Longstreet's Great Failure: The East Tennessee Campaign of 1863 (part 2 of 2)

 The Fortified City

The Federals reached the lines in and around Knoxville on the 17^th, but they could not be considered safe yet. The Confederates approached on the 18^th. Captain Orlando Poe, the engineer in charge of the defenses, had already set to work building upon the unfinished Rebel entrenchments. The exhausted soldiers found themselves having to hurriedly work on their own entrenchments before the Confederates arrived and hit them. Poe believed that he needed only a few hours before the army could have effective defenses. He and Burnside decided that General William Sanders and his cavalry would have to hold off the Confederates for the duration of that time. It was a large thing to ask of Sanders and his men. Dismounted cavalry could buy time for the infantry to come up, as General John Buford did at Gettysburg, but did not fare as well when expected to play defense on their own. Sanders took up the challenge with determination.

General William Sanders, the
martyr of the Knoxville Campaign

McLaws’ division was the first to reach Sanders’ line. Sanders’ men used piles of rails, intended for an unfinished railroad, as their breastworks. For hours they managed to hold off the Confederates. Poe wrote years later that their stand “excited the wonder of the rest of our army.” Whenever the line began to falter, “Sanders would walk up to the rail piles and stand there erect, with fully half his height exposed to a terrific fire at short range, until every retreating man, as if ashamed of himself, would return to his proper place.” Sanders also worked with the artillery. He directed its fire to a house full of sharpshooters, and Federal shells struck the building and drove them out. Sanders’ bravery cost him. One bullet found him and mortally wounded him. However, he had bought the necessary time for the rest of Burnside’s army. The grateful commanding general sat by his bedside as he passed away. In honor of the cavalry general Fort Loudon, one of the most prominent fortifications at Knoxville, was renamed Fort Sanders.[1] The armies now settled into a siege.

Longstreet's Great Failure: The East Tennessee Campaign of 1863 (part 1 of 2)

General James Longstreet is popularly portrayed as a voice of modern warfare in the Civil War. He has also become the voice of reason at the Battle of Gettysburg. If his superior General Robert E. Lee had listened to him and avoided frontal assaults than the Confederacy would have had a much better summer of 1863. One would think that, given independent command, Longstreet would excel. He did in fact have a good shot at independent command at the end of 1863. But rather than excelling, he performed poorly. Casual and even some avid Civil War buffs might be surprised to learn that he was defeated by Union General Ambrose Burnside, a man often regarded as just another incompetent general to lose to Lee in Virginia. So why did one of the most highly regarded Confederate generals do so poorly and to what extent should credit be given to Burnside? Here is a short look at the Knoxville Campaign, which was waged in November and December of 1863.

Longstreet Goes West

Georgia-born James Longstreet was working as an army paymaster in New Mexico Territory when the war broke out. Resigning from the army, he soon led a brigade at the First Battle of Bull Run. In 1862 he rose to become one of the South’s greatest generals and Lee’s most reliable subordinate. Commanding the First Corps, he did exemplary service up to the Battle of Gettysburg. While his criticisms of Lee’s risky offensive tactics were valid, his execution of these tactics were themselves mishandled. After the disaster at Gettysburg he looked west for both practical and personal reasons.

Ten Battles from the Second Sino-Japanese War (1937-1945)

 

The Second Sino-Japanese War was one of the largest yet overlooked fronts of World War II. In this theatre of war Chiang Kai-Shek’s Nationalist government forces and Mao Tse-Tung’s Communists forged an uneasy alliance to stave off Japanese conquest. After victory was achieved, they quickly turned on each other. Though it was the first theatre of war to open up, predating Nazi Germany’s attack on Poland by two years, little has been written about it beyond the opening phases. Many sources and documents were destroyed by the upheaval of the continuing Chinese Civil War and then Mao’s Cultural Revolution. Information from Chinese or Taiwanese scholars are often heavily slanted in favor of the Communist or Nationalist causes or simply difficult to translate, while Japan’s presentation of its role in World War II is often purposefully hazy. Here are ten battles from an often ignored front of World War II, a couple fairly well-known and the others not so much.

 

#1: Shanghai (August 13 – November 26, 1937)

 

Shanghai was a major world economic center with thousands of foreign residents. It was therefore a natural target for Japanese military planners, who hoped to end the war with one swift blow. Chiang Kai-Shek also hoped to end the war soon. Thus both sides continuously funneled reinforcements into a desperate bid for quick victory. The battle itself largely took place within the city itself, resulting in furious and confusing building-to-building fighting. Ironically many Chinese units were led into battle by their German advisers (Germany was already under Nazi control and was turning towards an alliance with Japan).[1] The battle was a grueling stalemate, the Chinese using their numerical advantage to counter Japan’s advantage in aircraft and tanks. This changed in mid-November when the Japanese 10^th Army arrived and made a major breakthrough with an amphibious operation.[2] The Chinese army was sent retreating towards Nanking. China had lost much of its industrial base as well as many of its best units. However, it displayed a newfound determination to resist decades of Japanese aggression. The Chinese lost over 250,000 out of 750,000 men while the Japanese lost about 40-60,000 out of 300,000.[3] The latter army would soon seize Nanking and commit one of the greatest atrocities of the 20^th Century.

The Second Battle of Winchester: The Confederate Victory that Opened the Door to Gettysburg (book review)

Wittenberg, Eric J. and Scott L Mingus, Sr. The Second Battle of Winchester: The Confederate Victory that Opened the Door to Gettysburg. Savas Beatie, 2016.

Wittenberg and Mingus team up to reveal a battle that has been overlooked even by Civil War enthusiasts. The Second Battle of Winchester occurred on June 13-15, in Virginia’s bountiful Shenandoah Valley. In this event General Richard Ewell’s I Corps of the Confederate Army of Northern Virginia successfully entrapped over half of General Robert Milroy’s Union force at Winchester. The battle removed all potential opposition to General Robert E. Lee’s invasion route into the North. The battle has usually received scarce attention, a pit stop on the way to the much larger Battle of Gettysburg.

            Wittenberg and Mingus seek to argue that this battle had significant impact, though are careful not to over exaggerate. After his disastrous defeat, Milroy tried to clear his name by arguing that the battle delayed the Confederate forces and gave the Union Army of the Potomac time to concentrate and meet the enemy at Gettysburg. Citing a similar argument by a Confederate veteran who saw the battle as a serious delay, the authors agree that if not for the Battle of Winchester Gettysburg would very likely not have happened, at least as it did, but do not dare to say if the Confederates would have been the victors instead. The battle also raised alarm levels in the North and hopes in the South. People across American and even in Britain seriously viewed as the prelude to a successful Confederate invasion. The Union victory at Gettysburg soon washed away the hysteria and exultation respectively.

            Otherwise the book describes the background and details of the battle. For a small battle this is a lengthy book, which can be a good or bad thing depending on your personal preferences. The first chapter details the Union occupation of Winchester, which was rife with tensions between the occupiers and occupied. Milroy was involved in the theft of civilian property, making him particularly unpopular to residents of the Valley.  The authors further go into General Ewell, who headed the Confederate invasion. They restore some of his reputation, showing that he and his subordinates pulled off the battle spectacularly and any failed measure of success can be attributed to the unpredictability of war. Milroy, remembered as a bungler, also receives a (not full) revival of his reputation. While the authors agree that he could have conducted the battle better and likely should have just retreated before engaging, he was left to dry by his superiors, who failed to either send reinforcements or to firmly order a withdrawal.

          The battle itself is described in great detail, easier to do for a smaller engagement. The battle is described so vividly and through the eyes of so many men on the ground that it might be surprising to observe the light numbers of killed and wounded. I would recommend this book more to somebody already well versed in Civil War history, or perhaps to someone who wants to do a video or book project on the Gettysburg Campaign that pays more attention to the lead-up. One who is just getting into Civil War history might find it overwhelming to read such an in-depth work on a small battle which, despite the authors’ hard work, still has questionable impact on the overall war. Then again, small events often have great ramifications that are hard to see.

The book can be bought here.

Rating: Highly Recommend

Rating System

Must-Read: Definite read for history in general
Highly Recommend: Definite read within a certain subject
Recommend: Good for further information or into on a certain topic
Adequate: Useful if looking for further information certain topic
Pass: Awful, only useful for examining bad or ideologically-tainted history

East African Campaign (1914-1918) Part IV: War Along the Railway

The Lesson of Jassini

Lettow-Vorbeck prepared for his offensive against Jassini. Early in January, Lettow-Vorbeck scouted ahead with one of his captains. He created as accurate sketch as possible of the terrain and enemy dispositions. The most notable feature of Jassini was its large coconut plantation. The fort at Jassini itself was only manned by a small advance force, with the bulk of the British force miles to the north (now under the command of General Richard Wapshare). In Jassini’s rear was a small river, the Sigi. The commander of Jassini’s garrison was an Indian Colonel, Raghbir Singh. Under him were Indians and elements of the KAR. If Lettow-Vorbeck hit it swiftly enough, he could overwhelm the small garrison and remove the northern threat to Tanga. He hastened back to his army and brought it up. He was careful and secretive in organizing his men, hoping for the element of surprise. Contingents went ahead, going north around the town to straddle the roads north. They hoped to block and delay any relief efforts for the garrison.

The battle began on January 18. The surprise attack was looking to be a success, but internal dissensions prevented it. Among the Askaris were Arabs, and they were very angry with their commander. Lettow-Vorbeck wanted few impediments to his force’s mobility, and had ordered the Arabs to leave their boys behind. These young males helped the Askaris carry their gear, and performed certain other services for the Arabs. Stripped of their youthful companions, the Arabs waited until they were close to enemy lines and then fired their guns into the air, alerting Singh’s Indians. They ran to the rear, satisfied that they had gained their revenge. However, the African Askaris were furious and turned their guns on the Arabs, mowing them down. Having dealt with this treachery, the Schutztruppe now found itself embroiled in a furious battle.

George Fitzhugh: Confederate Socialist?

“All concur that free society is a failure. We slaveholders say you must recur to domestic slavery, the oldest, the best and most common form of Socialism.”- George Fitzhugh[1]

The likening of southern slaveholding ideology to socialism seems anathema to us today. The former is associated with conservatism and the latter with leftism. But it must be remembered that not all socialism is Marxism. Still, the states that would make up the Confederacy never thought to have the government control the economic means of production. Yet in the years leading up the Civil War, one Virginian intellectual insisted that there were commonalities between socialism and slaveholding ideology. This man was George Fitzhugh, a small slaveholder and lawyer in Port Royal, Virginia. He sought to prove the legitimacy of slavery and furthermore to show that it was a moral good for the betterment of the lower classes.

Southerners often defended slavery on the grounds that it was a benign institution, that it uplifted blacks towards white civilization. A common counter-argument of the abolitionists was that if slavery was so good, then why were impoverished whites not put into it? Unlike other pro-slavery advocates, Fitzhugh took their arguments to their logical conclusion, that there was nothing wrong with enslaving whites. This was a radical suggestion, though Fitzhugh did argue that the enslavement of whites would be much different than the enslavement of blacks. However, he considered slavery of any kind to be a better alternative to “free society” capitalism, especially in industrializing countries. It should also be noted that many of his arguments were not unheard of among Southerners in general. He merely took them a little further. Most of his ideas expressed here are taken from his two major works, Sociology for the South (1854) and Cannibals All (1857). Both attacked free capitalist society and both defended the Southern way of life as the most natural and benevolent.

East African Campaign (1914-1918) Part III: The Sting of Defeat

The Invasion Force

As the first skirmishes broke out on land and at sea, the British Empire prepared a death blow to German East Africa. Given the rapid successes mounting against Germany’s other colonies, it expected much to be accomplished with one hastily assembled force. This force was Indian Expeditionary Force B. Assembled in India, it soon was stripped of many of its best men and top-notch gear. These resources were diverted to deal with the oncoming entrance of the Ottoman Empire on Germany’s side. Indian Expeditionary Force B was led by General Arthur Edward Aitken of the Indian Army. He had not done much of note in his career, but had good familial and political connections. This gave him a command position, albeit one in a sideshow. Originally IEF B was built around Aitken’s own 16^th Poona Brigade, and his mission was to seize Dar-es-Salaam and its radio station. However, the 16^th Poona Brigade was taken away, while his superiors gave him a far more ambitious plan. He was to land his force at the port town of Tanga. After seizing it, he was to move north towards Stewart’s IEF C, which was currently squaring off against Lettow-Vorbeck, and secure the colonial border. After this he was to conquer all of German East Africa. Like many of the famed British military disasters of history, the upcoming campaign was to be undone by an incredible stream of horrible decisions and terrible luck.

Replacing the Poona Brigade was the 27^th Bangalore Brigade under General Richard Wapshare (but sans its cavalry, artillery, and pioneers which were redirected elsewhere). This was the only brigade in the force to hold an all-British battalion, the Loyal North Lancashires. One Regular Army brigade was added, with the 63^rd Palamcottah Light Infantry and the 98^th Infantry. The infantry was further filled out with Imperial Service troopers. These were not part of the British army, but soldiers assigned to various Indian princes. They had practically been private security forces and inexperienced in true warfare. Those that were borrowed were placed in a brigade under Brigadier General Tighe. The Indian Service units had originally been equipped with outdated Lee-Enfield long rifles and had barely any time to adjust to the newer shorter models handed out before the East Africa invasion. They did not have machine guns at all. A few finally got the weapons, but at the last minute and with no time to properly train. Finally Aitken was given the 61^st King George’s Own Pioneers, the 28^th Indian Mountain Battery, and various small detachments of support personnel such as railway specialists and signalmen. All of these units would not consolidate until they arrived at Tanga, making it impossible for Aitken to study his force as whole and reorganize it accordingly.

East African Campaign (1914-918) Part II: War Comes to East Africa

Neutral Hopes

War among the whites was not supposed to happen in Sub-Saharan Africa. The Scramble for Africa and other colonial ventures had been morally justified on the idea of transmitting European civilization to the unenlightened (“White Man’s Burden”). The whites had to set an example by showing they had moved beyond fighting each other. There were another dimension to this ideological reasoning. One was that Europe itself was hoping never to repeat the widespread conflagration of earlier coalition wars, the Napoleonic Wars serving as the most recent example. Europeans had managed to avoid any such conflicts for about a century. What wars there were between the nations included ones that were quick (Franco-Prussian War) or limited in its scope (Crimean War). Thus Europe hoped to prevent any escalation of competing imperial interests into a repeat of earlier disasters.

By not allowing blacks to see white kill white, the Europeans in the colonies were primarily serving their own self-interests. After all, they were perfectly willing to send blacks to kill other blacks. What they realized was that if the supposedly superior whites began to kill each other, it would undermine the image they had cultivated for themselves. Even worse, such a war in the colonies might require the use of black troops against whites, further undermining the hierarchy of race. Thus far the only inter-white conflicts in Africa had occurred between the British Empire and the Boers in Southern Africa, and these were not between the imperial powers, but between just one of them and a defiant group of colonists. It was furthermore restricted to only one part of Africa. World War I would be the true violation of colonial neutrality.

Grover Cleveland: Most Underrated President?

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Joseph T. Glatthaar's The March to the Sea and Beyond: Sherman’s Troops in the Savannah and Carolinas Campaign

Glatthaar, Joseph T. The March to the Sea and Beyond: Sherman’s Troops in the Savannah and Carolinas Campaign. Los Angeles: New York: New York University Press, 1985.

Glatthaar is a Civil War historian who specializes at looking into the lives or the everyday rank-and-file, though he has done work on major generals. He’s a bit of a social historian with a military focus. He’s more well-known for Forged in Battle, which looked at the relationship between black Union soldiers and their white officers. Before that he wrote this overview of Sherman’s force after the fall of Atlanta and up to May 1865. He attempts to show the reader that the various Union armies were unique in their own way. Sherman’s army, which was actually a combination of the Army of Tennessee and the Army of Georgia (actually two corps of the Army of the Cumberland) was primarily made up of westerners who had a more egalitarian view of the army. While there was discipline, officers and men spoke more freely. Officers, up to generals, would sometimes pitch in manually when a wagon or artillery piece needed to be freed from mud or quickly placed. Compared to the Army of the Potomac, they had much less concern for proper drill and proper attire. Two corps from the Army of the Potomac in fact helped make up Sherman’s force and they had trouble adjusting to this new army, which “at first glance… looked more like a mob than an army. They were an unkempt, boisterous, seemingly unruly lot, in no way resembling the stereotypical professional army of the min-nineteenth century...”

East African Campaign (1914-918) Part I: The German Empire

Map of Colonized Africa right before the outbreak of WWI. Courtesy of davidjl123 / Somebody500 via wikimedia at https://brilliantmaps.com/africa-1914/

World War I, also known as the Great War, was labeled thus because it involved nearly every nation on the world in some capacity. Every great power was militarily involved. Despite its status as a “world war”, the bulk of the fighting took place in Europe and the Middle East. There were battles in far-flung theatres amongst the belligerents' colonies, but these were considered side-shows. These theatres also did not last long into the war. Against the Entente’s Britain, France, Belgium, Japan, and later Portugal, the only member of the Central Powers to have colonies was Germany. It could not hold on to is oversea possessions against the British Royal Navy and the overwhelming numerical superiority of the Entente’s colonial forces. It would need to win on the European continent and get some or all of its territory back in a post-war settlement. By the end of 1915 all of its colonies had been conquered. All save one.

German East Africa, the crown jewel of the young German Empire, would see fighting all the way past the armistice of November 11, 1918. Led by the determined General Paul von Lettow-Vorbeck, the Germans and their native African soldiers would at first repel Entente intrusions and then lead them on long chases. They would furthermore strike into enemy colonies. Though defeated, Lettow-Vorbeck and his men would gain universal admiration and a considerable body of literature within military history. Many writers have claimed that his efforts diverted valuable resources from Europe, thus helping out the overall war effort. This series will look at several questions. What was the true impact of the East African campaign on the war overall?  How did German East Africa hold on so long? How much was owed to German genius and how much to British mistakes? Were there other factors? And how did the Africans themselves perceive the conflict and how were they affected? Before diving into the war, it would be good to start with a brief history of German East Africa.

Imposing Wilderness and Imagining Serengeti (Dual Book Review)

                               

Neumann, Roderick. Imposing Wilderness: Struggles over Livelihood and Nature Preservation in Africa. Los Angeles: University of California Press, 2002.

Shetler, Jan. Imagining Serengeti: A History of Landscape and Memory in Tanzania from Earliest Time to the Present. Athens: Ohio University Press, 2007.

Here we will be looking at two books on similar subjects. Roderick P. Neumann’s Imposing Wilderness and Jan Shetler’s Imagining Serengeti both seek to unravel the true histories of the lands now under the jurisdiction of natural conservation parks in Tanzania, the former Arusha and latter Serengeti. They reveal that prior to colonization the landscapes were in fact shaped and used by the indigenous peoples. Though not building towns and cities in the vein of European cultures, they did consider the landscape their home and property. This changed in the 19^th Century. In Imagining Serengeti, the peoples of the Serengeti were temporarily displaced by a series of disasters in the mid 19^th century, among them Masai invasions and several droughts and famines. When the European colonizers arrived and saw no settlement on much of the land, they assumed that they were on a pristine land untouched by man’s intervention. They decided to keep it that way as a game preserve, setting the stage for the Serengeti National Park. Likewise, in Imposing Wilderness the colonizers believed that the wildlife and land needed to be preserved. In both cases indigenous peoples exercising their old land and hunting rights were mislabeled as villainous poachers. This mindset has continues today. Many within the Tanzanian government do not necessarily hold this viewpoint, but side with the exclusion of local peoples in order to acquire funding from international conservationist groups. Many who trespass or poach on the parks are merely trying to support themselves or see themselves as dispensing justice against park policies which cut off traditional resources. Overall, Neumann and Shetler want conservationists to understand that wildlife issues in Africa are not black-and-white, that the zealous fight to preserve wildlife is actually harming many indigenous peoples and trapping them in a cycle of poverty.

Neumann and Shetler’s books are eye-opening and appear to suggest that a moderate adjustment to national park policies is needed to address both Tanzanian and conservationist concerns. What this solution would look like is not given. So which book is better? Neumann spends less time on pre-colonial history. As a result he spends less time on oral history and more on examining the European, conservationist, and Tanzanian governmental viewpoints. One of the high points is his chapter on the psychology of Europeans towards nature, which Shetler does get into as well. The natural landscapes of 18^th-century European pastoralist paintings conjured up the images of true “nature”, usually absent of people, and influenced what colonizers thought landscapes should look like. Africans were often seen as part of the landscape, but only as a representation of European origins that instead of going on the path of civilization, remained in the “savage noble” state. The Meru who showed enterprise in clearing out vegetation for cultivation or finding ways to trap or ward off animals attacking their crops and livestock were seen as improper representations of the ideal native. To Europeans this divergence from the idealized African could not be allowed to taint the Mount Meru National Park. While not often sharing the early colonists’ racial views, conservationists have similarly stated that only people who are “harmonious” with nature can live on the park, and in their definition this does not include anybody who hunts or tears down plant life for cultivation or construction. This disqualifies almost all natives in the region from having access to the park.

Shetler’s book is much longer and involves much more oral research, digging deeper into Tanzanian peoples’ culture, religion, and pre-colonial history. A unique challenge for her is that Serengeti society had no clear hierarchy, thus there are no royal genealogies or royally approved tradition of the past within their oral tradition. She attempts to overcome this problem through what she calls spatial analysis, deducing the past by how the people in the oral traditions dealt with their geographic surroundings. She bolsters this with environmental and social history, as well as archaeology and what archival information she can find. Shetler’s book is longer and thus more chock-full of information and examples.

Imposing Wilderness is a better bet for a more casual reader, not merely because it’s shorter. Neumann’s text is clearer and easier to follow than Shetler’s, especially when it comes to explaining European views of nature and the reasons why African governments would feel pressured to dispossess some of their own people. Shetler’s book is more valuable for its methodological explanations, which she spends a good deal of time explaining in her introduction. A professional historian looking for ways to approach history obscured by illiteracy can appreciate and implement her use of spatial analysis.

Imposing Wilderness Rating: Highly Recommend

Imagining Serengeti Rating: Recommend

Neumann, Roderick. Imposing Wilderness: Struggles over Livelihood and Nature Preservation in Africa. Los Angeles: University of California Press, 2002. Buy the book here.

Shetler, Jan. Imagining Serengeti: A History of Landscape and Memory in Tanzania from Earliest Time to the Present. Athens: Ohio University Press, 2007. Buy the book here.

Rating System

Must-Read: Definite read for history in general

Highly Recommend: Definite read within a certain subject

Recommend: Good for further information or into on a certain topic

Adequate: Useful if looking for further information certain topic

Pass: Awful, only useful for examining bad or ideologically-tainted history

Ten World War II Films to Watch

No war has gotten more time on theater screens than World War II. With its all-encompassing nature, diverse cast of characters and battles, and for many relatively clearer tale of good against evil, it makes for a very attractive cinematic subject. Also, being so recent, there is still plenty of original gear to use from tanks to uniforms to guns. That certainly saves filmmakers the trouble of building replicas from scratch. With so many World War II films out there, I thought I’d make a list of ten great films. This is not a list of the top ten films, though I only chose ones I consider to be at the least very good. I have tried to make a list that covers various aspects from the Holocaust to partisan warfare to the Nazi hierarchy. If you want to learn some history through movies, than watch these ten.

Before starting the list I have to recommend HBO’s Band of Brothers and The Pacific. They’re mini-series, not movies, but they are must-see due to their accuracy. I should also note that I only include films based directly on real people or events, so no Saving Private Ryan or one of those special mission action films like Dirty Dozen.

#1: City of Life and Death (2009)

The Sino-Japanese War does not get much play in Western film. There are plenty of Chinese movies on the subject, but they're hard to track down or rife with propaganda. One sub-topic that has lent itself well to film is the Rape of Nanking. In late 1937 the Japanese captured the Chinese capital of Nanking and embarked on one of the greatest streaks of terror in human history. At least tens of thousands of Chinese civilians were slaughtered, often with torturous methods. Almost as many women, ranging from young girls to the elderly, were raped, and many of these victims were killed afterwards. It’s a war crime matching and usually exceeding any incident in Hitler’s war with Russia.

John Broich's Blood, Oil, and Axis (book review)

Broich, John. Blood, Oil, and the Axis: The Allied Resistance Against a Fascist State in Iraq and the Levant, 1941. Harry N. Abrams, 2019.

World War II was a massive war and many fronts and battles remain unknown by the general public. John Broich tells the story of a forgotten campaign in which British Commonwealth forces faced off against Vichy France and several indigenous foes in the Middle East. Broich believes that this was a campaign that, if had gone the other way, could have spelled doom for the British Empire.  If the Axis Powers had gained control of the region, it would have access to plenty of oil, as well as the means to transport it back to Europe via Syria. It would also be closer to taking the Suez Canal, thus hamstring British supply, and to India, which might feel inspired to rebel against Britain. Iraq at the time was nominally independent, but heavily controlled via British influence. Thus it was not a stretch for Iraqi or other Mid-Eastern groups, most notably the pro-Nazi Golden Square, to side with the Axis Powers out of nationalist aspirations. Bordering Iraq to the west was Syria. Its current ruler, Vichy France, was under immense pressure from Germany to supply aid if requested.

Broich’s work is more narrative than argumentative. He chooses a cast of characters to focus on, from Francophile American Jack Hasey to Palestinian interpreter code-named Reading to traveling writer Freya Stark to Nazi liaison in Vichy Syria Rudolf Rahn. Regardless of whether or not they were officially in the military or a member of the belligerent nations, they all felt a need to defy or assist the Axis. The book is thus full of personal stories to help connect with events of the ground. It also is infused with a great deal of tragedy. Perhaps one reason this front is often overlooked is the make-up of the two sides, which does not gel with the favored good vs. evil narrative. The Axis forces consisted of few Germans, mainly Luftwaffe planes coming in from Greece and the Mediterranean. Instead it was primarily made of Iraqis, French, and French colonial troops. Most tragic of all was that Free French with the British fought with Vichy French. Also, at the beginning of most chapters, Broich provides quotes related to America’s recent and ongoing war in Iraq. He seems to suggest a comparison, but aside from the geographic locations and western interventionism he doesn’t elaborate.

While Broich’s book reveals an oft-ignored aspect of World War II, it fails to be truly great thanks to a couple minor flaws. One is that Broich too broadly employs the “fascist” and “anti-fascist” label for characters and factions in the Middle East. Some were undoubtedly attracted to fascism and some were opposed to it. But Broich shows within his own text that most Arabs, Palestinians, Jews, and others were not primarily concerned with growing or fighting fascism, if at all, but with nationalist aspirations or personal honor (for example, many of the Indian troops volunteered to gain prestige in their village, not to battle fascism or serve the British Empire). A second nitpick is Broich’s failure to follow up on his argument, even within a narrative style. He argues that if Hitler had focused his energies on the Middle East rather than the Soviet Union, he could have knocked out Britain. It would have helped if he set some time aside to examine Hitler’s ideology and motivations in regard to coming after the Soviet Union in 1941, and why he possibly would not have considered prioritizing the Middle East.

Overall, Blood, Oil, and Axis is full of information and stories rarely told. Whoever wants to broaden his or her knowledge of World War II should give this a look. It also provides material for those who like to imagine alternate scenarios.

Rating: Highly Recommend

Broich, John. Blood, Oil, and the Axis: The Allied Resistance Against a Fascist State in Iraq and the Levant, 1941. Harry N. Abrams, 2019. Buy the book here.

Rating System

Must-Read: Definite read for history in general

Highly Recommend: Definite read within a certain subject

Recommend: Good for further information or into on a certain topic

Adequate: Useful if looking for further information certain topic

Pass: Awful, only useful for examining bad or ideologically-tainted history