Hitler Strikes Poland: Blitzfrieg, Idelogy, and Atrocity (Alexander B. Rossino)

 

In Hitler Strikes Poland: Blitzkrieg, Ideology, and Atrocity, Alexander Rossino argues that the war in Poland was in fact the first shots in a war of ethnic annihilation that resumed against the Soviet Union once Adolf Hitler believed that the western powers were no longer a threat to his ultimate goals. In addition to describing the ethnic cleansing carried out by the SS death squads, the  Einsatzgruppen, he does a good job criticizing the myth that the regular Germany Army, the Wehrmacht, was generally opposed to the atrocities for humane reasons and that the soldiers refused to participate or flat-out resisted the killings. He furthermore argues that many of the soldiers committed them quite willingly, with no repercussions for dissent.

The officer class is often romanticized as reluctant victims of Hitler’s control. This was thanks to their post-war memoirs, where they distanced themselves from the Nazis. They also portrayed themselves as competent victims of the Fuhrer’s regime, forced to do Hitler’s bidding. These men do not escape Rossino’s critical eye. When German and generals lower-ranking officers protested the looting and killings carried out by SS men, they were not shocked by the ideological atrocity, but the manner in which it was carried out. They believed that such actions undermined discipline and distracted the troops from their more purely military goals. Many generals did not appreciate Poles and Jews being killed without their authority and without “the court-martial process and other formal procedures”. In other cases, officers in the Wehrmacht collaborated with the Einsatzgruppen in weeding out and disposing of undesirables and had no qualms doing so.

Battle of Belmont (November 7, 1861) Part III: Grant on the Run

 

Grant had finally given his men a battle. They had for the most part acquitted themselves well, though discipline broke down once they reached Camp Johnston. They had tasted victory. Now they would taste defeat and its consequences.

 

Comic strip I found (https://emergingcivilwar.com/2021/08/05/the-battle-of-belmont-as-told-in-a-comic-strip/)

From Advance to Withdrawal

One consequence of the Federals’ premature celebration in Camp Johnston was that the Confederates, lying along the riverbank to the northeast, had time to collect and rally themselves.[1] Though he groused about it in his memoirs, Grant did not mention his force’s breakdown in discipline in report. He instead claimed that Belmont was on low ground and would be battered by enemy cannon fire. With no wagons to carry all the captured goods, he ordered the camp set on fire. The Federals carried with them captured horses and dragged off three artillery pieces. Just after the flame started the Confederates opened fire from across the river. They reasoned that since the camp was coming on fire there was no Confederates there. One shell from the Lady Polk, one of the larger pieces, struck the ground and caused Grant’s horse to whinny and rear up.[2]

When the Confederates later returned they found burned bodies of wounded men left behind in the tents. They believed the Federals had murdered them upon discovery and then left their corpses to burn alongside their dwellings. More likely the Federals failed to notice them or forgot them, so that they were burned alive. In addition to the rumors that they had bayoneted many of the wounded, this incensed and drove the Confederates. [3]

Emancipation, the Union Army, and the Reelection of Abraham Lincoln (Jonathan W. White)

 

In Emancipation, the Union Army, and the Reelection of Abraham Lincoln, Jonathan White presents a more cynical but probably more realistic take on the Union Army in regards to the motivations of its soldiers. He challenges the popular historical consensus that the overwhelming army vote for Lincoln in the 1864 election reflected solidarity with Republican war aims of emancipation. While he directly addresses James McPherson’s works, which trumpeted the army as a force of emancipation, he also criticizes Chandra Manning’s What This Cruel War Was Over, and in doing so challenges her thesis as well. In her book Manning claimed that by looking at hundreds of Union and Confederate letters, the soldiers obviously fought for the issue of slavery. As regards the Federals, she believes they for the most part put Unionism I the background in favor of destroying slavery. White believes that she and other historians inferred too much from a considerable, yet still fractionally small pool of letters and diaries. I add that they also failed to take differing ethnic and regional backgrounds to account (for example, a soldier from southern Illinois would not be as inclined towards abolitionism as a Massachusetts man or radical German immigrant). Furthermore, he believes that soldiers’ views change back and forth in response to events. Historians can fall into the trap of taking a few diaries and letters and making them representative of the whole army. He avoids being representative himself, stating that he only wishes to flesh out those who did not vote against Lincoln and not make any monolithic claims.

He argues several general facts that challenge the popular narrative. Using voting statistics, he shows that 20% of soldiers eligible to vote chose not to do so, showing either disinterest or disgust with both parties. Many who voted for Lincoln did so because they did not approve of the Democrats’ anti-war platform and just wanted to win the war. Finally, in the age of public ballots, there was an atmosphere of intimidation that dissuaded Democrat votes. Some Republican officers rigged pro-emancipation regimental resolutions to appear unanimously in favor. Soldiers who wanted to vote for McClellan could be stopped out of fear of riling up their comrades and being accused of disloyalty. Officers could have their careers stalled or destroyed if they expressed too much criticism of abolitionism.

Through his work White concludes a common historiographical trend. Often there is a prevailing view of a historical event that stays entrenched for decades. Then a revisionist makes a stark counter-argument that becomes the predominant view, only later on for a third “neo-revisionist” work to argue a middle ground. For a long time the Union soldier was presented for fighting primarily for preservation of his republic. Then it became emancipation. White shows that “for many northern soldiers, restoring the Union was the only true goal of the war from beginning to end.” Though his lack of time on it may not reveal it, he argues that many soldiers indeed came to see emancipation as the higher cause, but perhaps just as many prioritized preserving the Union without any concern for blacks. He argues that the Union Army was an army of emancipation not from some popular “bottom-up” movement by the soldiers, but from a top-down implementation of policies by Lincoln, the War Department, and then the generals and other officers.

White’s book does a good job of providing a more nuanced view of the Union army and showing that there was not a strong pro-emancipation majority, but there are a couple flaws. White makes the same mistake as Manning in not differentiating the different types of ethnicities and regions making up the armies. In reading this book I noticed that the soldiers with the strongest anti-emancipation views came from such states as Illinois and Ohio. General Sherman’s 1864 army, which was made up of westerners, refused to accept any black soldiers. Westerners had stronger economic ties with the South, and may have shared more of their racial views as a result. My second issue is that some of the officers and soldiers that were dismissed for disloyalty were directing some very bold criticisms and insults towards Lincoln and abolition. White never suggests that they might have twisted the stories behind their comments when presenting them in court. A pillar of the United States is free speech but one wonders if such blatant attacks on war aims and the commander-in-chief would have been accepted or still are.

Regardless this is a great book from the recent Dark Turn in Civil War historiography. While not pleasant, it is essential for White and others to challenge some of the comforting narratives. White also better accounts for the fact that history is made up of individuals, not collectives. While group pressure can shape an individual, he, especially an American one, is likely to have some degree of difference in views. Federals soldiers’ views on emancipation varied widely from outright abolitionism to pragmatic emancipation to complete disinterest to even anti-emancipation.

The book can be bought here. It's price has gone down significantly since I had to get it for my Master's course.

Rating: Highly Recommend

Rating System

Must-Read: Definite read for history in general

Highly Recommend: Definite read within a certain subject

Recommend: Good for further information or info on a certain topic

Adequate: Useful if looking for further information certain topic

Pass: Awful, only useful for examining bad or ideologically-tainted history

Battle of Belmont (November 7, 1861) Part II: Grant on the Attack

 

The Battle of Belmont can be divided into two phases: The Federals on the attack and the Federals on the retreat. This section covers the former. It was Grant’s first significant battle and the only one where he would be around the front line. Despite this, he is fairly absent from the drive on Belmont. Even in Nathaniel C. Hughes’ comprehensive study of the battle it is usually McClernand or Dougherty who make the wider decisions. Grant appears to have been content to devise the general battle plan and then let his subordinates take initiative. Most accounts place him staying in close proximity to Dougherty, and he did come under fire many times, with one horse shot out from under him. Likely he gave general directions to his brigade commanders and approved their choices, which were sound up to the taking of Camp Johnston.

Battle of Belmont (November 7, 1861) Part I: The Set-Up

In late 1861 Grant sported a longer beard. This photo also shows him well-dressed. This is a stark difference from the more humbly-dressed and shorter-bearded soldier that most are familiar with.

In most of the years between his departure from the Army and his return in the Civil War, Ulysses S. Grant had become a sad, obscure figure. His attempts to forge a career consistently came to naught, and in 1861 he was working as a clerk at his father’s store. Thanks to his West Point background and Mexican War experience, he suddenly became valued when war erupted. Even then it took special help from Illinois Congressman Elihu Washburne to get him a commission as colonel.

Grant quickly settled back into the role as an army officer. He performed creditably in Missouri, whipping his regiment into shape, fostering good relations with the civilians of a divided state, and looking for scattered pro-Confederate militia to defeat or drive off. Though he had fought no considerable battle, he got a promotion to brigadier-general and command over the District of Southeast Missouri. Soon one of America’s most famous generals would have his first battle as commander.

 

Where Three States Meet

Grant’s jurisdiction was not just southeast Missouri, but the southern tip of Illinois and possibly the Kentucky shore on the Mississippi River.  At first it seemed that his main opponent was General M. Jeff Thompson. Thompson commanded a division of the Confederate-aligned Missouri State Guard. Instead of uniting with Price’s main army of militia, Thompson waged guerilla-style warfare in his part of Missouri. As for Kentucky, both sides of the Civil War wooed it, but the border slave state remained inflexibly neutral. Union and Confederate forces struggled to restrain their desires to plant troops in the state. Whoever violated Kentucky’s neutrality first could send it into the arms of the opposition (see my post on Mill Springs for more background on this situation). Fortunately for the Union, the Confederate commanders in western Tennessee were not the Southern Cause’s best.          

                                Gideon Pillow                                                             Leonidas Polk

One of them was General Gideon Pillow. Pillow was the only general which Grant openly despised in his recollections of the war. Pillow was of aggressive temperament and yearned for glory. In the summer of 1861 he planned to fortify Columbus, Kentucky. With its high banks, Columbus provided an ideal place to control traffic along the northern Mississippi. It was also close to Cairo, Illinois, which stood at the junction of the Mississippi and Ohio Rivers. North and south of Columbus stood 150 foot high bluffs. To the south were the Chalk Bluffs. To the north were ones with strains of iron. These were called the Iron Banks, and stood between Columbus and any Union thrust from Cairo.

The History Behind the Unique Units of Age of Empires II: Aztec Jaguar Warriors

 This is hopefully the first in a series in which I take a historical look at the unique units in the real-time strategy game Age of Empires II. In this game the different civilizations share mostly the same units, with different civilization bonuses and varied accessibility to certain techs and upgrades making them unique. Each civilization can build a castle, where it trains a unique unit (some get secondary unique units in other buildings). These units are a big part of what makes each playable civilization unique. I will attempt to go in alphabetical order of the civilizations included in the HD edition and explain the background of each unique unit. I will also include a comparison to the in-game and real-life units.

First up is the Aztecs. They get the Jaguar Warrior. It is an infantry unit with an attack bonus against other infantry. The Mesoamerican civilizations in Age of Empires II also get the Eagle Warrior, which was in reality another warrior class equal to the jaguar warriors. I will get back to the in-game unit once I’ve gone through their history.

The Jaguar Warriors were called Cuauhocelotl in the Nahuatl language. For easer typing I will simply call them jaguar warriors. The main primary source comes from a Spanish writer. Bernardino de Sahagun, a Franciscan friar, arrived in Mexico a few years after the fall of Tenochtitlan the Aztec capital, and the assumed extinction of the jaguar warriors. He took great interest in the natives’ culture and, using native sources and artists, wrote the Florentine Codex, a history and ethnography of the Aztecs in their own Nahuatl language. Along with the later Mendoza Codex, this source is referred to by all historians of the Aztecs. I have looked at several scholarly works on the Aztecs (as well as a couple heavily illustrated histories) and actually found some dispute over a couple widely accepted facts about the jaguar warriors and their wars.

Mini-Series Review: I, Claudius (1976)

 I, Claudius is an adaptation of Robert Graves' novel of the same name and its sequel Claudius the God. This twelve-part TV series follows the Julio-Claudian Dynasty of emperors, from the first emperor Augustus himself to the assumption of the throne by Nero. The story is primarily told from the point of view of Claudius (Derek Jacobi), who was the fourth emperor of Rome. Claudius is born with a twitch, lame leg, and terrible stutter. It is eventually revealed that he has actually acquired control over most of his issues and is quite the intelligent historian and observer. However, to survive the intrigue-filled, blood-soaked events engulfing the imperial family, he persists in playing the fool to avoid any fears that he might come for the throne himself. This keeps him alive until he shockingly becomes emperor.

It should be stated that Graves' novels and its adaptation are not meant to be straight historical presentations. The plot is that the aged Claudius is writing down the true history of the Julio-Claudian Dynasty and thus there are dark secrets that historians have failed to uncover. For example Livia (Sian Phillips), Augustus' wife, is a schemer who arranges the deaths of many characters in order to guide the empire to what she perceives is the best course. The historical Livia was a notably intelligent woman who Augustus usually consulted when making decisions, but there is no evidence that she was a masterful villainess. Graves also plays up the horrific stories about Tiberius (George Baker) and Caligula (John Hurt). Historians have questioned many of theses tales, such as Tiberius' transformation of the island of Capri into his personal and perverted pleasure garden (complete with young boys). Caligula in particular is shown to be a psycho from childhood while even historians who believe all the salacious stories about him credit his madness to a bout with a severe illness as well as outrage over the assassinations of much of his family (in this show he actually helps kill his father Germanicus). Despite these liberties, this is still a fascinating look at early Imperial politics and drama, as Graves kept his narrative possible within accepted history.

McClellan’s War: The Failure of Moderation in the Struggle for the Union (Ethan S. Rafuse)

McClellan's War is Ethan Rafuse's 2005 attempt to truly decipher what Union General George B. McClellan, the first commander of the Army of the Potomac, was doing in the early third of the Civil War. For most of Civil War historiography, McClellan has been blamed for the Union's lack of success in Virginia. He was too egotistical in dealing with the President and other political leaders. He was needlessly cautious, displaying a mental handicap that prevented him from dealing several critical blows against Lee's Confederate Army. It does not help that McClellan was often in opposition to the deified Abraham Lincoln, even to the point of running against him for president. Historians and documentarians thus have depicted him as something of an arch-nemesis. Rafuse is one of several historians that have found this view of McClellan to be flawed, perhaps even cartoonish. In his 400 page tome he focuses primarily on McClellan's political and strategic beliefs and how they influenced his conduct of the war from 1861-1862.

The first quarter of the book fleshes out McClellan's background. He grew up in a Whig family. Many within the Whig political party, such as Henry Clay, emphasized compromise and careful rational thinking to solve political problems. When the Whig Party met its demise, McClellan shifted his views over to the Douglas Democrats. Like the Whigs, Stephen Douglas of Illinois stressed compromise to smooth over partisan differences and oppose extremism. He viewed both Secessionists and Republicans, especially Radical Republicans, as extremely dangerous. Though he sided with the Union, he was deeply concerned by the growing influence of abolitionist politics on war policy. He believed that this would stiffen Confederate resistance because of fears of a race war.