastrous defeat, Milroy tried to clear his name by arguing that the battle delayed the Confederate forces and gave the Union Army of the Potomac time to concentrate and meet the enemy at Gettysburg. Citing a similar argument by a Confederate veteran who saw the battle as a serious delay, the authors agree that if not for the Battle of Winchester Gettysburg would very likely not have happened, at least as it did, but do not dare to say if the Confederates would have been the victors instead. The battle also raised alarm levels in the North and hopes in the South. People across American and even in Britain seriously viewed as the prelude to a successful Confederate invasion. The Union victory at Gettysburg soon washed away the hysteria and exultation respectively.

            Otherwise the book describes the background and details of the battle. For a small battle this is a lengthy book, which can be a good or bad thing depending on your personal preferences. The first chapter details the Union occupation of Winchester, which was rife with tensions between the occupiers and occupied. Milroy was involved in the theft of civilian property, making him particularly unpopular to residents of the Valley.  The authors further go into General Ewell, who headed the Confederate invasion. They restore some of his reputation, showing that he and his subordinates pulled off the battle spectacularly and any failed measure of success can be attributed to the unpredictability of war. Milroy, remembered as a bungler, also receives a (not full) revival of his reputation. While the authors agree that he could have conducted the battle better and likely should have just retreated before engaging, he was left to dry by his superiors, who failed to either send reinforcements or to firmly order a withdrawal.

          The battle itself is described in great detail, easier to do for a smaller engagement. The battle is described so vividly and through the eyes of so many men on the ground that it might be surprising to observe the light numbers of killed and wounded. I would recommend this book more to somebody already well versed in Civil War history, or perhaps to someone who wants to do a video or book project on the Gettysburg Campaign that pays more attention to the lead-up. One who is just getting into Civil War history might find it overwhelming to read such an in-depth work on a small battle which, despite the authors’ hard work, still has questionable impact on the overall war. Then again, small events often have great ramifications that are hard to see.

The book can be bought here.

Rating: Highly Recommend

Rating System

Must-Read: Definite read for history in general
Highly Recommend: Definite read within a certain subject
Recommend: Good for further information or into on a certain topic
Adequate: Useful if looking for further information certain topic
Pass: Awful, only useful for examining bad or ideologically-tainted history

East African Campaign (1914-1918) Part IV: War Along the Railway

The Lesson of Jassini

Lettow-Vorbeck prepared for his offensive against Jassini. Early in January, Lettow-Vorbeck scouted ahead with one of his captains. He created as accurate sketch as possible of the terrain and enemy dispositions. The most notable feature of Jassini was its large coconut plantation. The fort at Jassini itself was only manned by a small advance force, with the bulk of the British force miles to the north (now under the command of General Richard Wapshare). In Jassini’s rear was a small river, the Sigi. The commander of Jassini’s garrison was an Indian Colonel, Raghbir Singh. Under him were Indians and elements of the KAR. If Lettow-Vorbeck hit it swiftly enough, he could overwhelm the small garrison and remove the northern threat to Tanga. He hastened back to his army and brought it up. He was careful and secretive in organizing his men, hoping for the element of surprise. Contingents went ahead, going north around the town to straddle the roads north. They hoped to block and delay any relief efforts for the garrison.

The battle began on January 18. The surprise attack was looking to be a success, but internal dissensions prevented it. Among the Askaris were Arabs, and they were very angry with their commander. Lettow-Vorbeck wanted few impediments to his force’s mobility, and had ordered the Arabs to leave their boys behind. These young males helped the Askaris carry their gear, and performed certain other services for the Arabs. Stripped of their youthful companions, the Arabs waited until they were close to enemy lines and then fired their guns into the air, alerting Singh’s Indians. They ran to the rear, satisfied that they had gained their revenge. However, the African Askaris were furious and turned their guns on the Arabs, mowing them down. Having dealt with this treachery, the Schutztruppe now found itself embroiled in a furious battle.

George Fitzhugh: Confederate Socialist?

“All concur that free society is a failure. We slaveholders say you must recur to domestic slavery, the oldest, the best and most common form of Socialism.”- George Fitzhugh[1]

The likening of southern slaveholding ideology to socialism seems anathema to us today. The former is associated with conservatism and the latter with leftism. But it must be remembered that not all socialism is Marxism. Still, the states that would make up the Confederacy never thought to have the government control the economic means of production. Yet in the years leading up the Civil War, one Virginian intellectual insisted that there were commonalities between socialism and slaveholding ideology. This man was George Fitzhugh, a small slaveholder and lawyer in Port Royal, Virginia. He sought to prove the legitimacy of slavery and furthermore to show that it was a moral good for the betterment of the lower classes.

Southerners often defended slavery on the grounds that it was a benign institution, that it uplifted blacks towards white civilization. A common counter-argument of the abolitionists was that if slavery was so good, then why were impoverished whites not put into it? Unlike other pro-slavery advocates, Fitzhugh took their arguments to their logical conclusion, that there was nothing wrong with enslaving whites. This was a radical suggestion, though Fitzhugh did argue that the enslavement of whites would be much different than the enslavement of blacks. However, he considered slavery of any kind to be a better alternative to “free society” capitalism, especially in industrializing countries. It should also be noted that many of his arguments were not unheard of among Southerners in general. He merely took them a little further. Most of his ideas expressed here are taken from his two major works, Sociology for the South (1854) and Cannibals All (1857). Both attacked free capitalist society and both defended the Southern way of life as the most natural and benevolent.

East African Campaign (1914-1918) Part III: The Sting of Defeat

The Invasion Force

As the first skirmishes broke out on land and at sea, the British Empire prepared a death blow to German East Africa. Given the rapid successes mounting against Germany’s other colonies, it expected much to be accomplished with one hastily assembled force. This force was Indian Expeditionary Force B. Assembled in India, it soon was stripped of many of its best men and top-notch gear. These resources were diverted to deal with the oncoming entrance of the Ottoman Empire on Germany’s side. Indian Expeditionary Force B was led by General Arthur Edward Aitken of the Indian Army. He had not done much of note in his career, but had good familial and political connections. This gave him a command position, albeit one in a sideshow. Originally IEF B was built around Aitken’s own 16^th Poona Brigade, and his mission was to seize Dar-es-Salaam and its radio station. However, the 16^th Poona Brigade was taken away, while his superiors gave him a far more ambitious plan. He was to land his force at the port town of Tanga. After seizing it, he was to move north towards Stewart’s IEF C, which was currently squaring off against Lettow-Vorbeck, and secure the colonial border. After this he was to conquer all of German East Africa. Like many of the famed British military disasters of history, the upcoming campaign was to be undone by an incredible stream of horrible decisions and terrible luck.

Replacing the Poona Brigade was the 27^th Bangalore Brigade under General Richard Wapshare (but sans its cavalry, artillery, and pioneers which were redirected elsewhere). This was the only brigade in the force to hold an all-British battalion, the Loyal North Lancashires. One Regular Army brigade was added, with the 63^rd Palamcottah Light Infantry and the 98^th Infantry. The infantry was further filled out with Imperial Service troopers. These were not part of the British army, but soldiers assigned to various Indian princes. They had practically been private security forces and inexperienced in true warfare. Those that were borrowed were placed in a brigade under Brigadier General Tighe. The Indian Service units had originally been equipped with outdated Lee-Enfield long rifles and had barely any time to adjust to the newer shorter models handed out before the East Africa invasion. They did not have machine guns at all. A few finally got the weapons, but at the last minute and with no time to properly train. Finally Aitken was given the 61^st King George’s Own Pioneers, the 28^th Indian Mountain Battery, and various small detachments of support personnel such as railway specialists and signalmen. All of these units would not consolidate until they arrived at Tanga, making it impossible for Aitken to study his force as whole and reorganize it accordingly.